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At the end of the Cold War two multiethnic socialist federations were dissolved: the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics1 and the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY).2 This period thus marked not only the end of the 
communist/socialist social, political and economic order but also the emergence of a 
number of new states.3 The entanglement of post*Cold War political developments 
and the emergence of new states led to ideas that democracy should be brought into 
international law in relation to both existing and emerging states. This was a time 
when it was discussed whether democracy would become a normative entitlement of 
all individuals4 and when some states explicitly expressed that they would 
(collectively) grant recognition only to those new states which had constituted 
themselves on a democratic basis.5  
The dissolutions of the Soviet Union and of the SFRY were followed by the 
dissolution of a third (then already formerly) socialist federation – Czechoslovakia.6 
Shortly afterwards, Eritrea successfully seceded from Ethiopia.7 Later East Timor8 
                                                 
1 Hereinafter: the Soviet Union.  
2 Legal analyses of the two dissolutions include the following works: Warbrick (1992), Pellet (1992), 
Türk (1992), Rich (1993), Trifunovska (1994), Craven (1995), Craven (1996), Bethlehem and Weller 
(1997), Grant (1999), Terrett (2000), Radan (2002), Ziemele (2005), Crawford (2006). 
3 New states emerging in the territory of the SFRY were: Bosnia*Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Macedonia and Slovenia. See infra ch. 4.3. The new states emerging 
in the territory of the Soviet Union were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania became independent states prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. See infra ch. 4.4.1. 
4 See especially Franck (1992), Franck (1994), Franck (2001), Teson (1992), Teson (1998), Slaughter 
(1995), Slaughter (1997).  
5 See the EC Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 
December 1991), para 3. 
6 See Stein (1997); Crawford (2006), p. 402. 
7 See Haile (1994); Crawford (2006), p. 402. 
8 See Martin (2001); Crawford (2006), p. 560–62; Wilde (2008), pp. 178–188. See also SC Res 1338 
(31 January 2001) & GA Res 57/3 (27 September 2002). 
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and, only months before the research for this thesis began, Montenegro9 also became 
independent states. When this thesis was underway Kosovo declared independence.10 
Kosovo has not been universally recognised but recognition was not collectively 
withheld.11 
 These developments point out that the study of creation and recognition of 
states and the exercise of the right of self*determination remain relevant and 
important even in the post*decolonisation period and after the dissolutions of the 
multiethnic socialist federations. Further, although it first seemed that democracy did 
not play an important role in the creation and recognition of states emerging in the 
territories of the former Soviet Union and of the SFRY,12 it may well be that 
democratic*considerations were the driving force behind international involvement in 
some subsequent state creations.    
This thesis is generally concerned with the role of democracy in the creation 
of states and in the exercise of the right of self*determination. Its central aim is not to 
examine whether international law allows for the creation of a non*democratic state. 
Rather, it considers whether some situations of post*1991 state creations reflected 
attempts to create democratic states and examines how such attempts were 
influenced by mode of state creation. 
The term ‘democracy’ not only refers to democracy as a political system but 
also to the principles of democratic decision*making.13 The thesis thus also seeks to 
                                                 
9 See GA Res 60/264 (28 June 2006). With this resolution Montenegro was admitted to the United 
Nations (UN). 
10 See Kosovo Declaration of Independence (2008).  
11 See Who Recognized Kosovo as an Independent State <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com>. 
12 See Grant (1999), p. 96, arguing that recognition was extended in due course, although democracy 
was not taking root in many of the newly*created states. Grant concludes that the EC Guidelines were 
a tool of geographical strategy rather than an instrument of international law.  
13 See infra ch. 2.2. 
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identify and analyse the operation of democratic principles in international law 
governing the creation of states and the exercise of the right of self*determination.14 
 The main focus is the post*1991 practice of state creations. However, for a 
thorough understanding of the relevance of type of government and domestic 
institutions for the law of statehood and the right of self*determination, pre*1991 
situations are outlined. The thesis generally focuses on situations which eventually 
led to new state creations, while unsuccessful secessionist attempts fall beyond its 
scope. A notable exception to this rule is the situation of Québec. Although it did not 
lead to a new state creation, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Québec case15 and the writings of prominent scholars16 on the matter clarify the 
position of international law in regard to new state creations and, more generally, in 
regard to the exercise of the right of self*determination.   
 


After the demise of the Soviet Union and the social, political and economic system it 
sponsored, Francis Fukuyama developed the thesis of the end of history, which 
proclaims liberal*democracy the only legitimate socio*political system.17 While non*
liberal*democratic societies still exist, they are, in Fukuyama’s view, “historical” and 
they would eventually need to adopt liberal*democratic practices and thus become 
“post*historical”.18 Fukuyama’s understanding of liberal*democracy is based on a 
selection of civil and political rights – mostly those relevant for the conducting of 
free and fair elections19 – and on a rejection of economic, social and cultural rights. 
                                                 
14 See especially infra ch. 5.4. and 6. 
15 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 (The Supreme Court of Canada) [hereinafter: 
the Québec case].  
16 See The Territorial Integrity of Quebec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty (Franck, 
Higgins, Pellet, Shaw, Tomuschat) (1992) [hereinafter: The Québec Report).  
17 Fukuyama (1992), especially pp. 276–77. 
18 Ibid., p. 277. 
19 Ibid., pp. 42–43. 
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Indeed, he proclaims the latter set of rights to be incompatible with the postulates of 
a free market economy.20 Fukuyama’s understanding of liberal*democracy is 
election*centric and closely associated with the existence of a capitalist economic 
system. 
 The post*Cold War absence of the Leninist concept of people’s democracy21 
and the proclamation of the victory of liberal*democracy as the only legitimate 
political system led some international legal scholars to make an argument in favour 
of a normative entitlement to democracy. In 1992, Thomas Franck authored “The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, an article which adopts the election*
centric definition of democracy and derives the new right from a selection of civil 
and political rights.22 A related idea stems from writings of Fernando Teson23 and 
Anne*Marie Slaughter,24 who suggest the re*conceptualisation of international law as 
law among liberal*democratic states.  
 The ideas of both normative democratic entitlement and international law as 
law among liberal*democratic states have attracted determined critique. Susan Marks 
argues that these endeavours are overtly ideological and points out the inadequacy of 
an election*centric definition of democracy.25 José Alvarez questions the idea of 
legal prescriptions being based on the election*centric liberal*democratic self*image 
of some states and argues that the liberal*democratic enterprise in international law 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 In the view of the Leninist concept of democracy, “[e]lections were not an occasion to call into 
question the hard*earned gains of popular struggle or to allow the enemies of popular power the 
opportunity to sow seeds of internal division. Rather, elections allowed the populace to appoint from 
within its midst the most dedicated and capable to carry forward the revolutionary project.” Roth 
(1999), pp. 327–28. In other words, the Leninist concept of people’s democracy did not exclude 
elections as such; it excluded elections in a multiparty setting.  
22 Franck (1992). See also Franck (1994), Franck (2001). 
23 Teson (1992), Teson (1998) 
24 Slaughter (1995), Slaughter (1997). 
25 Marks (2000). 
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proposes to disrupt the United Nations (UN) Charter system.26 Brad Roth points out 
that even from the perspective of the election*centric definition of democracy, a 
liberal*democratic bias in reading universal human rights standards cannot be 
assumed.27   
 However, these discussions on the idea that type of government would more 
prominently become a factor relevant for international law relate predominantly, if 
not exclusively, to the governments of existing states and deal with the origins of 
their legitimacy. In contrast, this thesis tries to explore how liberal*democratic 
procedures, institutions and even postulates of substantial democracy28 relate to new 
state creations.  
 Based on the practice of states and UN organs, arguments have been made 
that fulfilling statehood criteria will not necessarily be enough for a state creation. 
James Crawford argues that the traditional statehood criteria have been supplemented 
by additional ones and an entity which does not meet them is not a state.29 John 
Dugard bases his arguments in the general principle of law ex injuria jus non oritur 
and in the concept of jus cogens and argues that creation of an entity in breach of jus 
cogens is illegal and cannot produce legal rights to the wrongdoer, i.e. such an entity 
cannot become a state.30 However, at least prior to 1991, it was generally not 
maintained that judging type of government based on electoral practices could be 
determinative of a successful state creation.31 
 After the end of the Cold War, this perception changed to some degree. Part 
of the European Community’s (EC) response to the events in the territories of the 
                                                 
26 Alvarez (2001). 
27 Roth (1999), especially pp. 324–38. 
28 See infra ch. 2.2.2. 
29 Crawford (2006), pp. 96–173. 
30 Dugard (1987). 
31 See Fawcett (1965–1966), p. 112; Devine (1971), pp. 410–17 and Fawcett's response, ibid., p. 417. 
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SFRY and the Soviet Union was to issue a set of guidelines for recognition of new 
states emerging in these two territories.32 In the example of the SFRY, the EC also 
established a mechanism for recognition.33  
 The legal significance of international involvement – most notably of the EC 
– in the dissolution of the SFRY has been examined by writers in international law 
and international relations. Richard Caplan argues that although the EC termed its 
involvement as that of recognition of new states, it was rather collective state 
creations.34 The analyses of the dissolution of the SFRY, however, do not thoroughly 
deal with the substance of the EC’s requirement for new states to adhere to liberal*
democratic practices. Further, it has been insufficiently explored to what degree these 
requirements were implemented. Although it is acknowledged that international 
involvement was much more significant, i.e. had constitutive effects, for new state 
creations in the territory of the former SFRY than in the former Soviet Union,35 it 
remains insufficiently explored how the difference between consensual (Soviet 
Union) and non*consensual (SFRY) dissolution led to different degrees of 
international involvement and to attempts on different scales to impose certain 
democratic standards prior to recognition or, perhaps, in the process of state creation. 
 David Raič argues that the requirement for states to constitute themselves on 
a democratic basis, expressed in the EC Guidelines, should, as suggested by the title 
of this document, be regarded a recognition requirement and not a statehood 
criterion.36 Yet it remains somewhat unexplained to what degree some of the 
requirements expressed in the EC Guidelines were applied to subsequent state 
creations. This is especially relevant in situations where international involvement 
                                                 
32 See supra n. 5. 
33 See EC Declaration on Yugoslavia (16 December 1991).  
34 Caplan (2005). See also Terrett (2000), Grant (1999), especially p. 168. 
35 See infra ch. 4.3.7. 
36 Raič (2002), especially p. 436. 
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determined a new state creation, i.e. when international involvement was not limited 
to acknowledgement of the fact that a new state was in existence but rather produced 
such a fact.  
Democracy and democratic principles also enter the theory and practice of 
state creations through the right of self*determination. The principle of self*
determination and the democratic political theory have been expressly wedded in the 
ideas of the American and French revolutions and in writings and speeches of the 
United States (US) President Wilson.37 Yet self*determination also featured 
prominently in Lenin’s writings and thus in the socialist interpretation of law and 
society.38 It is thus questionable whether self*determination can be linked exclusively 
to democratic political theory.  
Robert McCorquodale argues that self*determination as a human right,39 like 
most rights, is not an absolute entitlement but is limited by other rights.40 The right of 
self*determination is also limited by and weighed against the principle of territorial 
integrity of states41 and would normally be consummated in its internal mode, i.e. its 
exercise will normally not result in a new state creation.42 However, the internal 
mode of self*determination gave rise to some speculation that this right has 
implications for democracy.43 Significantly, the right of self*determination is one of 
the cornerstones of Franck’s normative democratic entitlement thesis.44 
                                                 
37 See Wilson (1918); Baker and Dodd (1926). 
38 See Lenin (year of publication unknown).  
39 The right of self*determination is codified in the common Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966). 
40 McCorquodale (1994), pp. 875–76. 
41 See the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Cooperation and Friendly 
Relations among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [hereinafter: The 
Declaration on Principles of International Law], GA Res 2625 (24 October 1970), annex, principle 5, 
para 7. 
42 See the Québec case (1998), para 126. 
43 Thornberry (1993).  
44 See supra n. 22. 
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 The association of democracy as a political system with the right of self*
determination has been criticised by Antonio Cassese.45 However, what remains 
unexplored is how the requirement for a representative government for the purpose 
of the right of self*determination differs from the requirement for a representative 
government in democratic political theory. This issue not only needs to be considered 
in the context of the internal mode of the right of self*determination but also in the 
context of the so*called doctrine of remedial secession.46 
Authors discussing the link between democracy and the right of self*
determination have also insufficiently stressed the difference between democracy as 
a political system and the operation of democratic principles within the right of self*
determination. Jean Salmon points out that there are many governments in the world 
that do not adhere to liberal*democratic practices but are nevertheless representative 
of their peoples.47 Yet the General Assembly has clearly called for one*man*one*vote 
principles in the context of the exercise of the right of self*determination.48 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that, in principle, a popular consultation 
needs to be held before a change of the legal status of a territory can occur49 and the 
Badinter Commission reaffirmed this standard.50 These can be described as calls for 
the adoption of (some) democratic principles in the process of collective decision*
making for the purpose of the exercise of the right of self*determination. However, it 
remains to be clarified why such calls should not be interpreted too broadly to mean 
a requirement for democracy as a political system. 
                                                 
45 See generally Cassese (1995). 
46 See Crawford (2006), pp. 188–122; Tancredi (2006). 
47 Salmon (1993), p. 280. 
48 GA Res 2022 (5 November 1965), para 8 (on Southern Rhodesia).  
49 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, para 55. 
50 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 4 (11 January 1992), para 4.  
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 This thesis also explores how the will of the people in the context of the right 
of self*determination may be limited by the rules of international law. One source of 
such limitation is the principle of territorial integrity of states.51 Another, and 
arguably even more disputable, limitation on the will of the people may become 
evident once the claim to territorial integrity is removed, when new states are created 
and new international borders need to be confined. 
In the territory of the SFRY, the Badinter Commission applied the uti 
possidetis principle in order to confine the new international borders along 
previously existing internal boundaries.52 New minorities and numerically inferior 
peoples were thus created. This application of a colonial principle in a non*colonial 
situation remains criticised by several scholars, including Robert McCorquodale and 
Raul Pangalangan,53 Michla Pomerance,54 Peter Radan55 and Steven Ratner.56 On the 
other hand, Alain Pellet57 and Malcolm Shaw58 advocate the use of uti possidetis and 
argue that respect of the will of the people cannot justify a situation in which all 
border arrangements are in flux when new states are created. In their view this would 
be an invitation to territorial conquest. 
What remains insufficiently considered in the relevant literature are the 
common patterns of determination of new international borders in the territory of the 
former SFRY and the determination of new international borders in subsequent state 
creations. This thesis suggests that the historical origin of a border needs to be taken 
into account, although this does not necessarily mean that the uti possidetis principle 
is applicable outside of the process of decolonisation. 
                                                 
51 See supra n. 41. 
52 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 January 1992), especially para 2.  
53 McCorquodale and Pangalangan (2001), especially p. 875.  
54 Pomerance (1998–1999). 
55 Radan (2000). 
56 Ratner (1996). 
57 Pellet (1999). 
58 Shaw (1996), Shaw (1997).  
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The scope and context of this thesis require an interdisciplinary methodology, 
combining international law and democratic political theory. However, in some 
chapters methods will more closely fall within that of doctrinal law. 
Interdisciplinarity is most prominent in 
 ", where the ideas of 
bringing democracy into international law through provisions of international human 
rights law and of re*conceptualising international law as law among liberal*
democratic states are discussed. There are sceptical voices from both international 
law and political science scholarship.  
It will be argued that when one brings democracy into international law, one 
also brings along the quarrels about the meaning and definition of democracy in 
political science scholarship. This chapter will thus deal with different 
understandings of democracy and point out that the one adopted by the pro*
democratic endeavour within international law attracts significant criticism in 
political science scholarship. A similar approach will be taken when addressing the 
idea of the re*conceptualisation of international law as law among liberal*democratic 
states. It will be argued that the underlying theory of this idea is the democratic peace 
theory, which might not be built on sound foundations.   

deals with the pre*1991 practice of state creations. Initially 
the statehood criteria and recognition theories will be outlined. An argument will be 
made that in contemporary international law, the existence of an effective entity does 
not necessarily imply the existence of a state, not even a non*recognised one. It will 
be considered which non*effectiveness*based criteria have effects on the law of 
statehood, what the role of human rights standards is in this context and whether 
political system played any role in the creation of new states in the pre*1991 practice.  
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This chapter will also try to establish the relationship between the statehood 
criteria and recognition requirements, between recognition and non*recognition and 
make an argument in favour of the concept of the additional statehood criteria. The 
method in this chapter is that of doctrinal law, as it tries not only to examine the pre*
1991 practice of state creations but also to clarify some basic concepts in the law of 
statehood which are relevant for subsequent chapters.  
 
#examines the post*1991 practice of state creations. The main 
question is whether in the post*1991 period requirements other than those identified 
in Chapter Three as statehood criteria became relevant in the situations of new state 
creations. In particular, it will be considered whether the imposition of human rights 
standards and of a democratic political system have become a more prominent 
concern to the international community when new states are created. This chapter 
further examines how international involvement may determine the mode of state 
creation and open a possibility for the imposition of certain political requirements. 
Yet it is questionable whether such political requirements can be described merely as 
requirements originating in the recognition policy of some states or if they actually 
influence the emergence of an entity as a state. 
 This chapter comprehends non*empirical case studies of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the SFRY and subsequent state creations. Drawing on the 
interdisciplinary analysis in Chapter Two and on the doctrinal analysis in Chapter 
Three, Chapter Four examines the legal significance of the post*1991 attempts of the 
international community to contribute toward the creation of new states which are 
organised along liberal*democratic lines.  
 
#$addresses the relationship between democracy and the right of 
self*determination and examines the link between self*determination and democratic 
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political theory. It not only looks at the relationship between the right of self*
determination and democracy as a political system but also tries to identify the 
democratic principles operating within the right of self*determination. In this context 
standards of independence referenda are considered. It is examined whether the 
practice of such referenda gives a suggestion as to standards of popular consultation 
in the framework of the right of self*determination. For this purpose post*1991 
referenda are analysed from the perspectives of referenda rules and the impact of the 
expressed will of the people.  
This chapter draws on democratic political theory; initially to examine the 
link between democratic political theory and the principle of self*determination and, 
subsequently, to show how the will of the people operates within the right of self*
determination and how it is limited by general international law.  
 
considers the will of the people in regard to the creation of new 
international borders. It examines whether and to what degree internal boundaries 
potentially limit the will of the people when new states are created outside of the 
process of decolonisation. This chapter begins with the question of applicability of 
the uti possidetis principle outside of colonial situations and questions whether all 
“upgrades” of internal boundaries to international borders may be ascribed to the 
operation of the uti possidetis principle. It further attempts to clarify circumstances in 
which the will of the people in regard to the question of a new international 
delimitation may be rightfully limited by a pre*existing internal boundary 
arrangement. 
 
 $ addresses the specific situation of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence. It is not intended that Kosovo would be the central case study of the 
thesis. However, as the most recent, and a very disputable, state creation it deserves 
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thorough attention, which could not be given it in previous chapters. Further, the 
analysis of Kosovo draws on a variety of issues discussed in earlier chapters. These 
include: statehood criteria, recognition theories, applicability of the duty of non*
recognition, exercise of the right of self*determination, the ‘remedial secession 
doctrine’ and an attempt by the international community to create a new democratic 
state. The chapter on Kosovo may thus serve as an example to show how some 
concepts relevant for the law of statehood operate and what shortcomings they face 
in difficult situations.  
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Overlapping elements and an interdependence between democracy and human rights 
make international human rights law the most suitable framework for invoking 
democracy as a principle of international law.59 Yet the word ‘democracy’ does not 
appear in the universal human rights treaties, nor has the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) “based any of its decisions on the legal application of democratic 
principles.”60 The only universal human rights instrument that makes reference to 
democracy is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society.61 
Thus, even the UDHR does not use the noun ‘democracy’ but refers to it with 
an adjective in the notion of ‘democratic society’. Further, Article 29 of the UDHR 
mentions ‘general welfare in a democratic society’ as one of the considerations for 
whose purpose human rights may be subject to limitation, which implies that 
democracy and human rights are two distinct concepts which might not always work 
in the same direction and may pose limitations on each other. 
This chapter initially outlines the relationship between the concepts of 
democracy and human rights. Subsequently it examines the claim that universal 
human rights elaborations stipulate for rights and freedoms commonly associated 
with the concept of democracy62 and argues where the boundaries are of the so*called 
democratic rights. In this context it will be considered whether interpretation of the 
                                                 
59 Rich (2001), p. 23.   
60 Ibid., p. 20. 
61 UDHR, Article 29(2). 
62 Donnelly (2003), p. 609. 
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so*called democratic rights has taken a liberal*democratic bias in the post*Cold War 
period. Further, the proposed impacts of a liberal*democratic reading of international 
human rights law on general international law will be critically evaluated by 
analysing two somewhat distinct, though inter*related, theories: the normative 
democratic entitlement and democratic peace.  

+" !
It often appears to be generally accepted that “human rights and democracy belong 
together.”63 The two concepts are thus often used interchangeably.64 Yet the question 
of the relationship between democracy – otherwise a concept within political theory 
– and the framework of human rights law is complex.65 It is argued that 
“[d]emocracy aims to empower people in order to ensure that they, rather than some 
other group in society, rule [while] [h]uman rights, by contrast, aim to empower 
individuals, thus limiting rather than empowering the people and their 
government.”66 Furthermore, despite the close*knit relationship between democracy 
and human rights, the two concepts should not be perceived as complementary but as 
an “organic unity.”67 Therefore, democracy and human rights should not be referred 
to as synonyms or even as concepts necessarily pursuing the same goal, but rather as 
two concepts mutually dependent and supportive of one another. 
                                                 
63 Marks and Clapham (2005), p. 61. 
64 Donnelly (2003), p. 631: “If we are really interested in regimes that protect the full range of 
internationally recognized human rights – which is what most well*meaning Western advocates of 
‘democracy’ seem to have in mind – why not just say that? Why take the risk of being misread, or 
glossing over the crucial qualifying adjectives, by talking about democracy.”  
65 Beetham (1999), pp. 89–90: “Democracy and human rights have historically been regarded as 
distinct phenomena, occupying different areas of the political sphere: the one a matter of the 
organization of government, the other a question of individual rights and their defence. [The 
distinctions between democracy and human rights] have been further reinforced by an academic 
division of labour which has assigned the study of democracy to political science, and of human rights 
to law and jurisprudence.”  
66 Donnelly (2003), p. 619. To this one should add that human rights do not always empower only 
individuals but also groups such as peoples and minorities. For more see infra ch. 5. 
67 Beetham (1999), p. 90. 
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The definition of the relationship between human rights and democracy 
depends on the definition of democracy one adopts. Thus its different definitions 
need to be considered. 
 
! 
The term ‘democracy’ is a synthesis of the Greek words demos, meaning ‘people’, 
and kratos, meaning ‘rule’.68 Semantically, the term democracy stands for ‘rule by 
the people’; however, in political science discourse there has been much ambiguity 
surrounding both components of the word ‘democracy’. A consensus has been 
achieved that the term ‘people’ means all adult men and women.69 However, a 
consensus over the meaning of the term ‘rule’ is more elusive. Thus, the disputable 
question now is no longer who rules, but rather how people exercise their rule.  
The classical modern theory of democracy, adopted at the end of the 
eighteenth century, was government*centric and defined democracy “in terms of 
sources of authority for government, purposes served by government, and procedures 
for constituting government.”70 In the early years of modern democracy, when the 
category of ‘people’ was severely restricted, predominantly to wealthy men of a 
specific societal status determined by birth and education, the democratic method 
was confined to a small elite, which exercised rule on behalf of the majority, itself 
excluded from the power to rule.71 The democratic method of this kind still 
significantly resembled non*democratic ones.72 This was rather a situation of “[a] 
                                                 
68 See Sorensen (1993), p. 3.  
69 Relatively recently women in many states deemed democratic did not constitute the category of 
‘people who rule’. Many male citizens had long been excluded from this category based on reasons 
such as ethnic and racial background, class background, level of education, and wealth. See Sorensen 
(1993), pp. 9–16. 
70 Huntington (1990), p .6. 
71 See Held (1995), pp. 9–12.  
72 In some sense such rule was similar to that later established in apartheid South Africa, where 
democratic rule was in the hands of a minority determined by race, while the majority could not 
participate in the exercise of rule. See Sorensen (1993), pp. 14–17. 
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society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favoured elite 
[which] would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) 
or in tyranny (popularly*based dictatorship).”73 
 With extension of the category ‘people’, the inadequacy of the government*
centric definition of the rule became evident. The most tangible and quantitatively 
provable switch to the real rule of people happened by adoption of electoral laws that 
enacted universal suffrage.74 This enabled everyone to participate in the democratic 
process. Thus, the classical, i.e. government*centric, understanding of democracy 
was challenged in the electoral process. Consequently, a new understanding of 
democracy was developed, which is well*captured in the writings of Joseph 
Schumpeter: “[T]he democratic method is that of institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”75 His ideas have remained 
both influential and criticised up to present.76 
If one literally follows Schumpeter’s definition, democracy would only be a 
matter of electoral process. In such an understanding people periodically have a 
chance to elect their political leaders, while in the time between the elections, their 
participation within society is limited to the status of observers who assess the 
actions of their leaders in order to decide whether to re*elect or to replace them at the 
next elections.77 In this understanding one could argue that the only action that 
political leaders are precluded from is suspension of the following elections. 
                                                 
73 Lipset (1994), p. 75. 
74 It is argued that elections are the most tangible part of the democratic process and therefore are 
often considered a synonym for democracy. Carothers (1992), p. 264. Compare infra n. 180.  
75 Schumpeter (1942), p. 269. 
76 See infra ch. 2.4. 
77 Such an understanding of democracy may be challenged by the question of whether a democratic 
political system would not be “more democratic if ordinary citizens (as they typically do) lobbied their 
representatives between elections, organized campaigning groups, engaged in consultative processes, 
took part in demonstrations … if they actively regarded public matters as their affair, and if 
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 The ‘institutional arrangement’78 necessary for election of leaders may, 
however, point out an arrangement wider than merely that of electoral law which is 
not to be suspended. Indeed, the Schumpeterian definition of democracy already 
looks beyond the electoral process as the sole criterion of democracy and “elucidates 
the link between democracy, rights and the rule of law.”79 Namely, if everyone is 
allowed to compete for political leadership, “this will in most cases though not in all 
mean a considerable amount of freedom of discussion for all. In particular it will 
normally mean a considerable amount of freedom of the press,”80 which enables an 
individual to obtain more information on the candidates and their programmes and 
thus optimise the electoral choice. In essence, even the Schumpeterian understanding 
of the electoral process is not only about standing for an election and casting a vote, 
but it rather means that “the institution of periodic elections must go hand in hand 
with the necessary institutions for securing respect for the rule of law and 
constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights.”81 
 The Schumpeterian understanding of democracy does not literally refuse to 
look beyond elections but rather puts elections at the centre of the democratic 
method.82 In this perception, free and fair elections are seen not as a necessary 
condition of democracy, but as a sufficient one. 
                                                                                                                                          
representatives were systematically required to listen to them.” Beetham (1999), p. 3. In other words, 
the democratic process operates even between elections and not only at elections.  
78 Schumpeter (1942), p. 269. 
79 Marks (2000), p. 51.  
80 Schumpeter (1942), pp. 271–72.  
81 Marks (2000), p. 51.  
82 The Schumpeterian definition of democracy expressly echoes within the normative democratic 
entitlement theory: “The existence of a democratic form of government – evidenced by fair and free 
periodic elections, three branches of government, an independent judiciary, freedom of political 
expression, equality before the law, and due process – is sine qua non to the enjoyment of human 
rights.” Cerna (1995), p. 295. Above it was established that these institutions are indeed the sine qua 
non of the enjoyment of human rights as well as democracy. However, to take these institutions as 
evidence of a democratic form of government is to ignore that the relationship between human rights 
and democracy is much more complex and not confined to a selection of civil and political rights.  
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 While such a narrow (i.e. procedural) understanding of democracy 
acknowledges the necessity for other rights to be respected – expressly the freedoms 
of speech and assembly – it defines these rights vis*à*vis the right to political 
participation rather than vis*à*vis the entire human rights framework. In other words, 
the freedoms of speech and assembly in this model are the sine qua non of 
democracy because they are the sine qua non of the right to political participation.83 
Such a definition of democracy is thus based on a hierarchical order of a selection of 
civil and political rights. 
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In contrast to the procedural definition, the substantive definition of democracy is 
based on democracy’s underlying principles rather than merely elections. It is argued 
that:  
The core idea of democracy is that of popular vote or popular control over collective decision*making. 
Its starting point is with the citizen rather than with the institutions of government. Its defining 
principles are that all citizens are entitled to a say in public affairs, both through participation in 
government, and that this entitlement should be available on terms of equality to all. Control by 
citizens over their collective affairs and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control are the 
basic democratic principles.84  
Democracy is defined in a much broader sense of popular control and equality for all. 
Such a definition enables answering of the question of “why particular institutions or 
procedures have a claim to be democratic, and what needs to be changed to be more 
so.”85 Democracy is thus not defined as something absolute or as a promised 
destination, but rather as a continuous journey.86   
                                                 
83 Compare the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 25 (1996), para 12. 
84 Beetham (1999), p. 90–91 (italics in original).  
85 Marks and Clapham (2005), p. 63.  
86 Marks (2000), p. 73. 
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In the substantive definition of democracy, civil and political, as well as 
social, economic and cultural rights are made an integral part of democracy.87 
Indeed, “[i]f public decision*making is the business of all citizens equally, then all 
must be not just entitled, but also enabled, to undertake it, and that calls for access to 
the requisite social, economic and cultural resources. Political equality depends on 
overcoming material deprivation.”88This relationship is one of mutual dependency 
between economic, social and cultural rights on one side and democracy on the 
other,89 as the absence of social, economic and cultural rights “compromises civil 
and political equality, the quality of public life and the long*term viability of 
democratic institutions themselves; democracy, on the other hand, constitutes a 
necessary if not sufficient condition for the protection of economic and social 
rights.”90
Two main challenges to the argument of mutual dependency between social, 
economic and cultural rights and democracy have been invoked. First, proponents of 
the procedural understanding of democracy argue that social, economic and cultural 
rights lack normative precision and, consequently, democracy cannot be normatively 
defined. Such a view is well*captured in the following observation: 
To some people democracy has or should have much more sweeping and idealistic connotations. To 
them, “true democracy” means liberté, egalité, fraternité, effective citizen control over policy, 
responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal 
participation and power, and various other civic virtues. These are, for the most part, good things and 
people can, if they wish, define democracy in these terms. Doing so, however, raises the problems that 
                                                 
87 Beetham (1999), p. 114.  
88 Marks and Clapham (2005), pp. 64–65.  
89 Beetham (1999), p. 114.  
90 Ibid.  
 21 
come up with the definitions of democracy by source or by purpose. Fuzzy norms do not yield useful 
analysis.91 
Second, the mutual dependence between social, economic and cultural rights 
on the one hand and democracy on the other has been challenged by the neo*liberal92 
view that social, economic and cultural rights contradict some of the rights from the 
civil and political cluster. Fukuyama defines ‘fundamental rights’ as civil and 
political rights and rejects social, economic and cultural rights arguing that “the 
achievement of these rights is not clearly compatible with other rights like those of 
property or free economic exchange.”93 Such an argument has been described as “the 
extreme neo*liberal view that private property and the freedom of exchange 
constitute absolute and untouchable ‘natural rights’”.94 This is, however, to overlook 
that both private property and freedom of exchange are “socially constructed and 
validated institutions, whose primary justification lies in their effectiveness in 
securing people’s means of livelihood.”95 Ultimately, “[a] democratic society … 
requires both the institutions of private property and free exchange and the guarantee 
of basic economic rights, if it is to be founded upon a general consent.”96  
 Although human rights and democracy ‘belong together’, they should not be 
understood as synonyms, nor are they merely a corrective of each other. While 
                                                 
91 Huntington (1990), p. 9.  
92 Consider the following definition of neo*liberalism: “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory 
of political economic practices that proposes that human well*being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to 
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices … [I]f markets do not 
exist … then they must be created, by state action if necessary. State interventions in markets (once 
created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly 
possess enough information to second*guess market signals (process) and because powerful interest 
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own 
benefit.” Harvey (2005), p. 2.  
93 Fukuyama (1992), pp. 42–43.  
94 Beetham (1999), p. 101. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid., pp. 100–01.  
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democracy and human rights depend on each other, realisation of one does not bring 
automatic realisation of the other.97  
 

When new democratisations are in question, the implementation of democratic 
institutions and procedures is a task of democratic transition. In one oft*quoted 
definition, in the process of democratic transition a state adopts the legal order, the 
institutions and procedures which guarantee and allow for:  
(i) the right to vote, (ii) the right to be elected, (iii) the right of political leaders to compete for support 
and votes, (iv) elections that are free and fair, (v) freedom of association, (vi) freedom of expression, 
(vii) alternative sources of information and (viii) institutions for making public policies depend on 
votes and other expressions of preference.98 
However, “[w]hile the transition process is critical, experience has shown that the 
more difficult battle is that for democratic consolidation; simply put, one successful 
election does not create democracy.”99  
Diamond defines democratic consolidation as a process “in which the norms, 
procedures, and expectations of democracy become so internalized that actors 
routinely, instinctively conform to the written (and unwritten) rules of the game, 
even when they conflict and compete intensely.”100 Democratic consolidation thus 
depends on the behaviour of political actors and not merely on the existence of 
democratic procedures.101 Democratic consolidation is therefore an ongoing process, 
a continuous journey,102 during which steps forward or backwards are always 
possible. Responsibility for democratic consolidation does not lie only with 
                                                 
97 Marks and Clapham (2005), p. 64. 
98 Dahl (1971), p. 3, 
99 Rich (2001), p. 26.  
100 Diamond (1999), p. 65. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Compare supra n. 86. 
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governments but also with other actors, such as the political opposition, civil society, 
media and even individuals and international factors.103 
 One could say that in the view of the procedural definition of democracy, 
democratic transition is enough to proclaim a certain state to be a democracy. On the 
other hand, the substantive understanding of democracy, arguably, takes a 
consolidated democracy as its ideal. However, as democratic consolidation depends 
on multiple actors (i.e. it is not a sole responsibility of governments) and is virtually 
impossible to define normatively, it would be difficult to draw international legal 
prescriptions and consequences with a consolidated democracy in mind.  
 
!"$", "
Although international human rights instruments make no reference to democracy 
itself being a human right, arguments have been made that democratic principles 
operate within certain human rights elaborations and thus “by becoming a party to an 
international human rights instrument, a state agrees to organize itself along 
democratic lines by establishing independent tribunals, allowing freedom of 
expression, and conducting free elections.”104 
This understanding is a reflection of the procedural understanding of 
democracy, which places free and fair elections in the middle of the democratic 
process, while it acknowledges that some other criteria of human rights protection 
also need to be met for the conducting of such elections.105 Yet, even if one accepts 
the electoral*centric (procedural) definition of democracy, it is questionable whether 
the universal understanding of the right to political participation really requires the 
political system of liberal*democracy. 
                                                 
103 For more see Berglund (2001), pp. 13–14.  See also Diamond (1999), p. 66. 
104 Cerna (1995), p. 295. 
105 See supra ch. 2.2.1. 
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The right to political participation is elaborated in Article 21 of the UDHR and in 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In 
the Cold War environment, the meanings of the “will of the people”106 and of the 
“will of the electors”107 were controversial.108 This was a consequence of two 
competing interpretations of democracy and democratic principles at that time. The 
interpretation of the Western109 world referred to the model of ‘liberal*
democracy’,110 while the interpretation of the Soviet bloc referred to the model of 
‘people’s democracy’.111  
 Article 25 of the ICCPR provides: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.112  
Similar to Article 21 of the UDHR, Article 25 of the ICCPR does not specifically 
require multiparty elections. Further, it does not establish a specific link between 
elections and government*formation. In other words, nothing in this provision 
                                                 
106 UDHR, Article 21(3) 
107 ICCPR, Article 25(b). 
108 A possible interpretation could also be that, for example, multiparty elections are not required if the 
will of the people is against them. See Rich (2001), p. 23. 
109 The term ‘Western states’ at that time implied states belonging to the regional group ‘Western 
European and Others’, unofficially used within the UN system. Yet after the end of the Cold War such 
a definition of ‘Western states’ is no longer adequate. References to ‘Western states’ in the post*Cold 
War era should then be understood as states of Europe broadly understood and non*European states in 
which societies are of European historic, cultural, religious and linguistic origin. In this context 
Carothers (1992), p. 263 argues: “Latin America and Eastern Europe are essentially parts of the 
Western world.”    
110 See infra ch. 2.3.3. for understanding of democracy in the framework of the ECHR.    
111 See Roth (1999), p. 331, consider especially the following argument:  “In the Marxist*Leninist 
view, multi*party competition [otherwise a crucial postulate of the Western concept of liberal*
democracy] masks the inalterable structure of power rooted in the concentrated ownership and control 
of the major means of production, distribution and exchange.”  
112 ICCPR, Article 25. 
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defines the extent to which a government needs to reflect the electorate’s will.113 If in 
a liberal*democratic understanding the composition of government needs to reflect 
electoral results,114 and elections need to take place in a true multiparty setting,115 
such an interpretation is not acceptable for the Leninist concept of democracy.116 
Indeed, the drafting history shows that many, if actually not most, signatory states 
would have refused to ratify the ICCPR were it to bind them to liberal*democratic 
institutions.117 Thus, the language of the UDHR and the ICCPR is to be understood 
as an attempt “to avoid controversy over institutional requisites, while still asserting 
a universal human interest in political participation that states are bound to satisfy in 
some manner,”118 while one cannot proclaim the liberal*democratic interpretation of 
democracy as the authoritative one. 
 The position that human rights treaty provisions and customary international 
law do not require a state to adopt any particular electoral method or, in general, any 
political, social, economic and cultural system, was confirmed by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case.119 However, if such an interpretation of the ICCPR and of customary 
                                                 
113 Roth (1999), p. 330. 
114 This postulate of liberal*democracies is subject to caution. Since the liberal*democratic model does 
not prescribe a single model of government*formation or a single constitutional system (presidential, 
semi*presidential, or parliamentary), the ‘representative government’ may significantly differ from 
electoral results. What is more, the question of what is a ‘representative government’ to a great degree 
becomes subject to subjective analyses. For more see infra ch. 2.3.3. 
115 Even this postulate is subject to caution as the liberal*democratic model does not prescribe a single 
model of party system, which is also a consequence of different electoral systems. The model of two*
party democracy may lead to significant considerations regarding its democratic quality and so can a 
fragmented, so*called hundred*party system. A detailed analysis of these deficiencies would, however, 
reach beyond the scope of this thesis. For more see von Beyme (2001), pp. 3–24, Elgie and Zielonka 
(2001), pp. 25–47. 
116 See supra n. 111. 
117 Roth (1999), p. 332. 
118 Ibid.  
119 In the Nicaragua case, ICJ Rep 1986, the ICJ, inter alia, held: “[T]he Court cannot find an 
instrument with legal force, whether unilateral or synallagmatic, whereby Nicaragua has committed 
itself in respect of the principle or methods of holding elections.” (para 261).  The Court took this 
position although Nicaragua was a party to the ICCPR and further argued: “[A]dherence by a State to 
any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law to hold 
otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the 
whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social, economic and 
cultural system of a State … The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a 
 26 
international law was accurate in 1986, there is a question of whether this has 
changed after the end of the Cold War. 
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After the end of the Cold War, an argument in favour of a global trend shifting 
toward democracy was made within international law scholarship. Writing in 1992, 
Franck argued: 
For nations surfacing from long, tragic submergence beneath bogus ‘people’s democracy’ or outright 
dictatorship, the legitimization of power is a basic, but elusive, move in the direction of reform. As of 
late 1991, there are more than 110 governments, almost all represented in the United Nations, that are 
legally committed to permitting open, multiparty, secret*ballot elections with a universal franchise. 
Most joined the trend in the past five years.120 
While Franck acknowledges that there are still a few out of 110 democracies that are 
democratic “more in form than in substance,”121 there is much critique against such a 
generalisation. Indeed, the number of democracies only formally following electoral 
procedures while not being substantial democracies is too great to be put into the 
category of ‘merely a few’.122 It is therefore questionable whether the end of the Cold 
War has provided us with practice in support of the claim that the right to political 
participation is to be understood in the interpretation of the Western model of liberal*
democracy.   
                                                                                                                                          
right of intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some 
particular ideology or political system.” (para 263). 
120 Franck (1992), p. 47.  
121 Ibid.  
122 In response to Franck’s argument it was held that “this observation greatly overstates the 
prevalence of electoral structures that can usefully be characterized as liberal*democratic. Electoral 
processes in many countries coexist with de jure or de facto repression, exclusion of candidates 
regarded as unacceptable, and reserves of power (especially military) elites, not to mention 
mechanisms for the perpetration and fraud.” Roth (1999), p. 337. 
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In 1990, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/150, entitled 
‘Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections’. The 
Resolution, inter alia, provides: 
[T]he efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of periodic 
and genuine elections should not call into question each State’s sovereign right freely to choose and 
develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the 
preferences of other States.123 
 This Resolution was followed by Resolution 45/151, entitled ‘Respect for the 
principles of national sovereignty and non*interference in the internal affairs of 
States and their electoral processes’. The Resolution, inter alia, provides: 
Recognizing that the principles of national sovereignty and non*interference in the internal affairs of 
any State should be respected in the holding of elections; 
Also recognizing that there is no single political system or single model for electoral process equally 
suited to all nations and their peoples, and that political systems and electoral processes are subject to 
historical, political, cultural and religious factors; 
4. Urges all states to respect the principle of non*interference in the internal affairs of States and the 
sovereign right of peoples to determine their political, economic and social system.124  
 Arguably, this is the first post*Cold War expression of opinio juris125 on the 
relationship between obligations imposed by the right to political participation and 
the principle of non*interference into matters essentially in domestic jurisdiction, 
such as adoption of a particular political system and/or electoral method. These 
General Assembly Resolutions confirm the Nicaragua case standard. Namely, 
                                                 
123 GA Res 45/150 (18 December 1990). The Resolution was adopted with a vote of 129 in favour and 
eight against, with nine abstentions. 
124 GA Res 45/151 (18 December 1990). The Resolution was adopted with a vote of 111 in favour, 
and twenty*nine against, with eleven abstentions.  
125 General Assembly resolutions are not per se a source of international law, but may serve as 
expression of opinio juris and state practice. Indeed, “[t]he process by which they [General Assembly 
Resolutions] are adopted (adopted unanimously, or nearly unanimously, or by consensus or otherwise) 
establishes whether the practice is a ‘general’ one.” Harris (2004), p. 58. See also infra n. 424. 
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obligations imposed on states by the right to political participation and other human 
rights standards do not demand a specific political system. 
In 1996, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) adopted General Comment 25, 
in which it held that the right to political participation “lies at the core of democratic 
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles 
of the Covenant.”126 Further, it established that the right to political participation 
depends on some other rights: “Freedom of expression, assembly and association are 
essential conditions for the right to vote and must be fully protected.”127  
The HRC further argued that “[p]ositive measures should be taken to 
overcome specific difficulties, such as illiteracy, language barriers, poverty, or 
impediments to freedom of movement which prevent persons entitled to vote from 
exercising their rights effectively.”128 Notably, the HRC invoked a number of 
requisites necessary for the right to political participation to be exercised effectively 
that are comprehended in a cluster of social, economic and cultural rights, but failed 
to invoke those rights specifically (very notably the right to health and the right to 
education). The HRC, however, also specifically stated that no particular electoral 
system is prescribed by the right to political participation.129 
It has been observed that General Comment 25 “gives teeth to the Covenant’s 
obligation to hold ‘genuine periodic elections’.”130 However, what is evidently 
absent in General Comment 25 is a specific reference to elections in a multiparty 
setting. 
Consequently, not even General Comment 25 allows us to adopt a liberal*
democratic bias when reading the elaboration of the right to political participation in 
                                                 
126 HRC, General Comment 25 (1996), para 1.  
127 Ibid., para 12. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., para 21. 
130 Rich (2001), p. 23. 
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the ICCPR, as “[t]here is a great difference … between obliging States to address 
seriously their citizens’ interest in participation in governance and imposing on a 
state a specific political solution in a given circumstance.”131 

!  
There is no reference to democracy in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.132 On the other hand, the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)133 
makes a reference to ‘democratic institutions’ in the preamble,134 while elaborations 
of the right to assembly,135 freedom of association136 and freedom of movement and 
residence137 invoke the interest of ‘democratic society’, for the purpose of which 
these rights may be limited. Further, Article 32 provides: “The rights of each person 
are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of 
the general welfare, in a democratic society.”138 The strongest reference to 
democracy as a political system is, however, made in Article 28 which, inter alia, 
provides that “[n]o provision of [the ACHR] shall be interpreted as … precluding 
other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from 
representative democracy as a form of government.”139  
‘Representative democracy’ has also been invoked in reports of the Inter*
American Commission on Human Rights, where the Commission “underlined the 
direct relationship between representative democracy and the guarantee of the 
                                                 
131 Roth (1999), p. 343. 
132 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1982). 
133 The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (1969). 
134 Ibid., Preamble, para 1.  
135 Ibid., Article 15 
136 Ibid., Article 16 
137 Ibid., Article 22.  
138 Ibid., Article 32(2). 
139 Ibid., para 28(c).  
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observance of human rights.”140 Yet nothing in the ACHR implies that elections need 
to be in a multiparty setting. 
The phrase ‘representative democracy’ within the ACHR has also been dealt 
with in the jurisprudence of the Inter*American Court of Human Rights. In this 
regard the Court argued: 
States may establish minimum standards to regulate political participation, provided they are 
reasonable and in keeping with the principles of representative democracy. These standards should 
guarantee, among other matters, the holding of periodic free and fair elections based on universal, 
equal and secret suffrage, as an expression of the will of the voters, reflecting the sovereignty of the 
people, and bearing in mind, as established in Article 6 of the Inter*American Democratic Charter, 
that “[p]romoting and fostering diverse forms of participation strengthens democracy”.141 
The right and opportunity to vote and to be elected embodied in Article 23(1)(b) of the American 
Convention is exercised regularly in genuine periodic elections by universal and equal suffrage and by 
secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters.142 
 In Castañeda Gutman v Mexico, the Court also held that “the American 
Convention, like other international human rights treaties, does not establish the 
obligation to implement a specific electoral system. Nor does it establish a specific 
mandate on the mechanism that the States must establish to regulate the exercise of 
the right to be elected in general elections.”143 The Court therefore did not 
specifically establish that elections need to take place in a multiparty setting. 
However, the Court further held: 
[I]n comparative electoral law, the regulation of the right to be elected, as regards the registration of 
the candidacies, may be executed in two ways: by the system of registration of candidates exclusively 
                                                 
140 Trinidade (1998), p. 410.  
141 Yatama v Nicaragua (2005), para 207. 
142 Castañeda Gutman v Mexico (2008), para 149. 
143 Ibid. 
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by the political parties, or by the system of registration of candidacies by the political parties, together 
with the possibility of registering independent candidacies.144  
Although this observation was made in the context of registration of candidates, it is 
significant that the Court made a reference to political parties in plural. Thus, it 
might be possible to argue that while there exists no generally prescribed electoral 
system, the Court has at least implied, although not unequivocally stated, that 
elections need to be in a multiparty setting.   
 The subsequent chapters of this thesis deal with situations of new state 
creations in which international involvement expressed some democratic 
considerations.145 In the majority of situations of this kind, international involvement 
was evidently channelled through European states. Therefore the image of 
democracy applied was, arguably, also European. The European image of democracy 
is, however, reflected in the framework of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), which therefore needs to be more thoroughly considered. 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates for limitation 
of certain rights if ‘necessary in democratic society’. This limitation clause is not 
invoked generally but is attached to specific human rights provisions: the right to a 
fair trial,146 the right to respect for private life and family,147 freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,148 freedom of expression,149 and freedom of assembly and 
association.150 However, at the time of its drafting, democracy within the ECHR 
framework was not understood too broadly. Indeed, the initial draft elaboration of the 
right to political participation, which stipulated for elections in a multiparty setting, 
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was rejected.151 The interpretation of the so*called democratic rights was thus not 
unitary and could accommodate different concepts of democracy and electoral 
process.  
The subsequent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), however, ascribed the elaborations of the so*called democratic rights 
within the ECHR a liberal*democratic meaning. The link between democracy and 
freedom of expression was established in the Handyside case152 and was later 
affirmed in a number of subsequent cases.153  
The standard that elections need to take place in a multiparty setting was 
firmly established in the United Communist Party of Turkey case, dealing with the 
freedom of assembly and association: 
[P]olitical parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy. In view 
of the importance of democracy in the Convention … there can be no doubt that political parties come 
within the scope of Article 11 …154 
[T]he State is under the obligation, among others, to hold, in accordance with Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1, free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot under conditions which will ensure the 
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. Such choice is 
inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political parties representing the different 
shades of opinion to be found within countries’ population. By relaying this range of opinion – with 
the help of the media – at all levels of social life, political parties make an irreplaceable contribution 
to political debate, which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society.155 
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 The framework of the ECHR thus became much more specific in terms of the 
definition of a particular political system than it was at the time of its drafting. 
Indeed, in the Court’s view: “Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of 
the European public order. Democracy … appears to be the only political model 
contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with 
it.”156 Importantly, the Court unequivocally linked democracy with multiparty 
elections. 
The Court’s most recent jurisprudence also shows that democracy in the 
framework of the ECHR is to be understood comprehensively and not merely in 
terms of electoral procedures. In the Rekvenyi case, the Court dealt with the question 
of whether the prohibition of members of the police, military, and security forces to 
join political parties was a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR. The Court based its 
reasoning on the relatively recent Hungarian experience with a non*democratic 
regime, in which the police, military, and security forces were heavily politicised and 
in the service of the regime.157 The Court did not find the prohibition to be a 
violation of Article 11 and stated that such a limitation could be beneficial for the 
“consolidation and maintenance of democracy”. 158  
 Also interesting from this perspective is the Ždanoka case, where the Court 
held that the limitation of the right to stand for an election to a person who was 
actively involved in the activities of the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL) was 
disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society.159 The Court clearly 
separated the question of de*politicisation of the police, military, and security forces, 
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upheld in the Rekvenyi case, from the question of restriction of the right to political 
participation.160 
The Ždanoka case is also instructive because of the Court’s reasoning on the 
question of the imminence of a threat to ‘democratic society’. The Government of 
Latvia argued that former members of the CPL were a threat to Latvian democracy. 
According to the submission of the Government of Latvia, the CPL had sponsored 
subversive actions against the newly*elected Latvian government, following the first 
democratic elections in March 1990.161 The Court, however, rejected this view: 
“[T]he applicant’s disqualification from standing for election to Parliament and local 
councils on account of her active participation in the CPL, maintained more than a 
decade after the events held against that party, is disproportionate to the aim pursued 
and, consequently, not necessary in a democratic society.”162 
The Court gave express support to the view of the dissenting opinion of three 
(out of seven) judges of the Constitutional Court of Latvia, where it was held that 
“the Latvian democratic system had become sufficiently strong for it no longer to 
fear the presence within its legislative body of persons who had campaigned against 
the system ten years previously.” 163 The Court thus partly based its decision on the 
view that the state of Latvian democracy ten years after the subversive events was at 
a level where such restrictions were no longer necessary. Although the Court did not 
use the specific term ‘democratic consolidation’, it obviously took the latter into 
account when deciding that a threat to ‘democratic society’ was not imminent. 
Arguably, the Court thus also implied that its decision might have been different if it 
had considered Latvian democracy not consolidated enough to reject the existence of 
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an imminent threat to ‘democratic society’. This allows us to assume that in a 
possible similar case in the future, the Court’s decision might be different and 
imminence could be established based on a democracy more vulnerable than Latvia’s 
was at the time when the decision in the Ždanoka case was taken. Arguably, the 
Court adopted an approach to contribute to substantive democracy within state 
parties and contribute toward democratic consolidation. 
 This section has shown that in the time of drafting of the ECHR, references to 
democratic society did not reach beyond the meaning of such reference in the UDHR 
and elaborations of the so*called democratic rights were not read with a liberal*
democratic bias. However, jurisprudence of the ECtHR has changed this 
understanding and now there exists no doubt that state parties to the ECHR need to 
organise their electoral method and political system along liberal*democratic lines. 
The Inter*American Court of Human Rights has moved in the same direction, though 
not as unequivocally as the ECtHR. 
   
/$
/% 
At the end of the Cold War and in the triumphal age of liberal*democracy and 
ideological proclamation of the “end of history”,164 an attempt was made to proclaim 
democracy itself a human right. In his groundbreaking article entitled ‘The Emerging 
Right to Democratic Governance’,165 Franck derives the right to democratic 
governance from the right of self*determination, freedom of expression and the right 
to political participation.166 Franck remains aware that this is a rather narrow concept 
of democracy; however, he is prepared to accept it in order to find the lowest 
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common denominator in the politically and culturally diverse world.167 Further, 
Franck sees that a right to democratic governance, so underpinned, benefits from a 
relatively clear normative framework and thus appears to be much more persuasive 
as a legal right.168  
Franck argues that people’s consent – meaning democratic choice – validates 
governance.169 Consequently the legitimacy of non*democratic governments is 
disputed. At the same time the democratic legitimacy of a government is not merely 
an internal, but also an international category.170 An international component in this 
understanding also means that the right to democratic governance is guaranteed on 
the international plane and that there should exist international mechanisms for its 
protection.  
Although the three cornerstones of the right to democratic governance (the 
right of self*determination, freedom of expression and the right to political 
participation) have been acknowledged as international human rights, initially 
invoked by the UDHR and later specified by the ICCPR, it is argued that it was the 
international circumstances at the end of the Cold War that enabled the emergence of 
the customary rule of the global entitlement to democratic governance.171 Franck 
argues that after the response to the coups in the Soviet Union and Haiti in 1991, “the 
leaders of states constituting the international community vigorously asserted that 
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only democracy validates governance.”172 In this perception, a global switch to 
democracy after the Cold War has occurred and (liberal) democracy has become the 
only form of government deemed legitimate by the world’s population: “People 
almost everywhere now demand that government be validated by Western style 
multiparty democratic elections. The [democratic] entitlement now aborning is 
widely enough understood to be almost universally celebrated.”173 
When pronouncing Western style democracy as the universally*accepted, sole 
legitimate system of government, Franck provides little evidence for such a claim. 
Relevant evidence may exist within newly democratised Western societies.174 Yet it 
would be virtually impossible to extend Western*style democracy to be the 
preference of all of humanity.175  
The right to democratic governance also provokes a question associated with 
the definition of democracy, i.e. to what one is entitled by the proposed normative 
entitlement to democracy. The decisive criterion for the exercise of the right to 
democratic governance appears to be formation of a government based on free and 
fair elections: 
The right to democracy is the right of people to be consulted and to participate in the process by which 
political values are reconciled and choices made.176 … The term ‘democracy’, as used in international 
rights parlance, is intended to connote the kind of governance that is legitimated by the consent of the 
governed. Essential to the legitimacy of governance is evidence of consent to the process by which a 
populace is consulted by its government.177  
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In this understanding, elections are perceived as a sufficient rather than 
necessary criterion for democracy.178 The right is therefore premised on the 
procedural understanding of democracy, the shortcomings of which have been 
discussed above.179 However, since elections are the most tangible part of the 
democratic process,180 it is relatively easy to monitor them and determine whether 
they were free. According to Franck, the legitimacy of government would ultimately 
depend on this determination.181  

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The idea of the right to democratic governance proposes that electoral monitoring 
become an institutionalised instrument.182 Merely refusing electoral monitoring – not 
the failure to have free and fair elections let alone democracy broadly understood – 
might then constitute a breach of international law.183 This shifts the focus of the 
right to democratic governance from the electoral process to electoral monitoring. 
 Nevertheless, electoral monitoring features a quality of normative 
determinacy, which is otherwise significantly absent in value judgements on whether 
a certain state is a democracy.184 Political scientists have developed methods to 
measure democracy, all of which, however, suffer from arbitrariness in the choice of 
parameters as well as in the creation of certain values in order to categorise states 
into groups ‘democratic’, ‘non*democratic’, and, possibly, ‘semi*democratic’.185 
Even if one adopted the definition of a democratic state proposed by the normative 
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democratic entitlement endeavour within international law scholarship,186 there is 
still no central authority to make a judgement on whether a state is democratic. The 
threshold of democracy is thus reminiscent of a well*known definition of obscenity, 
made by the US Supreme Court Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v Ohio (1964), who 
held that he could not define which materials were obscene, but nonetheless 
famously concluded “I know it when I see it.”187 With value judgements on whether 
a certain state is democratic, one could paraphrase this statement and establish the 
pattern in the following words: name a state and I will tell you whether it is a 
democracy.188 Such value judgements are greatly influenced by a liberal*democratic 
self*image of states.189  However, when consequences are to be drawn based on the 
determination of whether a state is a democracy, such subjective value judgements 
do not appear to be an appropriate underpinning. 
The institutionalised international electoral*monitoring arrangement 
seemingly overcomes this deficiency. The democratic nature of a state is no longer 
defined in terms of ‘I know it when I see it’ but is rather backed by the authority of 
international electoral monitoring. In other words, through an international standard 
of electoral monitoring a threshold for democracy would be established which would 
work in two steps. In the first step states would need to agree to electoral monitoring. 
A rejection of monitoring would mean “a signal that the country concerned is not 
prepared to open itself to international scrutiny and is not interested in the 
international legitimacy that a positive report would bestow.”190 In the second step, a 
report of international observers would need to be positive. This would seemingly 
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provide the normative quality of the judgement on whether a state is democracy. 
However, the problem is that the decision of the electoral monitors can be objective 
only in relation to electoral procedure, i.e. if they did not discover any significant 
electoral fraud (e.g. fake ballots). The assessment of other demands of free elections, 
acknowledged even by the procedural understanding of democracy (i.e. freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion and conscience),191 would, 
however, still remain in the subjective sphere of ‘I know it when I see it’. Indeed, in 
a short period spent in an observed state, observers cannot realistically assess the 
requisites of democracy in that state.192  
Further, any assessment of this kind is inherently subjective because of the 
lack of normative criteria to be used when such assessments are made. Indeed, 
“electoral monitoring has not been the democratic panacea,” 193 as it is much easier to 
implement democratic institutions (the task of democratic transition) and observe this 
part of the democratisation process than to consolidate democracy and assess 
progress in this phase.194  
The normative democratic entitlement idea pronounces democratic transition 
for democracy while democratisation theory sees this institutional part as only one 
phase of the democratisation process which needs to be followed by the 
consolidation phase.195 However, it would be rather difficult to define the right to 
democratic governance as a ‘right to consolidated democracy’ for two major reasons. 
First, such a comprehensive definition of democracy does not provide us with a 
precise normative framework which would enable us to make a distinction between 
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‘democratic’ and ‘not democratic’.196 Consequently, one could say that a 
comprehensive definition of democracy does not allow us to express in normative 
and non*descriptive terms what is a democracy. On the other hand, if normative 
democratic entitlement to democracy is de facto defined in terms of free and fair 
elections, the entitlement is much more precise and quantitatively definable.197 
Second, while governments can be held responsible for implementation of 
democratic institutions in respective states, the postulates of democratic 
consolidation reach beyond the responsibility of governments and define a variety of 
duty*bearers in the process of democratic consolidation.198 In human rights language, 
it would be impossible to define upon whom the obligations stemming from the right 
to democratic governance, so conceived, would fall, and the obligations would go 
beyond those of governments.199  
This section has shown that the idea of the right to democratic governance 
essentially adopts the procedural definition of democracy. As its normative 
determinacy is based on electoral monitoring, the right to democratic governance 
effectively becomes a right to monitored elections.  
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In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote a work entitled “To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch”200 in which he laid out an idea of perpetual peace among states with a 
republican form of government which form a federation of free states. Kant saw 
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democracy on the domestic plane to be the decisive factor for peaceful behaviour on 
the international plane.201  
The neo*Kantian understanding of international law rejects the Kelsenian 
concept of a presupposed validity of the Grundnorm,202 and rather anchors the 
validity of the legal norm in the people’s consent, which is presumed to be a 
consequence of rational choice.203 The first premise is that people are rational and 
peace*loving and therefore their democratic choice is peace rather than war. If the 
second premise is that people exercise final control over decision*making, then the 
conclusion should follow that democracies pursue peaceful behaviour in international 
affairs. 
In part of the post*Cold War international law scholarship, an attempt was 
made to accommodate neo*Kantian ideas of democratic peace within contemporary 
international law. In this theory, the consent of people on the domestic plane has 
direct implications for the law of statehood, as “[i]ndividuals must give consent to 
governments in order that they can possess the formal credentials of statehood.”204 
Consent of people is premised on the existence of a liberal*democratic political 
system, which is typically deemed to require the following qualities:  
[1] formal legal equality for all citizens and constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights such 
as freedom of religion and the press; [2] broadly representative legislatures exercising supreme 
sovereign authority based on the consent of the electorate and constrained only by a guarantee of basic 
civil rights; [3] legal protection of private property rights justified either by individual acquisition, 
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common agreement or social utility; [4] market economies controlled primarily by the forces of 
supply and demand.205 
 The proponents of the democratic peace theory in international law argue 
that international law should be conceived as law among liberal*democratic states, 
while states with a different form of government would not be part of this legal 
system.206 The relationship between liberal*democratic states vis*à*vis states with 
other forms of government would be governed by different legal rules and liberal*
democracies would have a duty to take action for the implementation of the will of 
the people (i.e. liberal*democratic institutions) in states where the will of people is 
disregarded (i.e. liberal*democratic institutions are absent).207   
In the context of international action, Teson differentiates between 
illegitimate governments and illegitimate states.208 Illegitimate governments are 
those that are not representative of their people, i.e. they do not come to power by 
means of liberal*democratic electoral process.209 Illegitimate states, on the other 
hand, are those in which human rights are systematically breached and their peoples 
no longer consent to the existence of such a state.210 In both circumstances, it is 
suggested, such states would no longer be deemed sovereign in their territories.211 
The concept of illegitimate states, to some degree, falls close to arguments in favour 
of the ‘remedial secession doctrine’ and might also underpin arguments in favour of 
dissolution of non*representative multiethnic states,212 both of which will be 
thoroughly discussed below. Yet Teson at this point does not make an argument in 
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favour of ‘remedial secession’ but an argument in favour of military intervention 
which he terms “humanitarian”, although it rather appears to be pro*democratic:213  
 [F]orce will sometimes have to be used against nonliberal regimes as a last resort in self*defence or in 
defence of human rights. Liberal democracies must seek peace and use all possible alternatives to 
preserve it. In extreme circumstances, however, violence may be the only means to uphold the law 
and defend the liberal alliance against outlaw dictators that remain nonmembers. Such … is the proper 
place of war in the Kantian theory.214 
Such an argument has been described by sceptics as consistent with 
democratic peace but inconsistent with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.215 
Significantly, the invoked right to self*defence is not disputable and applies to all 
states under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As such it does not need to be specifically 
invoked as a postulate of new international law, defined as law among liberal*
democratic states. The situation, however, changes if a non*democratic government 
is per se perceived as a threat to international peace. This is what the pro*force 
argument within the so*called Kantian theory of international law implies: “[A] war 
of self*defence by a democratic government and its allies against a despotic 
aggressor is a just war.”216 From the context of this statement it is clear that reference 
to self*defence against a despotic aggressor is not meant as against an aggressor from 
outside but against an aggressor who is deemed to lack domestic (democratic) 
legitimacy. In this understanding, states would enjoy attributes of statehood, 
including protection of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, based on the democratic 
legitimacy of their governments.  
Slaughter, on the other hand, concentrates on the expansion of the zone of 
liberal*democracy – and consequently of democratic peace – by peaceful means. Her 
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theory looks under the layer of state sovereignty and focuses on cooperation and 
networking between professionals from different states working in the same or 
similar branches, which impact governance both globally and within states.217 The 
foundation for such transnational networking is a common liberal*democratic 
identity in which societies, arguably, pursue similar goals.218 In Slaughter’s view, 
such networking should not be an exclusive club for professionals from liberal*
democratic states. Indeed, cooperation with professionals from non*liberal*
democratic states is of crucial importance for Slaughter and serves as a means for 
non*liberal*democratic states to get accustomed to liberal*democratic practices.219 
Slaughter ultimately sees a possibility for an expansion of the liberal*zone in this 
‘tutorial approach’ of professionals from liberal*democratic states towards 
counterparts from non*democratic states.220 Such tutelage and networking between 
professionals from liberal*democratic and non*liberal*democratic states should lead 
to adoption of liberal*democratic practices in non*liberal*democratic states, which 
would, according to neo*Kantian postulates, lead to peaceful behaviour in 
international affairs.221 
Such a conceptualisation, however, draws parallels with the system of 
international law developed in the nineteenth century, where a ‘standard of 
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civilisation’ was applied in order to decide on whether a state was to be admitted into 
the system of international law.222 The idea thus gets a neo*colonial spin, where the 
old colonial ‘civilising missions’ would be renamed ‘democratisation and 
pacification missions’. 
Slaughter further proposes development of an adequate normative framework 
which would allow us to distinguish between liberal and non*liberal states as well as 
provide us with a set of rules which would govern relations between them.223 Such a 
normative framework is, however, conceived on the platform of the procedural 
understanding of democracy, the association of democracy with certain liberal*
democratic institutions and postulates of the free market economy, and with the 
established hierarchy of civil and political rights.224 In short, the normative system to 
distinguish between liberal and non*liberal states adopts Fukuyama’s pattern, which 
pronounces a liberal*democracy wherever a capitalist economy is in existence.225 
Furthermore, while Slaughter does establish the category of illiberal states, which 
operate outside of the ‘zone of law’,226 her theory remains somewhat unclear as to 
what the consequences are of this status. 
 Conceptualising international law as law among liberal*democratic states 
rejects the principle of sovereign equality of states and replaces the concept of state 
sovereignty with the concept of popular sovereignty, which originates in democratic 
political theory.227 It attempts to create a system of international law based on the 
exclusive*club*approach and an expansion of this club would be sought. The 
                                                 
222 Simpson (2001), p. 546, consider especially the following argument: “Civilisation was a usefully 
illusive term”, however, even at that time it was perceived that “a civilised state was one that accorded 
basic rights to its citizens.” 
223 Slaughter (1995), p. 506. 
224 Slaughter adopts the definition of a liberal state developed by Doyle (compare supra n. 205). See 
Burley (1992), p. 1915. At a later point Slaughter (1997, p. 196) defines a non*liberal State as one that 
“has neither a representative government nor a market economy.”  
225 See Fukuyama (1992), p. 42.  
226 See supra notes 217–220. 
227 Compare infra ch. 5.2. 
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proposed means for the expansion of this club differentiate and range from informal 
networking among professionals from different states to pro*democratic 
interventions. Such views are, however, difficult to reconcile with the UN Charter 
system, which is based on the sovereign equality of states. Yet proponents of such a 
new international law do not seem to seek reconciliation with the UN Charter. 
Indeed, they seem to seek invention of a new international legal system228 which 
would take different types of governments into account. Liberal*democratic 
governments would be at least strongly favoured by the new international system, if 
not actually pronounced the only legitimate ones. However, as Koskenniemi argues, 
international law has been there before – when ‘civilisation’ was applied as a 
qualifying criterion.229  

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The democratic peace theory has both philosophical and empirical foundations. 
Philosophically, it is founded on the Kantian assumption that people are rational and 
prefer peace to war.230 Consequently, if the people have control over decision 
making and access to information, which are qualities of democratic states, their 
governments will conduct peaceful policies.231 The empirical foundation of the 
theory is based on the studies proving the absence of war between any two 
democracies. Perhaps the most influential study of this kind is that of Michael Doyle, 
who traces peace between democracies from 1817.232  
                                                 
228 Slaughter (1997), p. 183. 
229 See Koskenniemi (2000), p. 17. 
230 Kant (1795), Section II, First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Doyle (1983). 
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Both foundations of the theory have been subject to criticism. In regard to 
citizens’ control over war*making, it is argued that in modern constitutions, these 
decisions are “often not encumbered by reference to public opinion.”233 Indeed: 
In relatively few of the major constitutional democracies does the legislature have a substantial role in 
making war. The executive has accrued more and more power through the years by recourse to 
national security arguments. Even in cases where elected representatives are given a role in the 
Constitution, methods are found to circumvent these checks and balances.234 
Further, it cannot be assumed that people in democratic states will always disapprove 
of their governments getting involved in armed conflicts.235 Both problems have 
been affirmed in 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq. The United Kingdom went to 
war with Iraq despite the disapproval of an overwhelming majority of the United 
Kingdom’s population, who had no mechanism to prevent the war.236 In the United 
States, on the other hand, the government had the overwhelming approval of its 
citizenry to go to war with Iraq,237 which proves that it cannot be presumed that the 
populations of modern democracies would necessarily disapprove of war*making.   
The reliability of the empirical underpinnings of the democratic peace theory 
also remains questionable. The definition of war adopted for this empirical study 
excludes civil wars and covert operations of one democratic state against another 
one,238  and it sets the bar for a conflict to be defined as a war at a thousand 
fatalities.239 Despite these disputable methodological manoeuvres, there exist 
exceptions to the above*quoted rule that liberal states do not fight wars inter se. For 
                                                 
233 Simpson (1994), p. 122. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid., p. 123. 
236 See Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War, BBC, 11 February 2003 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm>. 
237  Poll: Most Back War, But Want U.N. Support, USA Today (16 March 2003) 
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003*03*16*poll*iraq_x.htm>. 
238 Doyle (1983), pp. 215–16.   
239 See Alvarez (2001), p. 234, n. 240 for a critical evaluation of such a statistical manoeuvre. The 
terminological distinction between war and conflict is problematic from the perspective of 
international humanitarian law, as such a distinction does not exist in its framework. For clarity of 
argument in this section the terminology adopted by democratic peace proponents will be used. 
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example Peru and Ecuador fought a war in 1941, although they were both classified 
as democratic states according to the underlying criteria of the democratic peace 
theory.240 
Further, the democratic peace theory is built on a procedural understanding of 
democracy241 and on a democratic self*image of some states,242 it ascribes the 
responsibility for conflicts to states deemed non*democratic and does not address the 
problem of an overtly aggressive behaviour of states deemed democratic vis*à*vis 
those deemed non*democratic.243  
Given the non*disputed inclination of democracies toward waging wars on 
states deemed non*democratic,244 the theory of the consent of an inherently rational 
and peaceful citizenry, significant for liberal*democracies, appears to be rather 
vague. To put it differently, this theory would only allow us to conclude that the 
population in a democracy behaves rationally and peacefully toward its ‘co*
democracies’, while it loses its peace*proneness and rationality when non*democratic 
states (and their respective populations) are in question. 
It is not possible to deny that democratic peace does exist in some form, but 
there is a question in which form it exists and whether it can really have any 
influence on international law. As one sceptical scholar has argued, “we are given no 
                                                 
240 See Doyle (1983), p. 213. Doyle (1983), p. 216–17 also invokes wars between England and the 
United States as well as the First World War. He concludes that these wars do not spoil the causality 
of democratic peace. According to Doyle, the United States became a liberal republic after 1865 (thus 
assuming that England in colonial times was a liberal state) and in reference to the First World War, 
Doyle (ibid.) argues that Imperial Germany may have been liberal on the domestic plane, while its 
citizenry did not have access to decision*making in foreign affairs. Especially the latter explanation is 
rather odd in light of the argument of the democratic peace theory that democratic government on the 
domestic plane per se fosters peaceful behaviour in international affairs. (Compare supra n. 201). 
Lastly, participation of the citizenry in decision*making in foreign affairs has always been restricted 
and remains restricted even now. It was not significant only for Imperial Germany (see supra n. 233.).  
241 See Doyle (1983), pp. 206–07. 
242 See Alvarez (2001), pp. 236–37. 
243 Ibid.,  p. 238, especially the following argument: “Liberal prescriptions for ‘perpetual peace’ say 
little about the possibility … that liberal states may have a tendency, perhaps a greater tendency than 
non*liberal states, to wage war on those that they perceive to be non*liberal.” 
244 Ibid. 
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reason … to believe that the liberal peace, if it exists and truly reflects something 
more than the transitory experience of a number of post*1945 democracies, matters 
to the legal developments at issue.”245 Democratic peace proponents generalise the 
absence of wars among democratic states as proof of the peaceful behaviour of 
democratic states in international affairs. In other words, they use the conclusion in 
order to interpret the premises. The overtly aggressive behaviour of liberal*
democratic states against those deemed non*liberal*democratic, however, disproves 
the validity of such an interpretation.  
 In what form democratic peace does exist is a comprehensive question and a 
detailed analysis would fall beyond the scope of this thesis. It is indeed difficult to 
find a convincing rationale for democratic peace and therefore “it is difficult to make 
it relevant to specific legal prescriptions.”246 Democratic peace might exist between 
mostly Western states, a fact which does not imply the peace*proneness of these 
states, but, perhaps, that “[d]emocracies seem able … to resolve … clashes by means 
other than war.”247 No other causality should be implied based on this conclusion. 
Further, taking into account the undisputed aggressiveness of democracies in relation 
to states deemed non*democratic,248 as well as claims that such a use of force should 
be legal, one could make a cynical conclusion that democracy gives one state the 
assurance that it would not be invaded by another democracy or a coalition of states 
led by a state with a democratic form of government which rhetorically invokes 
democratic ideals as a justification for a military intervention.  
 
                                                 
245 Ibid., p. 235. 
246 Ibid., especially the following argument: “As those international lawyers who have tried to 
examine the legal implications of the liberal peace have noted, finding out whether, for example, 
democracies do not make war on one another because of normative*cultural explanations, due to 
structural/institutional factors, or because of complex interactions between the two, would appear to 
have radically different implications as well as pose very distinct research methodologies.”  
247 Crawford (2001), p. 91.  
248 See supra n. 243. 
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Democracy has come into international legal parlance through human rights law. In 
the building period of the UN system, the noun ‘democracy’ was omitted from the 
relevant documents, while the provisions of human rights law arguably required 
some legal consequences, usually associated with the concept of democracy. In the 
Cold War period a liberal*democratic interpretation of these provisions was not the 
single authoritative one and general international law perceived political system to be 
a matter in the essential domestic jurisdiction of states. 
 At the end of the Cold War, when Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history 
and the ultimate victory of liberal*democracy, these ideas had an echo even in 
international law. The absence of the competing concept of people’s democracy 
inspired a liberal*democratic reading of human rights provisions, as well as 
interpretations of general international law with a pro*democratic bias.  Thus, on the 
one hand liberal*democracy was associated with certain human rights and on the 
other democracy was itself proclaimed a human right.  
 In regard to the claim that human rights provisions stipulate for a political 
system organised along liberal*democratic lines, this chapter has established that this 
was not a generally accepted position at the time of drafting of these provisions, and 
not even the end of the Cold War changed this perception. Yet such a universal 
pattern is not applicable to the framework of the ECHR, which at the time of its 
drafting did not imply a liberal*democratic interpretation of its references to 
democracy. Such an interpretation has, however, developed through the 
jurisprudence of the organs of the Convention. To some degree similar, though 
perhaps not so unequivocal, development has also been witnessed in the framework 
of the ACHR. 
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According to neo*liberal ideology, the end of the Cold War also meant a 
defeat of social, economic and cultural rights. Fukuyama expressly proclaimed the 
supremacy of the civil and political cluster and declared the social, economic and 
cultural cluster incompatible with both civil and political rights as well as with 
liberal*democracy itself.249 Liberal*democracy was defined in terms of electoral 
procedures and a free market economy. The definition adhered to the Schumpeterian 
procedural understanding of democracy, which perceives democracy as a method of 
choosing a government. The quality distinguishing it from a non*democratic method 
is that this method requires the consent of the governed, expressed at free and fair 
elections. The expression ‘free and fair elections’, however, requires fulfilment of 
some prerequisites that can be expressed in human rights language. The right to 
political participation thus comes at the centre of the procedural understanding of 
democracy, which is underpinned with a selection of other civil and political rights. 
This selection may vary from author to author but would commonly include freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion and the right to a fair trial.250  
From the political theory side it has been argued that the election*centric 
definition of democracy is inadequate. A more comprehensive definition is one in 
terms of the underlying principles of democracy,251 which are popular control over 
collective decision*making and the equality of all. However, these principles cannot 
be satisfied merely by a formally*guaranteed right to political participation. The 
equality of all and the control over collective decision*making also depend on social 
and economic requirements. Thus, social, economic and cultural rights are equally 
important as are civil and political rights. Further, human rights are not a synonym 
                                                 
249 Fukuyama (1992), pp. 42–43. 
250 See supra ch. 2.2.1., 2.3.1. and 2.4.1. 
251 See supra ch. 2.2.2. 
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for democracy. The two concepts are interdependent but can work in opposite 
directions.252 
The definition of democracy in terms of the right to political participation as a 
superior right and of a set of other civil and political rights establishes a hierarchy of 
human rights and arbitrarily limits the interdependence of human rights to a selection 
of civil and political rights. This is contrary to essential conceptual bases of human 
rights.  
It was on the basis of the procedural, electoral*centric, definition of 
democracy that the right to democratic governance was conceived. At the end of the 
Cold War it was argued that virtually all of humanity was embracing liberal*
democracy as the only legitimate political system.253 It was, furthermore, argued that 
the people’s consent validates governance while, without persuasive evidence, it was 
presumed that the people’s consent would also be in favour of a Western*style 
democracy.254 Thus a global normative entitlement to democracy was proclaimed 
where democracy is no longer treated as merely a political system, but as a human 
right. Based on the notion of popular sovereignty, it was argued that political system 
is no longer in the essential domestic jurisdiction of states. Consequently, a non*
democratic government would no longer be considered legitimate.  
There are many problematic aspects associated with this theory. Initially it 
assumes that the people’s legitimate choice would always be a “Western” style 
liberal*democracy. However, a global shift to democracy cannot be universalised. 
The theory of the right to democratic governance also stipulates for international 
legitimisation of governance.255 This legitimisation is electoral*centric, adopting the 
                                                 
252 See supra ch. 2.2.2. 
253 See supra ch. 2.4.1. 
254 See supra ch. 2.4.1. 
255 See supra ch. 2.4.1. 
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procedural definition of democracy, and draws its determinacy in election*
monitoring.256 The right to democratic governance thus effectively becomes a right 
to monitored elections. 
The idea related to the normative democratic entitlement is that of bringing 
the democratic peace theory into international law. It builds on postulates similar to 
those of the normative democratic entitlement school, stresses the importance of a 
non*state*centric analysis of the international society and implies that the internal 
organisation of a state is reflected in its behaviour in international affairs. It is argued 
by its supporters that international law should accommodate the differences between 
states organised along liberal*democratic lines and those adhering to a different 
political organisation. Consequently, international law would become law among 
liberal*democratic states.  
Despite some statistical manoeuvres and caveats used for validation of the 
peace*proneness of democratic states vis*à*vis other democracies, democratic peace, 
arguably, only exists in some form among Western states.257 From this conclusion no 
other correlations should be implied. The major deficiency of the theory is that it tells 
nothing about the behaviour of democratic states vis*à*vis those deemed non*
democratic.258 The aggressiveness toward non*democratic states also disproves the 
Kantian rationale behind it, namely that people with a republican education 
understand that war is evil and would not support waging a war.259 Since people in 
democracies have the final say over the decision*making, it is maintained that war in 
the last instance would not be waged.260 Yet this chapter has shown that people in 
                                                 
256 See supra ch. 2.4.1. and 2.4.2. 
257 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
258 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
259 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
260 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
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contemporary democracies do not have the final control over war*making.261 Further, 
the support for, say, the Iraq invasion in the United States in 2003 shows that the 
people’s understanding of wars as something inherently evil is not something which 
could be automatically presupposed in democratic states.262   
The means of expansion of democratic peace and of the international 
guarantee of a normative democratic entitlement also became an important question. 
While more modest proponents of the theory call for a slow and patient expansion 
through international cooperation and professional networks of multiple 
disaggregated states,263 more radical proponents propose a right to war of democratic 
states vis*à*vis those not deemed democratic.264 Thus, non*democratic states could 
ultimately lose some attributes of statehood. 
This chapter showed that democracy cannot be regarded as a continuous 
requirement for states in order to possess the attributes of statehood. It may well be 
that type of government and some democratic standards have played some role in 
situations of new state creations, but it remains questionable whether democratic 
standards operate within the concept of statehood criteria, recognition requirements, 
or have impacted the practice of new state creations in some other way. The 
forthcoming chapters therefore deal with international law governing the creation 
and recognition of states and the exercise of the right of self*determination. Although 
the European image of democracy cannot be universalised,265 it might have been 
envisaged by some documents regarding the creation and recognition of states in the 
post*Cold War period.  
                                                 
261 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
262 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
263 See supra ch. 2.5.1. 
264 See supra ch. 2.5.1. 
265 See supra ch. 2.3.3. 
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This chapter deals with the law of statehood and the act of recognition. It considers 
the norms constituting the statehood criteria and their relationship with the act of 
recognition. It is further examined to what degree recognition is a political and to 
what degree a law*governed act. The main focus of this chapter is the developments 
in the UN Charter era in the pre*1991 period. It outlines the traditional statehood 
criteria and the development of the additional statehood criteria and analyses the 
legal significance of non*recognition. The obligation to withhold recognition and the 
concept of the additional statehood criteria are examined to see if they may be 
problematic in light of the generally perceived role of recognition in contemporary 
international law.  
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The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, in its Article 1, 
provides: “The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory, (c) government; 
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”266 These provisions have 
acquired the status of customary international law.267 However, “the question 
remains whether these criteria are sufficient for Statehood, as well as being 
necessary.”268  
                                                 
266 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 165 LNTS 19 (1933), Article 1. 
267 See Harris (2004), p. 99. 
268 Dixon and McCorquodale (2003), p. 137.  
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The criteria of a permanent population and defined territory do not prescribe 
any minimum requirement of surface area or a minimum population*figure.269 As to 
the criterion of defined territory, international law does not require that all borders of 
a state need to be undisputed but rather demands “sufficient consistency” of the 
territory.270 Further, “a group of people without a territory cannot establish a 
State”271 and a territory alone cannot be considered a state without a group of people 
intending to inhabit it permanently. A qualifying group of people may, however, 
consist of different peoples,272 and of people of different nationalities,273 hence a 
permanent population has been defined as “[a]n aggregate of individuals of both 
sexes who live together as a community in spite of the fact that they may belong to 
different races or creeds, or be different in colour.”274 
The criterion of government has been described as “the most important single 
criterion of statehood, since all the others depend upon it.”275 This is so because 
“governmental authority is the basis for normal inter*State relations; what is an act of 
a State is defined primarily by reference to its organs of government, legislative, 
executive or judicial.”276 A government of a state needs not only to exist as an 
authority but also to exercise effective control in the territory of a state, as well as to 
operate independently from the authority of governments of other states.277 In this 
                                                 
269 See Crawford (2006), pp. 46–47 and pp. 52–53.  
270 See the German*Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal: “[I]t is enough that this territory [of a state] has 
sufficient consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited, and that the 
State actually exercises independent public authority over that territory.” Deutsche Continental Gas6
Gesellschaft v Polish State (1929), pp. 11–15. This position was later confirmed by the ICJ: “There is 
… no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often in various 
places and for long periods they are not.” North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Rep 1969, para 46.  
271 Raič (2002), p. 60.  
272 Ibid., p. 58.  
273 See Crawford (2006), pp. 52–53. 
274 Oppenheim, International Law (Lauterpacht, ed.) (1955), p. 118.  
275 Crawford (2006), p. 56.  
276 Ibid.  
277 See Aust (2005), pp. 136–37, arguing: “There must be a central government operation as a political 
body within the law of the land and in effective control over the territory … The government must be 
sovereign and independent, so that within its territory it is not subject to authority of another state.” 
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regard, the International Commission of Jurists held that the Finnish Republic in the 
period of 1917 to 1918 did not become a sovereign state “until the public authorities 
had become strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of that 
State without the assistance of foreign troops.”278 It is important to note that type of 
government was traditionally not important.279 It will be examined at a later point 
how and to what degree this has changed.  
The capacity to enter into relations with other states is said to be a corollary 
of a sovereign and independent government, which exercises jurisdiction on the 
territory of the state.280 As such, it is “a consequence of statehood, not a criterion for 
it.”281 Indeed, the criterion is self*fulfilling as non*state entities cannot enter into 
relations with foreign states on the same level as do states. They have this capacity 
once they become states. Nevertheless, non*state actors have some limited capacity 
to enter into relations with states, as the “[c]apacity to enter into relations with States 
at the international level is no longer, if it ever was, an exclusive State 
prerogative.”282 This capacity is also significant for international organisations and 
even for subunits of states.283 However, such a limited capacity cannot imply 
statehood of the subunit in question.  Further, the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states needs to be distinguished from the actual existence of relations, which is 
                                                                                                                                          
See also Raič (2002), p. 75, defining independence of a state as possessing “the legal capacity to act 
as it wishes, within the limits given by international law.” (italics in original).  
278 Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations 
with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question.  
LNOJ Spec. Supp. 3 (1920) [hereinafter: The Aaland Islands case (1920)], pp. 8–9. 
279 See Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000), p. 132.   
280 Ibid., p. 132, arguing: “Sovereignty means both full competence to act in the external arena, for 
example by entering into treaties or by acting to preserve state security, and exclusive jurisdiction over 
internal matters.”  
281 Crawford (2006), p. 61. 
282 Ibid.  
283 See Raič (2002), p. 73. See also Harris (2004), p. 106, arguing: “Units within a federal state may 
or may not be allowed by the federal constitution some freedom to conduct their own foreign affairs. 
If, and to the extent that, they are allowed to do so, such units are regarded by international law as 
having international personality … Such units are not thereby states but international persons sui 
generis.” (italics in original).  
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a matter of policy of states.284 In other words, the law of statehood does not impose 
an obligation upon states to enter into relations with other states if they do not wish 
to do so. 
Once states have acquired statehood, the latter is difficult to lose, even when 
the traditional criteria are no longer met. Indeed, statehood criteria only apply to 
newly*created states and not to existing ones.285 A clear example of this doctrine is 
Somalia, which continues to be a state although its government does not exercise 
effective control over its territory.286  
The traditional statehood criteria are criticised for being “essentially based on 
the principle of effectiveness,”287 as nineteenth century international law was ready 
to acknowledge statehood to any entity fulfilling the traditional statehood criteria and 
showing sufficient durability of its existence.288 The traditional criteria are therefore 
often considered to be effectiveness*based. Yet in contemporary international law 
there exists important evidence that effectiveness is no longer the only principle 
governing the law of statehood, as some additional criteria are also considered.  

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The criteria described as ‘additional’ do not originate specifically in the law of 
statehood but are rather concepts developed in other fields of international law which 
impact the law of statehood. The prohibition of the illegal use of force, respect of the 
right of self*determination and respect for human rights in general (not only of the 
right of self*determination) have most commonly been identified as such criteria.289   
                                                 
284 See Raič (2002), p. 73.  
285 McCorquodale (2005), p. 192. 
286 See generally Lyons and Samatar (1995).  
287 Crawford (2006), p. 97.  
288 Raič (2002), p. 57. 
289 See McCorquodale (2005), p. 191. 
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 The prohibition of the use of force is expressed in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.290 It is argued that the protection of states accorded in this Article:  
[E]xtends to continuity of legal personality in the face of illegal invasion and annexation: there is a 
substantial body of practice protecting the legal personality of the State against extinction, despite 
prolonged lack of effectiveness. [However] [t]he question is whether modern law regulates the 
creation of states to any greater degree than this, in a situation involving illegal use of force.291  
International law thus protects existing states from having their international 
personality extinguished, even when the effective situation suggests that a state no 
longer exists.292 At the same time, some evidence suggests that when a new effective 
entity emerges as a result of an illegal use of force, such an entity will not acquire 
statehood. These issues will be further discussed below. 
The right of self*determination is expressed in the common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Further, this right 
“has been declared in other international treaties and instruments, is generally 
accepted as customary international law and could even form part of jus cogens.”293 
The exercise of this right will be more thoroughly discussed at a later point in this 
thesis. In regard to the question of statehood, the right of self*determination has 
“softened” the traditional criterion of effective government: “The evolution of self*
determination has affected the standard necessary as far as the actual exercise of 
authority is concerned, so that it appears a lower level of effectiveness, at least in 
decolonisation situations, has been accepted.”294 While the right of self*
                                                 
290 UN Charter, Article 2(4). 
291 Crawford (2006), p. 132. 
292 The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait which was proclaimed null and void by the Security Council 
Resolution 662 may serve as an example of such.  See SC Res 662 (9 August 1990).  
293 McCorquodale (1994), p. 858. 
294 Shaw (2003), p. 183. Shaw (ibid, pp. 182–83) gives examples of the Congo and Guinea*Bissau. 
The Congo became an independent state on 30 June 1960. Although the province of Katanga declared 
its secession, the central government did not exercise effective control and there even existed two 
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determination may – at least this was the case in colonial situations – justify the 
creation of a new state even when effectiveness*based criteria are not met, there is a 
question as to whether self*determination may override effectiveness also in the other 
direction, i.e. if statehood can be denied to an effective entity created in violation of 
the right of self*determination. These issues will be further discussed below. 
 The question remains of whether human rights in general play any role in the 
creation of states. Crawford argues: 
[T]here is so far in modern practice no suggestion that as regards statehood itself, there exists any 
criterion requiring regard for fundamental human rights. The cases are numerous of governments 
violating fundamental norms of human rights; there is no case where such violations have called in 
question statehood itself.295 
There have been references to certain human rights made in relation to the creation 
of states in the era of decolonisation but it has been established that human rights 
standards invoked in this context aimed to foster the exercise of the right of self*
determination and were not expressed as conditions for statehood.296 Further, the 
statehood criteria are only relevant in relation to the creation of new states and not in 
relation to existing ones, in a sense that a state no longer fulfilling them would no 
longer be a state.297 Thus, the statehood of existing states could not be disputed on 
the basis of human rights violations, even if respect for human rights were accepted 
as a statehood criterion. Significantly, an entity wishing to become a state can only 
adopt institutional provisions for the protection of human rights but there can be no 
guarantee that it would not violate them in practice. At the same time international 
law does not foresee a loss of statehood if an existing state no longer meets all of the 
                                                                                                                                          
competing factions claiming to be the government of the Congo. Guinea*Bissau declared 
independence on 24 September 1973, which was accepted by majority of states in the General 
Assembly, although the rebel forces controlled between two*thirds and three*quarters of the territory.  
295 Crawford (2006), p. 148.  
296 See infra ch. 3.3.3. 
297 See supra n. 285.  
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statehood criteria,298 which would consequently also apply for the respect of human 
rights if this were a statehood criterion. In the pre*1991 era, human rights in general 
were therefore not a statehood criterion; however, it might be possible to argue that 
this is not the case when human rights of a jus cogens character are in question.299  
The additional criteria of statehood set legality*based standards for entities 
wishing to become states and thus look beyond mere effectiveness as adhered to by 
the traditional criteria. This does not mean that traditional criteria are no longer 
important but rather that the additional set of criteria may prevent effective entities 
from acquiring statehood. It also should be noted that the concept of the additional 
statehood criteria remains somewhat controversial and has not been acknowledged 
by all scholars.300 This issue will be further discussed below. 
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Recognition is argued to be “a method of accepting factual situations and endowing 
them with legal significance, but this relationship is a complicated one.”301  Indeed, 
the relationship between factual situations and the creation of legal rights by the act 
of recognition remains a controversial issue in international law, since the act has 
legal consequences while it is “primarily based on political or other non*legal 
considerations.”302 Yet, there exist strong suggestions that this act is no longer 
merely political but has become, at least to some degree, a law*governed process.  
 Traditionally two theories of recognition were developed: constitutive and 
declaratory. The constitutive theory perceives recognition as “a necessary act before 
                                                 
298 See supra n. 286. 
299 For more see infra ch. 3.3.3.4. 
300 See infra ch. 3.3.2. for Talmon's argument against the additional statehood criteria.  
301 Shaw (2003), p. 185. 
302 McCorquodale (2005), p. 193. 
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the recognized entity can enjoy an international personality”,303 while the declaratory 
theory perceives it as “merely a political act recognizing a pre*existing state of 
affairs.”304   
In regard to the constitutive theory of recognition, the question of “whether or 
not an entity has become a state depends on the actions [i.e. recognitions] of existing 
states.”305 However, the situation in which one state may be recognised by some 
states but not by others is an evident problem and thus a great deficiency of the 
constitutive theory.306 In the absence of a central international authority for granting 
of recognition, this would mean that such an entity at the same time has and does not 
have an international personality.307 
Therefore, most writers have adopted a view that recognition is 
declaratory.308 This means that a “state may exist without being recognized, and if it 
does exist, in fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognized by other 
states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state.”309 According to this view, when 
recognition actually follows, other states merely recognise a pre*existing situation. 
However, this answer does not seem to be entirely satisfactory, as it is not evident 
why the act of recognition is still important. Indeed: 
It is only by recognition that the new state acquires the status of a sovereign state under international 
law in its relations with the third states recognizing it as such. If it were to acquire this legal status 
before and independently of recognition by the existing states … this legal consequence under 
international law would occur automatically and could no longer be prevented by withholding 
recognition of the entity as a state. 310 
                                                 
303 Dixon and McCorquodale (2003), p. 154. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Grant (1999), p. 2. 
306 Brierly (1963), p. 138. 
307 Ibid.  
308 See Harris (2004), p. 145.  
309 Brierly (1963), p. 138. 
310 Hillgruber (1998), p. 494.  
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As a result there would be virtually no consequences of non*recognition. As 
Hillgruber further argues: “Legal personality under international law, which non*
recognition was intended to prevent, would already have been acquired, and non*
recognition would then in a sense be futile … without this flaw [of non*recognition] 
having any significant legal consequences under international law.”311 Thus, despite 
the general perception of recognition as being declaratory, it is not possible to deny 
that it does have constitutive elements, since international personality may depend on 
recognition.312   
Hersch Lauterpacht proposed that in the absence of a central international 
authority for granting of recognition, states need to perform this duty.313 
Lauterpacht’s view was that once an entity has met the criteria of statehood, existing 
states have a duty to recognise such an entity as a state and thus award it the rights 
and duties of a state.314 Such a solution would be both declaratory and constitutive, 
since it acknowledges a factual situation, i.e. meeting of the statehood criteria, and 
creates a new legal situation, i.e. awards statehood to the entity in question. This 
proposal has been challenged for its contradictory nature,315 as well as for 
insufficient state practice proving that states accept such a duty to recognise entities 
fulfilling the statehood criteria.316  
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In relation to the debate on the concept of the additional criteria and recognition 
theories, the scope and legal effects of collective recognition and non*recognition 
                                                 
311 Ibid.  
312 Ibid.  
313 Lauterpacht (1948), pp. 12–24 
314 Ibid. 
315 It has been argued that Lauterpacht’s theory “which makes recognition obligatory in conformity 
with the objective facts of a State’s existence defeats its own premise, since it ceases to be constitutive 
and in fact becomes declaratory however it may be described.” Marek (1968), p. 137. 
316 Ibid. 
 65 
have also become controversial topics. This section considers the legal significance 
of collective non*recognition and the relationship between non*recognition and the 
statehood criteria. Two main concepts in the theory of collective non*recognition will 
be distinguished: the prohibition of premature recognition and the doctrine of 
obligatory non*recognition. The former predominantly refers to prohibition of 
recognition before an entity has satisfied the traditional, effectiveness*based, 
statehood criteria. The latter predominantly refers to non*recognition of an effective 
entity which, having satisfied the traditional criteria, is not recognised as a state due 
to its illegal creation, i.e. does not satisfy the additional statehood criteria.  
An argument in favour of divorcing the additional statehood criteria from the 
prohibition of premature recognition is that it is inherent for the traditional, 
effectiveness*based, criteria that they might not be met at a certain point in time, but 
this does not mean that they could not be met in the future. Recognition can thus be 
premature. On the other hand, the additional criteria are legality*based. 
Consequently, if an entity is established illegally, time would normally not annul this 
illegality.317 Recognition of an illegally created entity therefore cannot be premature, 
only illegal.   
Premature recognition comes into question in the case of a secessionist entity 
trying to break off from its parent state. In such a case “[f]oreign states must then 
decide whether the new state has really already safely and permanently established 
itself, or only makes efforts to this end without having already succeeded.”318 If an 
entity has not satisfied the statehood criteria, recognition is considered “an unlawful 
act, and it is frequently maintained that such untimely recognition amounts to 
                                                 
317 It should be added that it is possible that an illegally*created entity “recreates” itself in accordance 
with the additional statehood criteria but then this is no longer the same entity, although the same 
territory may be in question. 
318 Oppenheim’s International Law (Jennings and Watts, eds.) (1992), p. 143.  
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[unlawful] intervention.”319 In the case of recognition when an entity fails to meet 
statehood criteria, “nullity of certain acts of recognition has been accepted in 
practice.”320 However, this has not always been the case.  
Examples of premature recognition include the United States’ recognition of 
Israel (1948)321 and India’s recognition of Bangladesh (1971).322 Despite this 
premature recognition, Bangladesh subsequently received general recognition.323 
Israel remains unrecognised by a number of Arab states; however, their non*
recognition is “premised primarily on a determination to deny political legitimacy 
and not statehood to Israel.”324 Israel is a member of the UN and it is generally not 
disputed that it is a state.325 In the context of decolonisation there have been 
examples of recognition granted to former colonies which did not fulfil the statehood 
criteria.326 However, as argued above, one can ascribe this anomaly to the fact that 
the right of self*determination at that time somewhat “softened” the traditional 
statehood criteria, and decolonisation, via the exercise of the right of self*
determination, prevailed over effectiveness.327 
In the case of an illegally created entity, the doctrine of obligatory non*
recognition applies, which means that recognition of such an effective entity is 
collectively withheld. Arguably, non*recognition of an illegally created entity is an 
obligation owed erga omnes.328 Advocates of the declaratory theory who adopt the 
concept of the additional set of legality*based statehood criteria argue that the 
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320 Crawford (2006), p. 21. Crawford further invokes the accepted possibility of a nullity of 
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324 Dugard (1987), p. 61 (italics in original).  
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326 See supra n. 294. 
327 See supra n. 294. 
328 Raič (2002), p. 107. 
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purpose of collectively withholding recognition to illegally created entities is not that 
recognition could constitute statehood of such an entity but is merely an affirmation 
of a legally non*existent situation. One such argument is well*captured in the 
following paragraph:  
[T]he obligation of non*recognition has a declaratory character in the sense that States are considered 
to be under a legal obligation not to recognize a specific situation which is already legally non*
existent. Thus, the obligation of withholding recognition is not the cause of the fact that an illegal act 
does not produce the intended results, that is, legal rights for the wrongdoer. Non*recognition merely 
declares or confirms that fact and the obligation not to grant recognition prevents the validation or 
‘curing’ of the illegal act or the situation resulting from that act.329 
 Such an argument is not entirely persuasive. Talmon argues that the call for 
collective non*recognition of an illegally created effective entity indeed implies that 
such an entity could become a state through recognition and that proponents of the 
declaratory theory do not adequately prove that this is not so.330 Talmon, however, 
does not make an argument in favour of the constitutive theory but rather questions 
the concept of the additional statehood criteria, arguing that “adherents of the 
declaratory theory were forced to develop additional criteria for statehood, which in 
the case of the collectively non*recognized States were obviously not met, in order to 
explain non*recognition as confirming the objective legal situation [that an illegally 
created effective entity is not a state].”331 In this view, not acknowledging that 
illegally created effective entities are states is the ‘original sin’ which leads to two 
problems: (i) implying constitutive effects to the act of recognition and (ii) treatment 
of some recognition requirements as statehood criteria. Talmon consequently argues 
that “[t]he collectively non*recognized States may be ‘illegal States’ [but] they are 
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nevertheless still ‘States’”332 and that “the additional criteria of legality proposed are 
not criteria for statehood but merely conditions for recognition, viz reasons for not 
recognizing existing States.”333 
 In this perception, only the rights stemming from statehood are withheld by 
collective non*recognition, not the status of a state itself:334  “The creation of a State 
cannot be undone by non*recognition alone, and so non*recognition cannot have 
status6destroying effect either. What can be done, however, is to withhold the rights 
inherent in statehood from a new State. To that extent, non*recognition has a 
negatory, i.e. a status6denying, effect.”335 
 Although the critique of the constitutive nature of recognition, which stems 
from the concept of the additional statehood criteria and the doctrine of collective 
non*recognition, is well*made, Talmon’s arguments are not unproblematic. The 
argument, that the additional statehood criteria are merely an attempt to explain why 
the doctrine of collective non*recognition does not imply that recognition can have 
constitutive effects, ignores the fact that a similar relationship exists between the 
traditional statehood criteria and the prohibition of premature recognition.336 In some 
circumstances where recognition was granted before the traditional statehood criteria 
were met,337 it would be possible to argue that statehood was constituted.  
 Talmon’s arguments also suggest that a non*recognised state does not have 
all the rights stemming from statehood, i.e. it does not have all the attributes of 
statehood. It is, however, rather difficult to accept that there exist two types of states, 
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those with all and those with only some attributes of statehood.338 This seems to be 
unacceptable from the perspective of sovereign equality of states.339 On the other 
hand, denying statehood to illegally created effective entities does not lead to the 
problem of having states with differing attributes of statehood under international 
law. It is undisputed that effective entities have some but not all rights and duties 
under international law340 and thus some attributes of statehood. However, by being 
non*states, their unequal status vis*à*vis states does not disturb the principle of 
sovereign equality. 
 What I propose here is that the concept of the additional statehood criteria 
should not be dismissed on grounds of the argument that the doctrine of collective 
non*recognition, triggered by non*fulfilment of these criteria, suggests that 
recognition may sometimes have constitutive effects. I rather propose that it might be 
worthwhile to acknowledge that in some circumstances recognition will have 
constitutive effects. This is not to say that the declaratory view needs to be rejected. 
Indeed, it does not need to be disputed that the emergence of new states is merely a 
matter of fact.341 However, what should be acknowledged is that such facts are 
sometimes produced by considerable international involvement, in which the act of 
recognition and the doctrine of collective non*recognition play significant roles. 
Crawford argues that: 
[I]n many cases, and this is true of the nineteenth century as of the twentieth, international action has 
been determinative [for new state creations]: international organizations or groups of States—
especially the so*called ‘Great Powers’—have exercised a collective authority to supervise, regulate 
and condition … new state creations. In some cases the action takes the form of the direct 
                                                 
338 This does not mean that non*recognised states cannot exist. Below an argument will be made that 
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339 UN Charter, Article 2(1). 
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establishment of the new State: a constitution is provided, the State territory is delimited, a head of 
State is nominated. In others it is rather a form of collective recognition—although the distinction is 
not a rigid one. Alternatively, various international regimes have been established for particular 
territories or groups of territories, with eventual independence in view—in particular, the Mandate and 
Trusteeship systems, and the procedures established under Chapter XI of the [UN] Charter.342  
Crawford rejects the constitutive theory;343 however, this observation implies that 
collective state creations are not only a matter of direct multilateral state*making 
such as, for example, at the Congress of Berlin344 or settlements after both world 
wars.345 Collective recognition can also have constitutive effects and is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish from collective state creations. This is especially the case 
when the territorial status of an entity is unclear and/or there exists a competing 
claim to territorial integrity by a parent state.346 These issues will be further explored 
at a later point in this thesis, where post*1991 state creations will be examined. 
Arguments will be made that collective state creation and/or collective recognition 
does not need to be a matter of institutionalised international action but can be also 
be a consequence of informal agreement and/or ‘concerted practice’ among certain 
states.  
When acknowledging some constitutive effects in the act of recognition, 
caveats accompanying the constitutive theory need to be considered.347 Indeed, if 
collective recognition by certain states is considered equivalent to state creation, the 
inevitable question that follows is how many and whose recognitions are necessary 
for collective recognition to be seen as state creation. However, this question could 
also be asked from the other direction: in absence of a Security Council Chapter VII 
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Resolution explicitly calling for non*recognition, how many and whose withholdings 
of recognition are required that an entity is not considered a state? As the recent 
example of Kosovo shows, this question is not easy to answer and will be dealt with 
at a later point. 
As to the effects of non*recognition, the situation is relatively clear when the 
Resolution is in question as “the incidents of non*recognition will normally be 
spelled out in the instruments.”348 The question remains of what the effects of 
collective non*recognition are when it is practiced without a specific resolution. Even 
if an entity is not recognised, this does not mean that it does not have rights and 
obligations under international law. Indeed: 
[T]he governments of both Israel and Palestine are expected to comply with customary international 
law, no matter what their international status. Similarly, the international recognition in 1999 of both 
Kosovo and East Timor as having some form of international personality was a necessary 
consequence of international actions on those territories.349 
Further, judicial decisions – those of the ICJ as well as some significant decisions of 
domestic courts – show that even non*recognised entities and illegally annexed 
territories have some sovereign powers in the disputable territory when people’s 
interest or “private rights” are in question. As the ICJ held in the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion: 
[T]he non*recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in depriving 
the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international co*operation. In particular, while 
official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after 
the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, 
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such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be 
ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.350 
 This section shows that the prohibition of premature recognition and the 
doctrine of obligatory non*recognition bring legal considerations into the otherwise 
political act of recognition. Non*recognition on legal grounds stems from non*
fulfilment of statehood criteria, traditional and/or additional. The problematic aspect 
of collective non*recognition is, however, that it implies that recognition may in 
some circumstances create a state. An argument was made that the most convenient 
response to this problem might be to simply acknowledge that (collective) 
recognition can sometimes have constitutive effects and that it is sometimes difficult 
to separate it from collective state creation.  
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Development of the doctrine of collective non*recognition of illegally created 
effective entities arguably began in the era of the League of Nations and collective 
response to the creation of Manchukuo and of European annexations and puppet 
states. 
After Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and establishment of the State 
of Manchukuo,351 the latter was not universally recognised as a state. On 11 March 
1932, the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution in relation to 
Manchukuo in which it held that “[i]t is incumbent upon the Members of the League 
of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought 
                                                 
350 The Namibia Advisiory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1971, para 125. In the practice of the United Kingdom’s 
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about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of 
Paris.”352 Despite this proclamation, it remains questionable whether Manchukuo 
may really serve as an early example of the doctrine of obligatory non*recognition. 
Indeed, the Lytton Commission, established by the League to enquire on the case of 
Manchukuo, found that the entity lacked independence and was a puppet state of 
Japan.353 Consequently, statehood could be denied based on traditional criteria and 
not due to its illegal creation.354 
 International responses to the annexations and establishing of puppet*states in 
Europe and in Africa by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany355 as well as by the Soviet 
Union356 do not give a unitary answer to whether the new effective situations were 
recognised. Indeed, “[t]he extinction of Austria, Albania and Czechoslovakia was 
recognized by most European Powers”357 and submergence of the Baltic States 
“widely if tacitly accepted”,358 while the Independent State of Croatia was 
recognised only by Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Japan.359  
 Like Manchukuo, the situation in Europe also invoked questions of 
independence of the newly*created states. Albania, Slovakia and Croatia, though 
each in a constitutionally different position, can be merely described as puppet states 
                                                 
352 LNOJ (March 1932), p. 384. Notably, the Covenant of the League of Nations dealt with the 
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of Italy and Germany, respectively.360 Thus, similarly to Manchukuo, their statehood 
can be disputed under the traditional statehood criteria. It therefore remains 
somewhat unclear whether unlawful use of force in the interwar period was 
considered a barrier which prevented Manchukuo and some European entities from 
becoming states. One can say that there existed insufficient state practice, as well as 
insufficient opinio juris, to support such a claim.361 Nevertheless, “State and League 
practice, albeit inconsistent, demonstrated a clear trend in favour of the non*
recognition of territorial conquests, if necessary, of the non*recognition of an aspirant 
State produced by conquest.”362 
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In 1974, the officers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which was backed by 
Greece, overthrew the central government of Cyprus.363 In response, Turkey 
militarily intervened and established an effective Turkish entity in Northern 
Cyprus.364 
Turkey maintained that the intervention aimed to protect Turkish Cypriots;365 
however, the Security Council adopted Resolution 353 in which the intervention was 
condemned.366 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared 
independence on 15 November 1983,367 after negotiations on a possible federal 
arrangement between Turkish and Greek Cypriot entities failed.368 
Upon proclamation of independence of the TRNC, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 541 in which it, inter alia,  called “upon all States to respect the 
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sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non*alignment of the Republic of 
Cyprus”,369 and called “upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than 
the Republic of Cyprus.”370 While Resolution 541 was not adopted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the TRNC was not recognised by any state other than 
Turkey.371   
Illegal creation is not the only issue where the statehood of the TRNC can be 
disputed. The continuous presence of the Turkish military and its political 
dependence on Turkey lead to the conclusion that the TRNC’s statehood may be 
disputed under the traditional statehood criteria. Namely, it is questionable whether 
the TRNC has government which is independent from the government of any other 
state. As was held by ECtHR in Cyprus v Turkey: 
[T]he Court’s reasoning is framed in terms of a broad statement of principle as regards Turkey’s 
general responsibility under the Convention for the policies and actions of the “TRNC” authorities. 
Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, its responsibility cannot be confined to the acts 
of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the 
local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support. It follows that, in 
terms of Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey’s “jurisdiction” must be considered to extend to securing 
the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which 
she has ratified, and that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey.372 
One possible argument is therefore that Turkey is in effective control of the TRNC, 
which is a puppet*state of Turkey. Nevertheless, if the TRNC attracted a significant 
number of recognitions, it would be difficult to argue that it is not a state.  
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On 11 November 1965, the government of Southern Rhodesia issued the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI).373 This was done despite the fact that both the 
General Assembly and the Security Council adopted a set of resolutions in which the 
white*minority government, due to the exclusion of the black population from 
political participation, was proclaimed as non*representative of the entire population 
of Southern Rhodesia and thus held not to be the right authority to declare 
independence.374 The Security Council called on the United Kingdom not to 
decolonise Southern Rhodesia and on other states to withhold recognition.375 
 Upon the issuing of the UDI, UN organs continued the initiative for collective 
non*recognition. The General Assembly Resolution 2024 condemned “the unilateral 
declaration of independence made by the racialist minority in Southern Rhodesia”376 
and recommended the matter to the Security Council.377 The Security Council 
adopted Resolution 216, in which it condemned “the unilateral declaration of 
independence made by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia.”378 It further decided 
“to call upon all States not to recognize this illegal racist minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal regime.”379 This 
Resolution was followed by Resolution 217, in which the Security Council 
condemned “the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in Southern 
Rhodesia and [regarded] the declaration of independence by it as having no legal 
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validity;”380 and called “upon all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not 
to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it.”381 
 All states, including apartheid South Africa,382complied with the resolutions 
and “Rhodesia was at no stage recognized by any State.”383 Such a situation occurred 
despite the fact that there was no doubt that Southern Rhodesia met the traditional 
criteria for statehood.384 None of the relevant resolutions directly invoked Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, though references to international peace and security were 
made. The legal status of some of the resolutions is thus questionable;385 however, in 
absence of a direct reference to Chapter VII they were probably not legally binding. 
Upon Southern Rhodesia’s proclamation of a republic on 18 March 1970,386 
the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted 
Resolution 277, in which it decided “that Member States shall refrain from 
recognizing this illegal regime or from rendering assistance to it.”387 Call for non*
recognition of Southern Rhodesia thus doubtlessly became legally binding, although 
full compliance was achieved already after previous resolutions, even though they 
had probably not been legally binding.388 
The Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Southern 
Rhodesia notably avoided the use of the term ‘state’. The reason for this stems from 
the purpose of these Resolutions, namely preventing Southern Rhodesia from 
acquiring statehood. The Security Council and the General Assembly did not want to 
cause any ambiguity, which could have resulted if the term ‘state’ were used. 
                                                 
380 SC Res 217 (20 November 1965) para 3. 
381 Ibid., para 6.  
382 Dugard (1987), p. 91: “South Africa, with which Rhodesia maintained diplomatic relations and 
close economic and political ties, refrained from according express recognition to Rhodesia.”  
383 Ibid., p. 91. 
384 Ibid., p. 91.  
385 Ibid., p. 95. 
386 Ibid., pp. 92–93. 
387 SC Res 277 (18 March 1970), para 2.  
388 Compare supra n. 385. 
 78 
Consequently, the language used in the Resolutions may lead us to the conclusion 
that the matter in question is actually non*recognition of the government.389 
However, “the real issue was the statehood of Rhodesia, as the purpose of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence was to establish Rhodesia as an independent 
State.”390 In other words, although legitimacy of the white minority government was 
denied, this was done in the context of the UDI, i.e. that the white minority 
government was not a legitimate authority to proclaim independence.391 
Notable from resolutions of the UN organs in reference to Southern Rhodesia 
are the references to democracy and democratic principles, even to political 
parties.392 However, references to democracy and democratic principles in the 
relevant resolutions were limited to the framework of the right of self*determination 
and to the question of how this right is to be exercised.393 Indeed, democratic 
principles in the Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia were invoked because the 
government, which declared the UDI, was not representative of the people of the 
entity and as such did not have the competence to make such a proclamation.394 In 
other words, the change of legal status of the territory would not occur “in 
accordance with … freely expressed will and desire”395 of all of the people of 
Southern Rhodesia, as demanded by the General Assembly Resolution 1514. In order 
for the “freely expressed will and desire” to be ascertained, some democratic 
principles obviously need to be followed but it is too ambitious to conclude that 
                                                 
389 Dugard (1987), p. 93–94. Evident are references to the “illegal regime” and to “authority”. 
390 Ibid., p. 94.  
391 See Raič (2002), p. 134. 
392 See GA Res 2022 (XX) (5 November 1965), para 8. 
393 See Nkala (1985), p. 57. See also Fawcett (1965–1966), p. 112; Devine (1971), pp. 410–17 and 
Fawcett’s response to Devine’s article. Ibid., p. 417. 
394 Compare supra n. 374. 
395 GA Res 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960), para 5.  
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operation of the right of self*determination necessarily requires democracy as a 
political system.396  
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The development of the “homeland*policies” in South Africa began in the 1950s as a 
response to international pressure on the apartheid*regime.397 These policies 
attempted to attach indigenous Africans to separate territorial entities, based on their 
respective tribal origins.398 With the “independence” of the “homelands”, these 
people would lose South African citizenship.399 Further, there was an extensive 
indigenous African population living outside of “their homelands”, who would also 
become “homeland citizens” and thus likewise denationalised as citizens of South 
Africa.400 Consequently, it was observed that: 
Should all the Bantustans become independent, then theoretically there would no longer be any black 
citizen of South Africa; instead, the urban blacks would all be tied by citizenship clauses … to one of 
the various homelands. The material wealth of the country would remain in the hands of the white 
minority.401 
The creation of the “Homelands” as quasi*independent states was in obvious 
pursuance of racist policies of their parent*state, South Africa. 
 In regard to the right of self*determination it can be argued that the right was 
not applied to the entire peoples who would qualify for it and that the “initial 
organization of the black population of South Africa into bantustans was imposed 
                                                 
396 See infra ch. 5. 
397 See Raič (2002), p. 135. 
398 See Crawford (2006), p. 339. 
399 Ibid., p. 340–41. 
400 Transkei, for example, which was a “homeland” of Xhosa*speaking peoples, had resident 
population of 1.7 million. In addition, there were another 1.3 million people classified as citizens of 
Transkei who had no real linkage to its territory. See Faye Witkin (1977), p. 610. 
401 Ibid., p. 622. 
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without their participation.”402 Thus, the creation of the “homelands” as quasi*
independent states was not an expression of the right of self*determination, as 
maintained by South Africa,403 but its violation which attempted to prevent self*
determination of a larger unit.404 
Between 1976 and 1981, Transkei,405 Bophuthatswana,406 Venda,407 and 
Ciskei408 were granted quasi*independence by South Africa as a parent*state. Even 
before the declaration of independence of the four “homelands”, the General 
Assembly Resolutions 2671F409 and 2775E410 held that the “homeland” policies were 
expressions of apartheid and against the right of self*determination.
 After the declaration of independence of Transkei, the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 31/6A in which it called upon “all Governments to deny any 
form of recognition to the so*called independent Transkei and to refrain from having 
any dealings with the so*called independent Transkei or other Bantustans.”411 The 
General Assembly thus held that the creation of “Homelands” was not a real 
expression of the right of self*determination but rather meant a pursuance of racist 
policies and called for non*recognition. This view was subsequently confirmed by 
Security Council Resolutions 402412 and 407413 and after the admission to 
                                                 
402 Ibid., p. 621. Notably, the “homelands” were not entirely forced into “independence”. Indeed, “[i]t 
seems more likely that the homeland leaders chose the course of separation as the only means open to 
them to further the interest of their tribes [in the absence of a popular consultation] [i]t is … unclear 
whether the goal of independence was shared equally by the populace of the bantustan.” Ibid., p. 614. 
403 See Raič (2002), p. 135. 
404 Crawford (2006), p. 128.  
405 Status of Transkei Act 100 (26 October 1976). 
406 Status of Bophuthatswana Act 89 (6 December 1977). 
407 Status of Venda Act 107 (13 September 1979). 
408 Status of Ciskei Act 110 (4 December 1981). 
409 GA Res 2671 F (8 December 1970), see especially para 3. 
410 GA Res 2775  (29 November 1971). 
411 GA Res 31/6 A (26 October 1976), para 3. 
412 SC Res 402 (22 December 1976).  
413 SC Res 407 (25 May 1977).  
 81 
“independence” of the three other “Homelands” also by General Assembly 
Resolutions 37/43414 and 37/69A.415 
None of these Security Council resolutions was adopted under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Nonetheless, full compliance of third states was achieved. Further, 
the fact that the Security Council did not act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
“does not necessarily mean that States [were] not under any legal obligation to 
withhold recognition of the homeland*States.”416 The character of norms violated in 
the case of the South African “homelands” may be argued to be that of jus cogens 
and, consequently, states may have been “under a general legal obligation to 
withhold recognition of such an illegality.”417 
 While it can be generally concluded that the violation of the right of self*
determination and the pursuance of racist policies were the source of the illegality of 
the state*creations in the case of the South African “Homelands”, it also needs to be 
noted that these cases may serve as examples of limits to external self*determination 
exercised with the consent of a parent state.418  
 
0
$-        


As shown above, the doctrine of obligatory non*recognition of illegally created 
effective entities has been developed in the practice of the UN organs and possibly 
even originates in the practice of the League of Nations. Yet it remains unclear 
whether “a binding resolution or decision of a UN body is necessary” for an 
obligation of non*recognition to be triggered419 but, nevertheless, “such a resolution 
                                                 
414 GA Res 37/43 (3 December 1982). 
415 GA Res 37/69A (9 December 1982). 
416 Dugard (1987), p. 102.  
417 Ibid. 
418 Compare infra ch. 5.4. 
419 McCorquodale (2005), p. 197 
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or decision makes the obligation definitive.”420 While there exists extensive practice 
of both the General Assembly and the Security Council calling for collective non*
recognition (the latter organ at one occasion even invoking Chapter VII),421 it shall 
be noted that collective non*recognition has been also practiced “in a number of 
other situations without a formal United Nations resolution to that effect (e.g. East 
Timor).”422  
It is questionable whether the requirements that an entity must not be 
established as a result of an illegal use of force, in breach or the right of self*
determination or in pursuance of racist policies reflect the additional statehood 
criteria or, perhaps, recognition requirements. However, there is significant evidence 
that these requirements (or criteria) have been universally adopted by states and that 
an entity created in violation of them will not be able to enjoy all attributes of 
statehood. This should imply that such an entity is not a state.423  
In the discussed situations, states withheld recognition to effective entities 
even in the absence of a Chapter VII resolution. Together with voting for resolutions 
of the UN organs which proclaimed the emergence of effective entities to be illegal 
in situations of illegal use of force, breach of the right of self*determination and 
pursuance of racist policies, this may imply the existence of state practice and opinio 
juris, proving the existence of rules of customary international law that any state 
creation in violation of the rules in question is illegal.424 If there exists a rule of 
customary international law, such a rule can only reflect statehood criteria, which 
have a status of legal prescription, and not recognition requirements, which are a 
                                                 
420 Ibid. 
421 See infra n. 387. 
422 Crawford (2006), p. 159 
423 See supra ch. 3.2.2. 
424 In the Nicaragua case ICJ Rep 1986, para 188, the ICJ held that opinio juris may be, inter alia, 
deduced from the attitude of states toward relevant General Assembly Resolutions and concluded that 
consent to the text of a resolution “may be understood as an acceptance of the rule or set of rules 
declared by the resolution.” Compare also supra n. 125. 
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matter of policy. In other words, law*governed obligations to withhold recognition 
can only be regarded as statehood criteria. Such is the relationship between the 
traditional statehood criteria and the prohibition of premature recognition as well as 
the relationship between the additional statehood criteria and the duty of non*
recognition of illegally created effective entities.  
When states withhold recognition this is not always done because either 
traditional or additional statehood criteria are not met. It will be argued in the 
forthcoming chapters that recognition can also be withheld on political 
considerations; however, in such circumstances a non*recognised entity may still be 
considered a state.425 
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The act of recognition of governments is, like the act of the recognition of states, “a 
political act that has legal consequences.”426 It is even more controversial than the act 
of recognition of states, as, unlike the recognition of states, the recognition of 
governments is not a one*time act.427 This opens the possibility of much more 
frequent politicisation of this type of recognition than of recognition of states. 
Recognition of governments can thus become “a political tool for reaching foreign 
policy goals.”428 Recognition of governments does not apply in situations when the 
change of government occurs in accordance with constitutional provisions of the 
state in question but only when a new government usurps power against such 
provisions.429 An implication of this limitation of the scope of the act of the 
recognition of governments is that after elections in a democratic state the new 
                                                 
425 See infra ch. 4.3.5. and 4.3.6. 
426 McCorquodale (2005), p. 197. 
427 Ibid., p. 198. 
428 Peterson (1997), p. 3.  
429 See Harris (2004), p. 156. 
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government will not be subject to recognition or non*recognition.430 However, if an 
elected government is overthrown, the coup government will not necessarily be 
considered the legitimate government of the state in question.   
 As is clear from the traditional statehood criteria, government is a sine qua 
non of a state.431 On the other hand, not even a government can exist without a 
state.432 On both the domestic and international plane the government acts on behalf 
of a state and consequently the state’s policies are perceived through the actions of 
its government. It is therefore important that there exists no doubt as to who is the 
government which is entitled to speak on behalf of a certain state. The criteria 
relevant for the determination of who constitutes the actual government are 
associated with the questions of effective control and legitimacy.433 
The effectiveness consideration does not deal with the question of how the 
new government has come to power but merely acknowledges the situation of an 
effective government being in power. This understanding is expressed in the 
following statement: “The government brought into permanent power by a revolution 
or a coup d’état is, according to international law, the legitimate government of a 
State, whose identity is not affected by these events.”434 In this regard two legal rules 
apply. First, recognition of a new government should not be granted before effective 
control over the territory of a state in question is achieved; second, after an old 
government loses its effective control, it should be no longer treated as the 
government of the state in question.435 The regime is thus granted recognition if it 
                                                 
430 Ibid. 
431 See supra ch. 3.2.1. 
432 Roth (1999), p. 130, argues: “just as there is no government without a state, there is no state 
without a government.”   
433 Ibid., pp. 136–37. 
434 Kelsen (1966), p. 220.  
435 Peterson (1997), p. 35. 
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meets the statehood criterion of government.436 This was also the practice adopted by 
most states in the twentieth century.437 There were, however, some important 
exceptions to this general rule, such as the United States, which required some 
democratic legitimacy before granting recognition.438  
 The practice of explicit recognition of governments has declined and most 
governments now resort to the “Estrada Doctrine”, which perceives an explicit 
declaration of recognition of governments as an insulting practice that interferes with 
the internal affairs of other states.439 Instead of an explicit proclamation of 
recognition the approach of the “Estrada Doctrine” is less formal and “confines itself 
to the maintenance or withdrawal … of … diplomatic agents, and to the continued 
acceptance … of … accredited diplomatic agents.”440 This doctrine was quietly 
accepted by the United States with the Department of State statement in 1977.441 
 Although the practice of explicit recognitions of governments has declined, 
there is significant practice of factual non*recognition of governments. Such practice 
has been identified in regard to three types of situations: 
[1] [There exist] [t]wo or more local de facto authorities each claiming to be the only legitimate 
government of a (recognized) State … [2] the government of a State claims to continue to be the 
government of a part of the State’s territory that has de facto seceded … [3] an authority in exile 
claims to be the government of a State which is under the effective control of a colonial power, a 
                                                 
436 McCoqruodale (2005), p. 198. 
437 Ibid.  
438 Ibid., though even practice of the United States was inconsistent. See Peterson (1997), p. 53. 
439 This doctrine is named after the Mexican minister of foreign affairs Genaro Estrada who, in 1930, 
made a proclamation on behalf of Mexico that its government in the future shall issue “no declaration 
in the sense of grants of recognition, since [Mexico] considers that such a course is an insulting 
practice and one which, in addition to the facts that it offends sovereignty of other nations, implies 
that judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal affairs of those nations by other 
governments, inasmuch as the latter assume, in effect, an attitude of criticism when they decide, 
favourably or unfavourably, as to the legal qualifications of foreign regimes.” Estrada Doctrine 
(1930), reprinted in Roth (1999), pp. 137–38.   
440 Ibid. 
441 See Harris (1999), p. 159. The United States Department of State argued that “establishment of 
relations does not involve approval or disapproval but merely demonstrates a willingness on our part 
to conduct affairs with other governments directly.” US Department of State statement (1977), 
reprinted in Harris (2004), p. 159.  
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belligerent occupant or its local puppet, or an authority which came to power by coup d’état or 
revolution.442 
In the absence of explicit recognitions in such situations, actions of states imply their 
views in regard to the problem of which government is considered the legitimate 
representative of the state in question.443  
 Important clarification of the doctrine of recognition and non*recognition of 
governments also stems from the practice of UN organs. From 1949, governments of 
the People’s Republic of China and of the Republic of China have both claimed to be 
the legitimate government of China.444 The Government of the Republic of China 
initially represented China in the UN.445 In 1971, however, the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 2758446 which recognised:  
[T]he representatives of [the Government of the People’s Republic of China] as the only legitimate 
representatives of China [and expelled] the representatives of [the Government of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan)] from the place which they unlawfully [occupied] at the United Nations and in all the 
organizations related to it.447  
Two observations can be made in this context. First, the General Assembly 
acknowledged that the Government of the Republic of China was not the legitimate 
government of China as it was in effective control of only a fraction of the Chinese 
territory, i.e. of Taiwan. Second, the General Assembly confirmed that the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China is the legitimate government of the 
entire Chinese territory, including Taiwan, although it obviously did not exercise 
effective control over Taiwan.  
                                                 
442 Talmon (1997), pp. 7–8. 
443 Ibid. 
444 Crawfod (2006), p. 200. 
445 Ibid. 
446 GA Res 2758 (25 October 1971). 
447 Ibid., para 4. 
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Subsequent practice of UN organs also shows that the question of 
effectiveness will not always be the only criterion when deciding whether a certain 
government is the legitimate representative of the state which it claims to represent. 
Indeed, to deny the status of legitimate government to the respective governments of 
the People’s Republic of China and Cyprus in the territories of Taiwan and the 
TRNC, respectively, could imply recognition of the two entities as states.448 
Recognition of the Smith government in Southern Rhodesia might have implied 
acceptance of the UDI.449 Non*recognition of the Kuwaiti government as the only 
legitimate government of Kuwait after the Iraqi occupation could have implied 
acceptance of the Iraqi annexation.450 However, in all of these circumstances, norms 
of general international law were involved while the regime type as such played no 
role.451   
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The traditional statehood criteria, originating in the Montevideo Convention, are 
essentially based on effectiveness. With further developments in other fields of 
international law, it is questionable whether the traditional criteria are the only 
relevant criteria for statehood. The concept of the additional statehood criteria has 
emerged in this context. However, the additional criteria remain disputed by some 
scholars and their scope is sometimes not entirely clear.  
 The disputability of the additional statehood criteria stems from the view that 
they blur statehood criteria with recognition requirements and in certain 
circumstances imply that recognition may have constitutive effects. However, it was 
argued in this chapter that the statehood criteria may be perceived as a concept which 
                                                 
448 Compare supra ch. 3.3.3.2. for the TRNC.  
449 Compare supra ch. 3.3.3.3. 
450 See SC Res 661 (6 August 1990). For more see also infra ch. 5.3.4.1.  
451 Compare supra ch. 3.2.2  
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brings legal reasoning into an otherwise political act of recognition. While no legal 
obligation to grant recognition exists, it can be argued that in certain circumstances 
there is a legal obligation to withhold recognition. Non*fulfilment of either set of 
statehood criteria, traditional or additional, may lead to such an obligation. If an 
entity does not meet the traditional statehood criteria, a premature recognition 
offends the territorial integrity of a parent state in the territory of which such an 
entity attempts to constitute itself. If an effective entity is otherwise established but 
in breach of some of the fundamental principles of international law, there is some 
evidence that such an entity will not be considered a state.  
 In the UN Charter era, the development of international law on the use of 
force, the right of self*determination and some other international human rights 
norms have had a notable impact on the law of statehood. Significant practice exists 
of UN organs in support of the conclusion that states are protected from having their 
international personality extinguished if force is illegally used against them.452 
Further, practice of the UN organs also shows that entities established as a result of 
an unlawful external use of force will not be recognised as independent states. Yet in 
such circumstances statehood may often also be disputed under the traditional 
statehood criteria as doubts exist whether such an entity really has a government 
independent from any other government. Practice of the UN organs also supports the 
conclusion that an effective entity will be denied statehood if it is created in breach 
of the right of self*determination or in pursuance of racist policies. 
 If the additional statehood criteria are not met, states are under obligation not 
to grant recognition. Such an obligation has been universally accepted when non*
recognition is called for by the General Assembly or by the Security Council, even if 
                                                 
452 See the response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. SC Res 662 (9 August 1990) and supra ch. 
3.2.2. 
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the latter organ does not act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Yet the 
applicability of the obligation of non*recognition without a specific resolution of a 
UN organ remains much more uncertain as a possible violation of relevant legal 
norms needs to be determined by states. 
 In regard to criticism that the additional statehood criteria imply that 
recognition may be constitutive, this chapter has made an argument that constitutive 
effects in some circumstances should be acknowledged. Indeed, although it is 
generally perceived in contemporary international law that recognition is declaratory, 
there exist situations in which international involvement, inter alia, through 
collective recognition and collective non*recognition, has constitutive effects. This is 
especially relevant in a case of unilateral secession, i.e. in a situation in which a 
competing claim to territorial integrity exists. An argument was made in this chapter 
that the principle of sovereign equality does not allow us to conclude that there exist 
two types of states: those with full rights and duties stemming from statehood and 
those with only some rights and duties stemming from statehood. Therefore, entities, 
albeit effective, which do not have full rights and duties inherent in statehood should 
not be considered states. 
 Further, in examples of illegally created (effective) entities, there exists 
significant state practice where states withheld recognition not due to their political 
considerations but because they believed international law – even in the absence of a 
Chapter VII resolution – bound them to do so. This may supplement state practice 
with opinio juris and prove the existence of some additional (i.e. legality*based) 
statehood criteria.  
 The influence of the right of self*determination and human rights in general 
on the law of statehood has led to some controversy in interpreting the scope of the 
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requirements that these criteria set for a lawful state creation. It should be recalled 
that statehood criteria are only applied when states are created and are, generally, not 
continuous requirements. This is, however, not to say that self*determination and 
human rights standards have no relevance for territorial integrity claims of the 
existing states. It may well be that gross human rights violations weaken the 
violating state’s claim to territorial integrity, when limiting the exercise of the right 
of self*determination to the internal mode of this right. This issue will be further 
addressed below, when discussing the ‘remedial secession doctrine’. 
     After the end of the Cold War and the creation of several new states, 
especially in the territories of the former SFRY and of the former Soviet Union, there 
is some evidence that recognition requirements :and possibly even statehood criteria 
:were expanded by some further requirements, such as: democracy rather than some 
democratic principles operating within the right of self*determination; human rights 
other than those of jus cogens character; and commitment to peace apart from the 
prohibition of creation of a state as a result of an unlawful use of force. These issues 
will be considered in the next chapter. 
 The practice of express recognition of governments has declined, yet there 
exists significant practice of factual recognition and non*recognition when states 
and/or UN organs have to decide which of the competing authorities is the legitimate 
representative of the state they all claim to represent. In pre*1991 practice, norms of 
general international law prevailed over effectiveness, while, in order to determine 
which government was legitimate, the type of government was not considered. In the 
forthcoming chapters it will be argued whether and to what degree this has changed.   
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This chapter deals with the question of whether the pre*1991 standard – that the 
nature of an entity’s political system does not per se impact the law of statehood – 
has changed in the practice of post*1991 state creations. The starting point will be the 
European Community (EC) Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union453 and the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia.454 It will 
be considered which requirements expressed in these documents stretch beyond the 
statehood criteria and what image of democracy they adopt when they spell out the 
latter as a recognition criterion. Subsequently, it will be examined how the EC 
Guidelines were applied in the territories of the former SFRY and of the former 
Soviet Union and how they interfere with the law of statehood. Further, it will be 
considered whether the requirements expressed in the EC Guidelines were applied in 
subsequent state creations. It this context an argument will be made that the practice 
of international imposition of certain democratic standards in situations of new state 
creations depends on the mode of a state creation.  
 This chapter deals with successful post*1991 state creations. Secessionist 
attempts which did not lead to new state creations are generally not considered, while 
the Kosovo situation is dealt with in Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
453 EC Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 
December 1991), reprinted in Trifunovska (1994), p. 472 [hereinafter EC Guidelines]. 
454 EC Declaration on Yugoslavia (16 December 1991), reprinted in Trifunovska (1994), p. 474 
[hereinafter EC Declaration]. 
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After Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence on 25 June 1991,455 an armed 
conflict between Slovenia and the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) broke out.456 
While there was no major outbreak of hostilities between Croatia and the YNA 
immediately after Croatia’s proclamation of independence, there had been conflicts 
between Serb paramilitaries and Croatian police since early 1991.457 
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, foreign ministers of the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Italy – the “EC Troika” – were sent to Slovenia “in order to 
negotiate the withdrawal of Slovenia’s declaration of independence [and] a cease*fire 
between the warring factions”458 along with reestablishment of normal functioning of 
federal organs.459 The efforts resulted in an agreement signed on 7 July 1991, at 
Brioni Islands, Croatia.460 The Brioni Agreement was concluded by the EC, 
represented by the EC Troika,461 representatives of the Yugoslav federal organs,462 
and representatives of Slovenia463 and Croatia.464   
                                                 
455 Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Slovenia (1991) and Declaration of Independence 
of the Republic of Croatia (1991).  
456 See Crawford (2006), p. 396. 
457 Terrett (2000), p. 31. 
458 Ibid., p. 72. 
459 The Yugoslav political crisis culminated in Serbia’s usurpation of federal organs such as the 
collective presidency in which it controlled three out of eight seats and the non*appointment of the 
Croatian member of the presidency to its constitutionally*established rotating chairmanship. See ibid., 
p. 32. 
460 See The Brioni Agreement <http://www.ukom.gov.si/10let/pot/osamosvojitveni*
dokumenti/brionska*deklaracija>. 
461 Ibid. The composition of the Troika of foreign ministers was changed due to the EC’s policy of 
rotating the presidency. The foreign minister of Italy was followed by the foreign minister of Portugal.  
462 The federal organs were represented by the premier, the minister of internal affairs, the deputy 
minister of defence, and members of the federal presidency. Ibid.  
463 The Slovenian representatives included the chairman of the Slovene presidency, the Slovene 
premier, the Slovene foreign minister, the speaker of the Slovene Assembly and the Slovene 
representative in the federal presidency. Ibid. 
464 Croatia was represented by its president. (Ibid.) The few*in*number Croatian representation can be 
understood in the context of the Agreement which predominantly dealt with Slovenia. See infra n. 
470.   
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 The Brioni Agreement stipulated for a three*month suspension period in 
which the situation of 25 June 1991 (prior to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of 
independence) was to be re*established.465 In this period further negotiations on the 
future of Yugoslavia were to take place.466 The Brioni Agreement also stipulated for 
the withdrawal of YNA units to their barracks as well as the demobilisation of the 
Slovene military units.467 It further established a monitoring mission under the 
auspices of the Conference for Security and Co*operation in Europe (CSCE), for 
which it was specifically stated that it was not a peace*keeping mission and that the 
observers were unarmed.468 In the latter context Croatia was also mentioned, 
although the entire text predominantly referred to the situation in Slovenia and aimed 
at ending hostilities between Slovenia and the YNA.469 Nevertheless, although the 
provisions of the Agreement effectively regulated the cease*fire in Slovenia, in 
general terms they also applied to Croatia and thus the three*month suspension of 
Croatia’s declaration of independence was also enforced.470  
 On 27 August 1991, the EC and its member*states founded the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, under whose auspices the Arbitration Commission was established.471 
The Arbitration Commission was chaired by the President of the French 
Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter.472 As has been observed, “the authority of the 
                                                 
465 The Brioni Agreement, Annex 1, para 4.  
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid., Annex 1, para 5. 
468 Ibid., Annex 2. 
469 It needs to be noted that the YNA was, at least formally, a military force of the federation. 
Although hostilities between Croatian police forces and Serb paramilitary units began already in early 
1991, the latter, unlike the YNA, could not be perceived as agents of the federation. In Slovenia, 
however, police and military units were involved in an armed conflict with a federal agent. This 
situation would soon develop in Croatia but had not openly occurred at the time when the Brioni 
Agreement was reached.  See supra n. 460. 
470 See supra n. 465. 
471 See Crawford (2006), p. 396. 
472 Hereinafter: The Badinter Commission. The other four members of the Commission were the 
Presidents of the Constitutional Courts of Germany and Italy, the President of the Court of Arbitration 
of Belgium and the President of the Constitutional Tribunal of Spain. See Pellet (1992), p. 178. Terms 
the ‘Badinter Commission’ and ‘Badinter Committee’ are used interchangeably. References to the 
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Commission … derived from two related but distinct sources: from the European 
Community as a legal entity unto itself and from the constituents of the 
Community.”473 The mandate of the Commission and the scope of its decisions were, 
however, not entirely defined:  
The mandate given to the Committee was somewhat vague. At the outset it was envisaged that the 
Committee would rule by means of binding decisions upon request from ‘valid Yugoslavian 
authorities’. Although no consultative procedure was formally established, the Committee was in fact 
called upon to give one opinion at the request of Lord Carrington, President of the Peace Conference 
(Opinion No. 1); similar requests were subsequently made by the Serbian Republic, using the 
Conference as intermediary (Opinions Nos. 2 and 3) and the Council of Ministers of the EEC 
(Opinions Nos. 4 to 7).474 
 The scope of legal issues with which the Badinter Commission dealt was 
relatively broad. Indeed, “[m]inority rights, use of force, border changes, the rule of 
law, state succession, and recognition all eventually fell within the Commission’s 
brief.”475 The opinions of the Badinter Commission were formally not legally 
binding.476  
At the Council of Ministers meeting on 16 December 1991, the EC adopted 
two documents in which it expressed its recognition policy in regard to the new 
states emerging in the territories of the SFRY and of the Soviet Union, 
respectively:477 the EC Guidelines478 and the EC Declaration.479 These documents 
were part of broader EC involvement in the processes of dealing with disintegration 
                                                                                                                                          
‘Badinter Committee’ in secondary sources should therefore be understood as synonyms for the 
‘Badinter Commission’. 
473 Grant (1999), p. 154.  
474 Pellet (1992), p. 178.  
475 Grant (1999), p. 156.  
476 See Türk (1999), p. 70.   
477 See Harris (2004), pp. 147–52.  
478 See supra n. 453. As the dissolution of the SFRY coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, “many of the same issues were raised in relation to both cases.” Terret (2000) p. 80. Notably, 
the EC became much more involved in the dissolution of the SFRY which was a source of instability 
in the geographical proximity of a number of the EC member*states. Hence the EC Declaration only 
dealt with the SFRY. 
479 See supra n. 454. 
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of the two federations, which were for a great part motivated by stopping ongoing 
and preventing future armed conflicts in their respective territories.480   
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The EC Guidelines invoked “the normal standards of international practice and the 
political realities in each case”481 when recognition was to be granted. This may be 
understood as a reference to the traditional statehood criteria.482 Further, the EC 
Guidelines, inter alia, invoke “the principle of self*determination,”483 “rights of 
ethnic and national groups and minorities”,484 “respect for the inviolability of all 
frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common 
agreement”485 and spell out: “The Community and its Member States will not 
recognize entities which are the result of aggression.”486 The standards invoked in 
this context, which deal with the prohibition of unlawful use of force, respect for the 
right of self*determination and even a limited reference to human rights, could 
arguably still fall within the additional statehood criteria, developed in the era of the 
UN Charter.487 
 The document, however, also spells out that new states must “have 
constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate 
international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful 
                                                 
480 See Caplan (2005), pp. 15–16. It should be noted that 1991 was the year of final negotiations on 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which also foresaw the creation of the “second pillar”, i.e. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the time when the EC became involved in the 
Yugoslav crisis, the TEU had not been ratified by all EC member*states, while “Yugoslavia became 
an experimental test*case” for the EC member*states and their commitment to the CFSP. Terrett 
(2000), p. 72.  
481 EC Guidelines (1991), para 2.  
482 See Harris (2004), p. 148. 
483 EC Guidelines (1991), para 2.   
484 Ibid., para 3. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid, para 4. 
487 See supra ch. 3.2.2. and 3.3.3.5. 
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process and to negotiations.”488 To these general requirements, stretching beyond the 
statehood criteria, a much more specific meaning is attached by the demand that new 
states need to have “respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of 
Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights.”489 As 
already discussed, the provisions of the UN Charter cannot be interpreted as 
favouring a particular type of political system, i.e. they do not require the Western 
style of (liberal) democracy.490 However, this might not be true in regard to the 
Charter of Paris and the Final Act of Helsinki. The image of democracy in these two 
documents determines the image of democracy in the EC Guidelines. This issue will 
be dealt with below. 
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The EC Declaration, inter alia, provides: 
The Community and its Member States agree to recognize the independence of all the Yugoslav 
Republics fulfilling all the conditions set out below. The implementation of this decision will take 
place on 15 January 1992. 
They are therefore inviting all Yugoslav Republics to state by 23 December [1991] whether: 
*  they wish to be recognized as independent States  
*  they accept the commitments contained in the above*mentioned Guidelines 
* they accept the provisions laid down in the draft Convention * especially those in Chapter II on    
human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups * under consideration by the Conference on 
Yugoslavia 
* they continue to support the efforts of the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United 
Nations, and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia.  
                                                 
488 EC Guidelines (1991), para 2. 
489 Ibid., para 3. 
490 See supra ch. 2. 
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The applications of those Republics which reply positively will be submitted through the Chair of the 
Conference to the Arbitration Commission for advice before the implementation date.491 
The EC Declaration thus established the procedure for collective recognition and set 
out the conditions for recognition.  
Caplan argues that: 
In a manner strikingly similar to the present case [EC’s recognition of the states emerging in the 
territory of the SFRY], the contracting parties to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (Austria, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey) linked their recognition of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Romania to respect for minority rights, then narrowly defined in religious terms, on the part of newly 
established states … Even more extensive were the minority rights provisions that the Entente Powers 
established as a condition for their recognition of the new states created after First World War—
Poland; Czechoslovakia; and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes …—and included in their 
treaties with many of the defeated and enlarged states.492 
The conditional collective recognition, based on some human rights standards, was 
thus not a new occurrence when the EC Declaration was adopted and new states 
recognised. However, the procedure foreseeing application of entities that “wish to 
become states,”493 which was then referred for consideration to the Badinter 
Commission,494 and the date that was set to determine when the decision would be 
implemented,495 lead to the question of whether the EC Declaration established a 
mechanism to create new states. 
  In the absence of a universal body for granting of recognition,496 it can be 
argued that the Badinter Commission to a certain degree played this role. This view 
is, however severely limited by the fact that its decisions were not legally binding – 
                                                 
491 EC Declaration (1991), para 3. For explanation on “the provisions laid down in the draft 
Convention” see infra ch. 4.3.3. 
492 Caplan (2005), pp. 61–62.  
493 EC Declaration (1991), para 3. 
494 Ibid., para 4. 
495 Ibid., para 2.  
496 See supra n. 313. 
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not even for EC member*states.497 Indeed, “[v]esting an arbitration panel with 
authority to study and advise on recognition is not the same as vesting such an organ 
with authority to recognize.”498 The Badinter Commission was thus not a body that 
granted recognition but rather a body that “to some extent … influenced state 
practice.”499 Yet it was also a body composed of eminent legal experts with a sense 
of strong legal persuasiveness in its opinions.500 The legal significance of its opinions 
will be further discussed below. 
 Conditions set for recognition make a general reference to the EC 
Guidelines501 and more specifically define a required commitment to human rights 
protection (especially rights of minorities),502 a commitment to peaceful resolution of 
the conflict in the territory of the SFRY,503 and an assurance that the new state would 
have no territorial claims toward neighbouring states.504 From the point of view of 
the conditions set for recognition, the EC Declaration followed the EC Guidelines 
and partially supplemented them with requirements which specifically addressed the 
situation in the territory of the SFRY in December 1991. The EC Declaration is 
therefore a technical and SFRY*specific document and its main relevance is that it 
established a mechanism for recognition in this particular situation. In order to 
determine the image of democracy in the EC’s involvement in the new state creations 
                                                 
497 See supra n. 476. 
498 Grant (1999), p. 168. The creation of such a body to deal with recognition, among other questions, 
was not unprecedented. Above were mentioned the Commission of Jurists, established under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, which dealt with the territorial status of the Åland Islands (see 
supra n. 278 and infra n. 940) and the Lytton Commission, also established by the League of Nations, 
that dealt with the status of Manchukuo (see supra ch. 3.3.3.1.). 
499 Ibid. 
500 Compare infra ch. 4.3. 
501 The EC Guidelines (1991), para 3. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid., para 5. This requirement specifically had in mind the dispute between Greece and Macedonia 
over the latter’s name. See Grant (1999), p. 158. Compare infra ch. 4.3.5.    
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in the territories of the SFRY and the Soviet Union, the relevant document to be 
analysed is the EC Guidelines.  
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It has been established that the EC Guidelines spelt out some requirements that 
arguably fall within either the traditional or additional statehood criteria.505 These 
will not be discussed at this point. The focus will be on two kinds of recognition 
requirements: first, requirements that do not constitute the statehood criteria; second, 
requirements that stem from the statehood criteria but extend the scope of their 
operation. The requirement for new states “to have constituted themselves on a 
democratic basis”506 falls within the first group. The image of democracy within this 
requirement will be examined in this context. In the second group fall: (i) the 
requirement for respect of human rights and (ii) the requirement that states must 
refrain from illegal use of force. As has been argued, respect for human rights to a 
certain degree is relevant as a statehood criterion.507 However, this section examines 
whether this requirement is extended in the EC Guidelines beyond the human rights 
of jus cogens character, whether the commitment to peace required by the EC 
Guidelines reaches beyond the requirement that a state may not be created as a result 
of an illegal use of force and whether the EC Guidelines thus, possibly, adopt the 
idea of democratic peace.508 
 
 
 
 

                                                 
505 See supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
506 EC Guidelines (1991), para 3.  
507 See supra n. 299. 
508 Compare supra ch. 2.5. and 3.2.2. 
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The EC Guidelines, inter alia, provide: 
[The EC and its member*states] affirm their readiness to recognize, subject to the normal standards of 
international practice and the political realities in each case, those new States which, following the 
historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the 
appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful 
process and to negotiations.509 
Reference to ‘constituted on a democratic basis’ could generally be interpreted as 
confined to ‘democratic principles’ operating within the right of self*
determination.510 In practice this would mean that this specific requirement would 
demand for independence to be declared upon a popular consultation at which a free 
and fair expression of the will of the people would be guaranteed.511 The requirement 
of ‘constituted on a democratic basis’ would thus, arguably, not reach beyond the 
scope of (additional) statehood criteria.512 However, there is a question of whether 
the EC Guidelines really attempted to confine references to democracy to 
‘democratic principles’ operating within the right of self*determination. While the 
EC Guidelines do not directly attempt to define the understanding of democracy, this 
understanding is expressed in the Charter of Paris, to which the EC Guidelines 
expressly refer.513 Consequently, the understanding of democracy within the EC 
Guidelines seems to be determined by its reference to the Charter of Paris.  
                                                 
509 EC Guidelines (1991), para 3.  
510 Compare supra ch. 3.3.3.3.  
511 Compare infra ch. 5.4.  
512 Compare supra ch. 3.2.2. 
513 There are also references made to the Final Act of Helsinki, with which the Conference on Security 
and Co*operation in Europe (CSCE) was established. However, dating to 1975, this is a document 
drafted in the Cold War era. It does not invoke democracy or ‘democratic principles’ and deals with 
human rights within the boundaries of the UDHR and the two universal covenants. (See The Final Act 
of Helsinki 14 ILM 1292 (1975)). The Charter of Paris, dating to 1990, will thus be the most relevant 
document to determine the image of democracy as well as human rights standards in the EC 
Guidelines. An analysis of the Final Act of Helsinki will follow from the point of view of the 
commitment to peace expressed in this document. See infra ch.  4.2.3.3. 
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 The Charter of Paris for a New Europe was adopted on 21 November 1990 in 
the framework of the Conference on Security and Co*operation in Europe (CSCE).514 
Notably, the document was adopted at the end of the Cold War and was signed by 
virtually all democratising (former) communist states in Europe, including the Soviet 
Union and the SFRY.515  
The Charter’s chapter entitled Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law, 
to which the EC Guidelines refer,516 inter alia, provides: 
Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair 
elections. Democracy has its foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law. Democracy 
is the best safeguard of freedom of expression of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for 
each person.517 
Apart from using the terms ‘democratic government’ and ‘democracy’, this 
definition falls close to the definition of the right to political participation expressed 
in Article 21 of the UDHR518 and Article 25 of the ICCPR.519 Notably, as in these 
two elaborations, reference to elections in a multiparty setting is omitted. However, 
the possibility of various interpretations of the democratic model required by the 
Charter of Paris is severely limited in light of Annex 1 to this document. Article 7 of 
Annex 1 provides: 
                                                 
514 The Charter of Paris for New Europe, with which the CSCE was transformed into the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was signed by the following states: France, 
Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Norway, 
Switzerland, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Cyprus, the Holy See, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino.  (See The Charter of 
Paris <http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf>). Later the following states also 
joined: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia*Herzegovina, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, FRY, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. (Ibid.). Apart from Albania and Andorra, all of the states that have signed the Charter of 
Paris after 1990 are former republics of either the SFRY or of the Soviet Union.   
515 Ibid.  
516 See supra n. 513. 
517 The Charter of Paris (1990), p. 3.  
518 See supra n. 106. 
519 See supra n. 112. 
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To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the 
participating States will 
* hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law; 
* permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a popular 
vote; 
* guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens; 
* ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are 
counted and   reported honestly with the official results made public; 
* respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of 
political parties or organizations, without discrimination; 
* respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political parties or 
other political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary 
legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment before the 
law and by the authorities; 
* ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and 
free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and 
the candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from 
learning and discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear of retribution; 
* provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media 
on a nondiscriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the 
electoral process; 
* ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law are duly installed 
in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end 
in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional 
procedures.520 
The references to a multiparty system, limited office*term and specific 
provisions for, rather than general reference to, free and fair elections go beyond the 
reach of ‘democratic rights’, which require a very restricted interpretation within the 
                                                 
520 Charter of Paris (1990), Annex 1, Article 7.  
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universal human rights instruments.521 Indeed, with these provisions the Charter of 
Paris goes beyond the universal standard of non*interference into the choice of a 
particular political system within a state522 and requires implementation of liberal*
democratic institutions.523 This image of democracy is thus close to the 
understanding within the ECHR and not within the universal framework.524  
Notably, the Charter of Paris predominantly deals with democratic 
institutions rather than substance. In Article 7 of Appendix 1, democracy is 
inherently associated with free and fair elections which depend on fulfilment of some 
other human rights, most notably freedom of association and freedom of expression. 
This rather narrow expression of democracy525 is, however, supplemented by a 
formulation in the Charter’s chapter on Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law, 
which attempts to define democracy more in terms of its underlying principles, 
beyond the electoral process and association with a selection of human rights:526 
“Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to 
the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice 
administered impartially. No one will be above the law.”527 
 The image of democracy in the Charter of Paris does not entirely adopt the 
procedural understanding of democracy. However, it stipulates for a number of 
institutional requirements significant for the interpretation of liberal*democracy in 
                                                 
521 Compare supra ch. 2.3. 
522 See supra ch. 2.3. 
523 Compare supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
It needs to be added that such a requirement contravenes the Cold War standard expressed in the Final 
Act of Helsinki: “[The participating states] will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and 
develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws 
and regulations.” The Final Acts of Helsinki (1975), Chapter I, para 1. It can be thus argued that the 
end of the Cold War within the framework of the OSCE brought a significant change to the liberal*
democratic understanding of democracy and human rights. It was argued at an earlier point that this 
change cannot be extended to the UN level. See supra ch. 2.3. 
524 See supra ch. 2.3.3. 
525 Compare supra ch. 2.2.1. 
526 Compare supra ch. 2.2.2. 
527 Charter of Paris (1990), p. 3.  
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the ECHR framework, which stretch beyond the scope of ‘democratic rights’ in the 
universal human rights elaborations.528 Further, the requirement for democracy goes 
beyond the operation of ‘democratic principles’ within the right of self*determination 
and thus exceeds the (additional) statehood criteria.  

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Apart from references to some human rights within the definition of democratic 
standards, the Charter of Paris makes the respect of human rights a separate 
requirement and a number of civil and political rights are specifically invoked, while 
reference to economic, social and cultural rights is only general.529 Notably, the 
Charter of Paris does not specifically invoke the right of self*determination, which is 
otherwise referred to in the Final Act of Helsinki. This reference essentially repeats 
the universal elaboration of the common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR,530 
while it also adds an important limitation to the right of self*determination, which is 
to be exercised “in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those 
relating to territorial integrity of states.”531 In other words, the Final Act of Helsinki 
affirms that the right of self*determination is not an entitlement to secession.532  
 It has been argued above that human rights other than those of jus cogens 
character have not been regarded as statehood criteria and that democracy as a 
                                                 
528 Compare supra ch. 2.3.3. 
529 Charter of Paris (1990), p. 3. The Charter thus invokes a number of civil and political rights and 
only makes a brief mention of the entire economic, social and cultural cluster, without naming those 
rights individually. On the other hand the Final Act of Helsinki specifically invokes the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief, and rights of minorities, without further elaborations on the 
scope of these rights. Further, there is a general reference to civil, political, economic, social, cultural 
and other rights and freedoms. The Final Act of Helsinki (1975), Chapter VII, para 1, para 2 and para 
4. 
530 The Final Act of Helsinki (1975), Chapter VII. For more on the right of self*determination and on 
the distinction between internal and external self*determination. See infra ch. 5.3. 
531 Ibid., para 1.  
532 Compare infra ch.. 5.3. and 5.4. 
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political system (or type of government in general) has not had any role in the 
creation of states.533 Yet the EC Guidelines, adopting the Charter of Paris, have 
notably set a much higher bar and proclaimed general respect for human rights a 
recognition requirement.534  
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A commitment to peace is expressed in the EC Guidelines and in the EC Declaration 
indirectly by a reference to the Final Act of Helsinki535 and by specific references in 
the two documents in regard to the situation in the disintegrating SFRY in 1991.536 
The scope of the requirement for new states to be committed to peace will be initially 
analysed through the understanding expressed in the Final Act of Helsinki. 
Subsequently, the scope of “peace*activism” expressed in the specific references in 
the EC Guidelines and in the EC Declaration will also be considered. The major 
question will be whether the commitment to peace as expressed in the two 
documents reaches beyond the requirement that a state cannot be established as a 
result of an unlawful use of force.537  
 With a view to reduce the Cold War tensions,538 the Final Act of Helsinki was 
signed in 1975 by both Western and socialist states.539 As already established its 
references to human rights do not reach beyond the universal interpretation and 
                                                 
533 See supra ch. 3. and 3.4. 
534 Compare supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
535 See supra n. 489. 
536 See supra notes 485 and 491. 
537 Compare supra ch. 3.2.2.  
538 See <http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html>. 
539 The document was signed by the following states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. The 
following states subsequently also signed the document: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia*Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. With 
exceptions of Albania, Andorra and Czech Republic, all of these states emerged in the territories of 
the former SFRY and of the former Soviet Union.  See <http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html>. 
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reflect the Cold War compromise to accommodate competing interpretations of 
democracy and human rights standards.540 
 The first chapter of the Final Act of Helsinki deals with sovereign equality 
and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,541 where it essentially subscribes 
itself to the provisions of Article 2 of the UN Charter.542 In the chapter on refraining 
from the threat or use of force, the Final Act of Helsinki mutatis mutandis repeats 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: 
The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations 
in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the 
present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of 
force in contravention of this principle.543  
 In regard to inviolability of the territory the Final Act of Helsinki provides: 
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all 
States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.  
Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all 
of the territory of any participating State.544 
The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military 
occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the 
object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or 
acquisition will be recognized as legal.545 
 It has been argued that in the case of unlawful use of force, existing states are 
protected from having their international personality extinguished.546 The same 
protection applies when partial occupation of the territory of a state resulting from an 
                                                 
540 Compare supra n. 118. 
541 The Final Act of Helsinki (1975), chapter 1.a.I. 
542  See UN Charter, Article 2. 
543 The Final Act of Helsinki, Chapter (1975) II, para 1. Compare UN Charter, Article 2(4). 
544 The Final Act of Helsinki (1975), Chapter III.  
545 Ibid., Chapter IV, para 3.  
546 See supra ch. 3.2.2. 
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unlawful use of force is in question – in such a situation international law would not 
recognise a shift of sovereignty.547 Consequently, in regard to existing states the 
Final Act of Helsinki does not extend the scope of the prohibition of the use of force 
and its consequences on the law of statehood any further than does the UN Charter. 
In other words, from the point of view of the prohibition of the use of force and non*
recognition of factual situations resulting from the illegal use of force, the Final Act 
of Helsinki did not bind the participating states to any higher standards than 
generally applicable international law does. The Final Act of Helsinki, however, 
dealt with existing states and generally did not refer to the creation of new states.548 
On the other hand, the EC Guidelines and the EC Declaration were documents 
referring to situations of new state creations. There is therefore a question of how the 
provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki, in conjunction with specific provisions of the 
EC Guidelines work as recognition requirements.   
The EC Guidelines provide: “The Community and its Member States will not 
recognize entities which are the result of aggression.”549 It can be argued that in this 
requirement the EC Guidelines follow the obligation to withhold recognition when 
an entity is created illegally.550 Yet the EC Guidelines set further requirements in 
regard to the prohibition of the use of force. The requirement of “respect for the 
inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by 
common agreement,”551 resembles the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki on 
                                                 
547 See supra ch. 3.3. 
548 It can be argued that it touches upon the question of new state creations indirectly in the chapter on 
self*determination by affirming that the right of self*determination is limited by the principle of 
territorial integrity of states (see supra n. 539). Unlike the universal elaboration of the right of self*
determination in the common Article 1 of the Covenants, the Final Act of Helsinki thus unequivocally 
adopts the distinction between internal and external modes of the exercise of the right of self*
determination.  
549 EC Guidelines (1991), para 5. 
550 Compare supra ch. 3.2.2. and 3.3. 
551 The EC Guidelines (1991), para 3.  
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inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states.552 Such a requirement 
applied to entities which are not (yet) states presupposes confinement of new 
international borders along the lines of internal boundaries in the case of dissolution 
of a parent state.553 Further, this requirement does not relate to the use of force within 
the entity itself in an attempt to create a new state554 but to the use of force beyond 
the newly confined international borders. Indeed, the EC Guidelines do not only refer 
to entities which could become effective as a result of an illegal use of force but also 
to potential new states which could be involved in armed conflict in other newly 
created states. In such a situation the question is not whether the entity itself is the 
result of an unlawful use of force555 but rather whether an entity resorts to an 
unlawful use of force outside of its territory. Such a requirement extends the scope of 
the additional statehood criterion that a state may not be created as the result of an 
unlawful use of force.556 Consequently, non*recognition following from failure to 
meet this requirement falls outside of the scope of the obligation to withhold 
recognition.557  
The EC Guidelines further set requirements which are either broadly related 
to the commitment to peace, such as “acceptance of all relevant commitments with 
regard to disarmament and nuclear non*proliferation as well as to security and 
regional stability”558 and “commitment to settle by agreement, including where 
appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and 
                                                 
552 See supra n. 544. 
553 For more on the uti possidetis principle applied in the territory of the SFRY compare infra ch. 6. 
554 Crawford (2006), pp. 135–35, argues that “[i]t is probably the case that the use of force by a non*
State entity in exercise of a right of self*determination is legally neutral, that is, not regulated by 
international law at all (though the rules of international humanitarian law may well apply).” 
555 Later Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina became such entities but they initially did 
not exist in the framework of the SFRY. See infra ch. 4.3.3. and 4.3.4. 
556 See supra ch. 3.2.2. 
557 See supra ch. 3.3.2. 
558 EC Guidelines (1991), para 4. 
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regional disputes.”559 The EC Declaration also demanded support of “the efforts of 
the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations, and the 
continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia.”560 These requirements evidently fall 
beyond the statehood criteria and express some recognition requirements which are 
specifically associated with the situation in the SFRY at the end of 1991. 
 
/%
4%

/1, <#$+* $
The SFRY was a federation of six republics561 and two autonomous provinces.562 It 
was established during the Second World War, on 29 November 1943, under the 
name Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia,563 following the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, initially named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was 
established in 1918.564  
At the time of the dissolution, the 1974 SFRY Constitution was in force, 
which defined republics as states565 and delimited internal boundaries.566 
Importantly, the “federal organization relied heavily on the ethnic component.”567  
The 1974 Constitution adopted a distinction between ‘nations’ and ‘nationalities’. 
The term ‘nation’ applied to the people attached to a certain republic and 
‘nationality’ to the people attached to one of the two respective autonomous 
provinces.568 It can be said that the Constitution was an expression of (internal) self*
                                                 
559 Ibid. 
560 EC Declaration (1991), para 3. 
561 The six republics were: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia*Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia. See Constitution of the SFRY (1974), Article 2. 
562 The two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were otherwise part of broader Serbia but 
had their autonomous status established within the federal (not Serb) constitutional order. See ibid.  
563 Renamed to the SFRY by the Constitution of 1963. 
564 For more see infra ch. 6.4.8. 
565 Constitution of the SFRY (1974), Article 3. 
566 Ibid., Article 5(1). 
567 Türk (1992), p. 66.  
568 See Constitution of the SFRY (1974), Article 1. 
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determination:569 federal units were given wide powers for the exercise of effective 
control over their respective territories570 and even had some limited competencies in 
the conducting of foreign policy.571 Such competencies were not confined to 
republics but were extended even to the two autonomous provinces.572 These units 
also had representatives in the federal organs.573 Such widely*conceived autonomy 
within the federal constitution in many respects elevated the powers of the 
autonomous provinces to the level of powers vested in republics. 
According to the preamble to the Constitution of the SFRY, only ‘nations’, 
i.e. peoples attached to one of the republics, were entitled to the right of self*
determination, and this right extended to cover even secession.574 Yet a specific 
constitutional provision enabling the exercise of the right to secession inherent to 
‘nations’ was missing. It therefore remains disputable whether nations (i.e. peoples 
attached to certain republics) really had a right to secession under the federal 
constitution.  
 When the Badinter Commission dealt with the situation in the SFRY, the 
entitlement to secession, possibly stemming from the preamble to the 1974 
Constitution, was not invoked. In its Opinion 1, the Commission expressed the 
opinion “that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of 
dissolution.”575 Such an opinion denied the position taken by Serbia, arguing that 
“those Republics which have declared or would declare themselves independent or 
sovereign have seceded or would secede from the SFRY which would otherwise 
                                                 
569 Compare infra ch. 5.3. 
570 See Constitution of the SFRY (1974), Articles 268 & 273. 
571 Ibid., Article 271. 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid., Article 291 (regulating the assembly), Article 348 (regulating the federal government), 
Article 381 (regulating the constitutional court). 
574 Ibid., preamble, General Principle I. 
575 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991), para 3.  
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continue to exist.”576 The Badinter Commission based its reasoning on the following 
arguments: four out of six republics of the SFRY (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia*
Herzegovina and Macedonia) had declared independence;577 the “composition and 
workings of the essential organs of the Federation … no longer meet the criteria of 
participation and representatives inherent in a federal state;”578 “an armed conflict 
between different elements of the federation had erupted [while the] authorities of 
the Federation and the Republics have shown themselves to be powerless to enforce 
respect for the succeeding ceasefire agreements concluded under the auspices of the 
European Communities or the United Nations Organization.”579  
In its subsequent opinions, the Badinter Commission applied the uti 
possidetis principle in order to “upgrade” the former internal boundaries to 
international borders.580 As follows from the EC Declaration, only republics were 
considered to be eligible for independence.581 Accordingly, autonomous provinces 
(Kosovo and Vojvodina) and subsequently*created entities in the territory of the 
disintegrating SFRY, such as Republika Srpska in Bosnia*Herzegovina and 
Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia, could not become states.582 The application of 
uti possidetis in this non*colonial situation was very controversial and remains 
criticised.583 This issue will be revisited at a later point.  
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On 25 June 1991, the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the 
Foundational Constitutional Instrument on Sovereignty and Independence of the 
                                                 
576 Ibid., Introduction.  
577 Ibid., para 3(a). 
578 Ibid., para 3(b). 
579 Ibid, para 3(c). 
580 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 2 (11 January 1992). 
581 See supra n. 491. 
582 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 January 1992). 
583 See infra ch. 6.3. and 6.4.8. 
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Republic of Slovenia and a separate Declaration on Independence. The preamble to 
the first instrument spelled out that “the SFRY does not function as a state governed 
by the rule of law and allows grave violations of human rights, rights of peoples, as 
well as rights of republics and autonomous provinces.”584  
The decision that the Republic of Slovenia shall become an independent and 
sovereign state was adopted at a referendum, held on 23 December 1990, by a 
majority of 88.5 percent of all eligible people to vote (ninety*two percent of those 
who voted) and with four percent in absolute figures expressly voting against it.585  
 After the adoption of the Brioni Agreement, Slovenia’s declaration of 
independence was suspended for three months.586 In the period of suspension no 
compromise was found and no alternative arrangement within the framework of 
Yugoslavia developed. On 23 December 1991, the Assembly of the Republic of 
Slovenia adopted a new constitution which adopted liberal*democratic institutions587 
and a chapter on human rights and fundamental freedoms.588  
The Badinter Commission specifically dealt with recognition of Slovenia in 
its Opinion 7. Applying the requirements from the EC Guidelines and the EC 
Declaration, the Badinter Commission made the following references in regard to 
democratic standards implemented in Slovenia:  
                                                 
584 The Foundational Constitutional Instrument on Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of 
Slovenia (1991), preamble, para 3, my own translation. The Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia No 1/91*I (25 June 1991). 
585 See the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Office of Information 
<http://www.ukom.gov.si/10let/pot/kronologija>.  
586 See supra ch. 4.2.1. 
587 The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (1991); Chapter 4, Articles 80–137. Chapter 4 of the 
1991 Constitution introduced the model of parliamentary democracy with a merely ceremonial role of 
the president of the republic. This system replaced the previous “Assembly model”, significant for 
socialist states, which, inter alia, foresees fusion of the legislative and executive branches. 
Consequently, in the previous constitutional order the government acted as the Executive Council of 
the Assembly. The democratic elections in April 1990 were held to the socialist institutional design 
upon constitutional amendments which enabled a multiparty setting. See Vidmar (2008), pp. 146–150. 
588 The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (1991), Chapter 2, Articles 14–65.  
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[T]he present Assembly was the outcome of elections held in April 1990, after which an Executive 
Council supported by six parties controlling a majority of the Assembly was formed. 
It should be noted that Article 81 of the new Constitution of 23 December 1991 provides for 
universal, equal and direct suffrage and the secret ballot. The Constitutional Act to give effect to the 
Constitution provides that the present Assembly will remain in place until the election of the new 
Parliament. 589 
The Badinter Commission further observed that Slovenia’s “Respect for the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of 
Paris is stated in the Declaration of Independence” and that in regard to: 
[T]he requirement that Slovenia's legal system should respect human rights, observe the rule of law 
and guarantee a democratic regime, the Republic's answers to the Commission's questionnaire cite a 
number of constitutional provisions which establish to the Commission's satisfaction that these 
principles will be acted upon.… The Republic of Slovenia undertakes to accept international 
machinery for monitoring respect for human rights, including individual petitions to the European 
Commission of Human Rights.590 
In regard to the requirement for the protection of ethnic groups and 
minorities, the Badinter Commission held that Slovenia’s constitutional order 
guarantees “a number of specific rights to the Italian and Hungarian minorities.”591 
The Opinion further analysed the provisions on human rights standards in Slovenia’s 
Constitution and concluded:  
[W]hile the Republic of Slovenia … accepts the international machinery that has been set up to 
protect and monitor respect for human rights, the Constitution of 23 December also institutes a 
Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to enforce respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
both in the law and in individual actions.
 592   
 In regard to Slovenia’s commitment to peace and resolving of the conflict in 
the territory of the SFRY, the Badinter Commission stated: 
                                                 
589 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 7 (11 January 1992), para 1. 
590 Ibid., para 2(a).  
591 Ibid., para 2(b). 
592 Ibid., para 3(a). 
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The commitment of the Republic of Slovenia to respect the inviolability of territorial boundaries made 
in the Declaration of Independence is repeated in the application for recognition. The Republic's 
frontiers are delimited in Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Charter of 25 June 1991 unchanged by 
reference to the existing frontiers. 
The Republic of Slovenia also stresses that it has no territorial disputes with neighbouring states or the 
neighbouring Republic of Croatia.593 
The Badinter Commission ultimately held that “the Republic of Slovenia satisfies the 
tests in the [EC] Guidelines and the [EC] Declaration.”594 
 From the reasoning of the Badinter Commission in Opinion 7, the following 
observation can be derived: First, the Badinter Commission did not find any 
difficulties with Slovenia’s meeting of traditional or additional statehood criteria. 
Indeed, its reasoning was mainly based on the political criteria expressed in the EC 
Guidelines. Second, when assessing Slovenia’s meeting of recognition requirements 
associated with democracy, protection of human rights and commitment to peace, the 
Badinter Commission based its reasoning on the institutional implementation of 
these requirements. Third, when the Badinter Commission examined actual 
developments in regard to the political system of liberal*democracy, its approach was 
electoral*centric and did not go beyond the observation that democratic elections had 
been held and the next democratic elections were scheduled. 
 Slovenia was recognised by the EC member states on 15 January 1992 and 
admitted to the UN on 22 May 1992.595 The Badinter Commission, however, 
subsequently held that Slovenia became a state on 8 October 1991, when the Brioni 
Agreement was terminated. 596 
 
                                                 
593 Ibid., para 2(c). 
594 Ibid., para 4.  
595 GA Res 46/236 (22 May 1992). 
596 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11, para 4 (16 July 1993).  
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On 25 June 1991, the Croatian parliament adopted the Declaration on Promulgation 
of a Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia.597 The Declaration, inter alia, 
draws legitimacy on the expressed will of the people at referendum, held on 19 May 
1991.598 At the referendum ninety*three percent of those who voted cast their votes 
in favour of independence.599 Adoption of the Brioni Agreement suspended Croatia’s 
declaration of independence for a period of three months.600 
 Because of the ethnic structure of its population, the case of Croatia was not 
as clear as that of Slovenia. Twelve percent of the population of Croatia was of Serb 
ethnic origin601 and opposed the declaration of independence.602 Already prior to the 
referendum on the declaration of independence, Serbs in Croatia proclaimed that 
they no longer accepted Croatia’s authority.603 As a result Kninska Krajina, an entity 
which sought union with Serbia, was established; however, the parliament of Serbia 
rejected such an option.604 With YNA support, Kninska Krajina became an entity in 
whose territory Croatia did not exercise effective control.605 On 19 December 1991, 
the self*proclaimed parliament of Kninska Krajina declared independence and, in 
                                                 
597 The Declaration on Promulgation of a Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia (1991). The 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia No 31/1991 (25 June 1991).   
598 Ibid., Article 2.  
599 See Trifunovska (1994), p. 299. 
600 See supra ch. 4.2.1. 
601 See Raič (2002), p. 349. 
602 Ibid. For more on the historical background of Serbian minority within Croatia see infra ch. 6.4.8. 
603 Ibid. 
604 Ibid., p. 388. The exact reason why the Milošević*controlled Serbian parliament rejected a union 
with Krajina is unknown. The answer should probably be sought in the context of international 
pressure to stop the conflicts in both Croatia and Bosnia*Herzegovina and secret agreements between 
the presidents of Croatia and Serbia. In 1993, the New York Times made the following observation: 
“In Zagreb, Croatia's capital, Western diplomats say they suspect President Milosevic reached a secret 
understanding with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia over territory [of Krajina] … No one seems 
sure of the substance of this agreement, but there is a suspicion in the Zagreb diplomatic corps that 
President Milosevic at least offered to force the Serbs in northern, western and southern Krajina to 
surrender in return for Croatia's giving him the separate eastern Krajina region, which directly abuts 
his territory. See Croatia’s Serb Enclave Feels Betrayed, NY Times (9 May 1993) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE7DA1E3EF93AA35756C0A965958260&scp
=1&sq=a%20plan%20for%20peace%20may%209%201993&st=cse>. 
605 Raič (2002), p. 338. 
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accordance with the EC Declaration, addressed a request for recognition as an 
independent state.606 The Badinter Commission ignored the application and 
recognition was not granted by any state, not even by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). It was not until 1995 that Croatia established effective control 
over Kninska Krajina.607 
 The Badinter Commission dealt with the recognition of Croatia in its Opinion 
5, delivered on 11 January 1992. Applying the EC Guidelines, the Badinter 
Commission found deficiencies in Croatia’s meeting of minority protection 
standards: 
[T]he Constitutional Act of 4 December 1991 does not fully incorporate all the provisions of the draft 
Convention of 4 November 1991, notably those contained in Chapter II, Article 2(c), under the 
heading `Special status' [and] the authorities of the Republic of Croatia should therefore supplement 
the Constitutional Act in such a way as to satisfy those provisions.608 
 The Badinter Commission thus referred to the Draft Convention of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia (the so*called Carrington draft Convention) from 4 
November 1991, which, inter alia, adopts minority protection standards agreed upon 
in the agreement between presidents Franjo Tuñman (Croatia), Slobodan Milošević 
(Serbia) and the Yugoslav defence minister Veljko Kadijević, brokered by the 
Netherlands’ foreign minister Hans van den Broek, at The Hague on 4 October 
1991.609 The relevant chapter provides: 
[A]reas in which persons belonging to a national or ethnic group form a majority, shall enjoy a special 
status of autonomy. 
Such a status will provide for: 
(a) The right to have and show national emblems of that group; 
                                                 
606 Ibid., p. 389. 
607 Ibid., p. 390. 
608 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 5 (11 January 1992), para 3. 
609 UN Doc S/23169 (4 October 1991). 
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(b) The right to a second nationality for members of that group in addition to the nationality of the 
republic 
(c) An educational system which respects the values and needs of that group; 
(d) (i) A legislative body, 
   (ii) An administrative structure, including regional police force, 
      (iii) And a judiciary responsible for matters concerning the area, which reflects the composition of 
the population of the area; 
(e) Provisions for appropriate international monitoring... 
Such areas, unless they are defined in part by an international frontier with a State not party to This 
Convention, shall be permanently demilitarized and no military forces, exercises or activities on land 
or in the air shall be permitted in those areas…610 
The Badinter Commission ultimately held: 
[S]ubject to this reservation [minority protection standards], the Republic of Croatia meets the 
necessary conditions for its recognition by the Member States of the European Community in 
accordance with the Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 
16 December 1991.611 
 The Badinter Commission did not invoke the problem that Croatia did not 
exercise effective control over part of its territory (i.e. in the territory of Kninska 
Krajina), although the EC Guidelines provide that “the normal standards of 
international practice”,612 i.e. statehood criteria, would be applied when recognition 
was to be considered. Nevertheless, despite this deficiency and despite the Badinter 
Commission’s finding that Croatia did not sufficiently fulfil the required minority 
protection standards, the EC member states granted recognition to Croatia on 15 
January 1991.613 Admission to the UN followed on 22 May 1992.614 The Badinter 
                                                 
610 Ibid., pp. 39–40. Compare also Caplan (2005), p. 22, at n. 30.  
611 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 5 (11 January 1992), para 3. 
612 See supra n. 481. 
613 Crawford (2006), p. 397. 
614 GA Res 46/238 (22 May 1992). 
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Commission subsequently held that Croatia, like Slovenia, became a state on 8 
October 1991, which is the day on which the Brioni Agreement terminated. 615 
Unlike in its reasoning in the case of Slovenia,616 the Badinter Commission did not 
invoke Croatian democratic elections or make any other direct observations in regard 
to democracy in Croatia. Indeed, “[r]ecognition proceeded apace for Croatia despite 
some unanswered questions over General Franjo Tudjman’s methods of 
governance.”617 
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Within the SFRY, Bosnia*Herzegovina was defined as a republic of three 
constitutive ‘nations’: Muslims, Serbs and Croats.618 Most numerous were Muslims 
(43.7 percent in 1991), followed by Serbs (31.3 percent in 1991) and Croats (17.3 
percent in 1991).619 Its diverse ethnic composition and the armed conflict that broke 
out made recognition of Bosnia*Herzegovina an especially difficult issue.  
 On 15 October 1991, the Assembly of Bosnia*Herzegovina, in the absence of 
the representatives of Serbian nationality, adopted the Memorandum on Sovereignty 
of Bosnia*Herzegovina.620 On 20 December 1991, Bosnia*Herzegovina addressed 
the application for recognition in accordance with the EC Declaration.621 
 The Badinter Commission, inter alia, held that: 
                                                 
615 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 4.  
616 See supra ch. 4.3.2. 
617 Grant (1999), p. 95. 
618 Constitution of the Socialist Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina (1969), Article 1. 
The term ‘Muslim’ had an ethnic and not religious connotation. In the times of the SFRY, the term 
‘Bosniak’ was not in use, while the term ‘Bosnian’ was in politically*correct language only used as an 
adjective, while it had a pejorative meaning if used as a noun to refer to the people of Bosnia.  
619 In addition to that, 5.5 percent of inhabitants of Bosnia*Herzegovina declared themselves 
‘Yugoslavs’ and 2.2 percent invoked some other ethnic background. The 1991 Census, The Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina <http://josip.purger.com/other/bih/index.htm>. 
620 The Memorandum on Sovereignty of Bosnia*Herzegovina, The Official Gazette of the Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia*Herzegovina No 32 (15 October 1991). The Memorandum was adopted at a night*
meeting of the Assembly, which began on the previous day; therefore, it is sometimes dated to 14 
October 1991.  
621 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 4 (11 January 1992). 
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[T]he current Constitution of the SRBH [Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina] guarantees 
equal rights for `the nations of Bosnia*Herzegovina * Muslims, Serbs and Croats * and the members of 
the other nations and ethnic groups living on its territory'.  
The current Constitution of the SRBH guarantees respect for human rights, and the authorities of 
Bosnia*Herzegovina have sent the Commission a list of the laws in force giving effect to those 
principles; they also gave the Commission assurances that the new Constitution now being framed 
would provide full guarantees for individual human rights and freedoms.  
The authorities gave the Commission an assurance that the Republic of Bosnia*Herzegovina had no 
territorial claims on neighbouring countries and was willing to guarantee their territorial integrity.622 
 The Badinter Commission thus saw no institutional deficiencies for the 
implementation of human rights standards. Direct references to democracy were not 
made “and Bosnia received recognition … with doubts lingering over whether … 
[its] nascent institutions would function democratically.”623 Democratic principles 
were nevertheless invoked in the context of the right of self*determination. This will 
be further discussed below.624  
 A referendum on independence, upon a specific request by the Badinter 
Commission,625 was subsequently held between 29 February and 1 March 1992.626 
The referendum was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs,627 while independence was 
supported by sixty*three percent of all eligible to vote (to which the boycotting Serbs 
also counted).628 Bosnia*Herzegovina was recognised as a state by the EC member 
states on 6 April 1992629 and admitted to the UN on 22 May 1992.630  
 The Badinter Commission subsequently held that Bosnia*Herzegovina 
became an independent state on 6 March 1992, the day when results of the 
                                                 
622 Ibid., para 1.  
623 Grant (1999), p. 195. 
624 See infra ch. 5.3. 
625 See infra n. 1153. 
626 See Crawford (2006), p. 398. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 
630 GA Res 46/237 (22 May 1992). 
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referendum on independence were proclaimed.631 This critical date for Bosnia*
Herzegovina’s becoming a state was also affirmed by the ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide 
case, in the context of the question of when Bosnia*Herzegovina became party to the 
Genocide Convention.632 
 The Badinter Commission and recognising states did not invoke that large 
parts of Bosnia*Herzegovina were not under effective control of the central 
government.633 Further, although popular consent for the creation of the state of 
Bosnia*Herzegovina was given prior to recognition, in light of the boycott of one of 
its constitutive peoples, the quality of this consent remains questionable. Two 
interpretations are possible regarding the question of why the boycott of the Serbian 
population was irrelevant. First, the majoritarian concept of democratic decision*
making at the referendum prevailed. Second, the exercise of the right of self*
determination was limited by the previous internal boundary arrangement which 
prevented Bosnian Serbs from seeking the arrangement they preferred.634 These two 
questions will be addressed at a later point. 
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Macedonia held its referendum on independence on 8 September 1991. The decision 
for independence was upheld by 72.16 percent of eligible to vote or ninety*five 
percent of those who voted.635 On 17 September 1991, the Declaration of 
                                                 
631 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 6. 
632 The relevant reasoning of the ICJ reads: “Whether Bosnia and Herzegovina automatically became 
party to the Genocide Convention on the date of its accession to independence on 6 March 1992, or 
whether it became a party as a result * retroactive or not * of its Notice of Succession of 29 December 
1992, at al1 events it was a party to it on the date of the filing of its Application on 20 March 1993.” 
The Bosnia Genocide case, ICJ Rep 1996, para 23. 
633 See Crawford (2006), p. 398. 
634 Compare infra ch. 6.4.8. 
635 Trifunovska (1994), p. 345. A share of 3.5 percent of those who voted was expressly against the 
independence. According to the 1991 census, major ethnicities populating Macedonia were the 
following: Macedonians (65.3 %), Albanians (27.73 %), Turks (3.79 %) and Serbs (2.09 %). 
Macedonian Census (1991) <http://www.makedonija.info/republic.html>. 
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Independence was proclaimed by Macedonia’s Assembly.636 On 20 December 1991, 
Macedonia sent a request for recognition in accordance with the EC Declaration.637  
 The Badinter Commission, inter alia, held that “the Arbitration Commission 
also notes that on 17 November 1991, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia 
adopted a Constitution embodying the democratic structures and the guarantees for 
human rights which are in operation in Europe.”638 The Badinter Commission further 
found that Macedonia had implemented an adequate institutional framework for 
minority rights protection639 and showed adequate commitment to international 
peace640 and inviolability of borders.641 
 Much of the Badinter Commission’s reasoning on Macedonia was dedicated 
to the latter’s dispute with Greece over the name ‘Macedonia’. Greece maintained 
(and still maintains) that use of the name ‘Macedonia’ implies territorial claims 
against Greece.642 The Badinter Commission noted that Macedonia amended its 
constitution on 6 January 1992 and unequivocally renounced any territorial claims 
and interference into affairs of other states. It ultimately took the view: 
[T]hat the Republic of Macedonia satisfies the tests in the Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the 
Council of the European Communities on 16 December 1991 [and] that the Republic of Macedonia 
has, moreover, renounced all territorial claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in 
international law; that the use of the name `Macedonia' cannot therefore imply any territorial claim 
against another State.
643 
                                                 
636 The Declaration on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Macedonia, 17 
September 1991, reprinted in Trifunovska (1994), pp. 345–47. 
637 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 6 (11 January 1992). 
638 Ibid., para 3.  
639 Ibid. 
640 Ibid., para 1. 
641 Ibid., para 4. 
642 See Greece Rejects Macedonia Nato Bid, BBC (6 March 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7280723.stm>. 
643 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 6 (11 January 1992), para 4. 
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 However, Greece was not willing to grant recognition to Macedonia under 
this name.644 Consequently, despite an explicit recommendation by the Badinter 
Commission, Macedonia remained unrecognised by the EC member states until 16 
December 1993, and even then it was recognised under the compromise name ‘The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYR Macedonia).645 Prior to recognition 
by the EC, on 8 April 1993, the FYR Macedonia had already become member of the 
UN.646   
For more than a year, non*recognition of Macedonia, which had origins in the 
EC’s internal policy, had been virtually universalised as only Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Lithuania granted recognition, under its original name, before admission of the FYR 
Macedonia to the UN.647 This situation had an evidently political character because 
Macedonia otherwise clearly met both the statehood criteria as well as other 
recognition requirements expressed in the EC Guidelines and the duty to withhold 
recognition did not apply.648 Indeed, Macedonia was not established in violation of 
the right of self*determination or as a result of an unlawful use of force. Further, 
since Macedonia’s former parent state no longer existed,649 this was not a case of 
unilateral secession and there was no applicable claim to territorial integrity which 
could prevent the creation of a new state. 
Nevertheless, this absence of recognition does not imply that Macedonia at 
that time was not a state but rather that it was an example of political non*
recognition.650 It also needs to be noted that in its Opinion 11, the Badinter 
                                                 
644 See Craven (1995), pp. 199–200. 
645 See Crawford (2006), p. 398. 
646 GA Res 47/225 (8 April 1993). 
647 See Rich (1993), p. 52.  
648 Compare supra ch. 3.2. and 4.2. 
649 See the Badinter Commission, Opinion 9 (4 July 1992). 
650 On 1 and 2 May 1992, the EC and its member states adopted the Declaration on the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in which it was held that they were “willing to recognise that State 
as a sovereign and independent State, within its existing borders, and under a name that can be 
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Commission held that Macedonia became a state on 17 November 1991, the day 
when it adopted a new constitution which proclaimed Macedonia a sovereign 
state.651 
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The two remaining former republics of the SFRY, Serbia and Montenegro, unified in 
the FRY and claimed continuity of SFRY’s international personality. This was 
expressed in the Constitution of the FRY, which was promulgated on 27 April 1992. 
Article 2 defined the FRY as a state of Serbia and Montenegro,652 while the preamble 
invoked their unification on the grounds of “uninterrupted international personality 
of Yugoslavia.”653  
 The FRY’s claim to the SFRY’s international personality is evident from 
submissions of both Serbia and Montenegro to the EC in response to the invitation to 
apply for recognition, as expressed by the EC Declaration. In his reply on 23 
December 1991, Serbia’s Foreign Minister recalled that Serbia acquired 
“internationally recognized statehood at the Berlin Congress of 1878 and on that 
basis had participated in the establishment in 1918 of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes which became Yugoslavia [and concluded that Serbia] is not interested 
in secession.”654  Montenegro’s Foreign Minister, in his response on 24 December 
1991, also declined the EC’s invitation to apply for recognition and invoked the 
                                                                                                                                          
accepted by all parties concerned.” Declaration on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Guimaracs, 1 and 2 May 1992, reprinted in Hill and 
Smith (2000), p. 376. The use of the term ‘state’ rather than, for example, ‘entity’ clearly implies that 
Macedonia’s attributes of statehood were not a subject of dispute,  it was rather that the EC did not 
want to enter into relations with Macedonia under its constitutional name. In this context see also 
Craven (1995), pp. 207–218. 
651 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 5. 
652 Constitution of the FRY (1992), Article 2. 
653 Constitution of the FRY (1992), preamble, my own translation. 
654 Rich (1993), p. 47. 
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international personality that Montenegro had prior to joining the Yugoslav state 
formations.655 
 The Badinter Commission, however, noted already in its Opinion 1 “that the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution.”656 
Subsequently, the UN Security Council in its Resolution 757 held that “the claim by 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (in the United Nations) has not been generally accepted.”657 The Security 
Council further held in Resolution 777: 
[T]he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the 
membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and 
therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not 
participate in the work of the General Assembly.658 
This recommendation was accepted by the General Assembly in its Resolution 
47/1.659 
 The Badinter Commission referred to Resolution 757 when it found that “the 
process of dissolution of the SFRY referred to in Opinion 1, from 29 November 
1991, is now complete and that the SFRY no longer exists.”660 In this context the 
Badinter Commission concluded in Opinion 9 that “[n]ew states have been created 
on the territory of the former SFRY and replaced it. All are successor states to the 
former SFRY”661 and that it follows from the Security Council resolutions that the 
“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has no right to consider 
                                                 
655 Ibid. 
656 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991), para 3.  
657 SC Res 757, preamble (30 May 1992). 
658 SC Res 777, para 1 (19 September 1992).  
659 GA Res 47/1 (19 September 1992).  
660 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 8 (4 July 1992), para 4. 
661 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 9 (4 July 1992), para 1. 
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itself the SFRY's sole successor.”662 Consequently, “the SFRY's membership of 
international organizations must be terminated according to their statutes and … 
none of the successor states may thereupon claim for itself alone the membership 
rights previously enjoyed by the former SFRY.”663 The Badinter Commission 
ultimately held in Opinion 10: 
[T]he FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new state which cannot be considered the sole successor to 
the SFRY … its recognition by the Member States of the European Community would be subject to 
its compliance with the conditions laid down by general international law for such an act and the joint 
statement and [EC] Guidelines664 
 Nevertheless, the FRY continued to claim continuity with the international 
personality of the FRY and, therefore, did not apply for membership in the UN 
before the end of the Milošević regime and was admitted to the UN on 1 November 
2000.665 While non*admission to the UN can be simply ascribed to the absence of an 
application for membership, the FRY’s non*recognition remains much more 
disputable. Since the FRY refused to seek recognition in accordance with the EC 
Declaration, it remained universally unrecognised. The EC recognition policy was 
thus universalised, just as in the case of Macedonia, although the circumstances were 
different. 
 Yet, non*recognition does not imply that the FRY was not a state. Indeed, 
“the FRY, despite not having received, or indeed requested, recognition, was clearly 
considered to have fulfilled the factual requirements of Statehood, as is confirmed by 
                                                 
662 Ibid., para 3. 
663 Ibid., para 4. 
664 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 10 (4 July 1992), para 5.  
665 UN Doc A/Res 55/12 (1 November 2000). Some statements made by officials of the Republic of 
Serbia imply that Serbia still holds that it inherited the international personality of the former SFRY. 
When addressing the Security Council after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the President of 
Serbia, Boris Tadić, inter alia, made the following statement: “Serbia, let me recall, is a founding 
State Member of the United Nations.”  UN Doc S/PV.5838 (18 February 2008), p. 4.  
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its appearance before the ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide Case.”666 There was also one 
circumstance which made the position of the FRY significantly different in 
comparison to other non*recognised states:  
[T]he FRY had the advantage of possession. The SFRY’s foreign service had been progressively 
denuded of its non*Serbian or Montenegrin representatives and accordingly, the personnel in the 
Yugoslav missions abroad were by and large loyal to Belgrade and most accepted the FRY as the 
country they now represented. 667 
Further, “[i]n response many countries reserved their positions and stated that 
continuing dealings with FRY representatives were without prejudice to any eventual 
decision on the FRY’s claim [to continuation of international personality of the 
SFRY]”.668 However, ‘the advantage of possession’ gave the FRY the capacity to 
enter into relations with foreign states, which is otherwise a significant problem of 
non*recognised states.  
 The FRY also declared itself a successor of treaties concluded by the 
SFRY.669 Consequently, “[o]ther states were … faced with a dilemma: they wanted 
the FRY to respect the treaties, especially human rights conventions, to which the 
SFRY had been a party, but they could not accept the FRY as a party on the basis of 
continuation of statehood.”670 Indeed, when deciding on jurisdiction in the Bosnia 
Genocide case, the ICJ made the following observations in regard to applicability of 
the Genocide Convention: 
[The SFRY] signed the Genocide Convention on 11 Decernber 1948 and deposited its instrument of 
ratification, without reservation, on 29 August 1950. At the time of the proclamation of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, on 27 April 1992, a forma1 declaration was adopted on its behalf to the effect 
that: "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international legal and political 
                                                 
666 Terrett (2000), p. 282. 
667 Rich (1993), p. 54. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Aust (2005), p. 400. 
670 Ibid. 
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personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by al1 the 
commitments that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally." This 
intention thus expressed by Yugoslavia to remain bound by the international treaties to which the 
former Yugoslavia was party was confirmed in an official Note of 27 April 1992 from the Permanent 
Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary*General. The Court observes, 
furthermore, that it has not been contested that Yugoslavia was party to the Genocide Convention. 
Thus, Yugoslavia was bound by the provisions of the Convention on the date of the filing of the 
Application in the present case, namely, on 20 March 1993.671 
 The non*recognition of the FRY was somewhat unusual because the FRY 
denied that there was any new state creation in its case.672 Further, other states did 
not deny that the FRY was a state but held that it did not continue the international 
personality of the SFRY. The FRY was, however, deemed to be a successor of rights 
and duties of the SFRY – albeit not the only one – and non*recognition did not 
influence this question. At the same time ‘the advantage of possession’ gave the FRY 
the capacity to act as a state also on the international plane. 
  The Badinter Commission in its Opinion 11 held that the FRY became a state 
on 27 April 1992, the day when it adopted its constitution.673 The United Kingdom, 
for example, recognised the FRY in 9 April 1996.674 Its denying recognition for this 
long has been described as “overtly political”.675 It needs to be noted that recognition 
came after the FRY had signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which, inter alia, stipulated for mutual recognition of the 
                                                 
671 The Bosnia Genocide case (1996), para 17. 
672 This problem is also pointed out in Opinion 11 of the Badinter Commission: “There are particular 
problems in determining the date of State succession in respect of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
because that State considers itself to be the continuation of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia rather than a successor State.” The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 
7.   
673 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 7. 
674 HC Deb (7 May 1996), col 89.  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199596/cmhansrd/vo960507/text/60507w19.htm>. 
675 Dixon and McCorquodale (2003), p. 160. 
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FRY and Bosnia*Herzegovina676 and effectively terminated the FRY’s direct military 
involvement in the armed conflict in Bosnia*Herzegovina.677  
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Although the EC Guidelines invoked “the normal standards of international 
practice”678 when recognition was to be granted, the traditional statehood criteria 
played virtually no role in the reasoning of the Badinter Commission. Indeed, Croatia 
and Bosnia*Herzegovina were recognised as independent states although their 
governments clearly did not exercise effective control over large parts of their 
respective territories. 
 Macedonia clearly met the traditional and additional statehood criteria as well 
as recognition requirements expressed in the EC Guidelines but remained 
unrecognised. 679 Fulfilment of the statehood criteria suggests that there existed no 
obligation to withhold recognition which would apply erga omnes.680 Further, as 
Macedonia was not a case of unilateral secession, it is virtually impossible to find 
any law*based reason for its non*recognition.681 There existed no competing claim to 
territorial integrity. Non*recognition was thus political. If one does not accept that 
                                                 
676 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article X (14 December 
1995) <http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng>. 
677 In this regard the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs later noted (in the 
context of the Kosovo crisis): “The EU's 'Declaration on Yugoslavia', adopted on 16 December 1991, 
required that all Yugoslav republics seeking recognition agree to accept extensive provisions for 
safeguarding the rights of national minorities within their boundaries, including the granting of 
autonomy ('special status') to minorities forming a majority in the area where they lived. However, 
when in April 1996 the EU member states, including the United Kingdom, decided to extend 
recognition to Yugoslavia, they chose to ignore the requirement of autonomy for the Kosovo 
Albanians which earlier had been a central component of the EU's recognition policy. The EU merely 
noted at the time that improved relations between Yugoslavia and the international community would 
depend upon, inter alia, a 'constructive approach' by Yugoslavia to the granting of autonomy for 
Kosovo. Again, achieving Milosevic's cooperation on Bosnia was given priority over exercising 
leverage on Kosovo.” HC Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report (23 May 2000), para 
32 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2807.htm#note53>. For 
more on Kosovo see infra ch. 7.2.  
678 See supra n. 481. 
679 See supra ch. 4.3.5. See also Rich (1993), p. 57. 
680 Compare supra ch. 3.3.2. 
681 Compare supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3.5. 
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recognition is constitutive,682 Macedonia’s statehood in the period of non*recognition 
cannot be disputed. 
 The FRY was a new state creation, although it denied this fact.683 Based on 
its claim for continuity of the international personality of the SFRY, the FRY did not 
seek recognition as foreseen by the EC Declaration.684 Consequently, the Badinter 
Commission did not need to apply the EC Guidelines to this situation. Given its 
involvement in armed conflicts in Croatia685 and Bosnia*Herzegovina,686 atrocities in 
Kosovo687 and the authoritarian nature of the Milošević regime,688 it is possible to 
speculate that the FRY would not have met the EC Guidelines standards associated 
with a commitment to international peace, human rights and democracy.689  
However, this does not mean that the FRY did not meet the statehood criteria. 
Indeed, the FRY obviously met the traditional statehood criteria, including the 
disputable criterion of capacity to enter into relations with foreign states.690 Further, 
although the FRY may well have been involved in an unlawful use of force outside 
of its territory (Bosnia*Herzegovina and Croatia) and denial of the right of self*
determination in its own territory (Kosovo),691 the FRY itself was not established as 
a result of unlawful use of force and/or in breach of the right of self*determination.  
Arguably, the example of the FRY points out the difference between the 
scope of the additional statehood criteria and the scope of recognition requirements 
                                                 
682 Above an argument was made that recognition can have constitutive effects. However, this is so 
when it is not clear whether an entity meets the statehood criteria and/or there exists a competing 
claim to territorial integrity. Neither was the case in the example of Macedonia. Compare supra ch. 
3.3.2. 
683 See supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3.6. 
684 See supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
685 See especially SC Res 815 (30 March 1993), SC Res 820 (17 April 1993), the latter implying 
Serbia’s involvement in both Croatia and Bosnia*Herzegovina. 
686 See especially SC Res 752 (15 May 1992), SC Res 757 (30 May 1992), SC Res 758 (8 June 1992), 
SC Res 760 (18 June 1992). 
687 See infra ch. 7. 
688 See N Miller (2005), pp. 552–64. 
689 See supra ch. 4.2.3. 
690 See supra ch. 4.3.6. 
691 See infra ch. 7.2. 
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expressed in the EC Guidelines. While the additional statehood criteria preclude a 
state creation where an effective entity is established as a result of an unlawful use of 
force or in denial of the right of self*determination,692 the EC Guidelines have a 
broader scope. They demand peaceful behaviour in the international community in 
general693 and adherence to a particular (liberal*democratic) political system, not 
merely operation of some democratic principles within the right of self*
determination.694 Thus, the aggressive behaviour of the FRY, human rights violations 
and the authoritarian nature of the Milošević regime cannot be deemed to have 
prevented the FRY from meeting the statehood criteria. Consequently, the duty of 
non*recognition did not apply erga omnes and non*recognition of the FRY can be 
seen as merely political and not as a consequence of a legal fact that the FRY was an 
illegally created effective entity. Indeed, it was shown that the FRY was treated as a 
state.695  
 The Badinter Commission expressly held that recognition is declaratory and 
that it did not perceive itself as a body which creates states. Such a perception is 
obvious from the reasoning in Opinion 11 in which it was, inter alia, held that 
Slovenia and Croatia became states on 8 October 1991 (the day of the expiry of the 
moratorium on their respective declarations on independence),696 Macedonia on 17 
November 1991 (the day of the adoption of a new constitution),697 Bosnia*
Herzegovina on 6 March 1992 (the day of the proclamation of referendum results)698 
and the FRY on 27 April 1992 (the day of the adoption of a new constitution).699 
                                                 
692 See supra ch. 3.2.2. 
693 See supra ch. 4.2.3. 
694 See supra n. 520. 
695 See supra ch. 4.3.6. 
696 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 4. 
697 See supra n. 651. 
698 See supra n. 631. 
699 See supra n. 673. 
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These opinions imply a declaratory understanding of recognition; however, they 
were made subsequently, for state succession purposes, and are not unproblematic.700  
When the Badinter Commission delivered its Opinion 11, on 16 July 1993, 
Slovenia and Croatia had already been recognised as independent states and were 
members of the UN.701 Further, on 16 July 1993 there already existed the authority 
of the Badinter Commission’s previous opinions holding that the SFRY was in the 
process of dissolution (Opinion 1)702 and that this process was completed (Opinion 
8).703  
Yet on 8 October 1991, an authority holding that the process of dissolution 
was underway in the SFRY was absent. Further, such a finding was supported by the 
fact that four out of the SFRY’s six constitutive republics had declared 
independence,704 while on 8 October 1991, Bosnia*Herzegovina had not yet declared 
independence705 and Macedonia’s declaration was fairly recent.706 The prevailing 
view on 8 October 1991 was that Slovenia and Croatia sought unilateral secession.707 
In such a circumstance the acquisition of statehood is much more questionable and, 
arguably, essentially depends on recognition. As was observed by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in the Québec case: “The ultimate success of … [unilateral] secession 
                                                 
700 In Opinion 11 the Badinter Commission dealt with questions of succession after the dissolution of 
the SFRY had been completed and for this purpose it had to establish critical dates on which the 
SFRY’s former republics became independent states. See the Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 
July 1993), para 2 
701 See supra n. 595 and n. 613 and 614. 
702 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991), para 3. 
703 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 8 (4 July 1992), para 4. 
704 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991), para 2. 
705 Bosnia*Herzegovina declared independence on 15 October 1991. See supra n. 620. 
706 Macedonia declared independence on 17 September 1991. See supra n. 636. 
707 See Grant (1999), pp. 152–53, arguing: “Though the United States, the Soviet Union, and various 
West European states and organizations stated their disapproval of Croat and Slovene unilateral 
declarations of independence, Germany quickly began to suggest that it would extend recognition to 
the putative states. As early as August 7, 1991, the German government expressed support for the 
secessionists.” See also Raič (2002), p. 352, arguing that on 8 October 1991, people of Croatia 
possessed the right to secession based on the ‘remedial secession’ doctrine.  
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would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely 
to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession….”708 
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s unilateral secessions would thus ultimately depend 
on recognition by the international community which would take legality and 
legitimacy criteria into consideration.709 However, recognition on 8 October 1991 
was not certain. Indeed, “[a]s much as the Slovenes may have wished and hoped for 
EC recognition, it was really not until the EC Council of Ministers meeting of 16 
December [1991] that they would be assured of it.”710 In other words, it was not 
before the adoption of the EC Guidelines and Declaration that it became clear that 
Slovenia (and also Croatia) would be recognised as independent states.711  
Caplan argues that “if one reads history of this period backwards from its 
final denouncement, the uncertainty is less apparent.”712 Arguably, this is what the 
Badinter Commission did when it subsequently held that Slovenia and Croatia 
became states on 8 October 1991. It was the opinion of the Badinter Commission, 
delivered on 29 November 1991,713 which established the universally*accepted 
authority stating that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution. Further, the EC 
Guidelines and Declaration established a mechanism to deal with this situation (i.e. 
to recognise new states emerging in the territory of the SFRY). Although the 
Badinter Commission expressly held that it did not see itself as a body which creates 
states,714 it can be said that its observation that the SFRY was in the process of 
dissolution crucially changed the international perception of legal circumstances in 
the territory of the SFRY. Indeed, in its Opinion 11, the Badinter Commission itself 
                                                 
708 The Québec case (1998), para 155. 
709 A ‘remedial secession’ argument could, possibly, be advanced. Compare infra ch. 5.4. 
710 Caplan (2005), pp. 105–106. 
711 Compare supra ch. 4.2.1.  
712 Caplan (2005), p. 104.  
713 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991). 
714 See supra notes 696–700. 
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ascribed great importance to the view that the SFRY was in the process of 
dissolution: 
[T]he demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, unlike that of other recently dissolved 
States (USSR, Czechoslovakia), resulted not from an agreement between the parties but from a 
process of disintegration that lasted some time, starting, in the Commission’s view, on 29 November 
1991, when the Commission issued opinion No. 1, and ending on 4 July 1992, when it issued opinion 
No. 8.715 
 The role of the Badinter Commission thus had constitutive effects as it 
provided for a universally*adopted authority that dissolution, rather than attempts at 
unilateral secession, was underway in the SFRY. This removed the claim to 
territorial integrity of the SFRY and recognitions were ultimately declaratory.716 The 
broader involvement of the EC, however, had significant constitutive effects. The 
opinions of the Badinter Commission were formally not legally binding717 and were 
not entirely followed by EC member states.718 Nevertheless, they importantly shaped 
state practice of the entire international community and, after such a finding of the 
Badinter Commission, it was not disputed that the SFRY was a case of dissolution.719 
Such a view was adopted even by the Security Council.720 
 The finding that dissolution was underway in the SFRY also importantly 
shaped legal circumstances for those republics which either declared independence at 
a later stage or attempted to continue the SFRY’s international personality. It was 
                                                 
715 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 2.  
716 The constitutive effects of the EC’s involvement in the state creations are captured in the following 
anecdote: “At the second meeting with an EC foreign ministerial troika in Zagreb on 30 June [1991], 
where the EC negotiators were seeking a restoration of the status quo ante, De Michelis [foreign 
minister of Italy] approached Rupel [foreign minister of Slovenia] and assured him privately that 
Slovenia would not be forced to rejoin Yugoslavia: ‘You will be an independent state. Croatia, on the 
other hand is a more complicated issue, since its situation is different from yours. But you’ll be free in 
three months. You just have to stick to your agreements.’” Caplan (2005), pp. 102–103, quoting 
interview with Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel. 
717 See supra n. 476. 
718 See the examples of Croatia (supra ch. 4.3.3.) and Macedonia (supra ch. 4.3.5.). 
719 See supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3.6. 
720 SC Res 757 and SC Res 777.  
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established above that non*recognition of Macedonia and the FRY did not preclude 
these two entities from being states.721 However, similarly to the cases of Slovenia 
and Croatia, it is difficult to accept that Macedonia was a state before it became 
evident that the opinion of the Badinter Commission, holding that the SFRY was in a 
process of dissolution, had been universally accepted. However, in the later stage, 
after Macedonia lacked recognition because of the dispute over its name,722 the 
situation was already determined by the dissolution of the SFRY and thus by the 
absence of a competing claim to territorial integrity. This was also the case with the 
FRY where there was no competing claim for territorial integrity. Since statehood 
criteria were obviously met, Macedonia and the FRY were clear situations in which 
the relationship between the emergence of new states and the act of recognition could 
be explained by the declaratory theory of recognition.   
While the EC Guidelines invoke democratic standards, human rights 
protection and commitment to peace as recognition criteria, it is possible to conclude 
that the Badinter Commission applied these requirements very loosely. An exception 
is Slovenia, in which case the Badinter Commission discussed the implemented 
democratic standards at great length.723 Democracy was broadly invoked in the 
opinion on Macedonia,724 while it played virtually no role in opinions dealing with 
Croatia and Bosnia*Herzegovina.  
 The Badinter Commission found significant deficiencies in Croatia’s meeting 
of minority rights protections standards, but the EC member states nevertheless 
granted recognition.725 In the case of Bosnia*Herzegovina, the Badinter Commission 
                                                 
721 See supra ch. 4.3.5. and 4.3.6. 
722 See supra ch. 4.3.5. 
723 See supra ch. 4.3.2. 
724 See supra ch. 4.3.5. 
725 See supra ch. 4.3.3. Croatia had later improved institutional provisions for the protection of 
minority rights (especially in regard to the protection of the Serb minority). See The Constitutional 
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held that it was unclear whether the will of its peoples really favoured the creation of 
a separate state.726 Thus, although the Badinter Commission did not deal with 
democratic institutions, it can be argued that democratic principles were invoked in 
regard to the right of self*determination. Only after the overwhelming majority of all 
citizens supported the creation of a separate state was recognition to Bosnia*
Herzegovina granted by the EC and subsequently by the entire international 
community.727 Yet the referendum was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs and support for 
independence, although widespread, ignored the wishes of one of the constitutive 
peoples.728  
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In regard to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, two separate occurrences need to be 
examined: first, the regaining of independence by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and 
second, the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).   
In the interwar period, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent states 
and were members of the League of Nations.729 Based on the Ribbentrop*Molotov 
Pact, signed in 1939, the three Baltic States were annexed by the Soviet Union in 
                                                                                                                                          
Act on Rights of National Minorities, The Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia No 01*081*02*
3955/2 (13 December 2002). However, it is still maintained that minority rights in general and rights 
of Serbs in specific remain inadequately protected in practice. In its 2008 report on Croatia, Amnesty 
International noted: “The 1991–95 war continued to overshadow human rights in Croatia. Despite 
some progress in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes, impunity remained widespread for 
crimes allegedly committed by members of the Croatian Army and police forces. Minorities, 
including Roma and Croatian Serbs, suffered discrimination, including in economic and social rights. 
Of at least 300,000 Croatian Serbs displaced by the conflict, approximately 130,000 were officially 
recorded as having returned home.” Amnesty International, Croatia, Report 2008 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/croatia/report*2008>. 
726 See supra ch. 4.3.4. 
727 See supra ch. 4.3.4.  
728 See supra ch. 4.3.4. See also infra ch. 5.4.3.3. 
729 See Crawford (2006), p. 393. 
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1940.730 While “[t]he international community almost uniformly refused to grant de 
jure recognition to the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic States,”731 it was de facto 
accepted that they were constitutive republics of the Soviet Union.732 
 Lithuania declared independence on 11 March 1990.733 At a subsequent 
referendum, held in February 1991, 90.47 percent of cast votes were in favour of 
independence.734 Estonia declared independence on 20 August 1991, following a 
referendum, at which 77.83 percent of cast votes were in favour of independence.735 
Latvia declared independence on 21 August 1991, following a referendum at which 
73.68 percent of cast votes were in favour of independence.736  Subsequently, “[o]n 6 
September 1991, the State Council of the Soviet Union voted unanimously to 
recognize the independence of the Baltic States.”737 Thus, consent of the parent state 
for the creation of the three independent states was given. 
 Some states granted recognition to the Baltic States prior to recognition 
granted by the Soviet Union. Notably, the EC member states recognised the Baltic 
States on 27 August 1991.738 However, due to different interpretations of the legal 
status of the Baltic States, there were also different views on the question of whether 
this was an act of recognition of new states or acknowledgement of a revival of states 
in existence prior to annexation in 1940: 
                                                 
730 Article 1 of the Secret Additional Protocol to the Ribbentrop*Molotov Pact reads: “In the event of a 
territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of 
influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is 
recognized by each party.” The German*Soviet Non*Aggression Pact (The Ribbentrop*Molotov Pact) 
(23 August 1939), Secret Additional Protocol, Article 1 
<http://www.geocities.com/iturks/html/ribbentrop_molotov_pact.html>. 
731 Himmer (1992), p. 323.  
732 Ibid., p. 324.  
733 Crawford (2006), p. 394 
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid. 
736 Ibid.  
737 Ibid. 
738 Warbrick (1992), p. 474. Recognition was thus granted before adoption of the EC Guidelines (see 
supra ch. 4.2.1.). The latter document was therefore not applicable in this situation. 
 137 
A distinction was drawn in the [EC] Presidency statement between the position of the Netherlands and 
Spain which had recognised the annexation of the Baltic States and which, accordingly, needed to 
recognise their revived status, and the remainder of the Community States, for which the act of 27 
August [1991] was not an act of recognition.739 
The dilemma is also captured in the position of the Government of the United 
Kingdom, which held that the act of 27 August 1991 was an act of recognition; 
however, “it has yet to take a position on whether the present Baltic States are simply 
revivals of the ones existing before 1940.”740 Warbrick concludes that “[f]rom a 
purely legal point of view, the outcome will depend to an extent on what view is 
taken of the legality of the Ribbentrop*Molotov Pact and the subsequent 
incorporation of the territories into the USSR.”741 
 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were admitted to the UN on 17 September 
1991.742 It remains significant that “[t]he Security Council did not consider the 
applications for recognition made by the Baltic States until 12 September 1991, six 
days after the Soviet Union had agreed to recognize them.”743 According to 
Crawford, this implies that “the position of the Soviet authorities was treated as 
highly significant even in a case of suppressed independence.”744 It also needs to be 
noted that Lithuania declared independence more than seventeen months before the 
EC extended recognition and held a referendum six months before recognition. 
Lithuania may be an example of a state creation where a unilateral declaration of 
independence was subsequently acknowledged by the parent state. On the other 
hand, Estonia and Latvia declared independence after a period of negotiations with 
                                                 
739 Ibid.  
740 Ibid. 
741 Ibid. 
742 GA Res 46/4 (17 September 1991) (Estonia), GA Res 46/5 (17 September 1991) (Latvia), GA Res 
46/6 (17 September 1991) (Lithuania). 
743 Crawford (2006), p. 394. 
744 Ibid. 
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Soviet authorities and in a more favourable political situation.745 Estonia and Latvia, 
unlike Lithuania, were recognised as states and received approval of the parent state 
virtually immediately after the declaration of independence.746  
After the three Baltic States became independent, the Soviet Union continued 
in existence as a federation of twelve republics. On 8 December 1991, the presidents 
of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States747 which, inter alia, comprehends the 
following formulation: 
We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation … and Ukraine, as founder states of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and signatories of the Union Agreement of 1922 … hereby declare that the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no 
longer exists.748 
 On 21 December 1991, a protocol to the Minsk Agreement was adopted by 
the remaining Soviet Republics, with an exception of Georgia,749 by way of which 
the CIS was extended to these former republics from the moment of ratification of 
the Minsk Agreement.750 On the same day, eleven Soviet Republics (in the absence 
of Georgia), adopted the Alma Ata Declaration which, inter alia, declared: “With the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics ceases to exist.”751  
                                                 
745 For more see Ziemele (2005), p. 43.  
746 Compare supra notes 737–742. 
747 The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991) 31 ILM 
138 (1992) [hereinafter the Minsk Agreement]. 
748 Ibid., preamble, para 1. 
749 The Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States signed at 
Minsk on 8 December 1991 by the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine 
(1991) 31 ILM 147 (1992) [hereinafter the Alma Ata Protocol].   
750 Ratifications took place on the following dates: Belarus (10 December 1991), Ukraine (10 
December 1991), Russia (10 December 1991), Kazakhstan (23 December 1991), Turkmenistan (26 
December 1991), Uzbekistan (4 January 1992), Armenia (18 February 1992), Kyrgyzstan (6 March 
1992), Tajikistan (26 June 1993), Azerbaijan (24 September 1993), and Moldova (8 April 1994). 
Eventually also Georgia ratified the Minsk Agreement on 3 December 1993. See the Minsk 
Agreement (1991). 
751 The Alma Ata Declaration (1991) 31 ILM 147 (1992). 
 139 
The Minsk Agreement further expressed the intention to set up “lawfully 
constituted democratic States”752 and: 
[T]o develop … relations on the basis of mutual recognition of and respect for State sovereignty, the 
inalienable right to self*determination, the principles of equality and non*intervention in internal 
affairs, of abstention from the use of force and from economic or other means of applying pressure 
and of settling of controversial issues through agreement, and other universally recognized principles 
and norms of international law [and confirmed] adherence to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the other documents of the Conference on 
Security and Co*operation in Europe.753 
Similar commitments were also expressed in the Alma Ata Protocol.754 
Notably, the Agreement adopted the commitment to standards similar to those 
expressed in the EC Guidelines.755 Yet the Minsk Agreement was concluded eight 
days before the EC Guidelines were adopted, so its commitments were obviously not 
expressed in order to comply with the EC Guidelines. Further, unlike in the example 
of the SFRY, where it was held that none of its former republics had an exclusive 
right to inherit the SFRY’s international personality,756 in the case of the Soviet 
Union it was mutually accepted by members of the CIS that Russia continued 
membership of the Soviet Union in international organisations. Such a position was 
expressed in the Decision by the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, adopted on 21 
December 1991: “The States of the Commonwealth support Russia’s continuance of 
                                                 
752 The Minsk Agreement (1991), para 3.  
753 Ibid., paras 3 & 4.   
754 The Alma Ata Declaration, inter alia, invokes the following commitments: “[S]etting up lawfully 
constituted democratic States, the relations between which will be developed on the basis of mutual 
recognition and respect for State sovereignty and sovereign equality, the inalienable right to self*
determination, the principles of equality and non*intervention in internal affairs, abstention from the 
use of force and the threat of force and from economic or any other methods of bringing pressure to 
bear, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights and freedoms including the rights of 
national minorities, conscientious discharge of obligations and the other universally acknowledged 
principles and norms of international law.” The Alma Ata Declaration (1991), para 2.   
755 Compare supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
756 See supra ch. 4.2.1., 4.3.6. and 4.3.7. 
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the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations.”757 
Subsequently, on 24 December 1991, the President of the Russian Federation 
addressed a letter to the UN Secretary*General, stating: 
The membership of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including the 
Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United Nations system, is being 
continued by the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the support of the countries of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States.758 
No resolution confirming the continuity of membership was passed but Russia took 
up the seat of the Soviet Union without objections.759 
All newly*emerged states in the territory of the former Soviet Union were 
rapidly admitted to the UN and no objection was raised in regard to their 
statehood.760 Further, although it was observed that both the Minsk Agreement and 
the Alma Ata Protocol invoked the commitments comparable to the requirements 
expressed in the EC Guidelines,761 the latter document was not applied by the 
recognising states before recognition was granted. As has been observed: 
                                                 
757 The Decision by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991) 
31 ILM 138 (1992), para 1.  
758 The Letter of the President of the Russian Federation to the UN Secretary*General, 31 ILM 138 
(1992). 
759 Crawford (2006), p. 395. Russia’s continued membership of the Soviet Union in the UN is, 
however, not uncontested by legal scholars. Significantly, this was not an example of state’s name 
change or secession of part of the Soviet Union’s territory. This was an example of dissolution and 
“with the demise of the Soviet Union … its membership in the UN should have automatically lapsed 
and Russia should have been admitted to membership in the same way as the other newly*independent 
republic (except for Belarus and Ukraine).” Blum (1992), p. 359. As was already argued, the former 
Soviet republics agreed that Russia would continue the Soviet Union’s membership in the UN (see 
supra n. 758). However, “[t]he correct legal path to this end would have been for all the republics of 
the Soviet Union except Russia to secede from the union, thus preserving the continuity between the 
Soviet Union and Russia for the UN membership purposes.” Blum (1991), p. 361. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable whether such a path was possible in rather complicated Soviet political situation in 1991. 
See also infra ch. 5.4.4.1. 
760 Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan all 
became members of the UN on 2 March 1992 and Georgia, who made its application belatedly, on 31 
July 1992. GA Res 46/223 (Moldova), GA Res 46/224 (Kazakhstan), GA Res 46/225 (Kirgizstan), 
GA Res 46/226 (Uzbekistan), GA Res 46/227 (Armenia), GA Res 46/228 (Tajikistan), GA Res 
46/229 (Turkmenistan), GA Res 46/230 (Azerbaijan), GA Res 46/241 (Georgia). Ukraine and Belarus 
were original members of the UN and continued their membership. See Aust (2005), p. 18. 
761 Compare supra ch. 4.2.3. 
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[I]n the face of evidence that democracy was still not taking root, recognition was in due course 
extended to [the] new states. [When drafting the EC Guidelines] [t]he West seems to have awaited 
stability in Moscow, rather than democracy in the republics, and this would imply that geographical 
strategy was more at work than international law.762 
This observation is indeed correct for the example of the Soviet Union, where the 
dissolution was consensual and recognition of new states became merely a matter of 
acknowledging a fact.763 Yet, as was shown above, the EC’s involvement in the 
dissolution of the SFRY was much more complex.764 

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The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was negotiated among, at that time already 
elected, political elites,765 while it was unclear whether the people of either federal 
unit supported the creation of separate Czech and Slovak states: 
[The dissolution] was the result of almost three years of constitutional negotiations which ended in 
deadlock when the Slovak side demanded a confederation or a “union” and the Czech side refused to 
accept anything but “a functional federation.” In the face of the “no exit” situation the two sides 
agreed, with the blessing of the Federal Parliament, on an orderly breakup and on a dense network of 
international agreements between the nascent republics defining their future relations.766 
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was thus not initiated by secessionist 
attempts in either republic but was rather a result of different views on the internal 
organisation of the common state and an inability to reconcile these views. In this 
negotiated settlement, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist on 31 December 1992.767 On 1 
January 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were proclaimed independent 
                                                 
762 Grant (1999), p. 96.  
763 Compare infra ch. 5.4.4.1. 
764 Compare supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3. 
765 The first post*Communist multiparty parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia took place on 8 
and 9 June 1990. Elections were held to both federal assembly and assembly of the constitutive 
republics. For more see Czechoslovakia: Parliamentary Elections <http://www.ipu.org/parline*
e/reports/arc/2084_90.htm>. 
766 Stein (1997), p. 45. 
767 See Crawford (2006), p. 402. 
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states.768 Both were admitted to the UN on 19 January 1992.769 Czechoslovakia was 
thus a clear example of consensual dissolution and the existence of the two new 
states was not disputed.  
It may be argued that consent of the people for the alteration of the legal 
status of the territory was not unequivocally given. The fact that the political leaders 
who carried out the dissolution were democratically elected does not change this 
consideration.770 The international community, however, accepted the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia and, consequently, the creation of two separate states, as fact and the 
absence of a referendum on the future legal status of the territory was not invoked 
before recognitions were granted. Further, the questionable quality of democracy in 
Slovakia in the period of Primer Minister Vladimir Mečiar did not play any role in 
international recognition of Slovakia.771  

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Eritrea was a former Italian colony. After Italy’s defeat in the Second World War, it 
was temporarily put under British administration.772 In 1950, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 390 proposed a federal arrangement for Eritrea and Ethiopia, under the 
Ethiopian Crown.773 The arrangement foresaw meaningful self*government for 
Eritrea.774 
 In 1952, a federal constitution “was adopted unanimously by the Eritrean 
Assembly and the Government of Eritrea and its federation with Ethiopia came into 
                                                 
768 Ibid.  
769 GA Res 47/221 (19 January 1993) (Czech Republic); GA Res 47/222 (19 January 1993) 
(Slovakia).  
770 See infra ch. 5.3.4.2. for discussion on the shortcomings of the electoral process when the exercise 
of the right of self*determination is in question.  
771 See Ramet (1997), pp. 85–90. 
772 For more see M Haile (1994), pp. 482–87. 
773 GA Res 390 (V) A (2 Dec. 1950). 
774 Resolution 390 (V), inter alia, provides: “Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated 
with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.” Ibid., para 1.  
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being.”775 Faced with growing Eritrean dissatisfaction over the federation with 
Ethiopia and calls for independence, the federal arrangement was unilaterally 
terminated by Ethiopia in 1962.776 Subsequently, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation 
Front (EPLF) emerged, which sought Eritrean independence.777 This became feasible 
after the change of government in Ethiopia in 1991, when the Ethiopian military 
regime was defeated by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, 
backed by the EPLF.778 In Eritrea, a provisional government was established, which 
co*brokered the ceasefire agreement between the conflicting parties within 
Ethiopia779 and planned a referendum on independence.780 
The referendum was held in 1993, under UN auspices, at which 
overwhelming (99.8 percent) support was given for independence.781 In this context 
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/114 on 16 December 1992, in which it 
observed “that the authorities directly concerned have requested the involvement of 
the United Nations to verify the referendum in Eritrea”782 and supported “the 
establishment of a United Nations observer mission to verify the referendum.”783 
Eritrean independence was accepted by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 
which previously came to power with help of the EPLF.784 Eritrea was admitted to 
the UN on 28 May 1993.785  
                                                 
775 M Haile (1994), p. 487. See also generally Schiller (1953), pp. 375–82. 
776 See Crawford (2006), p. 402. Ethiopia was at that time still ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie, 
whose government was ousted in 1974 by the military regime, which stayed in power until 1991. See 
M Haile (1994), p. 487 and S Haile (1987), pp. 9–17. 
777 See Crawford (2006), p. 402. 
778 Ibid.  
779 Keesing’s, (1992), p. 38855. 
780 Keesing’s (1992), p. 39085. 
781 Crawford (1992), p. 402. 
782 GA Res 47/114 (5 April 1993), preamble, para 3. 
783 Ibid., para 1. 
784 Ibid. 
785 GA Res 47/230 (28 May 1993). 
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Although one could advance an argument that Ethiopian suppression of the 
right of self*determination in Eritrea might have given support to ‘remedial 
secession’,786 it is notable that Eritrea became independent once consent of its parent 
state was given and, consequently, there existed no competing claim to territorial 
integrity. International involvement into the state creation of Eritrea was limited to 
observation of the independence referendum and did not address governance 
issues.787  
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In the case of the Soviet Union, the Minsk Agreement and the Alma Ata Protocol 
removed the claim to territorial integrity and made the dissolution consensual.788 
Consensual dissolution was also the case in Czechoslovakia and, consequently, there 
was no competing claim to territorial integrity. The example of Eritrea was different 
but led to a similar legal situation. Secession from Ethiopia, not dissolution, was in 
question. However, the approval of Ethiopia removed the claim to territorial integrity 
and, once it was confirmed that independence was an undisputable wish of the 
Eritrean people, there was no doubt that Eritrea was a state.  
In these situations, the absence of a claim to territorial integrity made the 
emergence of new states a matter of fact which was acknowledged by the 
international community and, consequently, recognitions and admission to the UN 
promptly followed. In these situations, international involvement was not decisive 
for the state creations. International involvement was much more significant in 
                                                 
786 For more on the 'remedial secession doctrine' see infra ch. 5.4. 
787 Compare infra ch. 4.5.1. and 7.3. for different accounts on East Timor and Kosovo.  
788 It needs to be noted that the political situation in the Soviet Union in 1991 was rather complicated, 
the three Baltic republics had become independent states and secessionist tensions were present also in 
some other republics. This situation was invoked in the Declaration by the Heads of State of the 
Republic of Belarus, the RSFSR and Ukraine: “[T]he talks on the drafting of a new Soviet Treaty 
have become deadlocked and that the de facto process of withdrawal of republics from the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the formation of independent States has become reality.” Declaration 
by the Heads of States of the Republic of Belarus, the RSFSR and Ukraine (1991) 31 ILM 138 (1992).  
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situations which were at least initially attempts at unilateral secession. Such was the 
case of the dissolution of the SFRY, where it was argued that international 
involvement had constitutive effects for the creation of new states. While the 
declarations of independence of Slovenia and of Croatia were initially considered to 
be attempts at unilateral secession, it was the opinion of the Badinter Commission 
which provided the authority that the dissolution was underway and thus 
Yugoslavia’s claim to territorial integrity was removed.789 Although the Badinter 
Commission expressly held that recognition was declaratory, its opinions had notable 
constitutive effects.790 There was no comparable international involvement in the 
other three situations which have been addressed so far. 
In 1991, the EC’s initial response to crises in the SFRY and the Soviet Union 
aimed to deal with the developments in both dissolving federations. This was implied 
by the EC Guidelines which applied broadly to Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union.791 The EC Declaration, however, specifically referred to the SFRY.792 
Consequently, while the recognition criteria, expressed in the EC Guidelines, were 
meant to be extended to the new states emerging in the territory of the Soviet Union, 
there existed no mechanism for recognition comparable to that established by the EC 
Declaration. Further, there existed no body comparable to the Badinter Commission 
which would discuss recognition issues and thus provide reasoning behind the 
application of the EC Guidelines.   
The standards expressed in the EC Guidelines, which reach beyond the 
statehood criteria,793 were not applied in those post*Cold War state creations in 
which statehood criteria were met and there existed no claim to territorial integrity by 
                                                 
789 See supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3. 
790 See supra n. 716. 
791 See supra ch. 4.2. 
792 See supra ch. 4.2.2.2. 
793 See supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
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a parent state. In these circumstances the international community accepted that such 
entities were states, regardless of type of government. It now needs to be examined 
what role democratic standards, expressed in the EC Guidelines, played in 
subsequent situations of new state creations. 

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The division of the Timor Island dates to Portuguese and Dutch colonial conquests. 
The Portuguese first arrived to the island of Timor at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century.794 In the early seventeenth century their control over the island was 
challenged by the Dutch.795 The history of foreign rule of East Timor has been 
thoroughly examined elsewhere.796 For the purpose of this thesis it should suffice to 
recall that the Portuguese managed to strengthen their power in the eastern part of the 
Timor Island while the Dutch controlled the western part. The division was officially 
confirmed in a treaty initially concluded in 1848797 and unequivocally accepted by 
both states in 1859.798 The colonial boundary between the Dutch*controlled western 
part and the Portuguese*controlled eastern part of the Timor Island was finally 
determined by the Treaty of The Hague in 1913.799 This delimitation now represents 
the international border between the Democratic Republic of Timor*Leste and 
Indonesia.800  
Colonial possessions of the Netherlands in the Indonesian archipelago were 
lost at the end of the Second World War. Indonesia declared independence in 1945, 
                                                 
794 See Singh (1995), p. 2.  
795 Ibid., p. 3. 
796 See generally Singh (1995), Krieger and Rauschning (1997), Taylor (1999), Hainsworth and 
McCloskey (2000), Martin (2001). 
797 For more see Singh (1995), p. 6. 
798 Ibid. 
799 See Chronology of East Timor <http://www.nautilus.org/~rmit/publications/timor*
cronology.html>. 
800 See Deeley (2001), especially pp. 25–27. See also the East Timor case, ICJ Rep 1995, para 10. 
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which was acknowledged by the Netherlands in 1949.801 Portugal, on the other hand, 
retained its colonial possessions until the democratic change in the 1970s.802 In East 
Timor the democratic change in Portugal led to the creation of three main political 
factions,803 the rivalries between which led to a civil war.804 After the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1975, the Portuguese administration left the island and, subsequently, 
two factions separately declared independence.805 While the pro*independence 
faction claimed that East Timor had become an independent state, the pro*Indonesian 
faction maintained that East Timor had acquired independence from Portugal and 
entered into association with Indonesia.806 On 7 December 1975, Indonesia occupied 
the territory, claiming “to be effecting East Timorese self*determination.”807 On 17 
July 1976, the President of Indonesia promulgated an act which declared East Timor 
an Indonesian province.808 In Indonesia’s view, the people of East Timor 
consummated their right of self*determination “through integration with 
Indonesia.”809 
In Portugal’s understanding, however, East Timor was not properly 
decolonised and, consequently, Portugal still regarded itself as an administering 
power.810 Such views were also expressed by the UN organs. The Security Council 
Resolution 384 called upon:  
[A]ll States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its 
people to self*determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); ... the 
Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory [of East Timor]; 
                                                 
801 Davison (2005), p. 18 
802 Singh (1995), p. 7. 
803 Taylor (1995), pp. 23–25. 
804 Martin (2001), p. 16. 
805 Ibid. 
806 Ibid. 
807 Wilde (2008), p. 179. 
808 Martin (2001), p. 16. 
809 Ibid., pp. 16–17. 
810 Ibid., p. 17. 
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the Government of Portugal as administering Power to co*operate fully with the United Nations so as 
to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self*determination; [and urged] … 
all States and other parties concerned to co*operate fully with the efforts of the United Nations to 
achieve a peaceful solution to the existing situations and to facilitate the decolonization of the 
Territory.811 
These views were reaffirmed by Security Council Resolution 389812 and by a 
set of General Assembly Resolutions.813 Importantly, East Timor remained on the list 
of Non*Self*Governing territories.814 It is argued that “Portugal continued to assert 
its formal ties to East Timor throughout the occupation, notably by bringing a case 
about East Timor against Australia to the ICJ in 1991.”815 
 In 1999, the new Indonesian leadership indicated that it would be willing to 
discuss the future legal status of East Timor.816 On 30 August 1999, upon an 
agreement between Indonesia and Portugal,817 a referendum on the future status of 
the territory was held. At the referendum, which was supervised by the UN 
mission,818 the people of East Timor rejected an autonomy arrangement within 
Indonesia and set the course toward independence.819 This decision led to an 
outbreak of violence, initiated by Indonesian forces.820 Subsequently, the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, on 15 September 1999, adopted Resolution 1264, 
which, inter alia, authorised: 
                                                 
811 SC Res 384 (22 December 1975), paras 1–4. A similar view was previously expressed by GA Res 
3485 (XXX) (12 December 1975). 
812 SC Res 389 (22 April 1976), especially paras 1 & 2. 
813 GA Res 31/53 (1 December 1976); GA Res 32/34 (28 November 1977), GA Res 33/39 (13 
December 1978); GA Res 34/40 (21 November 1979); GA Res 35/27 (11 November 1980), GA Res 
36/50 (24 November 1981).  
814 See Wilde (2008), pp. 179–80. 
815 Wilde (2008), p. 181. For more on the East Timor case see Scobbie (1995), pp. 223–242; Clark 
(1995), pp. 243–250, Simpson (1995), pp. 251–268.  
816 Ibid. 
817 See infra ch. 5.4.3.8. 
818 See SC Res 1236, especially paras 4, 8, 9 (7 May 1999). 
819 See infra ch. 5.4.3.8. 
820 Ibid. 
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[T]he establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the request 
of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary*General on 12 September 1999, with the 
following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in 
carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and 
authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this 
mandate.821 
 On 25 October 1999, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted 
Resolution 1272, with which it established “a United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which will be endowed with overall 
responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to 
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of 
justice.”822 Resolution 1272 in its preamble also reaffirmed “respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia.”823 
Prior to the “release” of East Timor to independence and transfer of power 
from international territorial administration to organs of the East Timorese state, the 
international administrative authority supervised the creation of democratic 
institutions.824 Under UN auspices, elections were held on 30 August 2001 and 91.3 
percent of those eligible to vote cast their votes.825 On 15 September 2001, the 
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General “swore in the 88 
members of the Constituent Assembly.”826 On 20 September 2001, the Special 
Representative appointed a second transitional government, the members of which 
were all East Timorese and the composition of the government reflected the outcome 
                                                 
821 SC Res 1264, para 3 (15 September 1999). 
822 SC Res 1272, para 1 (25 October 1999).  
823 Ibid., para 12. 
824 UN Doc S/2001/436 (2 May 2001), paras 2–7; S/2001/983 (18 October 2001), paras. 4–8. 
825 UN Doc S/2001/983 (18 October 2001), para 5. 
826 Ibid. 
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of the elections to the assembly.827 The UN Secretary*General noted that this was 
“the first time that the executive government [was] controlled by East Timorese, 
albeit under the overall authority of [the UN Secretary*General’s] Special 
Representative.”828  
On 28 November 2001, the Constituent Assembly adopted a resolution in 
which it expressed support for direct presidential elections.829 The Special 
Representative determined that the presidential elections would take place on 14 
April 2002.830 On 22 March 2002, the text of the new Constitution was signed by 
members of the East Timorese political elite, religious leaders and representatives of 
the civil society.831 It was determined that the Constitution would enter into force on 
20 May 2002, which was the day foreseen for the proclamation of independence.832 
East Timor’s course to independence was otherwise affirmed in Security Council 
Resolution 1338, adopted on 31 January 2001.833 After the declaration of 
independence on 20 May 2002,834 East Timor was ultimately admitted to the UN on 
27 September 2002.835 
The Constitution of East Timor makes a number of specific references to a 
democratic political order. Section 1 of the Constitution provides: “The Democratic 
Republic of East Timor is a democratic, sovereign, independent and unitary State 
based on the rule of law, the will of the people and the respect for the dignity of the 
                                                 
827 Ibid., para 7. 
828 Ibid. 
829 UN Doc S/2002/80 (17 January 2002), para 7. 
830 Ibid. See also S/2002/432 (17 April 2002), para 7. 
831 Ibid., para 4. 
832 Ibid, paras 2 & 4.  
833 SC Res 1338 (31 January 2001). Notably, this resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.  
834 See East Timor: Birth of a Nation, BBC (19 May 2002) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia*
pacific/1996673.stm>. 
835 GA Res 57/3 (27 September 2002). 
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human person.”836 Section 6(c) provides that one of the fundamental objectives is 
“[t]o defend and guarantee political democracy and participation of the people in the 
resolution of national problems.”837 Besides these general references to democracy, a 
number of other operative articles enact specific provisions which leave no doubt 
that the electoral process in East Timor is organised along liberal*democratic lines, in 
a multiparty setting. Section 7 expressly enacts universal suffrage and a multiparty 
political system,838 Sections 46 and 47, respectively, deal with the right to political 
participation and with the right to vote, within the elaboration of which a multiparty 
political system is expressly demanded839 and Section 70 deals specifically with 
political parties and the 'right of opposition'.840 
 According to the Constitution, the Constitutive Assembly was transformed 
into the Parliament.841 The Constitution specifically regulated elections of the 
Parliament842 and of the President.843 It can be concluded that the political system, 
which was designed in East Timor under UN auspices, is organised along liberal*
democratic (procedural) lines. The international territorial administration thus not 
only guided East Timor toward independence but also through the process of 
democratic transition and building of democratic institutions. Yet, if one does not 
understand democracy in its procedural understanding, defined in terms of 
democratic institutions,844 it would be an exaggeration to say that international 
territorial administration led East Timor to democracy. Indeed, after the declaration 
of independence, the process of democratic consolidation has not been 
                                                 
836 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (2002), Section 1(1).  
837 Ibid., Section 6(c). 
838 Ibid, Section 7. 
839 Ibid., Section 46 & Section 47. 
840 Ibid., Section 70.  
841 Ibid., Sections 92–101. 
842 Ibid., Section 93(1). 
843 Ibid., Section 76(1). 
844 Compare supra ch. 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. 
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straightforward and has faced several obstacles.845 Nevertheless, it remains 
significant that international territorial administration, the actions of which were 
attributed to the UN,846 implemented an institutional design characteristic for a 
liberal*democratic political system.847 
 
/0) 
As set out above, in 1992 Montenegro and Serbia founded the FRY.848 The two 
republics of this federation enjoyed significant degree of self*government849 but the 
FRY’s constitution did not foresee a mechanism for secession. In the last period of 
the Milošević regime in the FRY, which came to an end in October 2000,850 political 
forces favouring independence became more prominent in Montenegro.851 Opinion 
polls suggested that, at the end of 2000, independence was supported by roughly fifty 
percent of Montenegro’s population and expressly opposed by twenty*five percent. 
852 Another twenty*five percent of Montenegro’s population did not have an opinion 
on this question.853 This was a significant difference compared to 1998, when 
independence was supported only by twenty*five percent, rising to thirty percent in 
                                                 
845 See L Horta, East Timor: A Nation Divided, Open Democracy (8 June 2006) 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy*protest/easttimor_3629.jsp>. 
846 See infra n. 1628. 
847 Scepticism toward such an imposition was expressed by East Timor’s first president, Xanana 
Gusmao, in the following words: “We are witnessing … an obsessive acculturation to standards that 
hundreds of international experts try to convey … we absorb [these] standards just to pretend we look 
like a democratic society and please our masters of independence. What concerns me is the noncritical 
absorption of [such] standards given the current stage of the historic process we are building.” Quoted 
in Foley (2008), p. 141.  
848 See supra ch. 4.3.6. 
849 Each of the two republics had its own constitution and significant powers in internal matters as 
well as some limited competencies in foreign policy. See Constitution of the FRY (1992), Articles 6 
& 7.   
850 See Yugoslav Opposition Supporters Enter Parliament Building, CNN (5 October 2000) 
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0010/05/bn.03.html>. 
851 See Montenegro Reviews Yugoslavia Ties, Associated Press (18 June 1999) 
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1*23210818.html>.  
852 See Crnogorsko javno mnjenje uoči referenduma (23 December 2000) 
<http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/pubs/archive/data/200012/01223*005*pubs*pod.htm>. 
853 Ibid. 
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1999.854 Despite the increasing support for independence, a significant share of 
population and influential political parties opposed the change of Montenegro’s 
territorial status.855 
 Given the armed conflict associated with the dissolution of the SFRY, the 
international community feared pro*independence pressures could result in 
Montenegro’s unilateral declaration of secession and potentially lead to turmoil in 
Montenegro itself and broadly in the region. In response, the EU brokered a 
compromise between those who favoured independence and those who advocated a 
continued union with Serbia. It was observed that: 
The EU worked very hard to counter, or at least postpone, any prospect of Montenegrin independence, 
which is felt would have a negative spillover effect on Kosovo … Javier Solana, the EU’s High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, applied long and strong pressure on 
Montenegro’s politicians to obtain their agreement to remain in an awkward construct with Serbia that 
permitted both republics de facto independence in nearly all spheres. In return they were promised 
they could engage in a more rapid EU accession process.856  
The result of a compromise was the adoption of a new constitution in February 2003, 
which significantly differed from the one previously in force. The Constitution, inter 
alia, renamed the FRY as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SUSM)857 and 
referred to its constitutive parts as ‘states’.858   
 Compared to the federal arrangement of the FRY, the SUSM was a very 
loose federation with only a few federal organs which had severely restricted 
competencies.859 Unlike the Constitution of the FRY, the Constitution of the SUSM 
                                                 
854 Ibid. 
855 Ibid. 
856 The International Crisis Group Briefing No. 169, Montenegro’s Independence Drive (7 December 
2006), p. 1.  
857 Constitution of the SUSM (2003), Article 1. 
858 Ibid., Article 2. 
859 The state union had only five common ministries: internal affairs, defence, international economic 
affairs, domestic economic affairs and human and minority rights. Ibid., Articles 40–45. The 
Constitution further specified that only the SUSM had the international personality but at the same 
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provided for a clear constitutional mechanism to secede and even solved the problem 
of state succession in advance. Article 60 of the Constitution of the SUSM provided: 
After the end of the period of three years, member*states shall have the right to begin the process of a 
change of the status of the state or to secede from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
The decision on secession from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro shall be taken at a 
referendum. 
In case of secession of the state of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
international documents referring to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, shall only apply to the state of Serbia as a successor. 
The member*state which resorts to the right to secession shall not inherit the right to international 
personality and all disputes shall be solved between the successor*state and the seceded state. 
In case that both states, based on the referendum procedure, opt for a change of the state*status or 
independence, the disputable questions of succession shall be regulated in a process analogical to the 
case of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.860  
This article indicates the transitional nature of the SUSM and reflects the fact 
that the creation of this state was a political compromise and the political reality was 
clearly expressed: Article 60 evidently acknowledged that Montenegro (not Serbia) 
was the federal unit likely to seek independence. 
 At the referendum held on 21 May 2006, independence was supported by 
55.53 percent of those who voted at a turnout of 86.49 percent of the eligible to 
vote.861 Based on this vote, the Montenegrin Parliament, on 3 June 2006, adopted the 
Declaration of Independence862 and on 30 June 2006 Montenegro was admitted to 
                                                                                                                                          
time allowed the federal units some competencies in foreign policy, even membership in those 
international organisations which do not prescribe statehood as a condition for membership. Ibid., 
Article 14. 
860 Constitution of the SUSM (2003), Article 60, my own translation.  
861 Svet ministara državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora, Direkcija za informisanje (24 May 2006) 
<http://www.info.gov.yu/saveznavlada/list_detalj.php?tid=1&idteksta=15132>. 
862 Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Montenegro, The Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Montenegro No 36/06 (3 June 2006). 
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the UN.863 The referendum rules were, however, subject to political involvement of 
the EU and will be further discussed below.864 
 When the dissolution of the SFRY was in question, the EC became involved 
after Slovenia and Croatia respectively had already declared independence.865 In the 
framework of the EC’s involvement, the Badinter Commission held that dissolution 
of the federation was underway in the SFRY and not attempts at unilateral 
secession.866 This opinion became the legal authority which removed the claim to 
territorial integrity. In the case of Montenegro, the EU became involved in the 
process of the dissolution of the FRY already prior to Montenegro’s declaration of 
independence. To prevent possible turmoil resulting from Montenegro’s attempt at 
unilateral secession, the EU brokered a compromise which resulted in the transitional 
constitution of the SUSM. The constitution of this state established a clear 
mechanism for secession and even a formula for state succession. Although the 
procedure was different, the effect was similar to the case of the SFRY – the claim to 
territorial integrity was removed and Montenegro’s secession was not unilateral. 
Since the Constitution of the SUSM enabled the federal units significant attributes of 
statehood,867 there was no doubt that Montenegro was a state. Arguably, EU 
involvement created legal circumstances in which recognition was declaratory. 
However, involvement in the pre*recognition phase suggests that Montenegro could, 
possibly, be regarded as a collectively*created state.  
                                                 
863 GA Res 60/264 (28 June 2006). 
864 See infra ch. 5.4.3.6. 
865 See supra ch. 4.2.1. 
866 See supra ch.  4.3.1. 
867 See supra n. 859. 
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As institutions of liberal*democracy in Montenegro already existed,868 
international involvement in the state creation was not coupled with implementation 
of a democratic political system. 
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Some significant collective practice has developed which denies recognition to coup*
governments overthrowing democratically*elected ones. Sierra Leone and Haiti are 
examples of such. In the case of Sierra Leone, the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, demanded that “the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish 
power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically*
elected Government and a return to constitutional order.” 869  
The example of Haiti is even more significant as the Security Council 
authorised an intervention for the return of an ousted democratically*elected 
government. In 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, adopted Resolution 940 on Haiti. Based on this Resolution, the United 
States led a multi*national effort to bring the overthrown elected President Jean*
Bertrande Aristide back to power.870 The Resolution, inter alia, spelled out: 
Reaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the restoration of democracy in 
Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean*Bertrande Aristide, within the 
framework of the Governors Island Agreement … 
4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a 
multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary 
means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors 
Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 
                                                 
868 The OSCE has observed presidential and parliamentary elections in Montenegro since 1997. All of 
the elections observed took place in a multiparty setting and were deemed to be reasonably free and 
fair. For more see OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Elections: 
Montenegro <http://www.osce.org/odihr*elections/20443.html>. For more on the procedural 
understanding of democracy see supra ch. 2.2.1. 
869 SC Res 1132 (8 October 1997), para 1  
870 See generally Falk (1995). 
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legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti; and to establish and maintain a secure and stable 
environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the 
understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the 
participating Member States ….871 
Importantly, Resolution 940 thus authorised an intervention for the purpose of 
restoration of an elected government and not for imposition of democracy.   
The entire role of the UN in the Haiti events, which ultimately led to 
intervention under Chapter VII, is interesting from the point of view of pro*
democratic advocacy within international law.872 One can argue that the 
internationalisation of the internal matters of Haiti was the very instrument which 
opened the door to an intervention.873 Namely, the UN observed the Haitian election 
in 1990 and, after it had verified the electoral results, it was unwilling to accept 
nullification of these results by a coup.874 As Resolution 940 also points out, the 
Governors Island Agreement875 further internationalised the internal conflict. In the 
process of the negotiation of this agreement between the de facto government of 
Haiti and the government*in*exile, the UN also became a party and thus also 
responsible for the implementation of solutions foreseen by the agreement.876 As 
Resolution 940 shows, the failure of the de facto government of Haiti to comply with 
this agreement was also a reason for intervention. Thus, one could argue that the UN 
in the example of Haiti acted in accordance with the idea of an international 
guarantee of the normative entitlement to democracy which featured all phases 
proposed by the theory, from electoral*monitoring and verification of the electoral 
                                                 
871 SC Res 940 (31 July 1994). 
872 Compare supra ch. 2.3., 2.4. and 2.5. 
873 Roth (1999), p. 385. 
874 Ibid.  
875 The Governors Island Agreement, concluded on 3 July 1993, was a UN*sponsored agreement 
between the elected overthrown president Aristide and the de facto government of Haiti which 
foresaw a retreat of the non*elected de facto government from power in exchange for amnesty. For 
more see UN Doc S/26063 (12 July 1993). 
876 Ibid. 
 158 
results to the later actions of diplomatic efforts and, ultimately, the use of force when 
electoral results were disregarded.877 
It is noted that the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, although it is generally perceived that no threat to international peace and 
security existed,878 at least not if the ‘traditional understanding’ of this concept is 
applied. However, if the overthrow of the Aristide government is interpreted as an 
aggression against the people of Haiti, the intervention can be argued to be an 
exercise of an international guarantee of the normative entitlement to democracy.879  
Resolution 940 should not be understood too broadly, as the previous 
engagement of the UN in the electoral process in Haiti makes the situation somewhat 
specific. Further, it is questionable to what degree other Chapter VII resolutions 
addressing the governance problem in a certain territory have been founded on 
express pro*democratic rather than general human rights arguments. There exists 
practice established in regard to the legitimacy of those governments which are in 
effective control but are “unwilling to carry out essential international law duties and 
obligations.”880 Grave breaches of international human rights and threats to 
international peace fall under this category, but absence of a democratic government 
does not. An example may be found in the collective response to the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1363, in which it insisted: 
[T]hat the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, comply promptly with its previous resolutions and in particular cease the provision of 
sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate effective 
measures to ensure that the territory under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps, 
                                                 
877 Compare supra ch. 2.4.2. 
878 See Falk (1995), p. 342.  
879 Compare supra ch. 2.4.2. 
880 Roth (1999), p. 149. 
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or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and 
cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.881 
With the formulation “the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls 
itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”,882 the Security Council, arguably, 
expressed that it did not recognise the Taliban government as the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan. In regard to the situation in Afghanistan, the Security 
Council frequently invoked obligations of “the Taliban, as well as other Afghan 
factions.”883 This raises doubts as to whether, in the Security Council’s perception, 
the Taliban government had effective control over the territory of Afghanistan. The 
Taliban government in Afghanistan might have also been disputed in terms of its 
effectiveness.   
Nevertheless, it remains very significant that the Security Council in its 
resolutions on Afghanistan under Taliban control expressed that the Taliban were 
obliged to comply with duties imposed by international law – most notably threats to 
international peace884 and human rights885 were in question – while it strictly avoided 
using the term “the government of Afghanistan”. Instead, terms such “the Afghan 
faction known as the Taliban”,886 “the Taliban authorities”887, “the territory of 
Afghanistan under Taliban control”888 were used, or it was demanded that “the 
Taliban [and not “the government of Afghanistan”] comply”889 with previous 
resolutions. 
                                                 
881 SC Res 1267 (15 October 1999), para 1. 
882 Ibid. 
883 See SC Res 1214, (8 December 1998), para 1.  
884 See SC Res 1267, SC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) and SC Res 1363 (30 July 2001), where the 
Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
885 See SC Res 1267 (15 October 1999), preamble: “[D]eep concern over the continuing violations of 
international humanitarian law and of human rights, particularly discrimination against women and 
girls.” 
886 See SC Res 1267, para 1. 
887 See SC Res 1333, preamble. 
888 See SC Res 1363, para 3(b).  
889 See SC Res 1333, paras 1 & 2.  
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 Security Council Resolution 1378, inter alia, condemned “the Taliban for 
allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al*Qaida 
network and other terrorist groups”890 and expressed deep concern about “serious 
violations by the Taliban of human rights and international humanitarian law”891 and 
further expressed: 
[I]ts strong support for the efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional 
administration leading to the formation of a government, both of which: 
– should be broad*based, multi*ethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people and committed 
to peace with Afghanistan’s neighbours, 
– should respect the human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion, 
– should respect Afghanistan’s international obligations.892 
The Security Council thus denied legitimacy of the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan based on its grave human rights violation and threats to international 
peace and expressed its support for a change of government. However, despite some 
references to democratic principles, such as “broad*based” government, which is 
“multi*ethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people”,893 one cannot argue 
that Security Council Resolution 1378 expressed support for a particular political 
system – that of Western style liberal*democracy. The use of the term ‘democracy’ 
itself was avoided. Further, it was established above that certain ‘democratic rights’ 
cannot be a synonym for democracy.894 The Security Council’s expressed support for 
the change of government in Afghanistan was therefore confined to issues of 
international peace and human rights and cannot be regarded as pro*democratic 
activism.  
                                                 
890 SC Res 1378 (14 November 2001), preamble. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Ibid., para 1. 
893 Ibid. 
894 Compare supra ch. 2.2. 
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In the post*Cold War practice, recognition of governments in its “pre*Estrada 
Doctrine” meaning was not re*established.895 However, there is some evidence of 
collective non*recognition of governments.  Some effective governments were 
denied recognition because they were deemed illegitimate due to their 
unconstitutional establishments by overthrowing democratically*elected 
governments. Such were the examples of Haiti and Sierra Leone. Yet there exists no 
example in collective practice that would deny legitimacy to a firmly*established 
non*democratic government, based solely or predominantly on its non*democratic 
nature. As the example of the Taliban government in Afghanistan shows, the 
legitimacy of a government may be questioned based on threats to international 
peace and grave violations of human rights, but not based on non*democratic 
practices.  

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In 1991, faced with the developments in the Soviet Union and the SFRY, the EC 
issued a set of Guidelines for recognition of new states emerging in their respective 
territories, which stretched beyond the statehood criteria and made recognition 
dependent on fulfilment of some standards associated with democratic government, 
commitment to peace and respect for human rights. The documents expressed a 
liberal*democratic understanding of democracy, with elections in a multi*party 
setting, demanded that new states adopt human rights protection standards and 
abstain from the use of force outside of their territories.  In the case of the new states 
emerging in the territory of the SFRY, the EC’s involvement was most notable. As 
part of this involvement, a mechanism for recognition was established. This included 
the Badinter Commission which advised on matters regarding recognition. Opinions 
                                                 
895 Compare supra n. 439. 
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of the Badinter Commission provide a point of reference on how the EC Guidelines 
and statehood criteria were implemented. The Opinions were formally not legally 
binding; however, this was a body of strong legal persuasiveness and it opinions 
importantly shaped recognition policies of the EC and also some non*EC member 
states.  
Besides democracy, human rights and a commitment to peace requirements, 
the EC Guidelines referred to the established statehood criteria when recognition was 
to be granted. Croatia and Bosnia*Herzegovina, however, did not meet the criterion 
of effective government. The Badinter Commission did not find this deficiency 
problematic and recognition was granted. At the same time, statehood criteria were 
clearly met in the cases of Macedonia and of the FRY, but recognitions were granted 
with a delay. Non*recognition, however, did not prevent the FRY and Macedonia 
from being considered states.  
The Badinter Commission thoroughly discussed the democracy requirement 
expressed in the EC Guidelines only in the case of Slovenia and even in this 
situation, the reasoning was limited to free and fair multiparty elections and to 
acknowledgement that constitutional arrangements were implemented which 
provided for a multiparty political system and a guarantee of human rights. 
Democracy was also briefly invoked in the case of Macedonia but was not discussed 
in any other situation. 
 In the case of Bosnia*Herzegovina, democratic principles operating within 
the right of self*determination came into consideration. The Badinter Commission 
held that Bosnia*Herzegovina could not become an independent state before it was 
clear that independence was an expression of the will of the people.896 Recognition 
                                                 
896 See also infra ch. 5.4.3.3. 
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was not extended before a referendum was held, at which the majority of the 
population supported independence. Yet the referendum was boycotted by the ethnic 
Serb population in Bosnia*Herzegovina and thus it remains questionable whether one 
ethnic group may be outvoted by other ethnic groups and whether the previous 
internal boundary arrangement limited the choice of the Serb population. These 
questions will be dealt with below. 
 The Badinter Commission further found that the minority protection 
standards implemented in Croatia fell short of the requirements set by the EC 
Guidelines. The EC member states and the international community in general 
nevertheless granted recognition.  
 In the case of the Soviet Union and subsequent state creations, no comparable 
mechanism for recognition existed. The dissolutions of the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia had a consensual character. In the absence of a competing claim to 
territorial integrity, the emergence of new states was a fact which was promptly 
recognised by the international community without application of the standards 
expressed in the EC Guidelines. The standards invoked in the EC Guidelines were 
applied very loosely in the SFRY and did not play a significant role in other new 
state creations at the end of the Cold War. The EC Guidelines were thus a situation*
specific document, resulting from EC’s striving for peaceful dissolution of two 
socialist federations at the end of the Cold War. Although initially drafted with the 
Soviet Union also in mind, the EC Guidelines were in the end to some degree 
followed only in the territory of the former SFRY. Commitments similar to those in 
the EC Guidelines were expressed in the Minsk Agreement and in the Alma Ata 
Protocol; however, because the Minsk Agreement was concluded eight days prior to 
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the adoption of the EC Guidelines, such commitments were evidently not made in 
order to comply with the requirements expressed in the EC Guidelines. 
The standards expressed in the EC Guidelines were not generally adopted as 
recognition requirements in subsequent state creations nor have they become 
additional statehood criteria. Yet there exists strong evidence that democracy, human 
rights standards and commitment to peace did play an important role in some 
subsequent post*1991 state creations. This was evident in situations with significant 
international involvement in the process of state creation. 
 Although the Badinter Commission held that recognition is declaratory and 
did not perceive itself as a body that creates states, some of its opinions had 
constitutive effects. Notably, the view that the SFRY was in a process of dissolution 
changed the universal perception that Slovenia and Croatia were seeking unilateral 
secession. It may be argued that the Badinter Commission’s removal of the claim to 
territorial integrity had constitutive effects for the creation of new states, while 
recognition itself could be perceived as declaratory. 
 In subsequent successful state creations, international involvement began 
prior to the declarations of independence. In these situations international 
involvement sought to achieve the consent of a parent state and thus to remove the 
potential claim to territorial integrity. Such was the case of Montenegro, where EU 
involvement led to the creation of a transitional State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, the constitution of which comprehended a clear mechanism for 
secession. EU involvement also led to the adoption of rules for popular consultation 
before the legal status of Montenegro could be altered.897 In East Timor (and in 
Kosovo),898 international territorial administration was established under Chapter VII 
                                                 
897 See infra ch.5.4.3.6. 
898 For the discussion on Kosovo see infra ch. 7.3. 
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of the UN Charter. The reason for such an arrangement was abuse of sovereign 
powers by the parent state. However, the arrangement which was established to solve 
the problem of “bad governance” started to affect the question of sovereignty.899 It 
must be noted that the problem of “bad governance” in this context is generally not 
to be understood as a synonym for the absence of democracy but as a synonym for 
grave breaches of human rights and denial of the right of self*determination in its 
internal mode. In East Timor international involvement ultimately led to Indonesia’s 
consent to East Timor’s independence.  
 This chapter has shown that where independence is a matter of fact, i.e. 
where statehood criteria are met and no claim to territorial integrity exists, the 
international community will generally recognise this fact without an enquiry into the 
government’s methods of governing. If recognition in such circumstances does not 
follow, non*recognition is merely political and such an entity is nevertheless 
considered a state. However, where the international community is actively involved 
in producing the emergence of a new state, there is a clear trend that there would be 
an attempt to create democratic institutions along with the creation of a new state. 
This has happened even when the UN guided entities toward statehood. 
                                                 
899 See Wilde (2001), p. 503. 
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In the previous chapters it was concluded that the right of self*determination plays an 
important role in the creation and recognition of states and that some democratic 
principles operate within this right.900 It remains for this chapter to clarify how 
democratic principles operate within the right of self*determination and how norms 
of general international law limit the will of the people. 
   Initially it will be shown how the principle of self*determination was 
developed and linked to democratic political theory and why this linkage is not 
uncontested. Subsequently the scope of applicability of self*determination as a 
human right will be examined. A distinction between internal and external modes of 
the exercise of the right of self*determination will be drawn. For the internal mode, 
the crucial question will be how a representative government is defined and whether 
the exercise of the right of self*determination in its internal mode has effects of a 
‘right to democracy’. For the external mode, it will be considered in what 
circumstances it may lead to secession. Special consideration will be given to 
unilateral secession, to the ‘doctrine of remedial secession’, to modes of state 
dissolutions and to the question of what role, if any, democracy plays in these 
processes.  
To identify the democratic principles operating within the requirement for 
popular consultation before the legal status of a territory may be altered, case studies 
of post*1991 referenda in situations of new state*creations will be used. It will be 
examined whether common international standards exist which apply to public 
consultations of this kind. 
                                                 
900 See supra ch. 3.2. and 3.3. 
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The development of the principle of self*determination in its modern meaning was 
closely associated with the concept of a representative government.901 The idea stems 
from Enlightenment political theory and dates to the American and French 
revolutions in 1776 and in 1789, respectively. Both events: 
[M]arked the demise of the notion that individuals and peoples, as subjects of the King, were objects 
to be transferred, alienated, ceded, or protected in accordance with the interests of the monarch. The 
core of the principle lies in the American and French insistence that the government be responsible to 
the peoples.902 
The principle of self*determination initially proved to be a political tool rather 
than an empowerment of the people. The ideals of the American Revolution served 
the purpose of gaining independence from Great Britain, while the idea of a 
representative government on the domestic level was understood as the 
representation of a relatively small proportion of the entire population.903 The idea of 
popular sovereignty in post*revolutionary France was initially used as a tool for 
annexation of territories to France. In this context the will of the people was resorted 
to selectively and was implemented only if the popular vote were in favour of 
France.904 In the French understanding the principle of self*determination did not 
apply to colonial peoples.905 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the principle of self*determination 
featured prominently in the writings of two important political and intellectual 
figures, Lenin and Woodrow Wilson. As the former was the leader of the Socialist 
                                                 
901 R Miller (2003), p. 613. 
902 Cassese (1995), p. 11.  
903 See Reid (1989), pp. 121–22. 
904 Cassese (1995), pp. 11–12. 
905 Ibid. 
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Revolution in Russia and the latter the US President, these two champions of self*
determination had different ideological underpinnings for advancing the principle of 
self*determination and consequently also differing interpretations of the scope and 
objective of this principle.  
Writing in 1916, Lenin held that: 
Victorious socialism must necessarily establish a full democracy and, consequently, not only 
introduce full equality of nations but also realise the right of the oppressed nations to self*
determination, i.e. the right to free political separation.906  
The right of nations to self*determination implies exclusively the right to independence in the political 
sense, the right to free political separation from the oppressor nation. Specifically, this demand for 
political democracy implies complete freedom to agitate for secession and for the decision on 
secession to be made by a referendum of the seceding nation. This demand, therefore, is not the 
equivalent of a demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only 
a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression. The closer a democratic state 
system is to complete freedom to secede the less frequent and less ardent the desire for separation will 
be.907 
 Lenin thus thought of self*determination in terms of secession, which he saw 
as a last resort to end the nationalist oppression taking place in bourgeois societies.908 
The Leninist concept of self*determination needs to be looked at through the prism of 
Lenin’s ideological background. The objective of the Leninist notion of self*
determination was not protection of the collective interests of peoples but “a tool, a 
vehicle or a strategic concept for the realization of the integration of all nations, that 
is, a universal socialist society.”909  
 The understanding that self*determination was merely in service of the 
socialist revolution was clearly expressed in Lenin’s argument in favour of the 
                                                 
906 Lenin (year of publication unknown), p. 135.  
907 Ibid., pp. 138–39. 
908 Raič (2002), p. 186. 
909 Ibid. 
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Treaty of Brest*Litovsk.910 This peace settlement included substantial transfers of the 
territories of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Belarus to Germany, thus 
denying self*determination to the peoples of these territories.911 Yet Lenin saw the 
Treaty of Brest*Litovsk as crucially important for advancing the socialist revolution, 
arguing that socialism had priority over the respect for self*determination.912 
 Although in Lenin’s understanding self*determination was merely a tool for 
furthering the socialist revolution, the ideological attachment of the Soviet Union to 
self*determination played an important role in codifying the right of self*
determination in the UN Charter era.913 Further, the Constitution of the Soviet Union 
from 1977 provided: “Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede 
from the USSR.”914  
 
0  "   < (" (7 !  -


While Leninist self*determination originated in socialist political theory, President 
Wilson built his ideas of self*determination on liberal*democratic premises. Indeed, 
“[f]or the US president, self*determination was the logical corollary of popular 
sovereignty, it was synonymous with the principle that governments must be based 
on ‘the consent of the governed’.”915  
                                                 
910 The Treaty of Brest*Litovsk was signed between Russia and the Central Powers on 3 March 1918 
and brought a separate peace between these belligerents in the First World War. See Freund (1957), 
pp. 1–33 
911 Ibid. 
912 Cassese (1995), p. 18, quoting Lenin's article in Pravda on 21 February 1918.  
913 Ibid., p. 19.  
914 Constitution of the Soviet Union (1977), Article 72. The mechanism for secession was set out in 
the Soviet Secession Law (1990), which made secession virtually impossible in practice and in the 
end no Soviet republic followed this path to achieve independence.  See The Law on Procedures for 
Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR, reprinted Hannum 
(1993), pp. 753–60.  
915 Cassese (1995), p. 19.  
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 On 8 January 1918, President Wilson presented the Fourteen Points speech to 
the US Congress.916 Notably, his ideas for a lasting peace in Europe, expressed in 
this speech, are closely associated with the principles of self*determination and 
democracy. In the preamble, Wilson, inter alia, stressed that “[t]he day of conquest 
and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in 
the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked*for moment to 
upset the peace of the world.”917 The Fourteen Point speech specifically dealt with 
the situations in Russia,918 Belgium,919 France,920 Italy,921 Austria*Hungary,922 
Romania, Serbia, Montenegro,923 Turkey924 and Poland.925  
President Wilson stipulated the key criteria for drawing new borders in 
Europe, which would follow ethnic lines, respect the will of people in regard to in 
which state they wanted to live and enable economic development to the peoples of 
Europe. A similar view was expressed in Wilson’s statement from 1917, claiming 
that every people “has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall 
live.”926 In regard to the peoples of Austria*Hungary and Turkey, an ‘opportunity of 
autonomous development’ was invoked, while the term ‘self*determination’ does not 
appear in the Fourteen Points speech. It is argued that Wilson publicly used the term 
‘self*determination’ for the first time in his public appearance on 11 February 1918, 
                                                 
916 President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm>. 
917 Ibid, preamble, para 1.  
918 Ibid., Point VI. 
22 Ibid., Point VII. 
920 Ibid., Point VIII. 
921 Point IX provides: “A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality.” Ibid.  
922 Point X provides: “The peoples of Austria*Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.” 
Ibid. 
923 Ibid., Point XI. 
924 Ibid., Point XII. 
925 Ibid., Point XIII. 
926 Baker and Dodd (1926), p. 187. 
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which was about a month after he delivered the Fourteen Points speech. His 
preferred term until then was ‘self*government.’927  
The Wilsonian concept of ‘self*government’ was initially developed for 
internal purposes and its meaning was that “peoples of each State be granted the right 
freely to choose State authorities and political leaders.”928 The Wilsonian 
understanding of self*government (i.e. self*determination) was thus not only rooted 
in liberal*democratic political theory but was actually a synonym for a liberal*
democratic political system. It was the experience of the First World War which led 
Wilson to ascribe an external connotation to the concept of self*government.929 Yet 
the original internal (i.e. democratic) meaning and external implications could not be 
easily reconciled. Wilsonian self*government (i.e. self*determination) thus had a dual 
and somewhat contradictory meaning: “On the one hand, it implied the right of a 
population to select its own form of government, yet, on the other hand, it also 
suggested that self*government must be a continuing process and must therefore be 
synonymous with the democratic form of government.”930 In other words, when the 
internal (democratic) understanding of self*government was applied externally, there 
was a presumption that popular choice would always favour a democratic political 
system at the domestic level. Indeed, “the principles of self*determination put 
forward by President Woodrow Wilson divided and created States, but they also 
propose democracy.”931 Yet this implies interference with the choice of the political 
system of other peoples and thus a violation of rather than support for self*
determination.  
                                                 
927 See Pomerance (1976), p. 2.  
928 Cassese (1995), p. 19. 
929 Ibid. 
930 Pomerance (1976), p. 17 (italics in original). 
931 R Miller (2003), p. 619. 
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Wilson not only wed democracy and self*government (i.e. self*determination) 
but also closely associated these two concepts with peace. In his address to the US 
Congress on 2 April 1917, President Wilson, inter alia, stated that “[a] steadfast 
concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic 
nations … Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a 
common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interests of their 
own.”932 These views have also influenced the democratic peace theory.933 
Wilsonian self*determination was criticised for a number of inconsistencies, 
as was Wilson himself for departing from this principle in the post*First World War 
peace settlement. Indeed, “[a]lthough Wilson had proclaimed national self*
determination as though it were an absolute principle, in practice he could not 
prevent the inconsistent application of the principle by the Peace Conference. In 
other words, Wilson had promised more than he could deliver at Paris.”934  
The principle of self*determination invoked several questions which have not 
been entirely resolved up to the present day. Initially, there is a question of to whom 
the principle or the right of self*determination applies. It is argued that prior to the 
Paris Peace Conference Wilson naively believed that beneficiaries of the right of 
self*determination would be “self*evident and therefore easy to ascertain.”935 Hence, 
a well*known critique of Wilson’s concept of self*determination is captured in the 
following quote: 
[A] Professor of Political Science who was also President of the United States, President Wilson, 
enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as a sensible proposition, 
                                                 
932 Baker and Dodd (1927), p. 12. 
933 See supra ch. 2.5. See also Slaughter (1995), pp. 507–11. See generally also Slaughter (2009), pp. 
89–117. 
934 Raič (2002), p. 189.  
935 Ibid., p. 184. 
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the doctrine of self*determination. On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in 
fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.936  
Further, as soon as the principle of self*determination was ascribed a potential of 
external applicability, it became obvious that the principle of self*determination 
would collide with the principle of territorial integrity of states.937  
 In the process of drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations, Wilson 
included a draft of Article 10, which regulated the principle of territorial integrity of 
states and in this context invoked the right of self*determination.938  This draft was 
rejected and the final Article 10, which invoked territorial integrity of states, did not 
comprehend any reference to the right of self*determination and/or territorial 
readjustments.939 Self*determination remained a political principle and not an 
international legal entitlement. This was affirmed in the Aaland Islands case (1920), 
in which the International Committee of Jurists held that the principle of self*
determination was not a positive rule of international law.940  

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The codification of self*determination as a norm of international law came in the UN 
Charter era. The UN Charter invokes the respect of the principle of self*
determination among the purposes of the UN941 and in the context of the international 
economic and social co*operation. The principle of self*determination is ascribed a 
scope of applicability which is significantly broader than the political self*
                                                 
936 Jennings (1956), pp. 55–56. 
937 Pomerance (1976), p. 22.  
938 Draft Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, reprinted in Hunter Miller (1928), pp. 
12–13.  
939 Charter of the League of Nations, Article 10. 
940 The Aaland Islands case (1920), p. 5. Some observations in the Aaland Islands case nevertheless 
remain relevant for the modern understanding of the right of self*determination and will be revisited 
below. 
941 UN Charter, Article 1(2).  
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government applicable to peoples.942 As a human right, self*determination is 
elaborated in the common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICSECR.943 Further, this right 
“has been declared in other international treaties and instruments, is generally 
accepted as customary international law and could even form part of jus cogens.”944  
In the comment on Article 1, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) held that:  
In connection with article 1 of the Covenant, the Committee refers to other international instruments 
concerning the right of all peoples to self*determination, in particular the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co*operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970 (General 
Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)).945 
 The Declaration on Principles of International Law comprehends a clause that 
stipulates for the territorial integrity of states:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self*determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.946 
This elaboration should be looked at from two aspects. First, the provision attempts 
to limit the right of self*determination with the territorial integrity of states. Second, 
a reversed reading of this elaboration may suggest that under certain circumstances 
the territorial integrity limitation to the right of self*determination may not be 
applicable. The latter has been referred to as the ‘safeguard clause’.947  
                                                 
942 UN Charter, Article 55. 
943 ICCPR & ICESCR, Article 1. 
944 McCorquodale (1994), p. 858. 
945 The United Nations Human Rights Committee (1984), Comment 12, para 7. 
946 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co*
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625, annex, 
principle 5, para 7, (24 October 1970) [hereinafter the Declaration on Principles of International Law]. 
947 See Crawford (2006), pp. 118–21. 
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 From its early development the concept of self*determination has been 
criticised for its lack of precision. It is argued that it is unclear who is a people,948 
and even once a people is identified, it is not entirely clear what entitlement the 
applicability of the right of self*determination brings or how it is exercised. These 
questions will be dealt with in forthcoming sections. Initially, however, it needs to be 
recalled that self*determination in modern international law has the status of a 
(collective) human right and, as such, is subject to the same limitations as most 
human rights.949 Above an argument was made that President Wilson defined self*
determination as an absolute principle.950 Yet the human rights approach to self*
determination allows a significantly narrower scope: 
[T]he right of self*determination is not an absolute right without any limitations. Its purpose is not 
directly to protect the personal or physical integrity of individuals or groups as is the purpose of the 
absolute rights and, unlike the absolute rights, the exercise of this right can involve major structural 
and institutional changes to a State and must affect, often significantly, most groups and individuals in 
that State and beyond that State. Therefore, the nature of the right does require some limitations to be 
implied on its exercise.951 
It is further argued that limits on the right of self*determination are designed to 
protect the rights of everyone, “not just those seeking self*determination.”952 
 In regard to the presumption of a liberal*democratic nature of the right of 
self*determination, it is argued that “self*determination often was employed as a tool 
for challenging colonial oppression, but it was not necessarily linked to liberalism or 
democracy.”953 Further, “[s]elf*determination enjoys a ‘democratic’ label in spite of 
the fact that it was the former Eastern Bloc nations that played the most significant 
                                                 
948 See  infra ch. 5.3.3.1.1. 
949 See generally McCorquodale (1994).  
950 See supra n. 934. 
951 McCorquodale (1994), pp. 875–76. 
952 Ibid., p. 876. 
953 R Miller (2003), p. 612.  
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role in developing and promoting self*determination following World War II, usually 
in the face of great reluctance from Western democracies.”954 
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While it can be firmly established that international law supports the view that the 
right of self*determination applies outside of the colonial context, its non*colonial 
exercise has different implications. Indeed, in colonial situations “the only territorial 
relationship to be altered was that with the metropolitan power. Achieving 
independence … did not come at the expense of another sovereign state’s territory or 
that of an adjacent colony.”955 However, in non*colonial situations the right of self*
determination collides with territorial integrity of states. It should be recalled that the 
right of self*determination is not an absolute human right956 and thus the principle of 
territorial integrity limits the exercise of this right. In this regard the Supreme Court 
of Canada held in the Québec case: 
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self*determination of a people is 
normally fulfilled through internal self*determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, 
social and cultural development within a framework of an existing state. A right to external self*
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral 
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances.957 
 The Québec case affirms that outside of a colonial context the right of self*
determination will normally be consummated in its internal mode. However, there is 
a question of how the right of self*determination is to be consummated in the internal 
mode. Further, it is questionable what constitutes ‘the most extreme of cases’ in 
                                                 
954 Ibid. 
955 Fox (1994–1995), p. 736.  
956 See supra n. 951. 
957 The Québec case (1998), para 126. 
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which secession may be justified. Some possible interpretations in regard to these 
two questions stem from the principle of territorial integrity, as elaborated in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law.958 
 A reversed reading of this provision gives a sense of its entire scope. If so 
read, it can be interpreted that a state which does not have a government that 
represents “the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour”959 may, possibly, not have a right to avail itself on the principle of 
territorial integrity.960 In other words, in such circumstances external self*
determination may be legitimised. This issue will be further discussed below.  
Apart from possible relevance of the elaboration of the principle of territorial 
integrity for the external mode of the right of self*determination, this elaboration 
gives an idea of requirements for a representative government in the context of the 
internal mode of the right of self*determination. Indeed, an argument has been made 
that the Declaration on Principles of International Law represents “a shift in the tone 
of self*determination, from the Soviet*sponsored emphasis on external self*
determination to the Western*sponsored emphasis on internal self*determination.”961 
The formulations ‘the whole people’ and ‘without distinction as to race, creed 
or colour’ have both been interpreted in light of democratic political theory. One 
writer argued: “Is it not a mockery of self*determination to say that an oppressive 
dictatorship ‘represents’ the whole people?”962 The term ‘oppressive dictatorship’ is 
elusive but in the context of a democratic interpretation of the right of (internal) self*
determination it should probably be understood as a government which does not 
come to office based on the will of the people, expressed by means of liberal*
                                                 
958 See supra n. 946. 
959 Ibid. 
960 See Crawford (2006) p. 119. 
961 R Miller (2003), p. 623. 
962 Rosas (1993), p. 238.  
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democratic electoral procedures.963 However, even if one assumes that such 
governments do not reflect the will of the people, it is questionable whether non*
democratic governments breach the right of self*determination prima facie, i.e. solely 
by not adhering to liberal*democratic political system and its procedures.  
It is argued that “[t]he ‘democratic’ aspect of self*determination is present in 
muted form, through the idea of representation in the Declaration on Principles [on 
International Law], and by an indeterminate ‘connection’ with human rights.”964 In 
this section the interdependence of human rights will be examined in light of its 
effects on the right of self*determination. Initially, the question of the scope of the 
“democratic aspect” within the right of self*determination, stemming from the 
interdependence of human rights, will be discussed. Subsequently, the requirement 
for a representative government, originating from the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, will be evaluated and the reach of democratic principles, 
operating within this requirement, pointed out. 
 
0         
 

One exemplary expression of interdependence between the right of self*
determination and other human rights is captured in the statement of the West 
German representative in the General Assembly in 1988: 
The right of self*determination had far broader connotations than simply freedom from colonial rule 
and foreign domination. Article 1 [of the ICCPR and ICESCR] … defined the right of self*
determination as the right of all peoples freely to determine their political status and freely to pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development. The question as to how peoples could freely 
determine their status was answered in Article 25 [of the ICCPR] … The right of self*determination 
was indivisible from the right of the individual to take part in the conduct of public affairs, as was 
                                                 
963 See Franck (1995), pp. 84–85. 
964 Thornberry (1993), p. 120. 
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very clearly stated in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The exercise of the 
right to self*determination required the democratic process which, in turn was inseparable from the 
full exercise of such human rights as the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion; the right 
of freedom of expression; the right of peaceful assembly and of association; the right to take part in 
cultural life; the right to liberty and security of person; the right to move freely in one’s country and to 
leave any country, including one’s own, as well as to return to one’s country.965 
This statement also implies that the exercise of the right of self*determination 
requires adherence to some democratic standards. Particular attention has been paid 
to Article 25 of the ICCPR, which elaborates the right to political participation.966 
The relationship between the right of self*determination and the right to political 
participation was addressed by the HRC in its General Comment 25: 
The rights under article 25 are related to, but distinct from, the right of peoples to self*determination. 
By virtue of the rights covered by article 1 (1), peoples have the right to freely determine their 
political status and to enjoy the right to choose the form of their constitution or government. Article 
25 deals with the right of individuals to participate in those processes which constitute the conduct of 
public affairs.967 
The question at this point is whether the right to political participation and its 
influence on the right of self*determination ascribes the latter the effect of a ‘right to 
democracy’. 
 The answer to this question needs to be sought in the context of two 
arguments from Chapter 2. First, the right to political participation, as elaborated in 
Article 25 of the ICCPR, is not a synonym for democracy, as the procedural (i.e. 
electoral*centric) definition of democracy is inadequate.968 Second, the Western (i.e. 
liberal*democratic) interpretation of the right to political participation has been 
adopted in the context of the ECHR and to some extent also in the context of the 
                                                 
965 UN Doc A/C.3/43/SR.7 (13 October 1988), p. 16, para 76 
966 See supra n. 112.  
967 HRC General Comment 25 (1996), para 2.  
968 See supra ch. 2.2. and 2.3.1. 
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ACHR.969 However, an argument was made in Chapter 2 that such an interpretation 
cannot be universalised and Article 25 of the ICCPR cannot be interpreted as a 
requirement for multiparty elections.970 Thus, at the universal level, the consequence 
of the interdependence of the right of self*determination and the right to political 
participation does not constitute a requirement for states to enact a Western*style 
liberal democratic political system, a major feature of which is a multiparty electoral 
process.971  
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In the context of the internal mode of the right of self*determination, the importance 
of the ‘safeguard clause’ is that it gives a general idea of what is a representative 
government. Yet a definition of a representative government is not straightforward 
and attempts have been made to link it to procedures of a liberal*democratic political 
system.972  
In this section the scope of liberal*democratic practices operating in the right 
of self*determination will be evaluated. Initially, it will be discussed to whom the 
right of self*determination applies and how the ‘representativeness’ of government is 
to be understood for the purpose of the right of self*determination. Subsequently the 
‘representativeness’ of government in the context of the right of self*determination 
will be discussed in light of liberal*democratic procedural practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
969 See supra ch. 2.3.3. 
970 See supra ch. 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. 
971 Compare supra ch. 2.3.3. 
972 See supra ch. 5.3.3.1.2. on the Wilsonian concept of self*determination. See also ch. 2.2.1. 
 181 
0 1      -     
$ $

0(.
The right of self*determination only applies to peoples.973 This leads to the problem 
of distinguishing between those groups who qualify as a people and those who do 
not. Investigating the events in East Pakistan in 1972, the International Commission 
of Jurists made the following remark in regard to the concept of ‘people’ and the 
right of self*determination: 
If we look at the human communities recognized as peoples, we find that their members usually have 
certain characteristics in common, which act as a bond between them. The nature of the more 
important of these common features may be [historical, racial or ethnic, cultural or linguistic, religious 
or ideological, geographical or territorial, economic, quantitative]. This list … is far from exhaustive 
… [A]ll the elements combined do not necessarily constitute proof: large numbers of persons may live 
together within the same territory, have the same economic interests, the same language, the same 
religion, belong to the same ethnic group, without necessarily constituting a people. On the other 
hand, a more heterogeneous group of persons, having less in common, may nevertheless constitute a 
people. 
To explain this apparent contradiction, we have to realize that our composite portrait lacks one 
essential and indeed indispensable characteristic * a characteristic which is not physical but rather 
ideological and historical: a people begin to exist only when it becomes conscious of its own identity 
and asserts its will to exist … the fact of constituting a people is a political phenomenon, that the right 
of self*determination is founded on political considerations and that the exercise of that right is a 
political act.974 
 Although not of direct legal relevance, this definition gives some suggestion 
as to what criteria shall be applied when considering whether a group qualifies as a 
people, but these criteria are not entirely clear, non*comprehensive and subjective.975   
 
                                                 
973 See ICCPR (1966) and ICESCR (1966), Article 1. 
974 International Commission of Jurists, Events in East Pakistan (1972), p. 49. 
975 See generally Musgrave (1997) pp. 154–67.  
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There is sufficient practice of UN organs in support of the claim that a government 
which is not representative of people of all races and colours constitutes a violation 
of the right of self*determination. This follows from the General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia976 and South Africa977  and 
universal non*recognition of the Rhodesian UDI and South African “Homelands”. 
The link between racial discrimination and denial of the right of self*
determination was, for example, further expressed by Security Council Resolution 
417 on apartheid*rule in South Africa,978 in which the Security Council expressed 
grave concern “over reports of torture of political prisoners and the deaths of a 
number of detainees, as well as the mounting wave of repression against individuals, 
organizations and the news media,”979 reaffirmed “its recognition of the legitimacy 
of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and racial 
discrimination,”980 and affirmed “the right to the exercise of self*determination by all 
the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of race, colour or creed.”981 The 
Security Council then condemned “the South African racist regime for its resort to 
massive violence and repression against the black people, who constitute the great 
majority of the country, as well as all other opponents of apartheid;”982 and 
expressed “its support for, and solidarity with, all those struggling for the elimination 
of apartheid and racial discrimination and all victims of violence and repression by 
the South African racist regime.”983 
                                                 
976 See supra ch. 3.3.3.3. 
977 See supra ch. 3.3.3.4. 
978 SC Res 417 (31 October 1977). 
979 Ibid, preamble, para 3. 
980 Ibid., preamble, para 5 (italics in original). 
981 Ibid., preamble, para 6. 
982 Ibid., para 1 (italics in original). 
983 Ibid., para 2 (italics in original). 
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 Although Security Council Resolution 417, inter alia, makes references to 
political violence and to all opponents of apartheid, which can also be associated 
with the freedom of expression of South African whites and not only with the right of 
self*determination and prohibition of racial discrimination of South African blacks, it 
is obvious that the scope of this resolution is the prohibition of racial discrimination 
and not a political opinion, broadly understood.    
 It needs to be specified how broadly prohibition of racial discrimination can 
be understood and whether it can cover identities other than different skin colour. A 
broader definition stems from Article 1 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: 
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public 
life.984  
The reasoning of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is also 
in line with this broader interpretation of racial discrimination. In the opinion on 
Austria, the Committee addressed the problem of minority rights of Slovenes in 
Austria as a matter falling within the category of racial discrimination, 985 despite the 
fact that both ethnic groups, Slovene and Austrian, have the same skin colour. 
 It remains to be examined whether non*discrimination based on ‘creed’ can 
be interpreted to include political opinion and, if so, what the consequences are of 
such a requirement. Initially it should be recalled that the right of self*determination 
applies to peoples.986 The representativeness of a government, without any 
                                                 
984 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), 
Article 1. 
985 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2008), para 14. 
986 Compare supra ch. 5.3.3.1.1. 
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discrimination stemming from creed, can be most closely associated with the 
common identity of a people stemming from ‘religion or ideology’, as identified in 
the Events in East Pakistan study.987  
In a narrow way a people can be defined by political identities. Indeed, 
ethnicity*, race* and religion*based identities often transgress into the political sphere 
and, as a consequence, political activities based on such identities are very common, 
including emergence of political parties which stem from ethnic, racial or religious 
identities.988 However, this pattern cannot be extended to cover political opinion in a 
broader sense of plurality of political views and identities of members and/or voters 
of political parties. For example, one cannot argue that members or voters of the 
Labour Party in the United Kingdom have the right of self*determination.  
Consequently, governmental non*representation of a certain people based on 
their political view, construed in a sense of party*politics and political identities, 
which are not associated with identities constituting a people, cannot lead to a 
violation of the right of self*determination. This argument also works in the situation 
of a government not adhering to liberal*democratic practices. The government of 
Slobodan Milošević in the FRY and Serbia may have violated the right of self*
determination of Kosovo Albanians;989 however, there exists no support for a claim 
that it violated the right of self*determination of Serbs and/or Montenegrins. Indeed, 
its undemocratic character cannot be interpreted to mean a prima facie violation of 
the right of self*determination of all peoples in its territory.  
In the case of Southern Rhodesia, it was argued that the General Assembly 
called for participation of all political parties;990 however, this needs to be looked at 
                                                 
987 See supra n. 974. 
988 See generally Tepe (2005), p. 283.   
989 See infra ch. 7.2. 
990 See supra ch. 3.3.3.3. 
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in light of exclusion of black, i.e. colour/race*based, political parties from the process 
of the drafting of the constitution.991 The situation is thus confined to the violation of 
the right of self*determination stemming from racial discrimination and not from 
absence of a multiparty political system. 
 This section shows that a requirement for a representative government needs 
to be limited to groups with identities that constitute a people and cannot be extended 
to mean a political opinion in general. This confirms the standard according to which 
the right of self*determination applies to peoples and as political opinion in general 
does not define a people, the right of self*determination of groups with different 
political views cannot be violated.  
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It has been established above that ‘representativeness’ of a government for the 
purposes of the right of self*determination needs to be confined to groups to which 
the right of self*determination actually applies, i.e. peoples. In this section it will be 
examined whether the claim that a representative government needs to be an 
outcome of a multiparty electoral system is compatible with the elaboration of the 
right of self*determination as well as with state practice and practice of UN organs. 
Further, it will be argued that mere adherence to a multiparty electoral democracy 
may not necessarily result in the exercise of the right of self*determination. 
The Declaration on Principles of International Law was adopted in 1970, in 
the time of the Cold War. Thus it can be speculated that the socialist states at that 
time would not have supported the Declaration if this elaboration meant to bind them 
to a liberal*democratic political system. Such a conclusion does not only need to be 
                                                 
991 See SC Res 202 (6 May 1965), preamble. 
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based on an ideological assumption but also stems from the drafting history of the 
Declaration. At the time of drafting, the United Kingdom and the United States 
clearly expressed that the term ‘representative government’ did not presuppose any 
particular political system. On behalf of the United Kingdom it was stated that “[t]he 
use of the word ‘representative’ … was not intended to mean that only one system of 
government properly met the criterion [of representativeness].”992 Similarly, in the 
context of the meaning of the term ‘representative government’, the representative of 
the United States held that his government “understood that the Charter, as originally 
conceived, did not impose upon Members of the United Nations the duty to adopt a 
certain type of government.”993  
Hence, in the time of drafting of the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law, there was a unanimous perception that the term ‘representative government’ 
was not exclusively associated with the political system of liberal*democracy. 
Consequently, the ‘safeguard clause’ could not be interpreted to require multiparty 
elections. As discussed in Chapter 2, the end of the Cold War inspired the so*called 
liberal*democratic reading of provisions of international law. The requirement for a 
‘representative government’ operating within the right of self*determination was thus 
read as a requirement for a government which comes to office in multiparty 
elections.994 However, such an interpretation is problematic in light of the analysis in 
Chapter 2, where it is argued that the theory of normative democratic entitlement is 
based on a hierarchical sorting of an arbitrary selection of civil and political rights.995  
At the end of the Cold War, between 1988 and 1993, a set of General 
Assembly Resolutions, entitled ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of 
                                                 
992 UN Doc A/AC.125/SR.69 (4 December 1967), p. 9.  
993 UN Doc A/AC.125/SR.92 (21 October 1968), p. 133. 
994 See supra ch. 2.2.1. and 2.4. 
995 See supra ch. 2.2.1. and 2.4. 
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Periodic and Genuine Elections’ was adopted.996 The resolutions, inter alia, deal 
with the question of representative government and affirm that governmental 
authority stems from the will of the people,997 which is expressed at periodic and 
genuine elections.998 It states that the electoral process needs to accommodate 
“distinct alternatives”.999 Significantly, a call for accommodation of ‘distinct 
alternatives’ in the electoral system is not the same as a call for multiparty elections. 
If the drafters meant elections in a multiparty setting, they could have expressed this 
unambiguously in order to avoid the possibility of other interpretations. 
Despite some specific references to apartheid,1000 it cannot be argued that the 
resolutions have only an anti*apartheid meaning. Their universal language implies 
general applicability, while the resolutions clearly express that “there is no single 
political system or electoral method that is equally suited to all nations and their 
people.”1001 In this regard it is also recalled that “all States enjoy sovereign equality 
and that each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, 
economic, and cultural system.”1002 These expressions confirm that the right to 
political participation cannot be automatically associated with a liberal*democratic 
political system. Further, these expressions also confirm that free choice, conferred 
to peoples by virtue of the right of self*determination, is not limited to one particular 
political system – that of Western*style liberal*democracy.  
The view that the legitimacy of a government and territorial integrity of a 
state do not depend on adherence to a liberal*democratic political system also stems 
                                                 
996 See GA Res 43/157 (8 December 1988); GA Res 44/146 (15 December 1989); GA Res 46/137 (17 
December 1991); GA Res 47/138 (18 December 1992); GA Res 48/131 (20 December 1993). The 
latter two resolutions mainly deal with electoral assistance. 
997 GA Res 44/146, para 3; GA Res 46/137, para 4. 
998 GA Res 43/157, para 2; GA Res 44/146, para 2; GA Res 46/137, para 2. 
999 GA Res 43/157, para 3. 
1000 GA Res 43/157, para 4 of the preamble & para 4 of the main text; GA Res 44/146, para 4 of the 
preamble & para 6 of the main text; GA Res 46/137, para 5 of the preamble & para 6 of the main text.  
1001 GA Res 45/150 (18 December 1990).  
1002 GA Res 43/157 (8 December 1988).   
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from the reaction of the Security Council to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which 
otherwise coincided with the end of the Cold War. 
After the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, affirmed the territorial integrity of Kuwait. The 
Security Council expressed its determination “to bring the invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Kuwait.”1003 The Security Council also proclaimed the 
Government of Kuwait to be the legitimate government of that state by determining 
that “Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and 
has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait”1004 and “as a 
consequence, [decided] to take … measures … to restore the authority of the 
legitimate Government of Kuwait.”1005 
 It needs to be noted that Kuwait was an example of violation of territorial 
integrity by an illegal use of force from outside. Nevertheless, it remains significant 
that the Security Council established that Kuwait was protected by the principle of 
territorial integrity and that its government was the only legitimate government of 
that state. This was established despite the fact that the government of Kuwait was 
not known for adherence to liberal*democratic practices and despite its record of 
human rights violations. 1006 
                                                 
1003 SC Res 661 (6 August 1990), preamble. 
1004 Ibid., para 1. 
1005 Ibid., para 2.  
1006 Consider the following observation: “The human rights situation in Kuwait prior to the [Iraqi] 
invasion was not a good one.  The National Assembly (dissolved by the Emir of Kuwait in 1986, 
during the Iran*Iraq war, citing concerns that national security was being compromised by open 
debate) remained dissolved in 1990, although the war ended in 1988.  The ruling al*Sabah family 
continued in 1990 to resist calls to restore parliamentary rule and to relax the severe restrictions 
imposed on constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression and assembly. It continued to rule by 
decree, to tolerate torture, and to permit the secret trial of security cases by special tribunals whose 
decisions were not subject to appeal.” Testimony of Andrew Whitley, Before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Human Rights in Iraq and Iraqi*Occupied Kuwait Middle East Watch (8 January 
1991) <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/IRAQ91.htm>. See generally also Ghabra (1994). 
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 In one already discussed situation, the Security Council denied legitimacy to 
the Taliban government in representing the entire people of Afghanistan.1007 It was 
argued that the denial of legitimacy was based both on the lack of effective control 
and on threats to international peace and security and gross human rights 
violations.1008  
The relevant Security Council resolutions dealing with the Taliban regime1009 
in Afghanistan do not invoke free and fair elections in a multiparty setting, which 
implies that a representative government can also be achieved by means other than 
liberal*democratic electoral procedures. Resolution 1378 specifically refers to a 
‘multi*ethnic’ representation, while a multiparty*setting is not mentioned.1010 
The post*Cold War practice of the General Assembly and of the Security 
Council, dealing with the questions of territorial integrity and governmental 
legitimacy, thus prove that the liberal*democratic nature of a government is not a 
qualification for the protection of territorial integrity and for legitimacy of 
governments. Practice of UN organs thus acknowledges that governments can be 
representative of peoples even if they do not come to office upon liberal*democratic 
electoral procedures.  
Lastly, the definition of representative government for the purpose of the 
right of self*determination in terms of liberal*democratic practices is problematic in 
light of the free choice conferred to peoples by this right. As follows from the 
elaboration of the right of self*determination, “[b]y virtue of that right they [peoples] 
                                                 
1007 See supra ch. 4.6. 
1008 See supra ch. 4.6. 
1009 See supra ch. 4.6. 
1010 SC Res 1378 (14 November 2001), para 1. 
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freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”1011 On the other hand: 
The thesis that ‘representative’ government would necessarily entail the Western conception of 
representative democracy could be subject to criticism, as a preordained choice, it leaves no free 
choice to the people concerned as to their form of government, which would in itself be contrary to 
political self*determination ... [B]y necessarily linking internal self*determination to a Western style 
of democratic government, such an interpretation leaves no room for a population’s own perception of 
the representative character of the government and for people’s own (traditional) procedures.1012 
Salmon, similarly, argues that: 
In the Western countries it is generally believed that the only right answer is a system of liberal 
regime coupled with market economy. Such reasoning is purely ideological; there are many regimes 
in the world which are not similar to Western parliamentarism and which may, however, be viewed as 
truly representative of the peoples concerned according to their own social and historic traditions.1013 
Addressing this problem, Raič proposes a minimum threshold for a 
representative government which is not defined in terms of liberal*democratic 
procedures: 
A minimum requirement seems to be that the claim to representativeness by a non*oppressive 
government is not contested or challenged by (part of) the population. Thus, the notion of 
‘representativeness’ assumes that government and the system of government is not imposed on the 
population of a State, but that it is based on the consent or assented by the population and in that sense 
is representative of the will of the people regardless of the forms or methods by which the consent or 
assent is freely expressed.1014 
The fact that even a non*democratic state is capable of having a government 
representative of its peoples was implied by the Badinter Commission in the case of 
                                                 
1011 ICCPR & ICESCR, Article 1, para 1. 
1012 Raič (2002), pp. 276–77 (italics in original). This has been pointed out also in regard to the 
Wilsonian concept of self*determination. See infra ch. 5.2.2. 
1013 Salmon (1993), p. 280. 
1014 Raič (2002), p. 279. 
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the SFRY. In Opinion 1, in which it ultimately established that the SFRY was in the 
process of dissolution,1015 the Badinter Commission stated:  
The composition and workings of the essential organs of the Federation, be they the Federal 
Presidency, the Federal Council, the Council of the Republics and the Provinces, the Federal 
Executive Council, the Constitutional Court or the Federal Army, no longer meet the criteria of 
participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state.1016  
The Badinter Commission thus implied that prior to Serbia’s usurpation of the 
federal organs,1017 they were (could have been) representative of the peoples of the 
SFRY. This was so although the representatives in these organs were not elected 
according to liberal*democratic electoral practices.1018 
 This section shows that a representative government for the purpose of the 
right of self*determination cannot be argued to be only the one that comes to office 
as a result of liberal*democratic electoral procedures. In the age of the Cold War, 
such an interpretation was prevented by the competitive idea of ‘people’s 
democracy’. In the post*Cold War period, practice of UN organs shows that the 
Cold*War*standard, i.e. non*confinement of the concept of ‘representative 
government’ to a particular political system, has not changed. Further, imposition of 
a particular political system would violate the right of self*determination, as 
elaborated in the common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. If the right of self*
determination is to be protected, peoples need to be given an opportunity to choose a 
political system and choice cannot be limited solely to Western*style liberal*
democracy. 
                                                 
1015 See supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3.1. 
1016 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991), para 2(c). 
1017 See Dugard and Raič (2006), p. 126. See also supra n. 459. 
1018 Elections in the SFRY were indirect and not multiparty. For details see Constitution of the SFRY 
(1974), Articles 282–312 (Assembly), Articles 313–332 (Presidency), Articles 346–362 (the Federal 
Executive Council).  
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 Indeed, even a state that does not have a government which comes to office 
based on liberal*democratic electoral procedures can have a government 
representative of all of its people “without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”1019 
There is also a question of whether liberal*democratic liberal procedures necessarily 
lead to fulfilment of the right of self*determination.  
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An exemplary association of the right of self*determination with postulates of 
Western*style liberal*democracy can be found in the statement of the Government of 
the United Kingdom: 
[T]he right of self*determination in the United Kingdom itself is exercised primarily through the 
electoral system … The British system of parliamentary government is sustained by an electorate 
casting its votes in free and secret ballots at periodic elections which offer a choice between rival 
candidates, usually representing organised political parties of different views … All elections in 
Northern Ireland continue to produce an overall majority of the electorate voting for Unionist policies, 
i.e. continuing as part of the United Kingdom.1020 
 In this perception, the right of self*determination is not only associated with 
democracy but narrowly with the electoral process. More precisely, it is claimed that 
it is exercised through the electoral system. In this context the United Kingdom did 
not claim that liberal*democratic electoral practices are the only means for the 
exercise of the right of self*determination. This question has already been discussed 
above. At this point it will be discussed whether adherence to the postulates of the 
liberal*democratic political system per se leads to consummation of the right of self*
determination.  
 In regard to such a claim by the United Kingdom, it has been argued: 
                                                 
1019 The Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970), principle 5, para 7. 
1020 The Third Report of the United Kingdom to the Human Rights Committee, paras 18–20, quoted in 
McCorquodale (1996), p. 309.  
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As well as the difficulty in principle of expecting elections to be able to show the wishes of the people 
… the United Kingdom electoral system is particularly problematic as there is no proportional 
representation electoral system [apart from local and EU elections]. It has a ‘first*past*the*post’ 
electoral system, where the winner of a constituency seat is the person who polls the most votes, 
however few, which means that the winner of the election may very often not reflect the views of the 
majority of voters. There is an additional difficulty with a ‘first*past*the*post’ system if it is the sole 
means to determine the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland because of the divided nature of its 
society.1021 
 The HRC held in its General Comment 25 that the right to political 
participation does not impose any particular electoral system on a state; however, it 
stressed the need that an electoral system enables the equality of votes and does not 
discriminate against any group:  
Although the Covenant does not impose any particular electoral system, any system operating in a 
State party must be compatible with the rights protected by article 25 and must guarantee and give 
effect to the free expression of the will of the electors. The principle of one person, one vote, must 
apply, and within the framework of each State's electoral system, the vote of one elector should be 
equal to the vote of another. The drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating votes 
should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude 
or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely.1022 
The particular claim of the United Kingdom, that its electoral system 
guarantees the exercise of the right of self*determination, can be thus disputed on 
grounds of the specific anomalies of the electoral system. Further, the claim that 
electoral democracy per se leads to the exercise of the right of self*determination is 
problematic in general, not only in connection with a particular electoral system. The 
electoral process can lead to ‘tyranny of the majority’, i.e. to dominance of the 
majority people over a numerically inferior people. Indeed: 
                                                 
1021 Ibid., p. 310.  
1022 The UN Human Rights Committee (1996), General Comment 25, para 21.  
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Although, theoretically, in a Western*style representative democracy the entire population is entitled 
to participate in the elections of representatives who, in their turn, participate in the political decision*
making process on behalf of the population, this does by no means mean that this form of governance 
is automatically a sufficient guarantee for genuine respect for the right of internal self*determination 
of a people which constitutes a numerical minority within a State.1023 
This is especially the case when political parties are organised along ethnic or 
religious lines and parties of numerically superior people have access to a much 
broader electoral base and wider representation. If no other mechanisms limit the 
power of the majority, the liberal*democratic electoral process can lead to violation, 
not fulfilment, of the right of self*determination.1024  
Another problem of the association of the right of self*determination with the 
electoral process is the complexity of voters’ decision*making in the voting*booth. 
Indeed:  
[T]o rely on elections as the primary means of determining … free and genuine wishes [of the people 
of a territory] is fraught with difficulty. It is impossible to prove from election results on what 
particular issues a voter casts her/his vote, when there will invariably be other issue or issues besides 
self*determination which are raised during an election campaign.1025 
In other words, voting for a certain party does not imply that the voter agrees with 
the entire programme of the party. In this context, it cannot be presumed that a vote 
for a party that puts secession on its agenda implies a vote for secession.1026 For 
example, at the 2007 Scottish elections, the Scottish National Party (SNP) became 
the strongest party in the Scottish Parliament by winning 47 out of 129 seats.1027 
While the SNP puts independence of Scotland on its political agenda,1028 it cannot be 
                                                 
1023 Raič (2002), p. 280 (italics in original). 
1024 Compare infra ch. 5.4. and 6.5. 
1025 McCorquodale (1996), p. 304. 
1026 Compara infra ch. 5.4.1.1. for the example of Parti Québécois.   
1027 See BBC, Election 2007  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2007/election_2007/def 
ault.stm>. 
1028 See Scottish National Party <http://www.snp.org/node/240>. 
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assumed that all votes for the SNP are automatically votes for Scottish independence. 
Likewise, it cannot be assumed that all votes for parties other than the SNP are votes 
against Scottish independence.  

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There is no single arrangement prescribed for the right of self*determination to be 
exercised in the internal mode. Indeed, “[t]he exercise of this right can take a variety 
of forms, from autonomy over most policies and laws in a region or part of a State … 
to a people having exclusive control over only certain aspects of policy.”1029 
However, “customary and treaty law on internal self*determination [do not] provide 
guidelines on the possible distribution of power among institutionalized units or 
regions.”1030 
Federation has been argued to be an exemplary arrangement for protection of 
the right of self*determination. It is argued that: 
The classical case [of federalism] is that of a state composed of a number of ethnic, religious or 
linguistic groups, provided that these are concentrated in certain regions, so that the federal system 
makes it possible to confer upon them … self*rule. It is necessary … to ensure that the delimitation of 
internal boundaries between the cantons [i.e. federal units] would enable a specific group or groups—
constitution a minority on a country*wide basis—to form a majority within the borders of a given 
canton [i.e. federal unit].1031 
A federal arrangement can indeed vest significant powers in its units, even 
some attributes of statehood.1032 However, two caveats apply. First, not all 
federations are arrangements for the exercise of the right of self*determination. There 
exist states with federal units, the populations of which do not qualify as peoples and 
                                                 
1029 McCorquodale (1994), p. 864. 
1030 Cassese (1995), p. 332 (italics in original). 
1031 Dinstein (1993), pp. 223–24. 
1032 See Harris (2004), p. 106. 
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the right of self*determination is thus not applicable. Austria, for example, is a 
federal state1033 but the respective populations of its federal units clearly do not 
constitute separate peoples. Second, even non*federal state arrangements can adopt 
mechanisms for the protection of the right of self*determination and even have 
clearly delimited self*determination units. Such an example is the United Kingdom, 
which “may not be a federal system, but it is a union state built in 1707 upon the 
union of two established, or at least incipient, national societies.”1034 
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One can argue that “[i]t is undisputed that a people is entitled to secession if such 
right is provided for in the constitution of a parent state.”1035 An obvious example of 
such a constitutional provision is Article 60 of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro.1036 In the absence of a specific constitutional mechanism allowing for 
secession, it is not disputed that secession may occur if there exists approval of a 
parent*state.1037 Such approval may be given prior to the declaration of independence 
or subsequently, after independence has already been declared.1038 
When there exists no constitutional provision allowing for secession and the 
latter is opposed by the parent*state, the situation can be described as an attempt at 
unilateral secession. While there exists no entitlement to unilateral secession in 
international law, such an act is not prohibited. In this regard the Supreme Court of 
Canada held in the Québec case: 
International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of such a right, 
although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for 
                                                 
1033 The Federal Constitution of Austria (1920), Article 2. 
1034 Tierney (2004), p. 112. 
1035 Raič (2002), p. 313.  
1036 See supra n. 860. 
1037 Raič (2002), p. 314–15. 
1038 Ibid. 
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secession to be permitted under the right of a people to self*determination, e.g., the right of secession 
that arises in the exceptional situation of an oppressed or colonial people ….1039 
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self*determination of a people is 
normally fulfilled through internal self*determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, 
social and cultural development within a framework of an existing state. A right to external self*
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral 
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances.1040 
 Reference to ‘the most extreme cases’, which may justify a unilateral 
secession, is to be read against the background of the provision on self*determination 
and territorial integrity expressed in the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law.1041 The provision allows for an interpretation that a state which does not 
comply with “the principle of equal rights and self*determination of peoples” and 
whose government does not represent “the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour,”1042 would, possibly, not be entitled to 
limit the right of self*determination of the oppressed people with the territorial 
integrity principle. In this regard the Supreme Court of Canada held: “The other clear 
case where a right to external self*determination accrues [apart from colonial 
situations] is where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation outside a colonial context.”1043 
The Court also identified a possible link between denial of the right of self*
determination in its internal mode and unilateral secession:  
[T]he right to self*determination may ground a right to unilateral secession in a third circumstance. 
Although this third circumstance has been described in several ways, the underlying proposition is 
                                                 
1039 The Québec case (1998), para 112.  
1040 Ibid., para 126. 
1041 Ibid., paras 127–128.  
1042 The Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970), annex, principle 5, para 7. 
1043 The Québec case (1998), para 133. 
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that, when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self*determination 
internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.1044 
The Court observed that “it remains unclear whether this third proposition actually 
reflects an established international law standard,”1045 and held that in the Québec 
case clarification of this issue was not important because a violation of this kind was 
not in question in the situation of Québec.1046  
Secession of oppressed peoples, also referred to as ‘remedial secession’, 
generally has wide support among writers,1047 but it remains somewhat unclear in 
what circumstances ‘remedial secession’ may, possibly, become an entitlement. In 
the Aaland Islands case it was pointed out that a shift of sovereignty as an 
“exceptional solution” may only be considered as a “last resort.”1048 The latter 
condition is also adopted in modern writings and is interpreted narrowly: secession 
needs to be the only means for preventing systematic oppression.1049 
In the ECtHR’s’ case of Loizidou v Turkey, Judges Wildhaber and Ryssdal 
probably had ‘remedial secession’ in mind when arguing:  
In recent years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right to self*
determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if they are without 
representation at all or are massively under*represented in an undemocratic and discriminatory way. If 
this description is correct, then the right to self*determination is a tool which may be used to re*
establish international standards of human rights and democracy.1050 
                                                 
1044 Ibid., para 134. 
1045 Ibid., para 135. 
1046 Ibid. 
1047 For a detailed account on the academic support for ‘remedial secession’, see Tancredi (2006), p. 
176. But see also Shaw (1997), p. 483, who argues that “[s]such a major change in legal principle 
cannot be introduced by way of an ambiguous subordinate clause, especially when the principle of 
territorial integrity has always been accepted and proclaimed as a core principle of international law, 
and is indeed placed before the qualifying clause in the provision in question.” 
1048 The Aaland Islands case (1920), p. 21. 
1049 See Crawford (2006), p. 120 & Tancredi (2006), p. 175. See also the Québec case (1998), para 
134.  
1050 Loizidou v Turkey (1997), p. 535 (Judge Wildhaber concurring, joined by Judge Ryssdal). 
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 Despite significant support for ‘remedial secession’ in academic writings, 
there is an acute lack of state practice in support of this doctrine. The only possible 
examples in its support in the UN Charter era are the secession of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan and, possibly, the dissolutions of the SFRY and of the Soviet Union. 
In 1947, Pakistan was created “out of the provinces of the British India and 
the Indian states with majority Muslim population.”1051 Its territory was 
geographically divided in two parts, which were separated by a distance of about a 
thousand miles across India. In East Pakistan most of the population spoke Bengali, a 
language not spoken in West Pakistan, while “[t]he only aspect of social life which 
the two populations shared was that of Islam.”1052 East Pakistan “had suffered 
relatively severe and systematic discrimination from the central government based in 
Islamabad.”1053 
 At general Pakistani elections in December 1970, the Awami League, an 
autonomy*seeking East Pakistani party, won 167 out of 169 seats allocated to the 
eastern part of the state in the Pakistani Parliament.1054 This result meant a solid 
majority in the 313*seat Pakistani Parliament.1055 In response to the dominance of the 
Awami League, the central government of Pakistan suspended the Parliament and 
introduced a period of martial rule in East Pakistan, “which involved acts of 
repression and even possibly genocide and caused some ten million Bengalis to seek 
refuge in India.”1056 
                                                 
1051 Pavković and Radan (2007), p. 103. 
1052 Ibid., p. 104.  
1053 Crawford (2006), p. 140.  
1054 Ibid., pp. 140–41. 
1055 Ibid.  
1056 Ibid., p. 141. 
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 On 17 April 1971, the Awami League proclaimed the independence of East 
Pakistan.1057 East Pakistani guerrilla forces were at that time already in armed 
conflict with Pakistani armed forces.1058 On 3 December 1971, India intervened in 
support of East Pakistan, fighting Pakistani armed forces on both sides, eastern and 
western.1059 On 17 December 1971, Pakistani armed forces surrendered, India 
declared ceasefire on the western side and, on 6 December 1971, recognised the 
independence of Bangladesh.1060 With help of Indian forces, the Awami League 
exercised substantial control over the territory of Bangladesh.1061 Within weeks, 
Bangladesh was explicitly recognised by twenty*eight states.1062 Recognition by 
Pakistan was granted on 22 February 1974.1063  
 While Bangladesh may serve as an argument in support of ‘remedial 
secession’, this is not the only possible interpretation. Other arguments may also be 
plausible. Indeed: 
Different views can be held as to whether in the circumstances of 1970, the people of East Bengal had 
a right of self*determination, whether this was a case of ‘remedial secession’ or whether the 
withdrawal of the Pakistan Army after the ceasefire on 16 December 1971 merely produced a fait 
accompli, which in the circumstances other States had no alternative but to accept.1064 
In regard to the ‘remedial secession’ argument in the contexts of the Soviet 
Union and of the former SFRY, it is argued that:  
After the recognition by the international community of the disintegration as unitary States of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it could now be the case that any government which is oppressive to 
                                                 
1057 Pavković and Radan (2007), p. 102. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 Crawford (2006), p. 141. 
1060 Ibid.  
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Ibid. Consider also the following argument: “The USSR, bound by a recently concluded treaty 
with India, and its fellow members of the Soviet*led Warsaw pact recognized Bangladesh within 
weeks of India’s removal of the Pakistani army from power in Bangladesh. So did the Scandinavian 
States, Australia and New Zealand.” Pavković and Radan (2007), p. 108.  
1063 Crawford (2006), p. 141.  
1064 Ibid., p. 393.  
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peoples within its territory may no longer be able to rely on the general interest of territorial integrity 
as a limitation on the right of self*determination.1065 
However, it is questionable whether the ‘remedial secession’ argument was really 
acknowledged by the international community in these two situations. 
 Although the political situation in the Soviet Union in 1991 was rather 
complicated,1066 from the legal point of view the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
a consensual act supported by all republics, including Russia.1067 The ‘remedial 
secession argument’ could thus only be plausible in regard to the Baltic States, which 
achieved independence prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.1068 Such an 
argument in this context stems from suppression of their independence, which 
resulted from the Ribbentrop*Molotov Pact.1069 When the Baltic States were accepted 
to UN membership, “[i]ndividual Member States [of the UN] emphasized that, since 
the independence of the Baltic States had been unlawfully suppressed, they had the 
right of self*determination.”1070 Yet, as pointed out in this chapter, the right of self*
determination does not mean a ‘right to unilateral secession’ and even in the example 
of the Baltic States, applicability of the right of self*determination did not 
automatically result in secession.1071 In the end, the secession of the Baltic States was 
consensual, with the approval of the Soviet Union.1072 
In the case of the SFRY, it is argued that both Slovenia and Croatia were 
initially examples of an attempt at unilateral secession which later resulted in 
dissolution of the parent*state.1073 The attempts at unilateral secession played an 
                                                 
1065 McCorquodale (1994), p. 880. 
1066 For more see infra ch. 5.4.4.1. 
1067 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1068 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1069 See supra n. 730. 
1070 Crawford (2006), p. 394. 
1071 Ibid., p. 395. 
1072 See supra ch. 4.4.1. See also infra ch. 5.4.4.1. 
1073 Dugard and Raič (2006), pp. 123–30. 
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important role in the process of dissolution, which proves that “secession and 
dissolution are not mutually exclusive.”1074 The Badinter Commission indeed based 
its opinion in which it established that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution on 
the fact that three out of its six constituent republics had already declared 
independence and that due to Serbia’s usurpation of federal organs, the federation 
was no longer functioning.1075 As this implies that the SFRY was no longer 
representative of its peoples, Opinion 1 of the Badinter Commission may suggest that 
the ‘remedial secession doctrine’ was acknowledged.1076 Such an argument is not 
without difficulties as the Badinter Commission expressly held that dissolution, not 
unilateral secession, was at work.1077 This view was subsequently affirmed by state 
practice and practice of UN organs.1078 
It has been established that there is no right to unilateral secession under 
international law. On the other hand, the absence of such a right does not imply that 
unilateral secession as such is an illegal act: “The position is that secession is neither 
legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally neutral act the consequences of 
which are regulated internationally.”1079 In regard to the position of unilateral 
secession in international law, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Québec case 
made the following observation: 
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, that is 
secession without negotiation on the basis just discussed, this does not rule out the possibility of an 
unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession.  The ultimate success of such 
a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to 
consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of 
                                                 
1074 Ibid., p. 128. 
1075 See supra notes 577 and 578. See also Dugard and Raič (2006), pp. 125–26. 
1076 Ibid., p. 130. 
1077 See Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991).  
1078 See supra ch. 4.3. 
1079 Crawford (2006), p. 390. 
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Québec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition.  Such recognition, even 
if granted, would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession, either 
under the Constitution of Canada or at international law.1080 
 This position of the Supreme Court of Canada seems to be in line with 
Shaw’s opinion on the ‘safeguard clause’: 
[I]t may well be the case that the attitudes adopted by third states and the international community as a 
whole, most likely expressed through the United Nations, in deciding whether or not to recognize the 
independence of a seceding entity will be affected by circumstances factually precipitating secession, 
so that recognition may be more forthcoming where the secession has occurred as a consequence of 
violations of human rights. Thus, the content of the [safeguard] clause should perhaps best be seen in 
this light, that is as a relevant factor in determining the views taken by the international community 
generally, and states particularly, as to recognition.1081 
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At 1976 elections in the Province of Québec, the Parti Québécois (PQ) was elected 
into office.1082 On the political agenda of the PQ was state sovereignty of Québec, a 
Canadian province in which the majority of population is French*Canadian.1083  On 
20 May 1980, a referendum was held on a mandate to the Government of Québec to 
negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, which would lead to Québec’s 
sovereignty, while economic ties with Canada would be maintained. The English 
version of the referendum question reads:  
The Government of Québec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of 
Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Québec to acquire the 
exclusive power to make its laws, administer its taxes and establish relations abroad in other words 
sovereignty and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a 
                                                 
1080 The Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1081 Shaw (1997), p. 483. 
1082 See Dumberry (2006), p. 418.  
1083 See Bayefsky (2000), p. 5. 
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common currency; any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be submitted to 
the people through a referendum; on these terms, do you agree to give the Government of Québec the 
mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Québec and Canada?1084 
At a turnout of 85.61 percent of all eligible to vote, the mandate to the Government 
of Québec to negotiate with the rest of Canada on sovereignty of Québec was 
rejected by 59.56 percent of the valid votes cast.1085 
 After the re*election of the PQ in 1994, the Draft Bill Respecting the 
Sovereignty of Québec was tabled at the Québec National Assembly.1086 The Draft 
Bill foresaw Québec’s declaration of independence and authorisation of the 
Government of Québec to negotiate a new economic association with Canada.1087 
According to the Draft Bill, sovereignty could only be proclaimed upon an approval 
of the population of Québec, expressed at a referendum.1088 
 The question at the independence referendum, held on 30 October 1995, 
reads: “Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign, after having made a 
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the 
scope of the Bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on 12 
June 1995?”1089 At a turnout of 95.52 percent of all eligible to vote, the proposal was 
rejected by 50.58 percent of votes cast.1090 
Prior to the referendum, a Québec resident challenged the legality of the Draft 
Bill and legality of the referendum at the Superior Court of Québec.1091 After his 
                                                 
1084 Reprinted in Dumberry (2006), p. 418, at n. 8. 
1085 See Electoral Geography: Québec Independence Referendum.  
<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/q/quebec/quebec*independence*
referendum198 
0.html> 
1086 See Dumberry (2006), p. 419. 
1087 Ibid. See also Draft Bill Respecting the Sovereignty of Québec (1995), Articles 1 & 2. 
<http://www.solon.org/misc/referendum*bill.html>. 
1088 Ibid., Article 16. 
1089 Reprinted in Dumberry (2006), p. 420, at n. 16. 
1090 Ibid. 
1091 Ibid.  
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motion was denied, he filed another, revised, action in 1996.1092 Although the 
referendum results were already known, the Canadian federal government intervened 
and “initiated a ‘reference’ to the Supreme Court of Canada.”1093 
 The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with three questions:  
Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or government of Québec 
effect the secession of Québec from Canada unilaterally? 
Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Québec the right to 
effect the secession of Québec from Canada unilaterally?  In this regard, is there a right to self*
determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Québec the right to effect the secession of Québec from Canada unilaterally? 
In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the National 
Assembly, legislature or government of Québec to effect the secession of Québec from Canada 
unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada?1094 
The Court’s reasoning on these three questions provides important guidelines on the 
position of international law in regard to unilateral secession, limits on the right of 
self*determination and on democratic principles operating within this right. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada held in the Québec case that a democratic decision in 
favour of secession does not result in a ‘right to secession’, while such a will of the 
people cannot be ignored: 
The democratic principle … would demand that considerable weight be given to a clear expression by 
the people of Québec of their will to secede from Canada, even though a referendum, in itself and 
without more, has no direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral secession.1095 
The Court went on to argue that to accept:  
                                                 
1092 Details on this issue are beyond the scope of this thesis. For more see Dumberry (2006), pp. 421–
22 and Bayefsky (2000), pp. 10–12. 
1093 Bayefsky (2000), p. 12.  
1094 The Québec case (1998), Introduction, para 2.  
1095 Ibid., para 87. 
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[T]hat a clear expression of self*determination by the people of Québec would impose no obligations 
upon the other provinces or the federal government … would amount to the assertion that other 
constitutionally recognized principles necessarily trump the clearly expressed democratic will of the 
people of Québec.1096  
 The Court held that in such a circumstance an obligation would be put on 
both Québec and Canada to negotiate a future constitutional arrangement for Québec. 
The Court, importantly, stressed: 
No negotiations could be effective if their ultimate outcome, secession, is cast as an absolute legal 
entitlement based upon an obligation to give effect to that act of secession in the Constitution. Such a 
foregone conclusion would actually undermine the obligation to negotiate and render it hollow.1097 
In regard to the duty to negotiate, it has been observed that “[t]he content of 
this constitutional duty to negotiate is loosely defined by the Court, but it is clear that 
it should not solely consist of the ‘logistical details of secession’.”1098 However, the 
Court did not discuss any possible arrangements that would indicate an outcome of 
such negotiations nor did it address the problem of a situation in which Québec 
would accept nothing short of independence, while Canada would be unwilling to 
accept such a demand. 
Nevertheless, it remains significant that the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that democratic principles cannot prevail over all other principles. In the context of 
Canadian constitutional law, the following principles were identified: federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law and respect for minorities.1099 The 
Court importantly noted that the principle of democracy is not an absolute principle 
and “cannot be invoked to trump” other constitutional principles.1100  
                                                 
1096 Ibid., para 91. 
1097 Ibid.  
1098 Dumberry (2006), p. 429. 
1099 The Québec case (1998), para 33.  
1100 Ibid., para 91. 
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The Court also gave special consideration to the problem of tyranny of the 
majority to which procedural adherence to democratic decision*making may lead:  
Although democratic government is generally solicitous of [fundamental human rights and individual 
freedoms], there are occasions when the majority will be tempted to ignore fundamental rights in 
order to accomplish collective goals more easily or effectively. Constitutional entrenchment ensures 
that those rights will be given due regard and protection.1101 
The Court continued: “Canadians have never accepted that ours is a system of simple 
majority rule.”1102 
 The majority is a well*known problem of democratic decision*making and 
modern definitions of democracy have adopted some mechanisms for protection of 
minorities.1103 Indeed, “centuries of philosophical debate over, and political 
experimentation with, the majority principle have led to the protected status of the 
minority as much as to the authoritative status of the majority in Western 
democracies.”1104 In the context of the right of self*determination, decision*making 
regarding a change of legal status of a territory thus cannot be merely a matter of the 
majority and its preference. When unilateral rather than pre*negotiated, i.e. 
consensual, secession is in question the Québec case confirms the standard that a 
successful referendum does not lead to a ‘right to secession’ but is one of the factors 
that legitimises a secessionist claim. As follows from the Québec case, minority 
protection standards would also play an important role in determining the legitimacy 
of a secessionist claim. It can be argued that such a standard also follows from the 
EC Guidelines, which, inter alia, identified minority protection standards as 
requirements for recognition of new states.1105 Such standards were likewise applied 
                                                 
1101 Ibid., para 74. 
1102 Ibid., para 76. 
1103 For more on the protection of minorities within democratic constitutions and safeguards against 
the tyranny of the majority see Lijphart (1984), pp. 187–96.  
1104 R Miller (2003), p. 637. 
1105 EC Guidelines (1991), para 6.  
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by the Badinter Commission, which also stressed the importance of popular 
consultation.1106 
 It was argued above that the right of self*determination is not an absolute 
human right and, as such, it is limited by other human rights, which includes the right 
of self*determination of other peoples.1107 The Québec case confirmed this view. Yet 
Bosnia*Herzegovina was recognised as an independent state, although the popular 
consultation was boycotted by the Serb population.1108 Nevertheless, the example of 
Bosnia*Herzegovina is significantly different from that of Québec. When the 
referendum in Bosnia*Herzegovina was held, its parent state was deemed to be in the 
process of dissolution,1109 and the uti possidetis principle was applied by the Badinter 
Commission.1110 The impact of this principle on the will of the people will be 
examined in Chapter 6. 
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In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that “the application of the 
right of self*determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the 
peoples concerned.”1111 Expression of the will of the people for the purpose of the 
right of self*determination is most commonly associated with popular consultations, 
usually formalised by referenda.  
                                                 
1106 For more see supra ch. 4.3.3. and 4.3.4. 
1107 See supra notes 951 and 952. 
1108 See supra ch. 4.3.4. 
1109 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1110 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1111 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, para 55. 
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 Invoking the idea of self*determination, popular consultations were held 
already in the age of post*revolutionary French government.1112 However, self*
determination was at that time used as a tool of French annexations and the will of 
the people was applied selectively, i.e. only if it favoured a shift of sovereignty to 
France.1113 After the First World War, under the influence of President Wilson and 
his conception of self*determination, several referenda on the future legal status of 
European territories took place under the League of Nations’ auspices.1114 
  In the period of decolonisation, referenda became even more closely 
associated with the exercise of the right of self determination and “came to be the 
stock*in*trade of the United Nations in situations involving accession to 
independence, association, or integration of colonies and non*self*governing 
territories.”1115 Indeed: 
[T]he U.N. has organized or monitored self*determination plebiscites or referendums in colonial 
territories, so that the populations concerned the international status of their country or territory – 
union with another sovereign country, or independence as a sovereign country – upon being granted 
independence. The U.N. has also temporarily administered a few such territories as an interim 
authority before a transfer of sovereignty, or a plebiscite or referendum, or elections.1116 
 Despite the common association of the expression of the will of the people 
with referenda, there can be situations in which popular consultation is not required 
and/or necessary. In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held: 
The validity of the principle of self*determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely 
expressed will of peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly has 
dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were 
based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a “people” entitled to self*
                                                 
1112 Cassese (1995), p. 11. 
1113 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 
1114 Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 175.  
1115 R Miller (2003), p. 630. 
1116 Beigbeder (1994), p. 91. 
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determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special 
circumstances.1117 
It will now be considered whether referendum is the only relevant means of 
expression of the will of the people, what the effects are of the independence 
referenda and whether certain procedural referenda standards could potentially be 
regarded as rules of customary international law. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada held in the Québec case that “[t]he referendum result, 
if it is to be taken as an expression of the democratic will, must be free of ambiguity 
both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it achieves.”1118 In the 
Canadian context, the requirement of ‘free of ambiguity’ and the issue of 
negotiations for the determination of future status of an independence*seeking 
federal unit was subsequently addressed by the Clarity Act (2000). 
In regard to the referendum question, the Clarity Act provides: 
[A] clear expression of the will of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of 
Canada could not result from 
(a) a referendum question that merely focuses on a mandate to negotiate without soliciting a direct 
expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be 
part of Canada; or 
(b) a referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the secession of the province 
from Canada, such as economic or political arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct 
expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be 
part of Canada.1119 
                                                 
1117 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, para 59.  
1118 The Québec case (1998), para 87.  
1119 The Clarity Act (2000), Article 1, para 3. 
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 The Clarity Act was evidently drafted with the 1980 and 1995 referenda 
questions in Québec in mind. Both referenda questions were formulated in a way that 
they implied a future economic association with Canada.1120 Further, the 1980 
referendum question did not ask voters directly on independence but on a mandate 
for the Government of Québec to negotiate on a new arrangement with the rest of 
Canada, which would lead to independence.1121 Although the requirement for clear 
referendum questions reflects specific issues previously experienced with the 
referenda question in Québec, it nevertheless has some universal validity. Indeed, 
unclear or even misleading referenda questions cannot be a base for an expression of 
the will of the people. It remains to be determined below, when referenda questions 
in other secessionist situations will be examined, to what degree the Clarity Act 
standard can be universalised.    
In regard to the required majority, the Clarity Act provides: 
In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of the population 
of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of Commons shall take into 
account 
(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option; 
(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and 
(c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant.1122 
 The required majority thus remains undefined and it is not clear whether a 
majority of all valid votes cast would be perceived as an expression of the will of the 
people or a more qualified majority would be required (e.g. majority of all eligible to 
vote). As follows from the Clarity Act, the required majority may be situation 
specific and no universally prescribed standard can be imposed. It needs to be 
recalled that the expressed will of a people does not lead to the self*executing 
                                                 
1120 See supra ch. 5.4.1.1. 
1121 Compare supra n. 1084.  
1122 Bill C*20 (29 June 2000) [The Clarity Act], Article 2, para 2. 
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secession of a province but merely gives a mandate to a provincial government to 
negotiate with the federal government. This is specifically reaffirmed in the Clarity 
Act.1123  
 In the Québec situation, where consultation is to be understood as part of a 
broader process of negotiations for a future constitutional arrangement, a firmly 
prescribed majority is not necessary. This is different in situations in which 
consultation may lead to self*executing secession with the approval of a parent*state, 
where clear referendum rules need to be established in order to avoid ambiguity. 
Montenegro is a good example of such a situation.1124  
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The question at the independence referendum in Slovenia was prescribed by the 
Plebiscite on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia Act and 
reads: “Shall the Republic of Slovenia become a sovereign and independent 
state?”1125 The Act further specified: “The decision that the Republic of Slovenia 
becomes an independent state shall be adopted if supported by the majority of all 
eligible to vote.”1126  
Independence was supported by a majority of 88.5 percent of all eligible to 
vote (92 percent of those who voted), with four percent of all eligible to vote 
expressly voting against it.1127 The expression of the will of people on Slovenia’s 
                                                 
1123 Ibid., Article 3. 
1124 See supra ch. 4.5.2. and infra ch. 5.4.3.6. 
1125 The Plebiscite on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia Act (1990), 
Article 2, my own translation. The Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No 44*2102/1990 (2 
December 1990). 
1126 Ibid., Article 3, my own translation. 
1127 See From the Plebiscite to Independence <http://www.ukom.gov.si/10let/pot/kronologija>. 
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independence was therefore clear from the points of view of both clarity of the 
question asked and the majority in its support.  

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
On 25 April 1991, the President of Croatia issued the Decree on the Call for 
Referendum on Independence of the Republic of Croatia.1128 The Decree set the date 
of the referendum to be 19 May 1991.1129 Two choices were offered at the 
referendum: 
1. Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and independent state which guarantees 
the cultural autonomy and all civil liberties of Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, 
shall enter into an association of sovereign states together with other republics (according to the 
suggestion of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia for solving of the state crisis in the 
SFRY)? 
2. Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia shall remain in Yugoslavia as a unitary federal state 
(according to the suggestion of the Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Montenegro for 
solving of the state crisis in the SFRY)?1130 
The Croatian referendum question was thus much more ambiguous than was 
the case in Slovenia.1131 It is questionable whether the Croatian question would pass 
the standard set by the Clarity Act in Canada, which states that referendum results 
are relevant only if they are free of ambiguity. The Clarity Act specifies that the 
referendum question cannot be perceived as free of ambiguity if it: (i) merely 
consults on the beginning of negotiations for a future legal status of a territory rather 
than on secession itself, and/or (ii) envisages other possibilities of association with its 
                                                 
1128 The Decree on the Call for Referendum on Independence of the Republic of Croatia (25 April 
1991). The Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia No 21 (2 May 1991). The President of Croatia 
had the power to issue such a Decree under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
(1990).  
1129 Ibid., Article 2.   
1130 Ibid., Article 3, my own translation.  
1131 The Plebiscite on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia (1990), Article 2, 
my own translation. 
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parent state and thus obscures the real question.1132 Arguably, the Croatian 
referendum question did both. A possible loose association was a matter to be 
negotiated with other republics and not a pre*negotiated arrangement to be tested at a 
referendum. Further, the question on actual independence of Croatia was only 
implied in the first choice and to some degree obscured within a broader question. 
The wording of the referendum question actually suggests a situation in which 
Croatia at that time would already be a sovereign state and its population was given a 
choice to join a loose association of former Yugoslav states. This was, however, not 
the case on 19 May 1991, when the referendum was held. 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether Canadian standards can be 
transplanted to the situation in Croatia in 1991. The referendum question makes a 
reference to the Croatian and Slovenian proposal at that time that the SFRY would 
transform itself into a loose association of independent states.1133 It is questionable 
whether political elites in Croatia and Slovenia really believed that such an 
association was feasible.1134 Due to the internal political situation in the SFRY1135 
and reactions of the international community to the aspirations of Croatia and 
Slovenia to become independent states, 1136 the proposal aimed to express strive for 
independence in milder language. The ambiguous and implicit question on 
independence at the Croatian referendum should therefore be ascribed to political 
situation, while there existed no doubt among the population of Croatia that this was 
a referendum on independence. Such a perception was implicitly confirmed by the 
                                                 
1132 See supra n. 1119. 
1133 Pavković and Radan (2007), p. 147. 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 At that time Croatian police forces had already engaged in armed conflict with Serbian 
paramilitary groups. See supra n. 457. 
1136 The international community did not favour the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. See Cohen 
(1995), pp. 217–22. Compare supra notes 707 and 716. 
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Serb population of Croatia, who boycotted the referendum out of opposition to 
Croatia’s path to independence.1137  
 To specify the majority required for ascertaining the will of the people at the 
referendum, the Decree on the Call for Referendum on Independence of the Republic 
of Croatia adopted the referenda rules spelled out in Article 87 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia:1138 “At a referendum, a decision is taken by the majority of 
voters who cast votes, under the condition that majority of the eligible to vote cast 
their votes at the referendum.”1139 The required majority was thus less demanding 
than was the case in Slovenia, where a majority of all eligible to vote was 
required.1140 The majority of all eligible to vote was nevertheless achieved. At a 
turnout of 83.56 percent of all eligible to vote, 94.17 percent of votes cast were in 
favour of independence.1141 In absolute shares this means that independence of 
Croatia was supported by 78.69 percent of all eligible to vote.  
 In its Opinion 5, the Badinter Commission noted that it took the referendum 
results from 19 May 1991 into account;1142 however, the boycott of the referendum 
by the Serb population was not invoked. Thus, the Badinter Commission was ready 
to accept that Croatian Serbs were outvoted by the Croat majority. On the other hand, 
the Badinter Commission insisted on implementation of adequate mechanisms for 
protection of minority rights before Croatia could be recognised as an independent 
                                                 
1137 Twelve percent of the population of Croatia was of Serb ethnic origin and opposed the declaration 
of independence. Raič (2002), p. 349. Already prior to the referendum on the declaration of 
independence, Serbs in Croatia proclaimed that they no longer accepted Croatia’s authority. (Ibid.). 
As a result, an entity called Kninska Krajina was established (Ibid., p. 388). See supra ch. 4.3.3. 
1138 The Decree on the Call for Referendum on Independence of the Republic of Croatia (1991), 
preamble. 
1139 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990), Article 87, para 2, my own translation.  
1140 See supra n. 1126. 
1141 See A Short Summary of Croatian History <http://www.andrija*
hebrang.com/povijest.htm#nastanak>. 
1142 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 5 (11 January 1992), point 4.  
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state.1143 Such a standard is mutatis mutandis similar to the one later established by 
the Clarity Act in Canada, which provides that no secession may occur if, inter alia, 
sufficient minority rights protection standards in the secession*seeking territory are 
not implemented.1144 This requirement may be interpreted as a safeguard against the 
tyranny of the majority which can follow decision*making based on majoritarian 
principles. Further, the Badinter Commission also applied the uti possidetis 
principle,1145 which will be further discussed below. 
 Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991,1146 referring to Article 140 
of the Constitution of Croatia: 
The republic of Croatia shall remain a constitutive part of the SFRY until a new agreement of the 
Yugoslav republics is achieved or until the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia decides otherwise.  
Shall an act or procedure of a federal body or of a body of another republic or province member of the 
federation constitute a violation of territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, or shall she be 
brought into an unequal position in the federation, or shall her interests be threatened, the organs of 
the Republic shall, stemming from the right of self*determination and the sovereignty of the Republic 
of Croatia, affirmed by this Constitution, deliver necessary decisions, regarding the protection of 
sovereignty and interests of the Republic of Croatia.1147 
Importantly, Article 140 did not declare that Croatia had a ‘right to secession’ by 
virtue of the right of self*determination alone but obviously resorted to the ‘remedial 
secession’ doctrine. As has been argued above, such a claim is not unproblematic.1148 
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The Badinter Commission referred to the three ethnic groups constituting Bosnia*
Herzegovina as ‘peoples’ and not to a people of Bosnia*Herzegovina.1149 Further, the 
                                                 
1143 See supra ch. 4.3.3. 
1144 Clarity Act (2000), Article 2.3. 
1145 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1146 The Constitutional Decree of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia on Sovereignty and 
Independence of the Republic of Croatia (25 June 1991). 
1147 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (1990), Article 140, my own translation.  
1148 See supra notes 1077 and 1078. 
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Badinter Commission expressly held that the right of self*determination applies to 
the Serbian populations in Bosnia*Herzegovina and in Croatia, respectively.1150 It 
thus follows that the right of self*determination applies to all three constitutive ethnic 
groups in Bosnia*Herzegovina. It needs to be recalled that the Badinter Commission 
held that applicability of the right of self*determination did not give the Serbian 
population of Bosnia*Herzegovina the right to found their own state.1151 However, as 
follows from the Opinion on Bosnia*Herzegovina, the Badinter Commission held 
that the will of the people (or, perhaps, of peoples) of Bosnia*Herzegovina was 
unclear, i.e. had not been ascertained. The reasoning behind such a conclusion was 
obviously rooted (also) in the political activities of the Serbian population of Bosnia*
Herzegovina (e.g. the attempt at secession of Republika Srpska).1152  
In order to ascertain the will of the people in Bosnia*Herzegovina, the 
Badinter Commission suggested a referendum.1153 A referendum was not proclaimed 
the only means of expression of the will of the people (or peoples), however, the 
Badinter Commission did not specify what other means could also be acceptable.  
On 27 January 1992, the Assembly of Bosnia*Herzegovina adopted the 
Decree on the Call of the Republic’s Referendum for Affirming of the Status of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.1154 The referendum question reads: “Do you support 
sovereign and independent Bosnia*Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens, peoples of 
Bosnia*Herzegovina – Muslims, Serbs, Croats and people of other nationalities who 
live in Bosnia*Herzegovina?”1155 
                                                                                                                                          
1149 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 4 (11 January 1992). 
1150 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 2 (11 January 1992).  
1151 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 4 (11 January 1992). 
1152 Ibid., especially para 3 & 4.  
1153 Ibid., para 4.  
1154 The Decree on the Call of the Republic’s Referendum for Affirming of the Status of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, The Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 2 (27 January 
1992) (my own translation). For more on the background to the referendum see supra ch. 4.3.4. 
1155 Ibid., Article 3. 
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The referendum question was thus clear, although it notably avoided wording 
such as ‘Do you agree that Bosnia*Herzegovina becomes an independent state?’ The 
omission of a more specific wording probably needs to be ascribed to the fact that, at 
the request of the Badinter Commission, the referendum was held after Bosnia*
Herzegovina had already declared independence and after the Badinter Commission 
had already held that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution.1156 In the 
perception of its central government, Bosnia*Herzegovina at that time already existed 
as an independent, though non*recognised, state.1157 Such a perception also stems 
from the title of the Decree calling for a referendum, which expressly suggests 
affirming and not determining the status of Bosnia*Herzegovina. It may well be that 
the central government did not want the referendum question to imply that Bosnia*
Herzegovina was not a state at the time of the referendum.  
For the referendum rules, the Act on Referenda of the Socialist Republic of 
Bosnia*Herzegovina from 1977 was used.1158 This act foresaw decision*making with 
a majority of all valid votes cast and without any special guarantees to the 
constitutive peoples of Bosnia*Herzegovina that they would not be outvoted by the 
other two constitutive peoples.1159  
The referendum on independence of Bosnia*Herzegovina was boycotted by 
the Serb population while Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats overwhelmingly 
supported an independent state of Bosnia*Herzegovina. The result was sixty*three 
percent of all eligible to vote in favour of independence.1160 The boycotting Serb 
                                                 
1156 For details see supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1157 It needs to be recalled that the Badinter Commission held that Bosnia*Herzegovina became a state 
on the date when referendum results were declared. The same critical date for Bosnia*Herzegovina’s 
becoming a state was also adopted by the ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide case.  See supra ch. 4.3.4. 
1158 The Act on Referenda of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia*Herzegovina, The Official Gazette of 
the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina No 29/77 (1977). 
1159 Ibid, Article 28. 
1160 For more on the declaration of independence of Bosnia*Herzegovina and its subsequent 
recognition as an independent state see supra ch. 4.3.4. 
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population (31.3 percent of the entire population of Bosnia*Herzegovina) counted in 
the mathematical total of one hundred percent.1161 The referendum results were 
nevertheless deemed an expression of the will of the people in favour of 
independence. Bosnian Serbs were thus outvoted and, although they were bearers of 
the right of self*determination, not given a chance to seek an arrangement which they 
preferred. Indeed, the Badinter Commission held that they could only consummate 
the right of self*determination in its internal mode.1162 One possible interpretation is 
that the majoritarian understanding of democracy had prevailed. 
While the right of self*determination is, in general, virtually confined to 
consummation in its internal mode,1163 it is significant that Bosnia*Herzegovina was 
a new state creation and one of its constitutive peoples was unified in this state 
arrangement against its wishes and without its consent. This problem cannot be only 
ascribed to the majoritarian principles of democracy, as the uti possidetis principle 
was also applied by the Badinter Commission.1164 This issue will be further discussed 
below. 
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The Macedonian referendum question reads: “Are you in favour of an independent 
Macedonia with a right to enter into a future association of sovereign states of 
Yugoslavia?”1165 Similarly to the Croatian referendum question, the Macedonian 
question also mentioned the possibility of loose association of sovereign states in the 
territory of the SFRY. The Macedonian referendum question asked voters on 
independence, but the question was not as straightforward as the referendum 
                                                 
1161 See supra ch. 4.3.4. 
1162 See the Badinter Commission, Opinion 2 (11 January 1992). 
1163 See supra ch. 5.3. 
1164 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1165 See Ден што веднаш стана историја (Den shto vednash stana istorija), my own translation 
<http://217.16.70.236/?pBroj=1349&stID=2147477716>.  
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question in Slovenia.1166 An argument can be made that a possibility of a new 
Yugoslav association – an association of sovereign states – to some degree also 
obscured the real question and it is questionable whether it would pass the ‘clarity 
test’ set in the Canadian Clarity Act.1167 A possible interpretation is that the political 
elite sought approval on two different issues: (i) the independence of Macedonia, and 
(ii) a mandate to negotiate Macedonia’s entry into a possible loose Yugoslav 
association, premised on sovereignty of its member states. However, if this was the 
purpose of the referendum question, it should have been expressed in two separate 
questions in order to avoid ambiguity.  
A majority of 72.16 percent of all eligible to vote supported Macedonia’s 
independence.1168 As was argued in the previous chapter, the Badinter Commission 
held that Macedonia had implemented relevant minority protection mechanisms and 
dedicated most of its reasoning to Macedonia’s misunderstanding with Greece over 
its name and called for Macedonia’s unequivocal renouncing of territorial claims 
toward Greece.1169  
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Although the FRY was a new state creation, it was only at the end of the Milošević 
regime in 2000 when the FRY itself acknowledged this fact, most notably by 
applying for membership of the UN.1170 In these circumstances no consultation was 
held either in Serbia or Montenegro on the question of whether the population of 
these two republics approved the creation of the FRY. Instead, the view that there 
was no new state*creation was expressly affirmed in the preamble to the Constitution 
                                                 
1166 See supra n. 1126. 
1167 See supra ch. 5.4.2.2. 
1168 Trifunovska (1994), p. 345. 
1169 See supra ch. 4.3.5. 
1170 See supra n. 665. 
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of the FRY from 1992, which claimed the FRY’s continuity with the international 
personality of the SFRY.1171  
 The example of the FRY perhaps points out some contradictions of the EC’s 
involvement in the dissolution of the SFRY. While the Badinter Commission held 
that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution,1172 the EC Guidelines invited its 
constitutive republics to opt for recognition as independent states.1173 At the same 
time the EC Guidelines and the Badinter Commission did not address the question of 
republics that might not want to become independent states. The problem is that the 
parent state, according to the Badinter Commission, no longer existed and therefore 
the alternative to independence was not a continued status within the SFRY but an 
association in a new state*formation – the FRY. Such an association would, however, 
also require the approval of the peoples in question. 
Nevertheless, this was a problem only in Serbia and in Montenegro, where no 
significant independence movements existed at that time, while the problem in 
Bosnia*Herzegovina was only theoretical. The referendum on independence in 
Bosnia*Herzegovina was held after the EC Declaration had already invited the 
Yugoslav republics to opt for recognition as independent states and after the Badinter 
Commission already held that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution.1174 This 
was not the case in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia,1175 where referenda were held 
and independence proclaimed before the adoption of the EC Guidelines and before 
the Badinter Commission delivered its first opinion.1176 In theory, if the population of 
Bosnia*Herzegovina rejected the independence option at the referendum, it is not 
                                                 
1171 The Constitution of the FRY (1992), preamble. See also supra ch. 4.3.6. 
1172 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991). 
1173 See supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
1174 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1175 Macedonia declared independence only twelve days before the Badinter Commission issued its 
Opinion 1. See supra ch. 4.3.5. 
1176 See supra ch. 4.3. 
 222 
possible to say that this would be a proper expression of the will of the people to join 
the newly*created FRY. However, given the fact that the SFRY no longer existed, no 
other choice was left.1177 
The fact that there was no referendum on association held in Serbia and in 
Montenegro cannot be per se deemed a violation of the right of self*determination. 
The Badinter Commission’s opinion on Bosnia*Herzegovina can be interpreted in a 
way that referendum is a means to ascertain the will of the people but not the only 
one.1178 Further, the standard established by the ICJ in the Western Sahara Opinion 
allows for circumstances in which the will of the people is obvious and popular 
consultations are not necessary.1179 It is probably safe to conclude that no doubt 
exists that a federation between Serbia and Montenegro was at that time the 
undisputed wish of the vast majority of Serbs and Montenegrins.1180 

0/2) 
It has been argued that Montenegro’s secession from the SUSM was expressly 
permitted under Article 60 of the Constitution of the SUSM.1181 The same article also 
demanded a referendum for secession to take place; however, it did not specify the 
referendum rules.1182 The latter again became subject to EU involvement. The EU 
imposed the Independence Referendum Act, which required that secession be 
confirmed by a majority of fifty*five percent of votes cast, under the condition of 
participation of at least fifty percent plus one vote of those eligible to vote.1183 The 
                                                 
1177 In the example of Bosnia*Herzegovina necessary caveats apply, as one of its constitutive peoples 
opposed independence and demanded either independence for its own entity or continuation in 
association with Serbia and Montenegro. See supra ch. 4.3.4. and 5.4.3.3. 
1178 See supra ch. 5.4.3.3. 
1179 Compare supra n. 1117. 
1180 Compare supra n. 852. 
1181 For more see supra ch. 4.5.2. 
1182 The Constitution of SUSM (2003), Article 60. 
1183 The Act on Referendum on State*Legal Status of the Republic of Montenegro, The Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro No 12/06 (2 March 2006), Article 6. 
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required majority was probably based on opinion polls suggesting that approximately 
half of the population supported independence while a relatively large share of the 
population determinedly opposed it.1184 The referendum question was unambiguous: 
“Do you agree that the Republic of Montenegro becomes an independent state with a 
full international legal personality?”1185 
At the referendum held on 21 May 2006, independence was supported by 
55.53 percent of those who voted at a turnout of 86.49 percent of all eligible to 
vote.1186 As the referendum results show, the support for independence barely met 
the EU*imposed fifty*five percent requirement. The threshold was thus described as 
a political gamble as it would be quite possible that the result would fall in the ‘grey 
zone’ between fifty and fifty*five percent.1187 In such a circumstance: 
Montenegro’s government would have been legally unable to declare independence. At the same time 
it would have viewed the referendum result as a mandate to further weaken the State Union. The 
unionists would have viewed the result as a victory and demanded immediate parliamentary elections 
and closer ties with Belgrade.1188  
Although politically risky, the EU*imposed majority requirement contributed 
toward the legitimacy of decision*making. The EU feared that the proponents of a 
union would boycott the referendum and thus endanger its democratic legitimacy.1189 
The referendum formula, however, gave union advocates reasonable hope that the 
referendum on secession would not be successful and thus motivated them to 
mobilise their supporters to take part in the vote. By avoiding either a boycott of 
advocates of a union with Serbia or victory of the proponents of Montenegrin 
                                                 
1184 See supra ch. 4.5.2. 
1185 The Act on Referendum on State*Legal Status of the Republic of Montenegro (2006), Article 5, 
my own translation. 
1186 Svet ministara državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora, Direkcija za informisanje  (24 May 2006) 
<http://www.info.gov.yu/saveznavlada/list_detalj.php?tid=1&idteksta=15132>.  
1187 International Crisis Group, Briefing No. 42, Montenegro’s Referendum (30 May 2006), p. 6.  
1188 Ibid. 
1189 See International Crisis Group, Briefing No. 42 (30 May 2006), p. 2 
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independence with a narrow majority of, in theory, merely a vote over fifty percent, 
the referendum was given broader democratic legitimacy.  
The example of Montenegro also proves that the question of a relevant 
majority for a consultation to be considered an expression of the will of the people 
does not need to be limited to the choice between a majority of all eligible to vote 
and a majority of all (valid) votes cast. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that in 
absolute shares Montenegrin independence was supported by 48.02 percent of all 
eligible to vote. If, for example, the Slovenian standard of majority of all people 
eligible to vote were applied,1190 Montenegro would have been unable to declare 
independence.  

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In the environment of a consensual secession, i.e. with the approval of Ethiopia,1191 
the UN*sponsored referendum in Eritrea1192 was unambiguous from the point of view 
of both the question asked as well as popular support. The referendum question reads 
as follows: “Are you in favour of Eritrea becoming an independent, sovereign 
State?”1193 At a participation of 93.9 percent, 99.8 percent of votes cast were in 
favour of independence.1194 Independence was thus supported by 94.06 percent of all 
eligible to vote. Due to the consensual nature of the new state*creation, international 
recognition promptly followed.1195  
 
 
 
                                                 
1190 Compare supra n. 1126. 
1191 See supra ch. 4.4.3. 
1192 Ibid. 
1193 See Elections in Eritrea <http://africanelections.tripod.com/er.html>. 
1194 Ibid.  
1195 For details see supra ch. 4.4.3. 
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On 5 May 1999, the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor was concluded.1196 The 
Agreement comprehended a document entitled ‘A Constitutional Framework for a 
Special Autonomy for East Timor’, which provided for autonomy of East Timor 
within Indonesia.1197 The Agreement, however, foresaw consultation of the people of 
East Timor on the autonomy arrangement. The consultation was conducted under 
UN auspices.1198 
The popular consultation on the acceptance or rejection of the autonomy 
arrangement, which would lead to independence, was further affirmed by Resolution 
1246 of the UN Security Council.1199 Neither the Agreement nor Resolution 1246 
specified the required majority or the exact referendum questions. Neither was the 
majority*requirement specified in the Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the 
Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through a Direct Ballot, which was also 
concluded between Indonesia and Portugal on 5 May 1999.1200 
 As follows from the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, the 
interpretation of the referendum results was left to the Secretary*General. Some 
guidelines on standards adopted by the Secretary*General in regard to the referendum 
rules follow from the Report of the Secretary*General on the Question of East Timor 
from 5 May 1999:  
[S]hould the popular consultation result in a majority of the East Timorese people rejecting the 
proposed special autonomy, the Government of Indonesia would take the constitutional steps 
necessary to terminate Indonesia's links with East Timor, thus restoring under Indonesian law the 
                                                 
1196 UN Doc S/1999/513 (5 May 1999), Annex 1. See also Martin (2001), pp. 15–34. 
1197 UN Doc S/1999/513 (5 May 1999), Appendix. 
1198 UN Doc S/1999/513 (5 May 1999), paras 1–8. 
1199 Ibid., para 1.  
1200 UN Doc S/1999/513 (5 May 1999), Annex 2. 
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status that East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal 
would agree with the Secretary*General on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of 
authority in East Timor to the United Nations, which would then initiate a process enabling East 
Timor to begin a transition towards independence.1201 
By reference to the “majority of the East Timorese people”,1202 the Secretary*
General, perhaps, wanted to set a standard according to which a decision is taken by 
the more demanding majority of all eligible to vote and not by that of all valid votes 
cast. However, such a conclusion cannot be straightforward. 
 Two unambiguous questions were asked at the referendum: 
Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia? 
Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from 
Indonesia?1203  
In light of the somewhat undefined majority that determines the will of the people, if 
the Secretary*General’s reference to the “majority of the East Timorese people”1204 is 
interpreted as a requirement for the majority of all people eligible to vote, it is 
unclear what would have happened if neither of the two possibilities received the 
required support. In the absence of any other possibility, the Secretary*General 
would probably need to declare the winning choice to be the one which received the 
majority of all valid votes cast.  
 Nevertheless, the ambiguity associated with the required majority was not 
proven to be a problem in practice. The people of East Timor rejected the autonomy 
arrangement and supported the course to independence with 78.5 percent of votes 
                                                 
1201 Ibid., para 2.  
1202 Ibid. 
1203 Ibid., Annex 2, para B. 
1204 See supra n. 1201. 
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cast, at a participation of 98.6 percent.1205 This means that independence was 
supported by 77.4 percent of all eligible to vote in East Timor.  
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The dissolution of the Soviet Union was an outcome of the rather complicated 
political situation in this federation. The decisive development was a power contest 
between the Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the then already elected President 
of Russia, Boris Yeltsin.1206 The failed putsch attempt of a group of Soviet officials 
in August 1991 further weakened Gorbachev and the federal organs and strengthened 
Yeltsin and his agenda to undermine the federation.1207 In the post*putsch 
environment of a virtually non*functioning federation and with the former Baltic 
republics having been recognised as independent states, “independence for the 
republics [was] essentially a matter of declaring it.”1208 
 Notably, independence was initially not on the agenda of the political 
leadership in all of the Soviet republics. Indeed, Yeltsin’s primary goal was to 
undermine Gorbachev’s power and not to disrupt the Soviet Union.1209 The latter 
may be described as a side*effect of the primary goal. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian 
leadership, faced with a strong pro*independence movement, only co*opted 
independence ideas at the end of 1990.1210 In the Central Asian republics, political 
elites initially opposed the referendum on the future of the Soviet Union1211 but 
“once it became clear it would occur, they sought a way to co*opt nationalist 
                                                 
1205 See Crawford (2006), p. 561. For more on East Timor's course to independence, see supra ch. 
4.5.1. 
1206 Kotkin (2001), p. 103. 
1207 See ibid. for a detailed account on the situation. 
1208 Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 192. 
1209 Kotkin (2001), p. 104. 
1210 Ibid., p. 105. 
1211 See infra ch. 5.4.4.2. 
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sentiment.”1212 Nevertheless, “up until the very last minute … almost all of Central 
Asia’s leaders maintained hope that the Union could be saved.”1213 In many republics 
independence was not a result of secessionist activities but rather an outcome of 
political developments in the Soviet Union. Therefore for the most part “it was not 
nationalism per se, but the structure of the Soviet state … that proved fatal to the 
USSR.”1214  
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Faced with opposition from anti*reform Party hardliners, demands of the groups 
seeking democratisation, secessionist claims by some republics and Yeltsin’s attempt 
to usurp the Soviet state*institutions and put them in service of Russia, Gorbachev 
called for an all*Union referendum on the future of the Soviet Union1215 with an aim 
“to obtain the authority he needed to keep the Soviet Union intact.”1216 
 The referendum was held on 17 March 19911217 and the question read: “Do 
you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 
a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms 
of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?”1218 The required 
majority for the preservation of the Soviet Union to be voted for was fifty percent of 
those who voted.1219 Other referendum rules were somewhat unclear and results open 
to different interpretations “so that success could be claimed for a variety of different 
outcomes.”1220 It was not specified what the consequences of a negative answer 
                                                 
1212 Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 194. 
1213 Kotkin (2001), p. 40.   
1214 Ibid., p. 106. 
1215 Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 187. 
1216 Ibid. 
1217 Ibid., p. 186. 
1218 Ibid., p. 187. 
1219 See Taagepera (1993), p. 193. 
1220 Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 188. 
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would be, either by the entire population of the Soviet Union or by a single republic. 
Further, the question did not imply how the federation would be renewed. 
The referendum proposal was not unanimously accepted by the Soviet 
Republics and approaches toward the referendum question were not uniform. The 
referendum was boycotted by six out of the fifteen republics: Armenia, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova.1221 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also held 
referenda on independence prior to 17 March 1991, when the all*Union referendum 
was scheduled.1222 Armenia held a separate independence referendum after this 
date.1223 Of those Soviet republics which did not boycott the all*Union referendum, 
special referenda on independence prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 8 
December 1991 were held in Turkmenistan1224 and Ukraine.1225 On 29 December 
1991, when the Soviet Union had already been dissolved, special referenda on 
independence were also held in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.1226 In three Soviet 
republics: Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan no specific referenda on 
independence were held but the question of the all*Union referendum was modified 
                                                 
1221 Ibid.  
1222 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1223 At the Armenian referendum held on 21 September 1991 (announcing it before the all*Union 
referendum was scheduled), independence was supported by 99.3 percent of those who voted, at a 
turnout of 95.1 percent. Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 193. 
1224 In Turkmenistan, the independence referendum was organised on 26 October 1991. The 
referendum question on independence was presented along with “a vaguely worded question about 
support for the domestic and foreign policy of the president of the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan.” 
Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 201. Independence, along with the question on foreign and domestic 
policies, was supported by 97.4 percent of those who voted at a turnout of 94.1 percent. (Ibid.). 
1225 The referendum on independence of Ukraine was held on 1 December 1991. The referendum 
question read: “Do you support the Act of the Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine?” At a 
participation rate of 84.18 percent, 90.32 of votes cast were in favour of independence. This means 
that 76.03 percent of all eligible to vote supported an independent Ukraine. See Electoral Geography: 
Ukraine <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/u/ukraine/ukraine*independence*
referendum*1991.html>. 
1226 Independence referenda in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan were held subsequently, after the Soviet 
Union had already been dissolved. In the absence of any other option, independence of Azerbaijan 
was confirmed by 99.6 percent of those who voted at a turnout of 95.3 percent of all eligible to vote. 
Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 193. The independence of Uzbekistan was confirmed by 98.2 percent of 
those who voted at a turnout of 94 percent of all eligible to vote. (Ibid.). 
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to imply the possible creation of a sovereign state.1227 In Russia the all*Union 
referendum question was also modified but it did not ask on independence.1228 In 
Moldova, neither the all*Union referendum (in any of its variations) nor a specific 
independence referendum was ever held.1229   
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union was an outcome of internal political 
developments, in which independence referenda did not play the decisive role. In the 
absence of any other choice, they merely confirmed the emergence of new states. 
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The practice of independence referenda in situations of successful post*1991 state 
creations might form a base for the development of rules of customary international 
law regulating the legal significance of independence referenda and procedural rules 
to be followed at such consultations. The following rules have been identified in this 
section: (i) a democratically*expressed will of the people in favour of an independent 
state puts an obligation on both the secession*seeking entity and its parent state to 
negotiate the future legal status of the secession*seeking entity but there is no 
                                                 
1227 In Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan, the all*Union referendum question was modified to 
imply creation of a sovereign state. The referendum questions in Kirghizia and Uzbekistan read: “Do 
you consider it necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed 
federation of equal sovereign states, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any 
nationality will be fully guaranteed?” Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 194. The referendum question in 
Kazakhstan read: “Do you consider it necessary to maintain the USSR as a union of sovereign states 
of equal rights?” (Ibid.). Although these questions did not directly ask on independence, the shift from 
‘republics’ to ‘states’ is notable. In Kazakhstan, the turnout of the registered voters was 88.2 percent, 
while 94.1 of valid votes were affirmative to the question asked (and implying independence). (Ibid., 
pp. 190–91). In Kirghizia, the turnout of the registered voters was 92.9 and the answer was affirmative 
by 94.6 of those who cast their votes. (Ibid.). In Uzbekistan, the turnout of the registered voters was 
95.4 percent and the answer was affirmative by 93.7 percent of those who cast their votes. (Ibid., p. 
193). Unlike Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, Uzbekistan also had a special referendum on independence, 
which eventually took place after the Soviet Union had already been transformed to the CIS.  
1228 In Russia, the original question of the all*Union referendum was not modified but supplemented 
with a question on the popular election of the president of Russia. At the referendum, the answer to 
the original question of the all*Union referendum was affirmative by 71.3 percent of those who cast 
their votes, at a turnout of 75.4 percent of the registered voters. (Ibid.). The question on the popular 
election of the Russian president was supported by 69.9 percent of those who cast their votes. (Ibid., 
p. 194). 
1229 Brady and Kaplan (1994), p. 193. 
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presumption that such an entity would become an independent state;1230 (ii) 
referendum cannot be considered an expression of the will of the people if there 
exists ambiguity either in relation to the referendum question or the winning 
majority;1231 (iii) a referendum question should unequivocally consult on 
independence; (iv) the required majority can be situation*specific, but a wider 
majority gives the secession*seeking entity stronger arguments in negotiations with 
its parent state on possible secession; (v) a new state creation is not only a matter of 
majoritarian decision*making; therefore, adequate standards for protection of 
numerically inferior or otherwise non*dominant peoples and minorities will need to 
be implemented before a secession*seeking entity could, possibly, become an 
independent state.1232   
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The development of the principle of self*determination in its modern meaning was 
closely associated with the democratic political theory, most notably with ideas of 
President Wilson. However, its association with the political system of liberal*
democracy is rather problematic. Indeed, it is not possible to assume that the will of 
the people would always favour a particular political system of liberal*democracy. 
The limitation of a people’s choice to one particular political system would, 
however, violate the right of self*determination and not lead to its fulfilment.  
 As a human right, self*determination became codified in the era of the UN 
Charter. However, as it is not an absolute human right, the right of self*determination 
is limited by other human rights, including the right of self*determination of other 
peoples. In non*colonial situations the right of self*determination also clashes with 
                                                 
1230 See supra ch. 5.4.1.2.  
1231 See supra ch. 5.4.2.2, 
1232 See supra ch. 5.4.1.2. 
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the principle of territorial integrity of states. Therefore, two modes for the exercise of 
this right need to be distinguished: internal and external. 
 It is generally accepted that the right of self*determination would normally be 
consummated in its internal mode. In this regard arguments have been made that the 
right of self*determination has an effect of the ‘right to democracy’.1233 Such 
arguments stem from the interdependence of human rights and from the requirement 
of representative government expressed in the elaboration of the principle of 
territorial integrity in the Declaration on Principles of International Law. In regard to 
the ‘democratic nature’ of the right of self*determination stemming from the 
interdependence of human rights, it was concluded that such an interpretation would 
require a procedural (electoral*centric) definition of human rights and a liberal*
democratic reading of the so*called democratic rights, both of which were rejected in 
Chapter 2.   
 The elaboration of the principle of territorial integrity qualifies a 
representative government as one that does not discriminate its people based on race, 
colour or creed.1234 This qualification currently has a broader meaning than it had at 
the time of drafting and now covers all identities significant for a separate people. 
However, it does not cover identities other than those identifying a separate people. 
The requirement for a representative government therefore cannot be extended to 
mean non*discrimination based on political opinion.  
A representative government can also be a government which is not an 
outcome of multiparty elections. Indeed, the drafting of the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law expressly shows that the requirement for a representative 
government was not meant to interfere with a specific choice of a political or 
                                                 
1233 See supra ch. 2.4. and 5.3. 
1234 See supra ch. 5.3.3.1.2. 
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electoral system. Practice of UN organs shows that this attitude has not changed in 
the post*Cold War period. Further, despite the absence of a multiparty political 
system and liberal*democratic electoral procedures, the Badinter Commission 
implied that the SFRY was representative of all of its people prior to Serbia’s 
usurpation of the federal organs.1235  
 The analysis in this chapter also shows that a multiparty electoral process 
itself cannot guarantee respect for the right of self*determination and does not mean a 
per se fulfilment of this right. Indeed, the electoral process can lead to a situation of a 
tyranny of the majority. Further, party*politics is not a sufficient channel for 
implementation of self*determination standards as programmes of political parties 
cover a wide range of issues and not only those associated with the right of self*
determination.1236 
 When the right of self*determination is (exceptionally) consummated in its 
external mode, the operation of this right requires that the population of the territory 
in question needs to consent to the change of the legal status of a territory. This has 
been affirmed in jurisprudence of the ICJ,1237 by the Badinter Commission,1238 by 
state practice1239 and by practice of UN organs.1240 Yet it is not entirely defined how 
the population expresses its consent. As implied by the Badinter Commission in its 
opinion on Bosnia*Herzegovina, referendum would be a standard procedure for 
ascertainment of the will of people for the purpose of the right of self*
                                                 
1235 See supra notes 1016–1018. 
1236 See supra n. 1025. 
1237 See supra n. 1111. The importance of the popular support for the change of the legal status of a 
territory was also implicitly affirmed in the Bosnia Genocide case. The ICJ held that Bosnia*
Herzegovina became a state on 6 March 1992, i.e. on the day when referendum results were declared. 
See supra n. 632. 
1238 See supra n. 1153. 
1239 See supra ch. 5.4. 
1240 See supra n. 1111.   
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determination.1241 However, the reasoning of the Badinter Commission in its opinion 
on Bosnia*Herzegovina, as well as the reasoning of the ICJ in the Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion, allow for situations in which referendum would not be 
necessary.1242 This opens the possibility of an interpretation that in situations in 
which no objective doubt regarding the will of the people exists, a formal popular 
consultation may not be necessary. This question will be further dealt with in 
Chapter 7. As a general rule, popular consultations prior to alteration of the legal 
status of a territory are required, which leads to two questions: (i) what rules apply at 
popular consultations, and (ii) what consequences (or entitlement) brings a decision 
for a change of legal status? 
Some guidelines on referenda rules stem from the Canadian Clarity Act, 
which does not prescribe a specific majority but demands for that majority represent 
a clear expression of the will of the people. It further prescribes that the referendum 
question be free of ambiguity and not obscure the actual question on independence 
within a broader question, in the framework of which independence would only be 
implied. A detailed determination of these requirements is situation*specific. The 
referendum practice shows that a commonly prescribed threshold for success of a 
referendum is fifty percent plus one vote of all valid votes cast. At the same time, a 
majority of all eligible to vote is often achieved. However, if political (or societal) 
situation implies that a differently qualified majority would represent a clear 
expression of the will of people, referendum rules can prescribe a majority other than 
that of all valid votes cast or of all eligible to vote. Montenegro was such an example 
– the required majority was a political compromise which contributed to the 
legitimacy of the referendum. Although independence was supported by less than 
                                                 
1241 See supra n. 1153. 
1242 See supra ch. 5.4. 
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fifty percent of all eligible to vote, the referendum results were accepted and 
respected even by those who opposed Montenegro’s path to independence. 
 In regard to the consequences (or entitlement) that a positive referendum 
result brings, it can be concluded that a clearly expressed will of the people in favour 
of independence does not create a ‘right to secession’. Independence may be an 
automatic outcome only if secession is unambiguously allowed by the constitution of 
the parent state (e.g. Montenegro)1243 or if approval of the parent*state is given in 
some other way. Although an expression of the will of the people in favour of 
independence does not create a ‘right to secession’ in situations of attempts at 
unilateral secession, opinions of prominent writers in the situation of Québec lead to 
a conclusion that democratic principles demand that such an expression of the will of 
the people cannot be ignored.1244 A clear expression of the will of the people 
indicating that a people favours secession may lead to an obligation on both sides to 
negotiate a future legal arrangement of a territory, without any predetermined 
outcome.1245 Since the path to independence did not get approval at the Québec 
referendum, Canada and Québec never had to engage in such negotiations. However, 
other situations have proven that such negotiations are not easy and a compromise is 
difficult to achieve, as secession*seeking entities are unlikely to accept anything 
short of independence.1246 
                                                 
1243 It was shown that a mere constitutional proclamation of a ‘right to secession’ is of little use if a 
constitution does not provide for a mechanism leading to secession. Creations of new states in the 
territories of the former SFRY and of the former Soviet Union were not based on the ‘right to 
secession’ generally granted in General Principle I of the Constitution of the SFRY and Article 72 of 
the Constitution of the Soviet Union, respectively. On the other hand, Article 60 of the Constitution of 
the SUSM provided for a clear mechanism leading to secession and was followed by Montenegro on 
its path to independence (see supra ch. 5.4.2.).    
1244 See supra n. 1095. 
1245 See supra n. 1097. 
1246 See infra ch. 7.4. for discussion on Kosovo. 
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It has been established that the right of self*determination collides with the principle 
of territorial integrity as well as with other human rights, including the right of self*
determination of other peoples and minority rights.1247 The right of self*
determination is thus only exceptionally exercised in its external mode. However, 
when new states are created there is a question of how a territorial unit in which a 
people exercises the right of self*determination in its external mode is determined. It 
needs to be considered whether and to what degree a previously existing territorial 
arrangement within a parent*state can limit the will of a people when the right of 
self*determination is exercised in its external mode. 
Initially the application of the uti possidetis principle outside of colonial 
situations will be discussed. Subsequently, an argument will be made that in some 
circumstances international boundaries delimit self*determination units and serve as 
a basis for determination of the new international border. However, this means that 
new minorities and numerically inferior peoples may emerge and it is questionable 
whether their preferences on the change of the legal status of a territory would be 
taken into account.   
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It is firmly established in international law that new state*creations do not affect 
existing international borders. This follows from the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties,1248 the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
                                                 
1247 See supra ch. 5.3. and 5.4.  
1248 See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 62(2a). Notably, the ICJ has 
held that Article 62 codified customary international law. See the Gabčikovo6Nagymaros Project case, 
ICJ Rep 1997, para 46. 
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Treaties1249 and from the jurisprudence of the ICJ.1250 The SFRY, for example, 
bordered Italy, Austria and (partly) Hungary from the territory of Slovenia. When 
Slovenia became an independent state, these international borders were not subject to 
any controversy but became borders of Slovenia with these three states.
 The establishment of borders between former units of a parent*state or 
between a newly independent state and the remainder of its former parent*state is, 
however, much more controversial. In the age of decolonisation the uti possidetis 
principle was developed.1251 This principle was applied to “upgrade” administrative 
colonial boundaries to international borders, initially in Latin America and 
subsequently also in Africa. The modern meaning of the uti possidetis principle is 
captured in the following observation of the Chamber of the ICJ in the Frontier 
Dispute case: 
The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at 
the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no more than 
delimitations between different administrative divisions of colonies all subject to the same sovereign. 
                                                 
1249 See The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978), Article 11.  
This article, inter alia, provides that a succession of states does not affect “a boundary established by 
a treaty.” 
1250 The standard that the delimitation, which stems from a treaty, is permanent regardless of the later 
fate of that treaty was established in the Temple of' Preah Vihear case, ICJ Rep 1962, p. 34, where the 
ICJ argued: “In general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary 
objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the line so established can, at any 
moment, and on the basis of a continuously available process, be called in question, and its 
rectification claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by reference to a clause in the parent treaty is 
discovered. Such a process could continue indefinitely, and finality would never be reached so long as 
possible errors still remained to be discovered. Such a frontier, so far from being stable, would be 
completely precarious.” The standard was even more unequivocally affirmed in the Libya/Chad case, 
ICJ Rep 1994, paras 72 and 73, where the ICJ argued: “A boundary established by treaty … achieves 
a permanence which the treaty itself' does not necessarily enjoy. The treaty can cease to be in force 
without in any way affecting the continuance of the boundary … [W]hen a boundary has been the 
subject of agreement, the continued existence of that boundary is not dependent upon the continuing 
life of the treaty under which the boundary is agreed.” Ibid., para 73  
1251 The principle otherwise originates in Roman law, where it was used to determine a provisional 
status of property in private land claims. However, in its modern appearance it was used to 
permanently determine the territory of a newly emerging state. See Ratner (1996), pp. 592–93. 
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In that case, the application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in administrative boundaries 
being transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term.1252 
In Latin America, the application of uti possidetis in the early nineteenth 
century had two major purposes: First, “to ensure that no land in South America 
remained terra nullius upon independence, open to possible claim by Spain or other 
non*American powers”1253; and second “to prevent conflicts among the new states of 
the former empire by adopting a set of extant boundaries.”1254 The uti possidetis 
principle, however, did not prevent border disputes and led to some controversy over 
the question whether it should be applied based on express possession stemming 
from legal documents (uti possidetis juris) or based on effective possession (uti 
possidetis facto).1255  
The view that the uti possidetis principle cannot itself solve all border 
disputes, as well as the difference between the two understandings of the mode of 
application of the principle, were pointed out in the Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute case.1256 The Chamber of the ICJ also observed that the application 
of uti possidetis is difficult because in Spanish Central America “there were 
administrative boundaries of different kinds or degrees”1257 and held that: 
[I]t has to be remembered that no question of international boundaries could ever have occurred to the 
minds of those servants of the Spanish Crown who established administrative boundaries; uti 
possidetis juris is essentially a retrospective principle, investing as international boundaries 
administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes.1258 
                                                 
1252 Burkina Faso v Mali, ICJ Rep 1986, para 23. 
1253 Ratner (1996), p.  593.  
1254 Ibid., pp. 593–94. 
1255 A detailed analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis. For more on border disputes 
in Latin America and on the two different versions of application of the uti possidetis principle see 
Bartoš (1997), pp. 44–48. For the difference between uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis facto also 
see El Salvador v Honduras (Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Rep 1992, para 40. 
1256 El Salvador v Honduras (Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Rep 1992, para 41. 
1257 Ibid., para 43. 
1258 Ibid. 
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Latin American states have expressly accepted the applicability of the uti possidetis 
principle on their continent. This was done “either in national constitutions or in their 
relations inter se.”1259  
 In Africa, borders were established by European colonial powers, with little 
regard for the local population. Indeed:  
The European colonialists who arrived [to Africa] in large numbers in the eighteenth century did not 
draw lines immediately. Rather, each state made claims, leading to the recognition of spheres of 
influence, followed by more defined allocations, specific delimitations, and eventual alterations based 
on experience. Drawing these borders with only slight knowledge of or regard to local inhabitants or 
geography, the European powers made territorial allocations to reduce armed conflict among 
themselves. In that sense alone they were rational.1260 
Regardless of the nature of colonial boundaries, in the time of decolonisation the uti 
possidetis principle was applied.1261 Although the uti possidetis principle was not 
expressly mentioned in legally binding instruments, it was at least subsequently 
affirmed by the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Article 3(3) 
affirms “[r]espect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence.”1262 The inviolability of borders in Africa 
was also affirmed by Resolution 16(I) of the Assembly of the OAU, which provided 
that “the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a 
                                                 
1259 Bartoš (1997), p. 47. Brazil, the only former colonial possession in Latin America which not 
Spanish, also concluded treaties affirming the uti possidetis principle with its neighbouring states. 
1260 Ratner (1996), p. 595. 
1261 The solution that the former colonial borders would become international borders was advanced 
by European states and African elites. The Pan*African movement, on the other hand, proposed an 
entire redrawing of African borders. For more see Ratner (1996), p. 595. See also Franck (1995), p. 
151, arguing: “In Africa, there was no single, dominant, unifying culture, as there had been in Latin 
America. Also, unlike the dozens of European nations fashioned by Versailles, Africa was a continent 
of tribes and clans numbering in the thousands. What seemed to be needed was neither the uti 
possidetis of Latin America nor the self*determination of Europe, but some new normative concept 
combining aspects of both. Thus the emerging nationalist leaders of Africa persuaded the UN General 
Assembly (and the International Court of Justice in its Namibia Advisory Opinion) that there must be 
a right of self*determination, but that it would be exercised only within existing colonial frontiers.” 
1262 Charter of the Organisation of African Union (1963), Article 3(3). 
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tangible reality”1263 and declared that “all Member States pledge themselves to 
respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.”1264 
The application of the uti possidetis principle on the African continent was 
affirmed by the Chamber of the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute case. In this context 
references to the OAU Charter and Resolution 16(I) were also made: 
The elements of uti possidetis were latent in the many declarations made by African leaders in the 
dawn of independence. These declarations confirmed the maintenance of the territorial status quo at 
the time of independence, and stated the principle of respect both for the frontiers deriving from 
international agreements, and for those resulting from mere internal administrative divisions. The 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity did not ignore the principle of uti possidetis, but made 
only indirect reference to it in Article 3, according to which member states solemnly affirm the 
principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state. However, at their first 
summit conference after the creation of the Organization of African Unity, the African Heads of State 
[in Resolution 16(I)] … deliberately defined and stressed the principle of uti possidetis juris contained 
only in an implicit sense in the Charter of their organization.1265 
 The Chamber of the ICJ also addressed the conflict between the uti possidetis 
principle and the right of self*determination: 
At first sight this principle [uti possidetis] conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples to 
self*determination. In fact, however, the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often 
seen as the wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for their 
independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the continent of the gains achieved by 
much sacrifice. The essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually 
consolidate their independence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the 
respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self*
determination of peoples.1266 
                                                 
1263 AHG Res 16(I) (17–21 July 1964), preamble, para 3. 
1264 Ibid., para 2.  
1265 Burkina Faso v Mali, ICJ Rep 1986, para 22.  
1266 Ibid., para 25. 
 241 
[T]he principle of uti possidetis has kept its place among the most important legal principles, despite 
the apparent contradiction which explained its coexistence alongside the new norms implied. Indeed it 
was by deliberate choice that African States selected, among all the classic principles, that of uti 
possidetis.1267 
 The fact that the right of self*determination gives way the uti possidetis 
principle has been interpreted in the context of the latter’s contribution to peace and 
stability: 
[W]hen the principle of uti possidetis collides with the right of self*determination, or, stated 
otherwise, when the claims of peace among states clashes with the claims of justice by peoples, then 
the international legal system has consistently allowed the claims of peace to prevail.1268    
This observation points out that the right of self*determination is not an absolute 
right1269 and in international law as it currently stands the right of self*determination 
may also be weighed against the uti possidetis principle. Consequently, democratic 
principles operating within the right of self*determination1270 may also be limited by 
the uti possidetis principle. 
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In the Frontier Dispute case the Chamber of the ICJ argued: 
Although there is no need, for the purposes of the present case, to show that [uti possidetis] is a firmly 
established principle of international law where decolonization is concerned, the Chamber nonetheless 
wishes to emphasize its general scope, in view of its exceptional importance for the African continent 
and for the two Parties. In this connection it should be noted that the principle of uti possidetis seems 
to have been first invoked and applied in Spanish America, inasmuch as this was the continent which 
first witnessed the phenomenon of decolonization involving the formation of a number of sovereign 
States on the territory formerly belonging to a single metropolitan State. Nevertheless the principle is 
not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general 
                                                 
1267 Ibid., para 26. 
1268 McCorquodale and Pangalangan (2001), p. 875. 
1269 Compare supra n. 951. 
1270 Compare supra ch. 5.3. and 5.4. 
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principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, 
wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States 
being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the 
withdrawal of the administering power.1271  
It was for this reason that, as soon as the phenomenon of decolonization characteristic of the situation 
in Spanish America in the 19th century subsequently appeared in Africa in the 20th century, the 
principle of uti possidetis, in the sense described above, fell to be applied. The fact that the new 
African States have respected the administrative boundaries and frontiers established by the colonial 
powers must be seen not as a mere practice contributing to the gradual emergence of a principle of 
customary international law, limited in its impact to the African continent as it had previously been to 
Spanish America, but as the application in Africa of a rule of general scope.1272 
 This reasoning leaves no doubt that the uti possidetis principle is applicable 
in situations of decolonisation. However, it has also served as a reference for 
application of this principle outside of the context of decolonisation, more precisely 
in the territory of the SFRY, a situation of new state creations following non*
consensual dissolution of a federation. In its Opinion 3, the Badinter Commission 
stated: 
Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international 
law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in 
particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling 
decolonisation issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as stated by 
the [Chamber of the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute case].1273 
At this point the Badinter Commission quoted a fragment of paragraph 20 of the 
Frontier Dispute case:  
Nevertheless the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of 
international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the 
                                                 
1271 Burkina Faso v Mali, ICJ Rep 1986, para 20. 
1272 Ibid., para 21.  
1273 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 January 1992).  
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obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and 
stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles…1274 
 This position of the Badinter Commission has attracted determined 
critique.1275 Namely, there is nothing in the reasoning of the Chamber of the ICJ in 
the Frontier Dispute case that would suggest that the uti possidetis principle applies 
in situations other than those dealing with decolonisation.1276 Further, it may be 
argued that the Chamber of the ICJ indeed limited the applicability of the uti 
possidetis principle to colonial situations, while the Badinter Commission ignored 
those parts and resorted to selective quoting in order to extend applicability of the 
principle beyond colonial situations.  
 It is argued that the context of paragraph 20 implies that the Chamber of the 
ICJ’s reference to uti possidetis as “a general principle” is to be understood as an 
argument stating that the principle is not limited to decolonisation in Latin America 
but is a generally applicable principle where decolonisation is concerned.1277 Further, 
the observation that “there is no need, for the purposes of the present case, to show 
that [uti possidetis] is a firmly established principle of international law where 
decolonization is concerned”1278 may be a strong indication of the ‘colonial scope’ of 
the discussion on the uti possidetis principle in the Frontier Dispute case. Lastly, the 
omitted line at the end of the Badinter Commission’s quote of the Frontier Dispute 
case refers to “the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the 
                                                 
1274 Burkina Faso v Mali, ICJ Rep 1986, para 20, quoted in The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 
January 1992). 
1275 As examples of critical approaches to the application of the uti possidetis principle in the 
dissolution of the SFRY see: Radan (2000); Pomerance (1998–1999), Bartoš (1997), Ratner (1996), 
McCorquodale and Pamgalangan (2001), especially p. 875. For a different account see Shaw (1997).   
1276 Compare supra notes 1271 and 1272. 
1277 See Radan (2000), pp. 60–62. 
1278 Burkina Faso v Mali, ICJ Rep 1986, para 20. 
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administering power.”1279 Arguably, the reference to ‘administering power’ may be a 
clear indication that the Chamber of the ICJ had decolonisation in mind.1280 
 The Badinter Commission did not specifically invoke all boundaries in the 
former SFRY but only disputed ones: “The boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, 
between Bosnia*Herzegovina and Serbia, and possibly other adjacent independent 
states may not be altered except by agreement freely arrived at.”1281 The Badinter 
Commission was obviously motivated by the armed conflict taking place in Croatia 
and Bosnia*Herzegovina at that time and applied the uti possidetis principle in order 
to bring these two states and their boundaries under the protection of Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter: 
The [Badinter] Commission seems to have assumed that, regardless of any differences between 
Yugoslavia and the decolonizations, or between the law in 1960 and 1991, only uti possidetis would 
avoid anarchy by preventing attacks by one former Yugoslav republic on another. Thus, it concluded 
that only by recognizing the transformation of internal boundaries into international borders protected 
by Article 2(4) could stop the war.
1282 
 Despite the authority of Opinion 3 of the Badinter Commission, the 
applicability of the uti possidetis principle outside of colonial situations is not 
generally accepted. The analysis in this subsection shows that it may well be that the 
authority in support of its applicability in non*colonial situations is based on 
selective quoting of the ICJ’s jurisprudence and in an attempt at ‘peace activism’ in 
the former SFRY at that time. Nevertheless, the idea that internal boundaries need to 
be taken into account in some situations of secessions or dissolutions cannot be 
disregarded. For this purpose post*1991 non*colonial new state creations will also be 
examined from this aspect.  
                                                 
1279 Ibid. 
1280 See Radan (2000), p. 60. 
1281 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 January 1992). 
1282 Ratner (1996), p. 614.   
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In the context of determining boundaries of those new state creations which are not a 
consequence of decolonisation, the post*1991 practice of consensual secessions, 
unilateral secessions and dissolutions will be examined. It will be argued whether 
and in what circumstances internal boundaries may be “upgraded” to international 
borders and how this process differs from the uti possidetis principle applicable in 
colonial situations. 
 It is argued that “[t]he core functional distinction between international 
borders and internal administrative boundaries lies in a critical antinomy: 
governments establish interstate boundaries to separate states and peoples, while they 
establish or recognize internal boundaries to unify and effectively govern a polity.”1283 
For this reason it is questionable whether internal administrative boundaries can 
necessarily determine a territory which could potentially become an independent 
state.1284  
 Internal administrative boundaries, however, can have origins of a different 
kind. Indeed: 
In some cases [internal boundaries] ... are of relatively little importance; in others, such as is the case 
with federal states, they are of considerable significance. In many instances, such administrative 
borders have been changed by central government in a deliberate attempt to strengthen central control 
and weaken the growth of local power centres. In other cases, borders may have been shifted for more 
general reasons of promoting national unity or simply as a result of local pressures. In some states, 
such administrative borders can only be changed with the consent of the local province or state (in the 
subordinate sense) or unit. In some cases, internal lines are clear and of long standing. In some of 
varying types and inconsistent.1285  
                                                 
1283 Ibid., p. 602. 
1284 Ibid. 
1285  Shaw (1997), p. 489. 
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While some internal boundaries may be established for pure administrative 
purposes, others have a strong historical pedigree and even delimit self*determination 
units. Indeed, the internal organisation of a multi*ethnic state, which includes 
delimited subunits, may be an arrangement for the exercise of the right of self*
determination in its internal mode.1286 An argument was made that federalism is one 
such possibility; however, this is not always the case.1287 One counter*argument is 
that peoples of non*federal states cannot be simply excluded from the exercise of 
their right of self*determination.1288 Further, there exist federal states with federal 
units which do not constitute self*determination units.1289 
 Similarly, historical roots of an internal boundary do not necessarily 
constitute a self*determination unit. Borders between English counties have a long 
history1290 but the population of, for example, Nottinghamshire clearly does not 
constitute a people for the purpose of the right of self*determination. On the other 
hand, one cannot say that the internal boundary between England and Scotland is 
merely administrative. Not only does it have a strong historical pedigree, but there 
exists no doubt that the right of self*determination is applicable to the Scottish people 
and that Scotland is a self*determination unit.1291 In the case of hypothetical 
independence of Scotland, the international border of this state would be easy to 
ascertain.1292  
                                                 
1286 Compare supra ch. 5.3.4.3. 
1287 See supra ch. 5.3.4.3. 
1288 See Radan (2000), p. 71. 
1289 See supra ch. 5.3.4.3. 
1290 For more on the background on English counties see A Vision of Britain through Time 
<http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/types/level_page.jsp?unit_level=4>. 
1291 In regard to the Scottish identity as a people and its historical borders Tierney (2006), p. 71:  
“Scotland is a curious example of a sub*state national society in that, on the one hand, it is a former 
nation*state, indeed one of the oldest in Europe, but on the other, it is difficult to attribute points of 
clear objective distinction in terms of language, religion or ethnicity between Scotland and England … 
Scotland’s claim to societal discreteness is, therefore, largely based upon the historical development 
of indigenous institutions of civic and public life which emerged when Scotland was an independent 
state and which, to some extent, survived the Union of Parliaments with England in 1707.”  
1292 It would be the border in existence prior to the 1707 Union of Parliaments with England. Ibid.  
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 Thus, while it is possible to agree with the above*quoted observation that 
internal boundaries and international borders serve different purposes, it is also true 
that internal boundaries are not a unitary category, serve different purposes and do 
not have common origins. The question is then which internal boundaries may 
eventually become international borders.1293  
As the right of self*determination is central in situations of new state 
creations,1294 the answer needs to be sought in its context. Arguably, a group of 
people to whom the right of self*determination does not apply cannot make a 
plausible claim for secession from their parent state.1295 According to the elaboration 
of the right of self*determination, the right of self*determination only applies to 
peoples.1296 Thus, when a new state*creation is in question, the only internal 
boundaries that should matter for this discussion are those delimiting a self*
determination unit, i.e. a territory populated by a distinct people, from either the rest 
of a parent*state or from other self*determination units within a parent*state. Yet as 
will be argued on examples of the post*1990 new state creations, not even the ‘self*
determination approach’ entirely resolves the question of internal boundaries 
becoming international borders.    
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As secession of Québec never took place, its international borders did not have to be 
determined. Nevertheless, the question of borders was discussed along with other 
questions regarding the possibility of secession. The opinions of jurists may provide 
                                                 
1293 It needs to be recalled that all caveats with new state creations in the UN Charter era still apply. 
See supra ch. 5.3.1. and 5.4. 
1294 Compare supra ch. 5.4. 
1295 Compare supra ch. 5.3.3.1.1. 
1296 ICCPR (1966) and ICESCR (1966), Article 1. 
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some guidelines on the legal doctrine concerning the process of “upgrading” an 
internal boundary to an international border in the case of secession.  
 In the Québec case, the Supreme Court of Canada made no direct references 
to the question of borders. Arguably, the view that Québec could, possibly, become 
an independent state in its present provincial boundaries was implied in the 
observation that the ultimate success of a unilateral secession would depend on 
recognition of the international community.1297 Since this observation refers to the 
entire territory of Québec and not only to one part of it, it may be interpreted in a 
way that international recognition could lead to Québec’s statehood in its provincial 
boundaries.1298 
 Yet it was established above that success of a unilateral secession in the UN 
Charter era is unlikely.1299 The question of Québec’s boundaries therefore also needs 
to be addressed in light of consensual secession, which would be a possible outcome 
of negotiations on the future legal status of Québec.1300 There are three major 
questions to be asked in this context: (i) Could Québec become an independent state 
within its present provincial borders or should earlier boundaries become relevant? 
(ii) Does the duty to negotiate a future legal status include a duty to negotiate future 
international borders? (ii) Could Québec become an independent state despite the 
wish of its minorities to remain in an association with Canada? 
 In the Québec Report,1301 it was observed that Québec’s provincial borders 
are guaranteed by Canadian constitutional law, while after a possible achievement of 
                                                 
1297 The Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1298 See Radan (2000), p. 56. For the problem of unilateral secession and constitutive effects of 
recognition see supra ch. 2.3.2. and 2.3.3.5. 
1299 See supra ch. 5.4. 
1300 Compare supra n. 1097. 
1301 The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty [hereinafter The 
Québec Report] <http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/la_bibliotheque/territoire/integrite_plan_an.html>. The 
report was prepared in 1992 for the Québec Department of International Relations. Its authors were 
Thomas Franck, Rosalyn Higgins, Malcolm Shaw, Alain Pellet and Christian Tomuschat.   
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independence its borders would be protected by the principle of territorial integrity, 
which is firmly established in international law.1302 However, there is a question of 
whether the borders protected by international law would be those presently 
determined by Canadian constitutional law. In this regard the Québec Report held 
that “[f]rom a strictly legal perspective, since the attainment of independence is an 
instantaneous occurrence, there can be no intermediate situation in which other rules 
would apply. Furthermore, recent precedents have demonstrated that the principle of 
uti possidetis juris can be transposed to the present case.”1303 To this the Québec 
Report added: “[I]f the territorial limits of Québec were to be altered between now 
and the date of any future sovereignty … the borders of a sovereign Québec would 
not be its present boundaries (nor would they inevitably be those prevailing at the 
time of the formation of the Canadian Federation in 1867).”1304 
The Québec Report thus takes a view that the critical date for “upgrading” of 
internal boundaries to international borders is the moment of gaining of 
independence. According to this doctrine, previous territorial arrangements do not 
matter. The Québec Report also invoked the uti possidetis principle, referred to by 
the Badinter Commission in the case of the dissolution of the SFRY.1305 However, it 
has been argued in this section that the applicability of the uti possidetis principle in 
non*colonial situations remains disputable and has not been generally accepted.1306  
 The Québec Report further strengthened its position on the question of the 
critical date for the determination of international borders by holding that “[a] 
particular problem arises in respect of the territories ceded to Québec by the 
                                                 
1302 The Québec Report, chapter 2.1. 
1303 Ibid. 
1304 The Québec Report, chapter 2.2. 
1305 See supra n. 1273. 
1306 See supra ch. 6.3. 
 250 
Federation in 1912.”1307 In regard to these territories, the Québec Report then 
concluded: 
(i) the territory of Québec is comprised of all lands contained within the administrative limits (and 
international frontiers) of the Province; 
(ii) including those in which the indigenous peoples have rights; 
(iii) and those ceded to the Province by the federal State in 1912; 
(iv) the constitutional rules in force guarantee that the territorial limits so defined cannot be altered 
without the consent of the National Assembly of Québec … 
(v) The territorial integrity of Québec … is firmly secured by constitutional principles in force and the 
demarcation of its present boundaries cannot be altered against the will of its Legislature before the 
attainment of a possible sovereignty.1308 
 This position not only affirms the view that only the latest territorial 
arrangement within a parent*state is relevant but also gives an idea of the position of 
the newly*created minorities within a new state creation. It follows from the Québec 
Report that such minorities neither have veto power regarding the question of 
secession from a parent*state nor the right to secession from the newly*created state. 
It needs to be recalled, however, that their status may be part of the negotiation 
process prior to a potential agreement on independence.1309  
 These views attracted criticism. It was argued on behalf of the Canadian 
Government: 
As to the question of territorial integrity, there is neither a paragraph nor a line in international law 
that protects Québec’s territory but not Canada’s. International experience demonstrates that the 
borders of the entity seeking independence can be called into question, sometimes for reasons based 
                                                 
1307 The Québec Report, chapter 2.12. See also The Act to extend the Boundaries of the Province of 
Québec (1912), Art 2 (c), quoted in The Québec Report, chapter 2.12. 
1308 The Québec Report, chapter 2.14.  
1309 See supra notes 1099 and 1101. 
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upon democracy … [No one] can predict that the borders of an independent Québec would be those 
guaranteed by the Canadian Constitution.1310 
Further, in the view of the Canadian Government internal boundaries may 
automatically become international borders in a case of dissolution (e.g. the example 
of the SFRY) but not of secession.1311 In this context it was noted: 
In a case of secession the former sovereign state remains in existence, whereas in a case of dissolution 
the former sovereign state ceases to exist. This distinguishing factor may justify a different approach 
to the question of borders following the creation of new states. As a matter of logic, in the case of 
dissolution of a sovereign state, either new states emerge or parts of the dissolved state become parts 
of pre*existing states, thereby filling the vacuum created as a result of dissolution. Internal borders of 
the former sovereign state may be a sound basis for the borders of these successor states. In cases of 
secession no such vacuum arises. If secession is successful, the sovereign state from which secession 
is achieved does not cease to exist. Ultimately, the only issue in such a secession is the territorial 
extent of the new state that is the result of secession. In cases of a federation there is no reason to 
insist in all cases that the new state’s territorial extent should be that of a particular federal unit of the 
state from which secession has taken place. This is particularly so in cases where a significant 
minority opposes secession and wishes to remain part of the state from which secession is sought. Just 
as in the case of secession from a non*federal state, the territorial extent of the new state is ultimately 
a political question which will be resolved either (preferably) by negotiation or by force.1312 
This position leads to the question of whether negotiations on future 
international borders may be made a part of the negotiation process on a potential 
consensual secession. According to Pellet: 
If Québec were to attain independence, the borders of a sovereign Québec would be its present 
boundaries and would include the territories attributed to Québec by the federal legislation of 1898 
and 1912, unless otherwise agreed to by the province before independence, or as between the two 
States thereafter.1313  
                                                 
1310 Statement of Stéphane Dion, Federal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs in a Letter to the 
Premier of Québec, 11 August 1997, quoted in Radan (1997), p. 201. 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Radan (2000), p. 57. 
1313 Pellet (1999), quoted in English translation in Lalonde (2003), p. 137.  
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Pellet then relies on the modern (i.e. non*colonial) version of the uti possidetis 
principle applied by the Badinter Commission in the territory of the SFRY and 
concludes that “according to public international law, negotiations on Québec’s 
borders are possible but are not obligatory.”1314 It was noted that the Supreme Court 
of Canada in the Québec case “has not ruled out the possibility that the issue of 
Québec’s boundaries might be the subject of future negotiations [as] nothing in the 
Court’s ruling precludes negotiations between the Parties dealing with the issue of 
Québec’s borders.”1315 At the same time, international law imposes no obligation to 
negotiate future international borders.1316 
 In regard to this argument it has been held that: 
According to this scenario, Québec would accede to independence within the limits of the former 
Canadian province, including the territories of Native peoples. Why then would Québec be interested 
in conducting negotiations with the Canadian party? Without even having to enter into talks, it would 
obtain the whole of its claims.1317 
 Yet it should be recalled that territorial rearrangements are always possible as 
a result of negotiations when new states emerge. This was also affirmed in Opinion 3 
of the Badinter Commission.1318 Further, a situation of dissolution of a parent*state is 
significantly different from that of (negotiated) secession.1319 Since there exists no 
‘right to unilateral secession’ in international law but, possibly, only a duty to 
negotiate a possible future legal status of a territory,1320 it is not possible to assume 
that in a case of negotiated secession, a secession*seeking entity would necessarily 
keep its former internal boundaries as international borders. When potential 
independence becomes a matter of political negotiations, it is not difficult to imagine 
                                                 
1314 Ibid.  
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Ibid.  
1317 Hilling (1999), p. 445, quoted in Lalonde (2003), p. 150. 
1318 See supra n. 1273. 
1319 See supra ch. 5.4. 
1320 See supra n. 1097. 
 253 
that borders could also become part of these negotiations. When a secession*seeking 
entity is presented with the dilemma of having either independence within narrower 
borders or no independence at all, it is not possible to predict for which option such 
an entity would opt. Yet state practice in regard to this question is not developed.  
 The Québec Report also pointed out the problem of defining international 
borders in a situation of secession from a unitary state where internal boundaries are 
not defined and peoples not attached to a certain territorial unit:  
[W]hen a new State achieves sovereignty, this phenomenon must occur within the configuration of the 
administrative boundaries in which it was contained prior to independence. Such a rule could be 
difficult to implement in the case of the breakup of a unitary State, and might even be inapplicable in 
such a context since the territorial districts are less clearly individualized than in the framework of a 
federation. Indeed, this individualization of federal States is, no doubt, both cause and consequence of 
their greater propensity for independence.1321 
Such a claim is problematic from two aspects. First, it privileges peoples who 
live in federal states and/or units otherwise clearly delimited from the rest of a 
parent*state. Independence would then not stem from the right of self*determination 
applicable under international law but would only be achievable if constitutional law 
of a certain parent*state provided for an adequate internal arrangement with clearly*
delimited self*determination units. Second, the possibility of secession of a clearly*
delimited self*determination unit, following ethnic lines, could discourage states 
from providing constitutional arrangements required for the exercise of the right of 
self*determination in its internal mode.1322  
 
 
 
                                                 
1321 The Québec Report, Chapter 2.49.   
1322 See Radan (2000), p. 71. 
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As an Italian colony, Eritrea was an entity separate from Ethiopia and was federated 
with the latter in 1952.1323 In the 1952 federal Constitution, Eritrea was a self*
governing unit. This status was suspended by the central government of Ethiopia in 
1962.1324 Upon Eritrea’s consensual secession from Ethiopia,1325 the border between 
colonial Eritrea and Ethiopia was re*established.1326 The Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission noted that1327 “[t]he parties [Ethiopia and Eritrea] agree that a neutral 
Boundary Commission composed of five members shall be established with a 
mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent 
colonial treaties [concluded between Ethiopia and Italy] (1900, 1902 and 1908) and 
applicable international law.”1328  
The example of Eritrea is different from most situations of border*
determinations in Africa. Indeed, “[f]or the first time the principles of the 
intangibility of African frontiers and opposition to secession were breached, but in a 
way which conformed to the basis of the other African frontiers – the colonial 
                                                 
1323 See supra ch. 4.4.3. 
1324 Ibid. 
1325 Ibid. 
1326 Notably, because of some disputed parts of the border, an armed conflict between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea broke out. See Gray (2006), p. 701. A peace agreement was signed in December 2000 and 
included provisions for the establishment of three dispute settlement bodies, including the Eritrea–
Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Ibid., p. 703. The Commission was chaired by Elihu Lauterpacht, 
other members were: Bola Adesumbo Ajibola, W. Michael Reisman, Stephen Schwebel and Arthur 
Watts. The Boundary Commission delivered its decision on 13 April 2002.  
1327 See the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Ch. I. 1.1. <http://www.un.org/NewLinks/eebcar 
bitration/EEBC*Decision.pdf>. 
1328 Ibid., Ch. I.1.2., para 2. See also Goy (1993), p. 350. It should be noted that despite the prior 
agreement of both parties that they would accept the decision of the Boundary Commission, Ethiopia 
continues to oppose the delimitation decided on by the Commission in some disputed areas. In 
Ethiopia’s view, the Commission’s decision, which awards some disputed areas under Ethiopian 
control to Eritrea, is “totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible.” Ethiopia thus proposes “that the 
Security Council set up an alternative mechanism to demarcate the contested parts of the boundary in 
a just and legal manner.” UN Doc S/2003/1186 (19 December 2003), Annex I, para 10. The 
implementation of the Commission’s decision was called for by the Security Council in Resolutions 
1586 and 1622. Neither resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See SC Res 
1586 (14 March 2005) and SC Res 1622 (13 September 2005). For more see Gray (2006), pp. 707–
710. See generally also Shaw (2007). 
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frontier was restored.”1329 Nevertheless, although the colonial boundary was restored, 
Eritrea clearly was not an example of decolonisation.1330 Therefore the establishment 
of its historical borders, albeit of colonial origin, cannot be ascribed to the uti 
possidetis principle.1331 Significantly, reference to this principle does not appear in 
the decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission. 
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The creation of the Czech and Slovak Republics is an example of consensual 
dissolution of the previous state.1332 The border between the two newly*created states 
was determined by the Treaty on the General Delimitation of the Common State 
Frontiers, signed on 29 October 1992.1333 According to this Treaty, the internal 
boundary between the two constituent parts of Czechoslovakia became the 
international border between the Czech and Slovak Republics.1334 
 The internal boundary within Czechoslovakia had a historical pedigree. It 
originated in the internal division within the Austro*Hungarian Monarchy. Czechs 
were linked to the Austrian part of the Monarchy while Slovaks were linked to its 
Hungarian part.1335 Thus, the “[e]stablishment of the border between the present*day 
Czech and Slovak Republics is … more plausibly associated with the historical 
pedigree of that line rather than with the line’s later status as an internal 
administrative subdivision of the former Czechoslovakia.”1336 
                                                 
1329 Anderson (1997), p. 87. 
1330 Eritrea was decolonised when it was federated with Ethiopia. See supra ch. 4.4.3. It needs to be 
recalled that the decolonisation process did not only foresee an emergence as an independent state but 
also merger with another state. See GA Res 1541, principle VI. 
1331 Shaw takes a different view (to some extent) and suggests that the delimitation between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea was about “determining the uti possidetis line”. Shaw (2007), p. 776. Yet this is to accept 
that the uti possidetis principle is applicable also in situations which are not a matter of 
decolonisation.  
1332 See supra ch. 4.4.2. 
1333 See Shaw (1997), p. 500. 
1334 Ibid.  
1335 See Anderson (1997), p. 73. 
1336 Bartoš (1997), p. 83.  
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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent states in the interwar period and 
were forcefully included in the Soviet Union by the Ribbentrop*Molotov Pact.1337 It 
remains arguable whether their pre*Second World War independence was restored or 
if they were new state creations.1338 Nevertheless, the process of their (re)*gaining of 
independence shows that even in a situation of suppressed independence, the peoples 
of the Baltic States did not have a “right of unilateral secession [but] rather … a right 
‘to resolve their future status through free negotiation with the Soviet authorities in a 
way which takes proper account of the legitimate rights and interests of the parties 
concerned.’”1339 Thus the most plausible explanation might be that the three Baltic 
States should be categorised as examples of consensual secession. 
 After Estonia and Latvia became independent states in 1991, parts of their 
respective borderlines with Russia, which were subject to territorial rearrangements 
in the Soviet era, became disputed.1340 Estonia and Latvia insisted that the present 
international borders are the international borders in existence prior to the 
suppression of independence.1341 Russia, on the other hand, claimed that the latest 
internal boundaries between the Soviet republics of Russia on the one side and 
Estonia and Latvia on the other constitute the present international borders.  
 The Border Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Latvia foresaw delimitation along the former internal boundary between the Soviet 
                                                 
1337 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1338 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1339 Crawford (2006), p. 395, quoting the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
United Kingdom Materials on International Law (Geoffrey Marston ed.) (1991), p. 573.  
1340 See Russia Spurns Estonia Border Deal BBC (27 June 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4626141.stm>. 
1341 Ibid. See also Information Note, The Border Treaty between the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Latvia (8 June 2006)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/ 
dru20060615_07/dru20060615_07en.pdf>. The Latvian Constitution expressly provided that the 
disputable territory was part of the Republic of Latvia. Ibid., p. 5.   
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republics of Russia and Latvia.1342 After it was initially rejected by Latvia in 
2006,1343 it was later signed (in 2007) and ratified by legislatures of both Latvia1344 
and Russia.1345  
 A border treaty between Russia and Estonia has not been concluded as Russia 
does not accept Estonia’s insistence on delimitation based on the international 
borders prior to the suppression of independence.1346 However, the border treaty 
between Russia and Latvia might confirm the standard proposed in the Québec 
Report that in the case of secession, the most recent internal boundaries are those 
which would become international borders.1347 Nevertheless, different outcomes of 
negotiations are always possible. 

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As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union was transformed into the Commonwealth 
of Independent States by the Minsk Agreement and the Alma Ata Protocol, both 
signed in December 1991.1348 Thus, the former Soviet republics became independent 
states under international law.1349  
 In regard to the question of borders, Article 5 of the Minsk Agreement 
provides: “The High Contracting Parties acknowledge and respect each other’s 
territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the 
Commonwealth.”1350 Although initially concluded only by Belarus, Russia and 
                                                 
1342 Ibid. 
1343 Ibid. 
1344 See Latvia Ratified Border Treaty with Russia, Kommersant (17 May 2007) 
<http://www.kommersant.com/p*10733/r_500/border_treaty>. 
1345 See State Duma Ratifies Border Treaty with Latvia, Kommersant (5 September 2007) 
<http://www.kommersant.com/p*11344/r_500/Border_Latvia_ratify>.  
1346 See supra n. 730. 
1347 See supra n. 1304. 
1348 For more see supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1349 Ibid. 
1350 The Minsk Agreement (1991), Article 5(1).  
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Ukraine, the Minsk Agreement was subsequently adopted by other Soviet Republics 
through the Alma Ata Protocol.1351 In addition to the Alma Ata Protocol, the Alma 
Ata Declaration was adopted,1352 in which the newly independent states declared that 
they recognise and respect “each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of 
existing borders.”1353 
 The Minsk Agreement and the Alma Ata Protocol and Declaration thus 
confined international borders along the former internal boundaries within the Soviet 
Union. Importantly, only entities which had republic status became independent 
states while subunits with autonomous status could not become states.1354  Although 
the documents expressly invoked rights of the newly*created minorities,1355 no 
special provision was made that would give them a right to secession and creation of 
a new state or merger with another state. 
 A significant number of secessionist attempts were witnessed in the territory 
of the CIS. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have attempted to break away from 
Georgia,1356 Chechnya from Russia,1357 Nagorny*Kharabakh from Azerbaijan,1358 
and Gagauzia from Moldova.1359 Despite some recognitions none of these entities 
                                                 
1351 See supra ch. 4.4.1. Notably, Georgia ratified the agreement later, on 3 December 1993.   
1352 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1353 The Alma Ata Declaration (1991), para 3.  
1354 The following Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) existed when Soviet Union was 
transformed into the CIS in 1991: within Azerbaijan: Nakhchivan ASSR; within Georgia: Abkhaz 
ASSR, Adjar ASSR; within Russia: Bashkir ASSR, Buryat ASSR, Chechen*Ingush ASSR, Chuvash 
ASSR, Dagestan ASSR, Kabardino*Balkar ASSR, Kalmyk ASSR, Karelian ASSR, Komi ASSR, Mari 
ASSR, Mordovian ASSR, Northern Ossentian ASSR, Tatar ASSR, Tuva ASSR, Udmurt ASSR, 
Yakut ASSR; within Ukraine: Crimean ASSR; within Uzbekistan: Karakalpak ASSR. See The 
Constitution of the Soviet Union (1977), Article 85. The Soviet Secession Law, which was never 
implemented in practice, on the other hand foresaw that in case a republic opted for independence, it 
would not necessarily keep its borders, as peoples in autonomous republics would be consulted 
separately. See The Law on Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union 
Republics from the USSR, reprinted Hannum (1993), pp. 753–60, Article 3. 
1355 See The Minsk Agreement (1991), Articles 2 & 3. The Alma Ata Declaration (1991), para 2.  
1356 Crawford (2006), p. 403. 
1357 Ibid. 
1358 Ibid. 
1359 Ibid. 
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has acquired sovereignty under international law or merged with another state.1360 To 
the present day international law has not recognised any change of the delimitation 
along former internal boundaries within the Soviet Union, as established by the 
Minsk Agreement.  
 It needs to be noted that Turkmenistan withdrew from full CIS membership 
and became an associate member on 26 August 2005.1361 On 18 August 2008, 
Georgia announced its withdrawal from CIS membership, which is to become 
effective on 17 August 2009.1362 It has been pointed out that the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties and jurisprudence of the ICJ firmly establish that state borders established 
by a treaty remain valid regardless of the later fate of that treaty.1363 Thus, even if 
withdrawals from CIS membership were interpreted in a way that Turkmenistan and 
Georgia are no longer parties to the Minsk Agreement, which, inter alia, established 
international borders between former Soviet Republics,1364 this fact would not 
influence the question of their borders.  

2/2%
The border between East Timor and Indonesia was determined according to the 
colonial delimitation between Portuguese and Dutch possessions on the Timor 
Island.1365 Since East Timor remained on the list of non*self*governing territories 
                                                 
1360 Ibid. 
1361 Turkmenistan at the same time announced that in the future it would only develop relations with 
the CIS member states bilaterally. The official reason given for such a move was Turkmenistan’s 
decision to acquire status of a permanently neutral state. See Radio Free Europe (29 August 2005) 
<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061002.html>. Turkmenistan has nevertheless taken part in the 
meetings of the CIS leaders even after 25 August 2005, while its assembly does not cooperate in the 
Interparliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States. See 
<http://www.iacis.ru/html/index*eng.php?id=52>. 
1362 See Radio Free Europe (29 August 2005). 
1363 See supra notes 1249 and 1250. 
1364 See supra n. 1350. 
1365 See supra ch. 4.5.1. 
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after Indonesia’s occupation,1366 it might be possible to argue that it was properly 
decolonised when it declared independence in 2002.1367 Based on this argument it 
could be plausibly maintained that the delimitation of East Timor was a matter of uti 
possidetis. Yet the real question was not East Timor’s independence from Portugal 
but its independence from Indonesia which was not a matter of decolonisation, at 
least not in the traditional understanding of colonialism in the sense of European 
possessions of overseas territories.1368 The delimitation of East Timor therefore has a 
colonial pedigree and yet East Timor also constitutes a self*determination unit, the 
independence of which was not a matter of decolonisation.  
The mode of state creation of East Timor was thus secession with the 
approval of a parent state or even a collective state creation.1369 Consequently, even 
the pattern of the determination of international border was that of an “upgrade” of 
the former internal boundary, where such a boundary had a strong historical pedigree 
and delimited a self*determination unit. Although the historical pedigree of this 
boundary was colonial, the delimitation of East Timor cannot be ascribed to the uti 
possidetis principle. 
 
2/?) 
When Montenegro declared independence in 2006, the question of borders did not 
come into question. Montenegro is an example of consensual secession, which is 
obvious from both Article 601370 of the Constitution of the SUSM and from 
                                                 
1366 See supra n. 814. 
1367 See supra ch. 4.5.1. 
1368 The traditional doctrine of colonialism might be too narrow. Buchheit ((1978), p. 18) argues: 
“International law is thus asked to perceive a distinction between the historical subjugation of an alien 
population living on a different part of the globe and the historical subjugation of an alien population 
living on a piece of land abutting that of its oppressors. The former can apparently never be 
legitimated by the mere passage of time, while the latter is eventually transformed into a protected 
status quo.” 
1369 Compare supra ch. 4.5.1. 
1370 See supra n. 860. 
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international involvement in the process of secession.1371 Article 60 established a 
mechanism for secession and thus provided for the consent of the parent*state.1372 At 
the same time, Article 60 also stipulated for Serbia’s continuity of the international 
personality of the SUSM.1373 Serbia also continues the membership of the SUSM in 
the UN.1374 Thus, there is no doubt that when Montenegro declared independence 
this did not amount to the dissolution of the SUSM but to Montenegro’s secession.  
The border between Serbia and Montenegro was firmly established in Article 
5 of the Constitution of the SUSM: “The border between state*members shall not be 
altered unless there exists mutual consensus of both sides.”1375 Montenegro’ borders 
were identical to those in the FRY, in the SFRY and, with some minor changes, to 
those of the Montenegrin state recognised at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.1376 
Montenegro’s borders therefore have a strong historical pedigree and previously 
already had a status of international borders. 
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The example of the SFRY is more complex than other situations discussed in this 
subchapter. The dissolution was not a consensual process based on a treaty. It was 
rather a consequence of a chain of secessions and of a constitutional breakdown of 
the federation, which led the Badinter Commission to proclaim that the SFRY was in 
the process of dissolution.1377 In order to determine the new international borders, the 
                                                 
1371 See supra ch. 4.4.3. and 5.4.3.6. 
1372 See supra n. 1036. Compare also supra ch. 5.4. 
1373 The Constitution of the SUSM (2003), Article 60, paras 4 & 5.  
1374 Ibid. 
1375 Constitution of the SUSM (2003), Article 5(3), my own translation.  
1376 Compare infra ch. 6.4.8. 
1377 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
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Badinter Commission applied the uti possidetis principle. This application is still 
criticised.1378  
To oppose the “upgrading” of internal boundaries to international borders, 
which the Badinter Commission did by invoking the uti possidetis principle, an 
argument has been made that “in the SFRY, municipal borders were drawn by the 
Communist Party’s Politbureau, taking little account of ethnic factors.”1379 Such a 
claim implies drawing of borders which indeed reminds of colonial situations where 
borders were drawn by colonial powers with little regard to ethnic, religious or other 
identities of the local population.1380 The “upgrading” of internal boundaries to 
international borders would then also remind of the application of the uti possidetis 
principle in colonial situations. Such an argument, however, neglects the historical 
pedigree of the internal boundaries in the SFRY. 
 The first common state of Southern Slavs was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, created on 1 December 1918.1381 Slovenia and Croatia previously did 
not exist as independent states; the territories settled by Slovenes and Croats, 
respectively, were part of the Habsburg Monarchy.1382 The Kingdom of Serbia had 
existed as an independent state since the Congress of Berlin in 1878.1383 Yet not all 
Serbs lived within the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia. The former Habsburg 
territories of Vojvodina, Bosnia*Herzegovina and Croatia were also populated by 
significant shares of ethnic*Serb population.1384 Establishment of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes unified the Serb population in a common state. The new 
Kingdom also included the territory of Montenegro, which was otherwise also 
                                                 
1378 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1379 Bartoš (1997), p. 87. See also Kreća (1993), pp. 12–14.  
1380 See supra ch. 6.2. 
1381 Radan (2002), p. 136. 
1382 Pavlowitch (1971), pp. 42–43. 
1383 Ibid., p. 44.  
1384 See Cohen (1993), p. 14. 
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recognised as an independent state at the Congress of Berlin in 1878,1385 and Bosnia*
Herzegovina, which was previously not a state but a separate unit within the 
Habsburg Monarchy with borders likewise established at the Congress of Berlin.1386 
 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was unified under the King of 
Serbia and created as a multiparty electoral democracy,1387 while it was initially not 
defined whether the new Kingdom would be a federal or a unitary state.1388 Since a 
significant Serb population lived outside of the frontiers of the former Kingdom of 
Serbia, the entire Serb population could not be federated within a single federal unit. 
Serbia was thus disinclined toward a federal arrangement. On the other hand, 
Slovenes and Croats feared Serbian centralism and dominance and demanded a 
federated state. In the end the Serbian majority within the parliament enacted the 
unitary Constitution of 1921.1389 It is argued that “[t]he 1921 Constitution was a 
reflection of the official view that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three tribes of 
one unified nation, namely the Yugoslavs.”1390 The strong ideology of a unitary 
‘Yugoslav people’ was also evident in the proclamation of the official language, 
which was ‘Serbo*Croato*Slovene’,1391 a language which linguistically does not 
exist. In this regard the following observation was made: 
According to the constitution adopted in 1921, the new state expressed the political will of the single 
“three*named Serbo*Croatian*Slovenian people,” who allegedly spoke a single “Serbo*Croatian*
Slovenian language.” Although an ethnic alliance composed of three different “tribes” was 
                                                 
1385 Pavlowitch (1971), p. 44. 
1386 At the Congress of Berlin, Bosnia*Herzegovina was “entrusted to Austro*Hungarian 
administration” (ibid., p. 44). It was formally annexed by Austria*Hungary in 1908. Ibid., p. 48. In 
historical documents, Bosnia was first mentioned in the 10th century and in the 12th century even 
existed as an independent state. For more see Ibrahimagić (1998), pp. 7–11. 
1387 See Pavlowitch (1971), pp. 59–64. 
1388 Radan (2002), p. 138. 
1389 Ibid. 
1390 Ibid. 
1391 Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1921), Article 3. 
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theoretically mandated to govern the country, the reality of power and rule was a centralized unitary 
kingdom, with state authority concentrated in Belgrade.1392  
 As a consequence of centralisation and of an attempt to establish a unitary 
‘Yugoslav people’, the 1922 ministerial decree established internal boundaries of 
thirty*three districts which did not follow ethnic lines.1393 Such a division was 
satisfactory for Serbs but opposed by Slovenes and Croats because it was set 
arbitrarily and did not delimit their respective historical territories.1394 Internal 
clashes in the Kingdom continued and on 6 January 1929 the King dissolved the 
parliament and introduced his personal dictatorship, claiming that this was necessary 
in order “to preserve the unity of the state and its peoples.”1395 At that time the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was also officially renamed the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia.1396 In 1931, the King promulgated a new unitary constitution, which 
divided the Kingdom into nine administrative units called banovina. In some 
situations these units came closer to historically delimited ethnic boundaries (e.g. the 
unit called Dravska banovina followed the historically delimited territory of 
Slovenes) but this was not always the case.1397 
 During the Second World War, in 1943, the second Yugoslavia (later known 
as the SFRY) was established by leaders of the partisan movement led by Josip Broz*
Tito.1398 The new state was defined as a federation and borders of its federal units 
                                                 
1392 Cohen (1995), p. 14. Compare to Shaw (1997), p. 489, arguing that in some circumstances 
“administrative borders have been changed by central government in a deliberate attempt to 
strengthen central control and weaken the growth of local power centres.” It can be argued that this 
was the case in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
1393 Radan (2002), p. 138. 
1394 Ibid. 
1395 Ibid. 
1396 See Lampe (1996), p. 159. 
1397 See Cohen (1995), p. 18 (map). 
1398 For more see Lampe (1996), pp. 197–228. 
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were established by the Presidency of the Anti*Fascist Council of the National 
Liberation of Yugoslavia1399 on 24 February 1945: 
Slovenia is taken in the borders of the former Dravska banovina [administrative unit within the former 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia]; Croatia in the borders of the former Savska banovina with 13 districts of the 
former Primorska banovina and the Dubrovnik district of the former Zetska banovina; Bosnia*
Herzegovina in the borders specified in the Berlin agreement; Serbia in the borders before the Balkan 
wars with districts taken from Bulgaria in the Treaty of Versailles; Macedonia—Yugoslav territories 
south of Kacanik and Ristovac; Montenegro in the borders before the Balkan wars with the Berane 
and Kotor districts and Plav and Gusinje.1400 
In this regard it is argued that: 
This decision relied largely on older historical borders, both as they existed in interwar Yugoslavia 
and in the former Austro*Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. In many respects the decision accepted 
borders that coincided with, either exactly or approximately, the borders claimed by the various 
nationalist movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.1401 
 Boundaries of no historical pedigree only had to be drawn between Slovenian 
and Croatian parts of the former Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste,1402 between 
Croatia and Vojvodina (the former Habsburg territory with a majority Serb 
population)1403 and between Serbia and Macedonia.1404 In these situations ethnic 
compositions of the territories were taken into account and geographical boundaries 
(i.e. rivers) were used for the purpose of delimitation.1405 In the end, the boundary 
between Slovenia and Croatia (apart from the short part within the former Zone B of 
the Free Territory of Trieste) followed the former division between Austrian and 
                                                 
1399 At the time, the Anti*Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia was the provisional 
legislature. See Pavlowitch (1971), p. 175.  
1400 Cavoski (1995), p. 25, quoted in Radan (2002), p. 149. 
1401 Radan (2002), p. 149. 
1402 For more on the Free Territory of Trieste see Crawford (2006), p. 553. 
1403 Radan (2002), p. 151. 
1404 Ibid. 
1405 Ibid.  
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Hungarian parts of the Habsburg (Dual) Monarchy.1406 Croatia and Serbia only 
bordered in Vojvodina where ethnic and geographical principles were used for the 
exact delimitation.1407 Bosnia*Herzegovina was re*established along the lines 
determined at the Congress of Berlin,1408 which originated in the delimitation of the 
medieval Bosnian state and of the Bosnian entity within the Ottoman Empire.1409 
Both Serbia and Montenegro were generally re*established along their pre*First 
World War international borders.1410 The only significant exception to the rule of 
boundaries of historical pedigree was Macedonia, which was part of the Kingdom of 
Serbia before the First World War.1411 To determine its boundaries, the boundaries of 
Vardarska banovina, a unit within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, were taken into 
account, although they were significantly narrower and followed ethnic division lines 
between Serbs, Macedonians and Kosovo.1412 An autonomous province of Kosovo 
was also established within its historical borders.1413  
 After borders between the republics were established, Josip Broz*Tito made a 
statement: “The lines between federated states in a federal Yugoslavia are not lines 
of separation, but of union.”1414 This statement might imply the understanding that 
internal boundaries were created with an aim better to govern a state and not with the 
view that internal boundaries could one day become international borders,1415 which 
                                                 
1406 See Pavlowitch (1971), p. 43. The Hungarian*Croatian compromise of 1868 recognised Croatia 
the status of a separate unit linked to the Hungarian Crown (ibid.).  
1407 See Radan (2002), p. 151. 
1408 Ibid. 
1409 See Ibrahimagić (1998), pp. 9*26. 
1410 Ibid. The exceptions were Kosovo and Vojvodina, which were not part of the Kingdom of Serbia 
but formally came under Serbian sovereignty in the time of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. See Malcolm (1998), pp. 264–66.   
1411 For more on the Creation of the Macedonian republic and recognition of Macedonian ethnicity see 
Pavlowitch (1971), pp. 198–204. 
1412 Radan (2002), p. 151–52. 
1413 For more on the historic background of Kosovo see infra ch. 7.2. 
1414 Tito's speech in Zagreb in May 1945, quoted in Radan (2002), p. 152. 
1415 Compare supra n. 1283. 
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might indeed remind of drawing of colonial boundaries.1416 However, there is a 
crucial difference between drawing internal boundaries in colonial situations and in 
the SFRY. 
Unlike the administrative units within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – which 
resembled the arbitrariness of colonial boundary drawing – the federal units of the 
SFRY were not created along arbitrary lines but followed boundaries of a historical 
pedigree, often even former international borders. Federalism and drawing internal 
boundaries along the lines of borders of historical pedigree also re*created the 
problem of Serbs settled outside of the boundaries of Serbia. This was, however, not 
a problem originally created by the internal boundary arrangement within the SFRY 
but a problem inherited from the past. Further, the internal boundaries in the SFRY 
did not create (or try to create) new ethnic identities within artificially*defined 
territorial arrangements but merely took into account the historically*created 
identities which the constitutional arrangement of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
disregarded and (unsuccessfully) tried to melt into a common Yugoslav ethnic 
identity.1417 Different identities were expressly recognised by the 1974 Constitution 
of the SFRY, which did not promote the idea of a common Yugoslav ethnic identity 
but rather created a federal arrangement which enabled the peoples of Yugoslavia to 
                                                 
1416 See El Salvador v Honduras (Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Rep 1992, para 43. 
1417 Compare supra ch. 4.2.1. The last reliable census in the SFRY dates to 1981 (the next one in 1990 
was already heavily influenced by the crisis in the federation and was subject to some organised 
boycotts).  The ethnic composition at the 1981 census was the following: Serbs (36.3 percent), Croats 
(19.7 percent), Muslims (7.9 percent), Slovenes (7.8 percent), Macedonians (6.0 percent), Albanians 
(5.8 percent), Yugoslavs (5.4 percent), Montenegrins (2.6 percent), Hungarians (2.3 percent). Other 
ethnic identities included: Italians, Roma, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians and Germans. What 
is significant is that most of the population identified itself along ethnic lines. In this perception 
individuals belonged to one of the constitutive peoples of the SFRY and only a small percentage of 
barely over five percent identified itself with a common Yugoslav identity. See The 1981 Census in 
the SFRY (1983). 
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exercise the right of self*determination in its internal mode and vested wide powers 
within the republics.1418 
When the SFRY disintegrated, the internal boundaries “upgraded” to 
international borders were thus not random, colonial*like boundaries (this would be 
the case if internal boundaries within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia became 
international borders), but for the most part historically firmly established borders 
between groups of peoples with different ethnic identities. Thus, the Badinter 
Commission should not be criticised for “upgrading” the internal boundaries to 
international borders. Indeed:  
Any attempted ethnic reconfiguration of the Former Yugoslavia on a totally free*for*all basis … 
would most likely have produced an even worse situation than that which did occur … The absence of 
uti possidetis presumption would leave in place as the guiding principle only effective control or self*
determination. To rely on effective control as the principal criterion for the creation of international 
boundaries would be to invite the use of force as the inexorable first step … Self*determination is a 
principle whose definition in this extended version is wholly unpredictable. Precisely which group 
would be entitled in such situations to claim a share of a territory? 1419 
 In other words, it is not possible to accept that in situations of non*consensual 
dissolutions all borders are in flux as this calls for ethnic*cleansing to claim effective 
possession of a territory. Instead, drawing borders along historically well*established 
boundaries, which separate people with different identities, seems to be a reasonable 
alternative. In a way, the Badinter Commission did what was later achieved 
consensually in Czechoslovakia.1420 It is, however, probably incorrect to term this 
process uti possidetis. Besides the disputable question of whether this principle 
                                                 
1418 The 1974 Constitution defined republics as states (Article 3) and proclaimed borders of the 
republics inviolable without consent of the republic (Article 5(1)), empowered republics to adopt their 
own legislation applicable only in their respective territories and to exercise effective control in their 
territories (Article 268) and gave republics powers to conduct their own foreign policies, subject to 
limitation by the general framework of the federal foreign policy (Article 271). 
1419 Shaw (1997), p. 502. 
1420 See supra ch.6.4.3. 
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applies outside of colonial situations,1421 the colonial practice of its application 
implies confinement of international borders along arbitrarily drawn internal 
boundaries. It was shown in this section that this was not the case in the SFRY. It is, 
however, significant that the confinement of international borders along the lines of 
former internal boundaries of strong historical pedigree created ethnic minorities and 
numerically inferior peoples.  
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The post*1991 practice of new state creations shows that in such situations internal 
boundaries are commonly “upgraded” to international borders. However, it is 
questionable whether this practice confirms the applicability of the uti possidetis 
principle outside of the colonial context. It may well be that “to classify all cases 
where internal lines become international boundaries as instances of uti possidetis in 
operation, simply because the operation of uti possidetis may produce this effect in 
some cases, is to commit a logical fallacy.”1422 Namely, if the uti possidetis principle 
“upgrades” internal boundaries to international borders, this does not necessarily 
imply that all such “upgrades” can be ascribed to uti possidetis. 
 It is significant that in the process of decolonisation the right of self*
determination enabled all colonial territories to become independent states, 
regardless of the nature of their boundaries.1423 In non*colonial situations, the 
principle of territorial integrity virtually confines the exercise of the right of self*
determination to its internal mode and subunits of states only exceptionally become 
independent states.1424 Thus, outside of colonial situations the “upgrading” of 
internal boundaries to international borders does not mean that just any internal 
                                                 
1421 See supra ch. 6.3. 
1422 Bartoš (1997), pp. 83–84. 
1423 See supra ch. 6.2. and 6.3. 
1424 See supra ch. 5.3.1. and 5.4. 
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boundary, regardless of how and why it was established, may potentially become an 
international border. As post*1991 practice shows, the new international boundaries 
commonly have a strong historical pedigree. The historical pedigree, however, has a 
close link to the right of self*determination. It has been argued that a sub*unit of a 
state can potentially become a state only if its population qualifies as a people and 
the right of self*determination applies.1425 In case of consensually*created states 
where it is not clear whether the right of self*determination is applicable, the state*
creation may itself create new identities and thus crystallise identities of a separate 
people.  The historic pedigree of borders can thus imply that the population of certain 
territory shared common identities which have constituted a distinct people. This 
may work in both directions: the border might have been established because of 
separate identities and a historical border may itself lead to the creation of distinct 
identities significant of a separate people.1426  
 Therefore, it is probably incorrect to proclaim uti possidetis wherever internal 
boundaries become international borders. Uti possidetis implies “upgrading” of 
former colonial boundaries which were drawn with little regard to local populations 
or their identities and were never meant to be international borders.1427 On the other 
hand, in the post*1991 state*creations, most new international borders have had a 
history as international borders, borders between empires and ethnic*based internal 
boundaries within empires. There is, however, a problem of the critical date in 
situations in which historic borders were altered within the most recent broader state 
formation.  
 Despite the strong historical pedigree, the exact borders may be negotiable 
and may become part of the process of negotiations on consensual secession or 
                                                 
1425 See supra 6.5. 
1426 Compare supra ch. 6.4. 
1427 See supra ch. 6.2. 
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dissolution. In the absence of a specific agreement at the time of secession or 
dissolution, the question of the critical date remains disputable. The Badinter 
Commission applied the SFRY’s last constitutional arrangement, and Latvia and 
Russia subsequently agreed to apply the last Soviet constitutional arrangement, while 
Estonia has not accepted this principle.   
Another issue of concern relates to minorities that are either newly*created in 
the new states or previously existed and enjoyed a certain level of protection within 
the previous state formation. As mono*ethnic “nation*states” do not exist in reality, it 
cannot be expected that new states could be created without the emergence of 
minorities and/or numerically inferior peoples. The post*1991 practice of new state*
creations shows that the status of such newly*created minorities and numerically 
inferior peoples can play an important role not only in the recognition of a new state 
but also in its creation. Indeed, as positions on the possible secession of Québec 
imply, the question of the status of minorities can become part of the negotiation 
process on a possible consensual secession.1428 Further, the situation of Québec also 
indicates that the new state has an obligation to maintain the level of rights of 
minorities in its territory, which was formerly guaranteed by the previous 
sovereign.1429  
In a case of dissolution, the status of the newly*created minorities and their 
rights may be specified in the dissolution agreement (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia). 
In a non*consensual dissolution, the status and rights of minorities have become a 
matter of international involvement leading to recognition of the new states (SFRY). 
Minority rights also play an important role in the situation of international territorial 
                                                 
1428 See supra ch. 6.4.1. 
1429 See supra ch. 6.4.1. 
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administration (East Timor).1430 In a case of unilateral secession, it may be argued 
that the (unlikely) success of such secession would, among other factors, depend also 
on the mechanisms put in place for the protection of minorities and numerically 
inferior peoples. Arguably, this is part of the ‘legality and legitimacy considerations’ 
before states decide to recognise a unilateral secession.1431   
 The post*1991 practice of new state*creations thus suggests that an entity 
cannot become a state if it does not adopt adequate mechanisms for protection of 
minorities and numerically inferior peoples in its territory. At the same time, the 
post*1991 practice also shows that minorities and numerically inferior peoples hold 
neither a veto right in regard to secession nor the right to secession or merger with 
another state.  
 In the post*1991 state*creations the commonly used “upgrade” of internal 
boundaries to international borders is not to be ascribed to the uti possidetis 
principle. Unlike in colonial situations, in the post*1991 practice of state creations, 
the “upgraded” boundaries had a strong historical pedigree and were in service of 
delimiting historically established self*determination units. The Badinter 
Commission’s reference to the uti possidetis principle and its extension beyond the 
colonial framework was probably wrong and yet the Badinter Commission was right 
when it “upgraded” the internal boundaries to international borders. In the situation 
of non*consensual dissolution of the SFRY, the Badinter Commission probably 
resorted to uti possidetis in order to find a cover of a well*established legal principle 
to justify such an “upgrading”, while the correct approach would probably be to 
discuss the historical pedigree of the internal boundaries within the SFRY. In 
subsequent practice of secessions and dissolutions, it has been proven that internal 
                                                 
1430 See supra ch. 7 for Kosovo. 
1431 See the Québec case (1998), para 155. 
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boundaries, where they delimit self*determination units along historical lines, form a 
solid base for drawing international borders. The SFRY was such an example, with 
republics representing self*determination units, divided along historically*established 
ethnic lines.  
 What the post*1991 practice of new state*creations does not indicate is how 
borders are to be drawn in situations in which a people exercises its right of self*
determination in its external mode but the territory of a self*determination unit is not 
defined (e.g. peoples within unitary states). It may well be that peoples within 
federations are privileged in this regard.1432 However, the question of borders may 
become the issue of negotiations on potential independence.1433 It is thus not 
excluded that a people could negotiate a future territory of its state with a present 
parent*state. The final decision will then be a matter of politics. 

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1432 See supra n. 1322. 
1433 See supra ch. 6.4.1. 
 274 
;%)
&
*&%&&';';%)%F;
?
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the legal positions and issues related to Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence and the legal significance of international involvement. 
Initially, it will be examined what circumstances led the Security Council to 
determine that Kosovo had a governance problem that needed to be addressed by 
establishing international territorial administration. It will be then argued that this 
authority created liberal*democratic institutions in order to procure ‘good 
governance’ in Kosovo. Subsequently, the role of international involvement was in 
the creation of the state of Kosovo and how this involvement determined the mode of 
state creation will be considered. Consideration for Kosovo’s democratic 
development will be especially relevant in the context of state creation. This chapter 
also considers whether Kosovo can be an example in support of the ‘remedial 
secession’ doctrine.  
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After the medieval Serbian state lost the battle of Kosovo,1434 the territory came 
under Turkish rule.1435 In modern times, Ottoman Turks lost control over Kosovo in 
1912.1436 Kosovo came under the de facto authority of the Kingdom of Serbia but, 
due to the outbreak of the First World War, no treaty was ever ratified between the 
Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire on the ceding of Kosovo.1437 After the 
First World War, Kosovo became part of the newly*created Kingdom of Serbs, 
                                                 
1434 For more on the battle of Kosovo, both fact and myth, see Vickers, (1998), pp. 12–16; Malcolm 
(1998), pp. 58–80. 
1435 See Vickers (1998), pp. 16–21. 
1436 See Malcolm (1998), p.  252. 
1437 Ibid., pp. 264–65. In 1913 Albania became a state by the Treaty of London; however, Kosovo 
Albanians were left in Serbia against their will. For more see Vickers (1994), pp. 5–6. 
 275 
Croats and Slovenes in 1918.1438 In the federal Yugoslav constitution of 1946, 
Kosovo was formally defined as an autonomous province within the republic of 
Serbia,1439 though at that time it had no organs for the exercise of self*
government.1440 The autonomous status was further expanded in the last Constitution 
of the SFRY from 1974, which established Kosovo’s political organs, necessary for 
the exercise of self*government.1441  
In 1989, with Milošević already firmly in power in Serbia,1442 Kosovo’s 
autonomous status within the federation was suspended by extra*constitutional 
means.1443 On 7 September 1989, Albanian members of Kosovo’s dissolved 
assembly met in a secret meeting and proclaimed the Constitutional Act of the 
Republic of Kosovo.1444 This was not a declaration of independence. The act adopted 
by this group aimed to create a republic of Kosovo within the framework of the 
SFRY.  
The dissolution of the SFRY1445 resulted in a push by ethnic Albanians for 
Kosovo to become an independent state.1446 On 22 September 1991, the unofficial, 
underground parliament of Kosovo Albanians proclaimed the Resolution on 
Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo.1447 The decision was subsequently 
confirmed at an unofficial referendum, held in secrecy between 26 and 30 September 
                                                 
1438 See Malcolm (1998), p. 266. This did not only apply to Kosovo Albanians but also to Albanians 
living in other parts of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later called Yugoslavia). 
1439 Constitution of the Federative Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia (1946), Article 2.   
1440 Vickers (1998), p. 146. 
1441 Constitution of the SFRY (1974), Article 2. See also the Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo (1974), translated in Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (1998), 
Kosovo: Law and Politics, Kosovo in Normative Acts Before and After 1974, especially p. 41 and p. 
45. [Hereinafter Kosovo in Normative Acts].  
1442 Ibid. 
1443 For more see Kosovo in Normative Acts (1998), p. 49; Malcolm (1998), p. 344. 
1444 Ibid., p. 347. 
1445 For more see supra ch. 4.2. and 4.3. 
1446 See Vickers (1998), p. 251. 
1447 Ibid. 
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1991.1448 Reportedly, eighty*seven percent of all eligible to vote cast their votes at 
the referendum and 99.87 percent of those voted in favour of independence.1449 
Following the referendum, the underground parliament declared independence on 19 
October 1991.1450 Recognition was granted only by Albania.1451  
 On 24 May 1992, elections for the underground Kosovo assembly were held 
and overwhelming support was given to the Democratic League of Kosovo.1452 The 
League supported a peaceful revolt against the oppression, tried to internationalise 
developments, and created parallel institutions of the putative Republic of 
Kosovo.1453 Meanwhile the actions against ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces 
continued. Writing in 1998, Noel Malcolm observed:  
To produce an adequate survey of the human rights abuses suffered by the Albanians of Kosovo since 
1990 would require several long chapters in itself. Every aspect of life in Kosovo has been affected. 
Using a combination of emergency measures, administrative fiats and laws authorizing the dismissal 
of anyone who had taken part in one*day protest strike, the Serb authorities have sacked the 
overwhelming majority of those Albanians who had any form of state employment in 1990. Most 
Albanian doctors and health workers were also dismissed from the hospitals; deaths from diseases 
such as measles and polio have increased, with the decline in the number of Albanians receiving 
vaccinations. Approximately 6,000 school*teachers were sacked in 1990 for having taken part in 
protests, and the rest were dismissed when they refused to comply with a new Serbian curriculum 
which largely eliminated teaching of Albanian literature and history.1454  
 In this environment Kosovo Albanians not only organised parallel political 
institutions but also a parallel system of education and healthcare.1455 Kosovo 
                                                 
1448 Ibid. 
1449 Ibid. 
1450 Ibid., p. 252. 
1451 See Crawford (2006), p. 408 
1452 The Democratic League of Kosovo won 96 out of 130 seats in the underground parliament. See 
Vickers (1998), p. 260.  
1453 See Malcolm (1998), p. 48. 
1454 Ibid. 
1455 Ibid. 
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became an entity of two parallel societies in which the majority population was 
discriminated in virtually all segments of life due to its ethnic background.  
In November 1995, the United States sponsored ‘peace talks’ at Dayton, 
Ohio, which led to the settlement of the conflicts in Bosnia*Herzegovina and Croatia 
by the so*called Dayton Peace Accords.1456 It is argued that the disappointment that 
Kosovo was not included in this settlement became a turning point in the attitude of 
Kosovo Albanians toward the settlement of the Kosovo question.1457 After years of 
peaceful resistance by the Democratic League of Kosovo, the militant Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) now emerged.1458 Serbian opposition escalated in 
response.1459 The situation in Kosovo was dealt with by Security Council Resolutions 
1160,1460 1199,1461 12031462 and 1239.1463 The first three were adopted under Chapter 
VII. The resolutions, inter alia, called for a political solution of the situation in 
Kosovo,1464 condemned the violence used by organs of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) as well as violent actions taken by Kosovo Albanians (the latter 
were called ‘acts of terrorism’),1465 and, affirming the territorial integrity of 
Serbia,1466 expressed support for “an enhanced status of Kosovo which would 
                                                 
1456 For more on the Dayton Peace Accords see Crawford (2006), pp. 528–30. See also supra n. 676. 
1457 See Vickers (1998), p. 287, arguing that “the Kosovars were both surprised and bitterly 
disillusioned by the outcome of the Dayton Agreement, which made no specific mention of Kosovo 
…. It now became apparent to all that as long as there appeared to be relative peace in Kosovo, the 
international community would avoid suggesting any substantive changes.” 
1458 See Vickers (1998), pp. 292–97. 
1459 Ibid., pp. 297–300. 
1460 SC Res 1160 (31 March 1998). 
1461 SC Res 1199 (23 September 1998). 
1462 SC Res 1203 (24 October 1998). 
1463 SC Res 1239 (14 May 1999). 
1464 See especially SC Res 1160, paras  1, 2, 5; SC Res 1199, paras 3, 4, 5; SC Res 1203, paras 1, 2, 5. 
1465 See especially SC Res 1160, paras 2–3; SC Res 1199, paras 1–2; SC Res 1203, paras 3–4. 
1466 References to territorial integrity of the FRY appear in the preambles of SC Res 1160, para 7; SC 
Res 1199, para 13; and SC Res 1203, para 14. The preamble to Resolution 1239, para 7, comprehends 
a more general reference to “the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in the region.”  
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include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self*
administration.”1467 
 While violence in Kosovo continued, negotiations between the FRY and 
Kosovo Albanians aiming for a political settlement began in February 1999 at 
Rambouillet, France.1468 On 23 February 1999, the Rambouillet Accords on Interim 
Agreement for Peace and Self*Government in Kosovo were drafted.1469 The 
document sought to establish conditions for the termination of hostilities in 
Kosovo1470 and foresaw meaningful self*government for Kosovo based on 
democratic principles.1471 In this context the Rambouillet Accords included a 
Constitution for Kosovo,1472 which established self*governing organs with wide 
powers.1473 The document further foresaw a withdrawal of Serbian military and 
police forces from Kosovo1474 and NATO peacekeeping.1475 Importantly, the 
Rambouillet Accords stressed territorial integrity of the FRY in both the preamble1476 
and in the operative articles.1477  
 The Rambouillet Accords notably foresaw a comprehensive arrangement for 
the exercise of the right of self*determination for Kosovo Albanians, while avoiding 
                                                 
1467 SC Res 1160, para 5.  
1468 See Crawford (2006), p. 557.  
1469 See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self*Government in Kosovo (23 February 1999) [hereinafter 
The Rambouillet Accords] <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/Rambouillet%20Index.htm>. The draft 
was prepared by the Contact Group composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, 
France and Italy. See Herring (2000), p. 225. Herring, p. 226, further argues: “The Contact Group 
proposal was effectively a NATO proposal as Russia was in many ways a dissenting voice within the 
Contact Group.” The Rambouillet Accords foresaw signatures by the FRY, Serbia and by 
representatives of Kosovo Albanians. Signatures of the United States, the EU and Russia were 
foreseen as witnesses. See The Rambouillet Accords, chapter 8, Article II.  
1470 See The Rambouillet Accords (1999), chapter 8, Article II, paras 1, 2. 
1471 Ibid. chapter 8, Article II, para 4.  
1472 Ibid. chapter 1.  
1473 See ibid. (the organs established by the proposed Constitution were the Assembly [Article II], 
President of Kosovo [Article III], Government and Administrative Organs [Article IV] and Judiciary 
[Article V]).  
1474 Ibid. chapter 7, Articles IV & VI.  
1475 Ibid. chapter 7, Article I, para 1 (a).  
1476 Ibid., preamble, para 4. The preamble to the Rambouillet Accords, inter alia, recalls “the 
commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.”   
1477 Ibid. chapter 7, Article I, para 1 (a).  
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use of this term. At the same time, unequivocal references to the territorial integrity 
of the FRY excluded the possibility of secession. Further, despite the wide powers of 
the self*governing organs in Kosovo, clear links were established between those 
organs and their federal counterparts.1478 Kosovo was thus meant to be an entity with 
a high degree of self*government, but still legally anchored within the international 
borders of the FRY. 
The Accords were signed by the representatives of Kosovo Albanians on 18 
March 1999, while the FRY and Serbia refused to sign.1479 Following this refusal, on 
24 March 1999, NATO started a military campaign against the FRY.1480 A full 
discussion of the legality question of the NATO intervention is outside of the scope 
of this thesis. Suffice it here to recall that given the absence of the authorisation of 
the use of force in the relevant Security Council resolutions,1481 the NATO 
intervention is generally perceived to be in breach of the UN Charter.1482  
 The end of hostilities between NATO and the FRY was achieved on 9 June 
1999 by the signing of the Military Technical Agreement at Kumanovo, 
Macedonia.1483 The Agreement reaffirmed “deployment in Kosovo under UN 
auspices of effective international civil and security presences” and noted that “the 
UN Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced 
[Resolution 1244], regarding these presences.”1484 It foresaw a “phased withdrawal 
                                                 
1478 See ibid., chapter 1, Article II, para 5 a (ix). In regard to the powers of Assembly, the proposed 
Constitution, inter alia, foresaw “[c]ooperating with the Federal Assembly, and with the Assemblies 
of the Republics, and conducting relations with foreign legislative bodies.” See also ibid. chapter 1, 
Article III, para 2 (vi) in regard to the powers of President of Kosovo, the proposed Constitution, inter 
alia, foresaw “[m]eeting regularly with the Federal and Republic Presidents.” 
1479 See Crawford (2006), pp. 557–58. 
1480 See Kritsiotis (2000), p. 330. 
1481 See SC Res 1160; SC Res 1199; SC Res 1203; SC Res 1239.  
1482 See Simma (1999), p. 10; Cassese (1999), p. 24; Chinkin (1999), p. 844; Kritsiotis (2000), p. 340. 
1483 The Military*Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (9 June 1999) 
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm>. 
1484 Ibid., Article I, para 1. 
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of FRY forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside of Kosovo”1485 and 
provided that: 
[T]he international security force ("KFOR") will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR 
[United Nations Security Council Resolution] … and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and 
with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all 
citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.1486  
The Military Technical Agreement thus severely limited the sovereign powers of the 
FRY (Serbia) in Kosovo and adopted the spirit of the Rambouillet Accords.1487 It 
may be possible to argue that, given the use of force against Serbia,1488 the latter was 
coerced into signing this Agreement. However, similar provisions were adopted and 
further developed by Resolution 1244.  
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The international territorial administration in Kosovo was established by Resolution 
1244, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on 10 June 1999.1489 
The preamble to Resolution 1244, inter alia, reaffirms “the commitment of all 
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and other states of the region, as set out in the Final Act of Helsinki and 
annex 2.”1490 Yet the Resolution’s operative paragraphs created an effective situation 
in which the FRY exercised no sovereign powers in Kosovo.1491 
                                                 
1485 Ibid., Article II, para 2. 
1486 Ibid., Article I, para 2. See also ibid. appendix B.  
1487 Compare supra n. 1469. 
1488 See supra n. 1482. 
1489 SC Res 1244 (10 June 1999). Resolution 1244 refers to the FRY but now applies to Serbia. 
Compare supra n. 860. 
1490 SC Res 1244, preamble, para 10. 
1491 The Resolution initially demanded “that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and 
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased 
withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid 
timetable.” (SC Res 1244, para 3). It allowed for the return of “an agreed number of Yugoslav and 
Serb military personnel” (ibid., para 4) after the withdrawal. However, as follows from Annex 2, to 
which the commitment to territorial integrity expressed in the preamble refers, this return was merely 
symbolic (ibid., annex 2, Article 6) and the number of personnel was severely limited (ibid., annex 2, 
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 In accordance with Resolution 1244, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary*General promulgated a document which vested wide authority in the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Section I of 
the regulation (entitled “On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo”) 
provides: 
1. All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the 
judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary*
General.  
2. The Special Representative of the Secretary*General may appoint any person to perform functions 
in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove such person. Such functions 
shall be exercised in accordance with the existing laws, as specified in section 3, and any regulations 
issued by UNMIK.1492 
 Resolution 1244 does not make an express reference to the right of self*
determination. However, it invokes several principles associated with the exercise of 
this right. In this regard the Resolution spelled out that the international civil 
presence in Kosovo was established: 
[I]n order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can 
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional 
democratic self*governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo.1493 
The Resolution, inter alia, identifies “promoting the establishment, pending a final 
settlement, of substantial autonomy and self*government in Kosovo”1494 and 
“[o]rganizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
                                                                                                                                          
note 2).The Resolution further decided to deploy “international civil and security presences,” (ibid., 
para 5) requested “the Secretary*General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a 
Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil and security presence” 
(ibid., para 6) and authorised “Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the 
international security presence in Kosovo.” (Ibid., para 7).  
1492 UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (25 July1999), Section 1. 
1493 SC Res 1244, para 10. 
1494 Ibid. para 11 (a).  
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democratic and autonomous self*government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections”1495 as the main responsibilities of the international 
civil presence. 
 Drawing authority from Resolution 1244, the Special Representative 
promulgated the document entitled Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self*
Government.1496 The chapter on basic provisions of the Constitutional Framework 
provides: 
1.1 Kosovo is an entity under interim international administration which, with its people, has unique 
historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes. 
1.2 Kosovo is an undivided territory throughout which the Provisional Institutions of Self*
Government established by this Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self*Government 
(Constitutional Framework) shall exercise their responsibilities.  
1.3 Kosovo is composed of municipalities, which are the basic territorial units of local self*
government with responsibilities as set forth in UNMIK legislation in force on local self*government 
and municipalities in Kosovo. 
1.4 Kosovo shall be governed democratically through legislative, executive, and judicial bodies and 
institutions in accordance with this Constitutional Framework and UNSCR 1244(1999).  
1.5 The Provisional Institutions of Self*Government are: 
(a) Assembly; 
(b) President of Kosovo.1497 
By invoking ‘self*government’ and ‘unique historic, legal, cultural and linguistic 
attributes’ of the people of Kosovo, the Constitutional Framework adopted self*
determination language.1498 Further, it also created an institutional framework for the 
exercise of self*government.1499 In regard to representation in these institutions, the 
                                                 
1495 Ibid., para 11 (c). 
1496 UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (15 May 2001) [hereinafter The Constitutional Framework]. 
1497 Ibid. chapter 1.  
1498 Compare supra ch. 5.3. 
1499 The Constitutional Framework, chapter 9. 
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Constitutional Framework enacted an electoral system based on democratic 
principles1500 and stipulated for the protection of human rights.1501  
The Constitutional Framework also expresses the commitment of Kosovo’s 
self*governing institutions “through parliamentary democracy [to] enhance 
democratic governance and respect for the rule of law in Kosovo.”1502 It further 
provides that “Kosovo shall be governed democratically through legislative, 
executive, and judicial bodies and institutions”1503 and enumerates the promotion and 
respect of the democratic principles among those principles, which shall be observed 
by the self*governing institutions.1504 Significantly, the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary*General thus promulgated a legal instrument which implemented 
democratic institutions and implemented the political system of liberal*
democracy.1505 The process of democratic transition in Kosovo was therefore carried 
out under UN auspices, which, as a universal organisation, thus implemented a 
political system that is not universally accepted as the only legitimate one.1506  
The democratic institutional design of the Kosovo self*governing organs 
under the Constitutional Framework was, however, not without flaws. While the 
institutions of self*government were vested with powers in the exercise of effective 
control over the territory of Kosovo which can be compared to those of authorities of 
sovereign states, the Constitutional Framework foresaw an appointed supervisor of 
the democratic process, i.e. the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General,  
to whom the self*governing organs remained subordinated.1507 
                                                 
1500 Ibid. chapter 9.1.3. 
1501 Ibid. chapter 3.  
1502 Ibid., Preamble, para 7. 
1503 Ibid., chapter 1.1.4. 
1504 Ibid., chapter 2.b.  
1505 Compare supra ch. 2.3.3. 
1506 See supra ch. 2.3. and 2.4. 
1507 Ibid. ch. 12. 
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The Constitutional Framework did not foresee the organs of the FRY or 
Serbia having any authority over the decision*making of Kosovo’s self*governing 
institutions. Thus, although Resolution 1244 states that the aim of the interim 
administration is that “the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”1508 the effective situation in fact implies 
Kosovo’s autonomy within the interim administration. Indeed, “UNMIK has 
assumed what is effectively (though not in name) the federal*type role of the Serb 
and FRY authorities, because these authorities failed to perform that role in the 
past.”1509 Kosovo thus became an internationally administered territory without being 
put under the international trusteeship system of Chapter XII of the UN Charter.1510  
While establishing international administration, Resolution 1244 did not 
define a future territorial status of Kosovo but called for a political process leading 
toward a final settlement.1511 However, in this period of an unclear future status, the 
international administration, which had been established to solve the governance 
problem, ended up “affecting or creating a sovereignty problem.”1512  The political 
process aiming to lead toward a final settlement was thus greatly influenced by the 
unclear future status, the presence of international administration and the fact that 
Serbia had no sovereign powers in Kosovo. 
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On 12 December 2003, the Security Council endorsed the document called 
“Standards for Kosovo”, which was launched under the auspices of the Special 
                                                 
1508 SC Res 1244, para 10. But see also O’Neill (2002), p. 30, especially the following observation: 
“No one knew what the terms ‘substantial autonomy’ and ‘meaningful self*administration’ really 
meant. What united all Kosovo Albanians, regardless of their political party loyalties, was full 
independence from Serbia and what was left of the FRY. They did not want to hear about autonomy, 
however defined.” 
1509 Wilde (2001), p. 595. 
1510 See Bothe and Marauhn (2002), pp. 230–35. 
1511 See supra n. 1494. 
1512 See Wilde (2001), p. 605. 
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Representative and upon an initiative of the informal contact group for Kosovo, 
composed of the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, France, Germany and 
Italy.1513 The document spelled out eight standards to be implemented in Kosovo 
prior to the determination of its status.1514 The “standards before status” policy, 
however, did not lead to the anticipated results. This was acknowledged in the report 
on the situation of Kosovo, submitted on 30 November 2004 by the Special Envoy of 
the UN Secretary*General.1515 
 Stemming from these observations, in his subsequent report on 7 October 
2005 the Special Representative stated that: “The risks that would follow from a 
continued ‘wait and see’ policy – in terms of increasing political, economic and 
social frustration – could soon be far greater than the risks related to a future status 
process.”1516 Consequently, the commencement of the process leading toward the 
final status was proposed.1517 On 24 October 2005, support for the commencement of 
the political process was given by the Security Council.1518 Former Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari was appointed Special Envoy of the UN Secretary*General on 
Kosovo’s status talks.1519 
After more than a year of unproductive negotiations and even occasional 
outbursts of ethnic violence,1520 the UN Secretary*General on 26 March 2007 
                                                 
1513 UN Doc S/PRST/2003/26 (12 December 2003),  para 2. 
1514 Ibid., para 3, the following standards were invoked: “[D]emocratic institutions; rule of law; 
freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property rights; dialogue with Belgrade; 
and the Kosovo Protection Corps.” The Security Council further urged: “[T]he Provisional Institutions 
of Self*Government to participate fully and constructively in the working groups within the 
framework of the direct dialogue with Belgrade on practical issues of mutual interest, to demonstrate 
their commitment to the process.”  
1515 UN Doc S/2004/932 (30 November 2004), p. 4. The report was prepared by Special Envoy Kai 
Eide, who was appointed by the UN Secretary*General to undertake comprehensive review of 
Kosovo. Ibid., p. 1.  
1516 UN Doc S/2005/635 (7 October 2005), para 10. 
1517 Ibid., paras 62–72. 
1518  UN Doc S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005), pp. 1–2. 
1519 See the Security Council Report, Kosovo Historical Chronology [hereinafter Kosovo Historical 
Chronology] <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2693009>. 
1520 Ibid. 
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addressed a document to the President of the Security Council entitled “Report of the 
Special Envoy of the Secretary*General on Kosovo’s Future Status”,1521 in which he 
recommended independence, supervised by the international community.1522 Special 
Envoy Ahtisaari, inter alia, observed that “both parties have reaffirmed their 
categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy 
within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence.”1523 In his 
view “the negotiation’s potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on 
Kosovo’s status is exhausted.”1524 The effective situation was pointed out in 
following terms:  
For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The 
establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), 
and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a 
situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one 
cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without 
provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia – however notional 
such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable.1525  
Consequently, the effective situation suggested that the only alternative to 
independence was the status quo. However, the latter was rejected by Special Envoy 
Ahtisaari: 
Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, 
accountability, economic recovery and inter*ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to 
further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending 
                                                 
1521 UN Doc S/2007/168 (16 March 2007) [hereinafter The Ahtisaari Plan].  
1522 Ibid., para 2. See also ibid., para 13.   
1523 Ibid., para 2. 
1524 Ibid., para 3. 
1525 Ibid., para 7. 
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otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own 
stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.1526 
Serbia and Russia rejected the Ahtisaari Plan and Russia made it clear that it would 
veto any draft Security Council resolution expressing support of Kosovo’s 
independence.1527 As a result, the Ahtisaari Plan was not endorsed by the Security 
Council.  
 In August 2007, the troika made up of the EU, the United States and Russia 
was given a 120*day period to broker talks between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians on 
the future status of Kosovo. The troika was expected to report to the UN Secretary*
General on the outcome by 10 December 2007.1528 In the course of this round, Serbia 
proposed the so*called Aaland*Islands*Model for Kosovo, which would be put in 
place for twenty years.1529 Once again, it became clear that Kosovo Albanians were 
not willing to accept anything but independence.1530  
 
 
 
                                                 
1526 Ibid., para 4. 
1527 For more see Kosovo Historical Chronology. 
1528 Ibid. 
1529 Belgrade’s Proposal Freezes Kosovo Status for 20 Years, Tanjug (20 November 2007). 
<http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/CI/KIM/211107_6_e.html>. The so*called Aaland*Islands*Model is 
summarised in following terms: “Serbia's sole jurisdiction in the case of Kosovo would be in the 
sphere of the foreign policy, control of the borders, protection of the Serb religious and cultural 
heritage. Serbia would solely be in charge of defence and this would not be applied in Kosovo … 
Kosovo would be solely in charge of its budget, economic policy, agriculture, the media, education, 
protection of the environment, youth, sports, fiscal policy, internal affairs, health care, energy, 
infrastructure and employment. Kosovo would independently elect and develop its institutions, and 
Serbia would not interfere in this. Kosovo would have legislative powers in the spheres of its sole 
jurisdiction and in other cases determined by the agreement. Serbia could not change and abolish laws 
in Kosovo, Kosovo would have executive powers, an independent and complete judicial system in 
charge of disputes in the sole jurisdiction of Kosovo and in other cases determined in the agreement. 
Belgrade's proposal calls for a transitional period under EU monitoring and the presence of 
international judges. In keeping with the example of Finland and the Aland Islands, in the case of 
Kosovo Serbia is the subject of international law and Kosovo is offered as its exclusive jurisdiction 
the negotiating of agreements with other states and international organizations. Kosovo prepares 
agreements in consultations with Serbia, while Belgrade formally signs the agreements along with the 
signature with Kosovo and Metohija.”  
1530 Kosovo Troika Press Communiqué, The Baden Conference (28 November 2007) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/declarations/97300.pdf>. 
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The additional round of negotiations merely reaffirmed the observations of Special 
Envoy Ahtisaari – that a mutual agreement on the future status of Kosovo was not 
achievable and that the political process called for by Resolution 1244 had failed.1531 
Despite some warnings by the EU to Kosovo leaders against a unilateral declaration 
of independence,1532 officials of the United States and of the EU soon expressed a 
general willingness to recognise Kosovo as an independent state.1533 Ultimately, 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 came as no surprise. 
Indeed, media reports in the weeks and days prior to the declaration suggest that the 
latter was coordinated between Kosovo officials on the one hand and the EU and the 
United States on the other.1534 It thus became obvious that the EU and the United 
States decided to implement the Ahtisaari Plan without a Security Council resolution. 
                                                 
1531 See supra n. 1531. 
1532 See Europe Warns Kosovo on Separation, NY Times (20 November 2007) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E7DC1038F933A15752C1A9619C8B63&scp
=104&sq=kosovo&st=nyt>.  
1533 See Talks on Kosovo Hit a Dead End, Rice Says, NY Times (8 December 2007) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E4DB1F3EF93BA35751C1A9619C8B63&scp
=94&sq=kosovo&st=nyt>. 
1534 See Here Comes Kosovo, NY Times (14 February 2008) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/opinion/14cohen.html?scp=57&sq=kosovo&st=nyt>. See also 
the protocol drafted (in Slovene) by an official of the Slovenian foreign ministry after meeting with 
representatives of the United States Department of State on 24 December 2007 (in the first half of 
2008 Slovenia lead the Presidency of the Council of the EU), which leaked to media, at 
<http://www.delo.si/media/faksimile02.pdf> & <http://www.delo.si/media/faksimile03.pdf>. The 
protocol proves that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was coordinated between Kosovo’s 
leaders on the one hand and the United States and the EU on the other. The following notes are 
especially instructive: “The prevailing view in the EU is that independence of Kosovo needs to be 
declared after the elections in Serbia (20 January [2008] and 3 February [2008]) …. The session of the 
Kosovo Parliament, at which declaration of independence would be adopted, should take place on 
Sunday, so RF [the Russian Federation] has no time to call for the meeting of the UNSC [United 
Nations Security Council]. In the mean time the first recognitions could already arrive .… The United 
States … after Kosovar authorities declare independence, will be among the first to recognise Kosovo. 
The United States strives for recognition of Kosovo by as many non*EU states as possible. The United 
States is lobbying with Japan, Turkey, Arab states, that have showed readiness to recognise Kosovo 
without hesitation .… The United States is currently drafting a constitution with Kosovars. The 
situation on the ground is favourable. The United States hopes that Kosovars are not going to lose 
self*confidence, as this could result in United States’ loss of influence.” (Translations from Slovene 
are my own).  
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In this context, on 16 February 2008 (one day prior to the declaration of 
independence) the EU Council launched the European Union Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX) in Kosovo, which aims “to support the Kosovo authorities in their efforts 
to build a sustainable and functional Rule of Law system.”1535 The EULEX mission 
goals, inter alia, provide: “Meanwhile [UNMIK] will continue to exercise its 
executive authority under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The philosophy of 
the EULEX Kosovo mission is that it will not replace UNMIK but rather support, 
mentor, monitor and advise the local authorities.”1536 
 The Declaration of Independence, proclaimed by the Kosovo Assembly on 17 
February 20081537 makes references to the democratic legitimacy of the Assembly, 
which consequently declares independence in the name of the people of Kosovo and 
points out Kosovo’s commitment to the Ahtisaari Plan. Article 1 of the Declaration 
of Independence provides: “We, the democratically*elected leaders of our people, 
hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration 
reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations 
of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement.”1538 
 By adopting the Ahtisaari Plan,1539 Kosovo, inter alia, expressed its 
commitment to democracy and human rights,1540 a prolonged international presence 
                                                 
1535 See the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=1458&mode=g&name=>.  
1536 Ibid. 
1537 See supra n. 10. 
1538 The Declaration of Independence (2008), Article 1. Compare also supra ch. 5.3.4.2. for an 
argument that the right of self*determination cannot be exercised solely through free elections. 
However, it has also been argued (see infra n. 1525) that in Kosovo no doubt exists that independence 
is the will of virtually all Kosovo Albanians, who constitute at least ninety percent of Kosovo’s 
population.  
1539 Ibid., Articles 3, 4, 5, 8, 12. 
1540 See The Declaration of Independence (2008), Article 4. 
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in its territory,1541 the inviolability of borders1542 and rights and duties previously 
accepted on its behalf.1543 Kosovo thus also accepted some significant restraints on 
its sovereignty. 
Kosovo’s Declaration on Independence, inter alia, makes reference to “years 
of strife and violence in Kosovo, that disturbed the conscience of all civilised 
people,”1544 and expresses gratefulness that “in 1999 the world intervened, thereby 
removing Belgrade's governance over Kosovo and placing Kosovo under United 
Nations interim administration.”1545 It declares Kosovo to be “a democratic, secular 
and multi*ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non*discrimination and equal 
protection under the law,”1546 welcomes “the international community's continued 
support of … democratic development through international presences established in 
Kosovo,”1547 and states that “independence brings to an end the process of 
Yugoslavia's violent dissolution.”1548 As of 20 March 2009, Kosovo has been 
recognised by fifty*six states.1549 
On 9 April 2008, Kosovo’s Parliament adopted the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosovo.1550 The Constitution affirms Kosovo’s commitment to 
                                                 
1541 Ibid., Article 5. 
1542 Ibid., Article 8. 
1543 Ibid., Article 9. 
1544 Ibid., preamble, para 7. 
1545 Ibid., preamble, para 8. 
1546 Ibid., para 2. 
1547 Ibid., para 5. 
1548 Ibid., para 10. 
1549 As of 20 March 2009, the following states have granted recognition (in alphabetical order): 
Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Nauru, the Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Who Recognized Kosova as an 
Independent State <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com>. 
1550 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008). 
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democracy in both the preamble1551 and in the operative articles1552 and proclaims 
that Kosovo “is a democratic Republic based on the principle of separation of powers 
and the checks and balances among them.”1553 Apart from these generally expressed 
commitments, the Constitution establishes the institutions of a liberal*democratic 
political system. It calls for periodic elections of the parliament1554 and of the 
president1555 and elections based on secret ballot and on the proportionality electoral 
system.1556 There is no explicit call for multiparty elections. Yet the multiparty 
environment is implied in some of the provisions, such as those regulating the 
composition of the parliament,1557 competencies of the president1558 and formation of 
the government.1559  
 The competencies of Kosovo’s constitutional organs, however, remain 
subordinated to the international territorial administration. Article 147 of the 
Constitution reads: 
Notwithstanding any provision of this Constitution, the International Civilian Representative shall, in 
accordance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007, 
be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of the said 
Comprehensive Proposal. No Republic of Kosovo authority shall have jurisdiction to review, diminish 
or otherwise restrict the mandate, powers and obligations....1560 
The Constitution thus not only accepts limits on Kosovo’s sovereignty and on 
competencies of its constitutional organs but also unequivocally subscribes Kosovo 
to the Ahtisaari Plan.1561  
                                                 
1551 Ibid., Preamble, para 1. 
1552 Ibid., Articles 1(1), 4, 7, 55(2), 125. 
1553 Ibid., Article 4(1). 
1554 Ibid., Article 66. 
1555 Ibid., Article 86. 
1556 Ibid., Article 64. 
1557 Ibid. 
1558 Ibid., Article 84 (14). 
1559 Ibid., Article 95(1) and 95(5).  
1560 Ibid., Article 147. 
1561 Compare supra n. 1521. 
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Based on Resolution 1244 and with promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, 
Kosovo’s government has been established.1562 Further, based on Resolution 1244, 
Serbia effectively lost its control over Kosovo.1563 Consequently, Kosovo has a 
government independent of Serbia. However, under the statehood criterion of 
government, independence of any other government, and not only of one particular 
government, is required.1564 Since Resolution 1244 remains in force even after 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence [i.e. there is still international territorial 
administration present],1565 it is questionable whether Kosovo really has such a 
government.1566 
 It needs to be noted that Kosovo is not the only example of a state put under 
international administration with significant powers in internal decision*making, 
which may even override the decisions of state*authorities.1567 Despite the extensive 
power of the international administration, it is not disputed that Bosnia*Herzegovina 
is a state. Kosovo may thus be a protected state, and its status could indeed be 
regarded as similar to that of Bosnia*Herzegovina.1568 It is, however, questionable 
whether the situation of Kosovo can be compared to that of Bosnia*Herzegovina. 
As to restraints on independence, it is argued that they do not infringe upon a 
state’s statehood if they are accepted voluntarily.1569 Further, statehood criteria are 
considered in the process of the creation of a new state. Once a state has acquired 
statehood, the latter is difficult to lose, even when the effectiveness*based criteria are 
                                                 
1562 See supra ch. 7.3. 
1563 See supra ch. 7.3. 
1564 Compare supra ch. 3.2.1. 
1565 See The Declaration of Independence (2008), para 1. 
1566 For more on the relationship between the Kosovo authorities and the international administration 
see supra ch. 7.3. 
1567 See supra n. 1456. 
1568 For more on the status of Bosnia*Herzegovina see Crawford (2006), pp. 528–30. 
1569 See Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000), p. 134, arguing that “a fully sovereign entity can only 
voluntarily accept restraints on its activities.” 
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no longer met.1570 One should also look at the differences between Bosnia*
Herzegovina and Kosovo in this context. 
Bosnia*Herzegovina obtained first recognitions after the declaration of the 
results of the referendum on independence on 6 March 19921571 and was admitted to 
the UN on 22 May 1992.1572 The current federal arrangement for Bosnia*
Herzegovina was, however, established by the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 
1995.1573 The parties to this agreement were the Republic of Bosnia*Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the FRY, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Republika Srpska.1574 This arrangement also foresaw the institution of the High 
Representative which severely limits sovereign powers of the authorities of Bosnia*
Herzegovina.1575 Nevertheless, the limitation on the independence of its government 
was accepted by Bosnia*Herzegovina voluntarily and after it had already been a 
state. In contrast to this, Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework were 
adopted before Kosovo declared independence.1576 Since provisions of both remain 
in force after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, this implies that Kosovo did not 
accept restrictions to independence on its government voluntarily but in order to 
comply with the pre*existing legal arrangements governing its territory.1577 Kosovo’s 
meeting of the (independent) government criterion for statehood is therefore 
deficient.  
                                                 
1570 See supra n. 285. 
1571 The EC member states recognised Bosnia*Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 (see supra n. 629). 
1572 See GA Res 46/237 (22 May 1992). Recognition of Bosnia*Herzegovina was not without 
controversy since the central government was obviously not in effective control over the territory of 
the state. For more see supra ch. 4.3.4.  
1573 See The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). See supra 
n. 676. 
1574 Ibid. 
1575 Ibid., annex 10. 
1576 See supra ch. 7.3. 
1577 Compare  SC Res 1244, para  5. 
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 Another possible problematic aspect from the point of view of the traditional 
statehood criteria stems from the criterion of the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states. Such a capacity is said to be a corollary of the sovereign and 
independent government, which exercises jurisdiction on the territory of the state,1578 
and is rather “a consequence of statehood, not a criterion for it.”1579 In the case of 
Kosovo, the self*fulfilling nature of this criterion is obvious.1580 Apparently, Kosovo 
has the capacity to enter into relations with states which have recognised it, while it 
does not have this capacity vis*à*vis those states which have not.  
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Given the historical developments, governance in separation from Albania, and the 
institutional frameworks for the exercise of self*government within the SFRY and 
under international territorial administration, Kosovo Albanians, who represent 
roughly ninety percent of the Kosovo population, probably developed a separate 
identity, characteristic of a people.1581 The right of self*determination is thus 
applicable.1582 According to the Constitutional Framework, Kosovo’s parliament is 
                                                 
1578 See Aust (2005), pp. 136–37. See also supra ch. 3.2.1.  
1579 Crawford (2006), p. 61. 
1580 See supra ch. 3.2.1. 
1581 Compare supra n. 974. Reference to the people of Kosovo and their “unique historical, legal, 
cultural and linguistic attributes” has also been made by the Constitutional Framework. See 
UNMIK/REG/2001/9, Chapter 1.1. (infra n. 1497).  
1582 Compare supra ch. 5.3.3.1.1., 7.2. and 7.3. A counter*argument could be made that Kosovo 
Albanians are not a separate people but an Albanian ethnic minority. As such they would be protected 
by Article 27 of the ICCPR and not by the common Article 1. The difference between peoples and 
minorities can be fuzzy and subject to subjective interpretations. However, it has been suggested that 
groups traditionally qualified as minorities should be regarded as peoples and consequently become 
beneficiaries of the right of self*determination. See Ermacora (1983), p. 327. Arguably, the Badinter 
Commission adopted such a position when asked to decide on whether the Serbian population in 
Bosnia*Herzegovina and in Croatia had the right of self*determination. The Badinter Commission 
implicitly answered this question by applying common Article 1 of the Covenants. See the Badinter 
Commission, Opinion 2 (11 January 1992), paras 2 and 4.  In the Badinter Commission’s view, the 
shared ethnic, religious and linguistic background of Serbs from Bosnia*Herzegovina and Croatia with 
Serbs in Serbia, obviously did not preclude them from being considered beneficiaries of the right of 
self*determination. Importantly, the applicability of the right of self*determination to Kosovo 
Albanians was implicitly acknowledged even by the foreign minister of Serbia, who argued that 
independent Kosovo would establish a precedent which “transforms the right of self*determination 
into a right to independence.” Address to the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and 
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elected based on democratic principles.1583 Consequently, when Kosovo’s parliament 
declared independence,1584 it acted as a representative of the people of Kosovo. Yet 
an argument has been made that the electoral system is not an adequate mechanism 
for the exercise of the right of self*determination.1585  
Significantly, no popular consultation on the change of the legal status of 
Kosovo was held in the era of the effective situation established by Resolution 1244. 
A popular consultation took place in September 1991 in significantly different 
circumstances.1586 It is possible to dispute the legality of the referendum, which was 
part of underground political activities of Kosovo Albanians.1587 Nevertheless, 
despite these possible procedural objections, there exists no doubt that independence 
is the wish of virtually all ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and thus of roughly ninety 
percent of Kosovo’s population.1588 As was held by the ICJ in the Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion and by the Badinter Commission in the opinion on Bosnia*
Herzegovina, there may exist circumstances in which popular consultation would not 
be necessary for the ascertainment of the will of people.1589  
In 2001, the percentage of the Albanian population in Kosovo amounted to 
eighty*eight percent and the Serb population to approximately seven percent.1590 
According to some estimates, the shares have changed to ninety*two percent of 
Albanians and four percent of Serbs.1591 From the aspect of the will of the people in 
                                                                                                                                          
Co*operation in Europe by H.E. Mr. Vuk Jeremić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Serbia, Vienna (19 February 2008) <http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/2008/02/29767_en.pdf>. 
1583 See supra ch. 7.3. 
1584 See supra n. 10. 
1585 See supra ch. 5.3.4.2. 
1586 See supra n. 1448. 
1587 Ibid. 
1588 This is, inter alia, affirmed in Ahtisaari Plan, see supra n. 1521. 
1589 See supra ch. 4.3.4. and 5.4.3.3. 
1590 Other ethnic groups include Bosniaks, Roma and Turks. See the Provisional Institutions of Self*
Government, Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning 
<http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/kosovo/SoE/p 
opullat.htm>. 
1591 Ibid. 
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the context of the right of self*determination, the question is whether the will of the 
Albanian majority can prevail over the will of the Serb minority.  
According to the standard established by the Québec Report, secession 
requires a prior establishment of sufficient mechanisms for protection of 
minorities.1592 Kosovo committed itself to minority protection standards in the 
Declaration of Independence1593 and, even more unequivocally, in its Constitution. 
The Constitution declared the direct applicability of the following universal and 
regional human rights instruments: UDHR; ECHR and its Protocols; ICCPR and its 
Protocols; Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.1594 Further, Article 53 provides: 
“Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be 
interpreted consistent with the court decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”1595 The Constitution proclaimed both Albanian and Serbian the official 
languages of Kosovo, while Bosnian, Turkish and Roma have the status of official 
languages at a municipal level.1596 The Constitution further grants specific rights to 
members of Kosovo’s communities1597 and introduces quotas for political 
representation of minorities at both municipal and state levels.1598 
These commitments to some degree diminished the possibility of dominance 
of majority over minorities and, at the institutional level, enabled representation of 
                                                 
1592 See supra ch. 6.4.1. 
1593 The Declaration of Independence (2008), see especially paras 2, 3, 4. 
1594 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 22. 
1595 Ibid., Article 53. 
1596 Ibid., Article 5. 
1597 Ibid., Article 59. 
1598 Ibid., Article 62 (1) & Article 64(2). 
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minorities in the government of Kosovo. Arguably, by the adoption of the 
Constitution, Kosovo has, at least at the institutional level, adopted mechanisms for 
protection of minorities and enabled their political participation. Yet it remains to be 
seen how these minority protection standards are implemented in practice. 
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Prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia on 14 February 2008 adopted a decree which proclaimed Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence null and void in advance.1599 A day after the declaration 
of independence was adopted, on 18 February 2008, the government’s Decree was 
confirmed by the National Assembly of Serbia.1600 The Decree, inter alia, annulled 
those acts of the self*governing organs in Kosovo which proclaim Kosovo’s 
independence,1601 confirmed that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia,1602 confirmed 
that all citizens of the autonomous province of Kosovo are considered equal citizens 
of Serbia,1603 declared the willingness of the government of Serbia to extend Serbian 
legal order to Kosovo,1604 and demanded from all states to respect the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia.1605 
                                                 
1599  See The Decree on the Annulment of Illegal Acts of Interim Organs of Self*Government in 
Kosovo and Metohija on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (2008) [hereinafter The Decree] 
<http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/kosovo*metohija/index.php?id=83040>. 
1600 See The Decree on Confirmation of the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on 
the Annulment of Illegal Acts of Interim Organs of Self*Government in Kosovo and Metohija on the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (2008).  
<http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/lat/akta/akta 
_detalji.asp?id=367&t=O#>. 
1601 The Decree, para 1. 
1602 Ibid., para 2. 
1603 Ibid., para 3. 
1604 Ibid., para 4. 
1605 Ibid., para 8. 
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 The annulment of Kosovo’s organs declaring independence has no legal 
effect because organs of Serbia have no authority over Kosovo.1606 This points out 
that while Serbia, under international law, has the right to oppose the secession of 
Kosovo with all legal means,1607 the legal arrangement for Kosovo, stemming from 
Resolution 1244, severely restricts the means that Serbia has at its disposal and 
leaves Serbia without any effective measure under its constitutional law. 
Nevertheless, the Decree is an express pronouncement of the fact that no consent of 
the parent state exists in the case of Kosovo’s secession. Further, the Decree makes 
specific references to Resolution 1244. In this context the view is expressed that the 
Resolution prohibits Kosovo’s secession.1608  
 References to the illegality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, 
stemming from Resolution 1244, were also made by the President of Serbia, Boris 
Tadić, in his statement to the Security Council on 18 February 2008: “This illegal 
declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians constitutes a flagrant violation 
of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), which reaffirms the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija.”1609 
President Tadić further stated: 
We request the [UN] Secretary*General … to issue, in pursuance of the previous decisions of the 
Security Council, including resolution 1244 (1999), a clear and unequivocal instruction to his Special 
                                                 
1606 See supra ch. 7.3. This was also implied in paragraph 4 of the Decree which states Serbia’s 
willingness to extend its legal order to Kosovo. The Decree thus acknowledged that Serbian legal 
order has no force in Kosovo and therefore organs of the Republic of Serbia do not exercise any 
powers in matters of Kosovo. See also infra n. 1610 for the call of Serbian president Boris Tadić to the 
Special Representative to annul the declaration of independence. This call implicitly acknowledges 
that constitutional organs of the Republic of Serbia have no legal powers in the territory of Kosovo 
and cannot take legal action against Kosovo’s independence under Serbian constitutional law.   
1607 Compare Crawford (2006), pp. 388–91. 
1608 The Decree, paras 1, 5, 7, 8. 
1609 UN Doc S/PV.5839 (18 February 2008). 
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Representative for Kosovo … to use his powers within the shortest possible period of time and declare 
the unilateral and illegal act of the secession of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia null and void.1610 
 The Serbian position was expressly supported by Russia, whose 
representative in the Security Council stated: 
The Russian Federation continues to recognize the Republic of Serbia within its internationally 
recognized borders. The 17 February declaration by the local assembly of the Serbian province of 
Kosovo is a blatant breach of the norms and principles of international law – above all of the Charter 
of the United Nations – which undermines the foundations of the system of international relations. 
That illegal act is an open violation of the Republic of Serbia’s sovereignty, the high*level Contact 
Group accords, Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) – which 
is the basic document for the Kosovo settlement – and other relevant decisions of the Security 
Council.1611 

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The representative of the United Kingdom expressed the view that provisions of 
Resolution 1244, which refer to the final settlement, need to be read independently 
from the provisions regulating the interim administration.1612 In this context the 
representative of the United Kingdom concluded: “Resolution 1244 (1999) placed no 
limits on the scope of that status outcome, and paragraph 11 (a) of the resolution is 
clear that the substantial autonomy which Kosovo was to enjoy within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was an interim outcome pending a final settlement.”1613 
 The representative of the United States most clearly expressed the 
understanding that Kosovo is a situation sui generis, which creates no precedent: 
“My country’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence is based upon the specific 
circumstances in which Kosovo now finds itself. We have not, do not and will not 
                                                 
1610 Ibid., p. 5.  
1611 Ibid., p. 6. 
1612 UN Doc S/PV.5839, p. 13. 
1613 Ibid. The representative of the United States expressed a similar position, however, without giving 
the reasoning behind the conclusion that secession is not prohibited by Resolution 1244, ibid., p. 18. 
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accept the Kosovo example as a precedent for any other conflict or dispute.”1614 The 
representative of the United Kingdom expressed a similar position and suggested 
Kosovo’s ‘unique circumstance’ legitimised its secession.1615  
The United States and those EU member*states which granted recognition to 
Kosovo, stressed the commitment to Resolution 1244. In this regard the EU member*
states expressed the view that the EULEX Mission in Kosovo was part of this 
commitment.1616 The representative of Belgium held: 
In recent days the European Union has taken important decisions, in full conformity with resolution 
1244 (1999). These unambiguously show that the EU itself is ready to shoulder its responsibilities and 
work alongside the Kosovar authorities on their important commitments towards the international 
community. The new European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is concrete 
testament to that.1617  
The representative of France expressed a similar position.1618 
 All EU member*states, which were represented in the Security Council on 18 
February 2008, expressed support for the Ahtisaari Plan. The representative of 
Belgium held: “Belgium has always felt that the Ahtisaari plan was the only realistic 
and viable option.”1619 A similar argument was made by the representative of 
Italy,1620 while the representative of the United Kingdom expressed the following 
position: 
The international community cannot be party to a settlement that is opposed by more than 90 per cent 
of the territory’s population. Apart from anything else, that would be contrary to our overriding 
priority of upholding peace and security. My Government is convinced that the proposal of the United 
                                                 
1614 Ibid., p. 19. 
1615 Ibid., p. 14. 
1616 Compare supra notes 1535 and 1536. 
1617 UN Doc S/PV.5839, p. 9. See also statement of the Italian representative, ibid., p. 10. 
1618 Ibid., p. 20. 
1619 Ibid., p. 9. 
1620 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Nations Special Envoy for supervised independence, which the Kosovo Assembly has embraced and 
committed itself to implement, is the only viable way forward.1621 
 Notably, the Ahtisaari Plan, inter alia, invokes democratic development 
among the criteria legitimising the creation of the state of Kosovo.1622 Since some 
recognising states make express references to the Ahtisaari Plan, they, arguably, also 
adopt the perception that democratic development is an important factor which 
legitimises unilateral secession in this particular circumstance. Nevertheless, the 
assessment of legitimacy of a claim for secession is part of a political (not legal) 
deliberation of each state.1623 In the example of Kosovo, the decision of some 
recognising states to take democratic development into consideration was thus 
merely political and does not reflect any obligation under international law that 
would require from states to recognise those entities which could pursue a better 
democratic development if they emerged as independent states. 
 Lastly, the United Kingdom and the United States, arguably, also advanced 
‘remedial secession’ arguments. The representative of the United Kingdom argued: 
At the heart of today’s controversy is [Resolution 1244]. In that resolution, the Council took an 
unprecedented step: it effectively deprived Belgrade of the exercise of authority in Kosovo. It did so 
because the then regime in Belgrade had not just unilaterally deprived Kosovo of its powers of self*
government … it had tried in 1999 to expel the majority population from the territory of Kosovo. 
Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were driven from Kosovo by the State forces of 
Slobodan Milosevic. People being herded onto trains provoked images from the 1940s. The events of 
1999 shape the events we see now.1624 
And the representative of the United States: 
Towards the end of the decade [1990s], the Serbian Government of Slobodan Milosevic brought 
ethnic cleansing to Kosovo. Responding to that humanitarian disaster and clear threats to international 
                                                 
1621 Ibid., p. 13. 
1622 See supra n. 1526. 
1623 Compare the Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1624 Ibid., p. 12. 
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peace and security, NATO led a military intervention that stopped the violence and brought peace to 
Kosovo … The Security Council solidified that peace by adopting resolution 1244 … an 
unprecedented resolution that provided for an interim political framework and circumscribed Serb 
sovereignty in that territory, and that called for the determination of Kosovo’s final status.1625 
 While ‘remedial secession’ arguments may be found in these two statements, 
they were employed in order to clarify the origins of the effective situation and in the 
context of pointing out the sui generis character of the situation. Statements of the 
representatives of the United Kingdom and of the United States otherwise clearly 
refer to Resolution 1244, which did not grant the right to secession to Kosovo 
Albanians.1626 This suggests that in their perception the human rights and 
humanitarian situation prior to the adoption of Resolution 1244 did not directly lead 
to the right to secession but rather created an effective situation which ultimately 
legitimised secession. Therefore not even the recognising states consider that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence could fall within the ‘remedial secession 
doctrine’.1627 Indeed, the ‘remedial secession’ doctrine is to be interpreted very 
narrowly, i.e. as a last resort for ending of oppression.1628 It could be perhaps 
possible to accept such an argument if Kosovo declared independence in 1999 but 
the effective situation suggests that secession in 2008 was not necessary for the 
purpose of ending the oppression. 
   
??

Kosovo was put under international territorial administration because of the 
governance problem. This problem was not associated with the absence of liberal*
democratic practices but with gross human rights violation and with a grave 
                                                 
1625 Ibid., p. 18. 
1626 See supra n. 1490. 
1627 Compare supra ch. 5.4. 
1628 See supra notes 1044 and 1048. 
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humanitarian situation. However, the international territorial administration, whose 
actions are attributable to the UN,1629 implemented the institutional design of liberal*
democracy and thus carried out the process of democratic transition.1630 The situation 
in Kosovo was thus comparable to that in East Timor. Yet in the example of Kosovo, 
no negotiated solution on its future status was found. Ultimately, Kosovo, with some 
significant international support, declared independence unilaterally.    
From the perspective of the traditional statehood criteria, it is questionable 
whether Kosovo has an independent government. Further, there are considerations 
whether the state of Kosovo was established illegally. The answer to the illegal*
creation issue depends on the interpretation of Resolution 1244.  
Serbia and Russia refer to the text of the preamble to Resolution 1244 
invoking the territorial integrity of the FRY and, thus, of Serbia,1631 and interpret the 
reference to territorial integrity as an inherent part of the Resolution as a whole and 
not as only applicable to the part establishing international administration. In their 
view the right of the territorial integrity of Serbia was doubtlessly affirmed by 
Resolution 1244. As a consequence, the observance of this right cannot be waived by 
other states. A unilateral secession is thus illegal and other states are under obligation 
not to recognise this illegality.  
The EU and the United States understand references to territorial integrity in 
the context of interim administration but not necessarily in the context of final 
status.1632 In their understanding the final settlement was meant to be an open*ended 
process. However, with references to the Ahtisaari Plan,1633 they make it clear that 
the open*ended nature of this process did not give Kosovo Albanians a self*executing 
                                                 
1629 See Bothe and Marauhn (2002), p. 228. 
1630 Compare supra ch. 2.2.3. 
1631 See supra ch. 7.6.2. 
1632 The position of the United Kingdom especially clearly establishes this dualism. See supra n. 1612. 
1633 Compare supra n. 1521. 
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right to secession. The latter instead became legitimate after the political process 
failed. Referring to the Ahtisaari Plan, Kosovo’s status needs to be settled in order to 
enable democratic development.1634 The recognising states accepted this as an aim 
that could legitimise secession. Although the Ahtisaari Plan was not endorsed by the 
Security Council in a subsequent resolution, it importantly shaped the policies of 
some states in regard to recognition. Further, the Assembly of Kosovo has adopted 
the Ahtisaari Plan as a foundation of the state of Kosovo.1635 Implicitly, the 
recognising states have also adopted the view that this document is now part of 
Kosovo’s legal order and has thus become legally relevant. Commitment to the 
Ahtisaari Plan is also expressed in Kosovo’s Constitution. The recognising states 
maintain that Resolution 1244 is still in force and that, according to the Ahtisaari 
Plan, Kosovo’s sovereignty is restricted.1636  
The recognising states invoked special circumstances and a sui generis 
situation in Kosovo, stemming from the current situation, which was put in place due 
to gross human rights violations, and in which Serbia does not exercise effective 
control over Kosovo.1637 The sui generis nature is also invoked in regard to 
international territorial administration. Such a situation was created by a Chapter VII 
Resolution 1244 and is thus different from other situations in which secession*
seeking entities exercise effective control over their respective territories – the loss of 
Serbia’s effective control over Kosovo stems from Resolution 1244 and not from 
unconstitutional activities of secessionists. At the same time, the vast majority of the 
population of Kosovo opposes any return of Serbia’s authority.1638 Thus, if the status 
of Kosovo is not to be determined against the wishes of its population, only 
                                                 
1634 See supra n. 1526. 
1635 See The Declaration of Independence (2008), para 5. 
1636 See generally The Ahtisaari Plan. 
1637 See supra ch. 7.6.3. 
1638 See supra n. 1525. 
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independence or the status quo are possibilities. The Ahtisaari Plan, however, 
suggests that the status quo is not a viable option.1639 
 The following conclusions shall be made in regard to the state practice in the 
Kosovo recognition issue: (i) There are strong indicators suggesting that it is 
generally not disputed whether the right of self*determination applies to Kosovo 
Albanians – the latter seems to have been acknowledged even by Serbia;1640 (ii) The 
dispute is around the question of whether Kosovo Albanians may exercise this right 
in its external mode; (iii) Resolution 1244 makes references to territorial integrity 
and states denying recognition argue that the state of Kosovo was created illegally, 
which leads to a collective duty to withhold recognition; (iv) States granting 
recognition interpret Resolution 1244 as a legal instrument not automatically 
precluding secession and that, consequently, the obligation to withhold recognition 
does not apply. In this context they also invoke the effective situation in Kosovo as 
well as the Ahtisaari Plan which, arguably, make secession legitimate.  
Despite grave human rights violations in the 1990s and references to these 
circumstances made by a number of recognising states, in 2008 secession cannot be 
interpreted as the last resort for the ending of oppression. Indeed, oppression was 
ended already by the effective situation put in place in 1999. As follows from the 
Ahtisaari Plan, secession was rather perceived as the last resort for Kosovo’s 
democratic development.1641 Accepting this argument as ‘remedial’ would, however, 
significantly stretch the otherwise narrowly*defined ‘remedial secession’ 
doctrine.1642  
                                                 
1639 See supra n. 1526. 
1640 See statement of the minister of foreign affairs of Serbia, supra n. 1582. 
1641 See the Ahtisaari Plan, para 4. 
1642 See supra ch. 7.6.3. 
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Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the oppression in the 1990s played a 
significant role in the creation of the state of Kosovo. It was the reason why a 
Chapter VII Resolution created a legal arrangement under which Serbia exercises no 
sovereign powers in the territory of Kosovo. Resolution 1244 put Kosovo under 
international administration. Significantly, the international territorial administration, 
drawing its legitimacy from Resolution 1244, designed Kosovo’s political system 
along liberal*democratic lines, which includes multiparty elections, although such a 
political system is not universally*accepted and practised by all UN member 
states.1643 The liberal*democratic nature of Kosovo’s political system is, however, 
severely curtailed by the fact that the ultimate legislative, executive and judiciary 
power is vested in the international territorial administration. It is possible to argue 
that this is not only problematic from the point of view of Kosovo’s democratic 
performance but also from the point of view of the right of self*determination. It may 
well be that such an arrangement, by allowing for indeterminate foreign governance, 
violates the right of self*determination of the people of Kosovo. Importantly, even 
after the declaration of independence such an arrangement remains in place and it 
can be argued that Kosovo does not have an independent government. 
 Resolution 1244 stipulates for a political process leading toward a final 
settlement of the status question, while the settlement was inherently determined by 
the legal arrangement put in place by the same resolution. The real question was not 
whether Serbia would transfer its sovereign powers to another authority (Serbia had 
already done so in 1999) but rather whether it would regain its sovereign powers. 
Unsurprisingly, it became clear during the political process that Kosovo Albanians 
were not willing to accept any settlement under which any degree of control would 
                                                 
1643 Compare supra ch. 2.3. 
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be transferred back to Serbia. Such a transfer would consequently mean a violation 
of the applicable right of self*determination.  
The political process did not lead to Serbia’s consent to secession. Kosovo 
did not follow the East Timor model in which international administration led the 
entity into pre*negotiated independence, affirmed by a subsequent Security Council 
resolution.1644 Yet, the Ahtisaari Plan, which rejects the status quo and proposes a 
“supervised independence”, albeit not endorsed by the Security Council, significantly 
shaped state practice in regard to the creation of the state of Kosovo. The recognising 
states refer to the Ahtisaari Plan, which provides for Kosovo’s development in the 
areas of democracy, human rights and economy. They perceive the effective situation 
and circumstances which led to its establishment as well as the Ahtisaari Plan and its 
objectives as the necessary legitimacy*background for secession. Recognition, it was 
argued above, is a political act with legal consequences1645 and not necessarily based 
on legal reasoning. If some states have adopted Kosovo’s democratic development 
(i.e. democratic consolidation) as a legitimacy criterion when granting recognition, 
this does not mean that ‘democratic development’ has become a legal criterion 
governing the act of state recognition. 
 While Kosovo’s secession was unilateral, many states found it legitimate and 
thus it attracted a significant number of recognitions. The Kosovo situation was 
inherently determined by the legal arrangement which established the international 
territorial administration. So it is generally not a precedent for other secessionist 
attempts. However, it points out the problem of arrangements for international 
territorial administration: if the territory is transferred back to the effective control of 
a previous sovereign against the wishes of its people or if the status quo continues 
                                                 
1644 See supra ch. 4.5.1. 
1645 See supra n. 302. 
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indeterminately, both circumstances breach the right of self*determination. In the 
example of Kosovo, the possibility of territorial division was not (or, perhaps, has 
not been) seriously discussed and the recognising states have recognised Kosovo in 
its historical borders.1646 However, a possible territorial division could perhaps be 
another option left for negotiations, which would make a consensual state*creation in 
such situations more feasible.1647  
 Kosovo probably does not satisfy all of the traditional statehood criteria; 
however, entities that did not satisfy them have become states before.1648 Views on 
the legality of its creation differ and there is no universally accepted interpretation on 
whether there exists a collective duty to withhold recognition. Kosovo is thus a 
situation in which the declaratory theory of recognition faces its limits. Is Kosovo a 
state? If so, would it be a state without the recognitions which have been granted? If 
recognition is always declaratory, why can Kosovo be considered a state now but 
was not after the declaration of independence in 1991? The FRY’s claim to territorial 
integrity existed then and Serbia’s claim to territorial integrity exists now. In 1991, 
the government which declared independence was not the effective government of 
Kosovo. In 2008, the government which declared independence was not an 
independent government of Kosovo. Similar legal considerations to Kosovo’s status 
of a state under international law thus existed in 1991 as exist now. Notably, 
however, after the declaration of independence in 1991, recognition was granted only 
                                                 
1646 Compare supra n. 1413. 
1647 Representatives of Serbia have recently hinted that they would be potentially willing to accept 
partition of Kosovo. See Serbia’s President Considers Kosovo Division, International Herald Tribune 
(30 September 2008) <http://iht.nytimes.com/articles/ap/2008/09/30/europe/EU*Serbia*Kosovo.php>. 
1648 See supra ch. 7.5.2. 
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by Albania,1649 while the 2008 declaration of independence recognition has been 
granted by fifty*six states.1650  
The most probable answer is that in the case of Kosovo an informally 
practised collective recognition had the effects of a collective state creation. The 
problem, however, is that the new state creation is not (or, perhaps, has not been) 
acknowledged by the entire international community. To put it differently, if 
recognition has constitutive effects, are fifty*six recognitions enough for a state 
creation? Is, then, Kosovo a state for fifty*six states but not for others? These 
controversies might be of a temporary nature and over time there might be no 
question of whether a certain entity is a state or not. Such is the example of 
Bangladesh.1651  
 The institutions of liberal*democracy were created in Kosovo under UN 
auspices. Yet UN organs did not confirm Kosovo’s path to independence. At the 
same time some recognising states find democratic development a factor that may 
legitimise Kosovo’s secession. The commitment to a democratic political system is 
also expressed in Kosovo’s Constitution, which was probably drafted by the United 
States.1652 Therefore it is possible to argue that in the example of Kosovo a number 
of states not only attempted collectively (albeit informally) to create a new state but 
also attempted to create a democratic state.  
                                                 
1649 See supra n. 1451. 
1650 See supra n. 1549. 
1651 See supra ch. 5.4. 
1652 See supra n. 1534. 
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The early 1990s not only marked the demise of the communist/socialist social, 
political and economic model but also the emergence of a number of new states in 
the territories of the Soviet Union and of the SFRY.1653 The impact of the political 
developments at the end of the Cold War on international law came from two 
perspectives. Some scholars argued that pro*democratic change should have an 
impact on international law governing the rights and duties of existing states.1654 At 
the same time pro*democratic change was also reflected in international law 
governing the creation of new states and the exercise of the right of self*
determination.1655 The latter impact was the main focus of this thesis and it can be 
argued that some support for the role of democracy and democratic principles in the 
creation of states and for the exercise of the right of self*determination can be found 
in state practice1656 and the practice of UN organs.1657    
This chapter initially summarises the idea that international law would 
differentiate existing states based on the (democratic) nature of their governments. 
Subsequently, conclusions are given on the impacts of the nature of government on 
entities wishing to become states. However, one should be aware that the discussion 
on new state creations also deals with existing states, i.e. the (former) parent states of 
the newly created ones. In this context, an especially relevant question is whether and 
how the type of government of a parent state can legitimise secession of a part of its 
territory. 
 
                                                 
1653 See supra ch. 4.3. and 4.4.1. 
1654 See supra ch. 2.4. and 2.5. 
1655 See supra ch. 4.2. 
1656 See supra ch. 4.3., 4.4. and 4.5. 
1657 See supra ch. 4.5.1. 
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After the end of the Cold War an argument was made that liberal*democracy is the 
only legitimate system of government and that this needs to be acknowledged even 
by international law.1658 In this view, the body of international human rights law 
should be interpreted with a liberal*democratic bias1659 and states not adhering to 
liberal*democratic practices could lose some attributes of statehood.1660 International 
law would no longer be a universal and inclusive system but rather law among 
liberal*democratic states.1661 In the most extreme interpretations, states not adhering 
to liberal*democratic practices would even lose protection of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.1662  
More modest proponents of the idea of international law as law among 
democratic states, however, do not speculate about the use of force and rather see 
international cooperation as a means for expansion of the liberal*democratic zone of 
law.1663 Through cooperation between officials of democratic and non*democratic 
states, the latter, so it is suggested, become accustomed to liberal*democratic 
practices.1664 
 This thesis has established that such interpretations of post*Cold War 
international law are problematic from the point of view of contemporary 
international law based the UN Charter system and from the aspects of its 
underpinnings in democratic political theory.  
 

                                                 
1658 See especially Franck (1992), Franck (1994), Franck (2001), Slaughter (1995), Slaughter (1997), 
Teson (1992), Teson (1998).  
1659 Ibid. 
1660 Ibid. 
1661 See Slaughter (1995), pp. 528–34. 
1662 See Teson (1998), p. 90.   
1663 See Slaughter (1997), pp. 185–86. 
1664 Ibid., p. 194. 
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Proponents of the liberal*democratic bias in post*Cold War international human 
rights law have argued that a state party to the ICCPR needs to organise itself along 
liberal*democratic lines.1665 In this view democracy is seen in terms of electoral 
procedures, which are defined by a selection of civil and political rights.1666 Since 
elections are at the centre of such an understanding of democracy, the right to 
political participation is treated as the core right of the democratic political 
system.1667 In this context the importance of some other so*called democratic rights, 
most commonly freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of 
religion and conscience is acknowledged.1668 Yet such a definition of democracy 
with a selection of civil and political rights is problematic from aspects of both 
procedural and substantial democracy.  
 Even if one accepts that democracy is merely a matter of electoral process, it 
would not be possible to assume that the elaboration of the right to political 
participation in the ICCPR1669 binds state parties to hold multiparty elections and/or 
to adopt a particular political system. Such an interpretation is not possible in light of 
the drafting history of the ICCPR,1670 the ICJ’s reasoning in the Nicaragua case,1671 
or in light of subsequent (post*Cold War) state practice and opinio juris on this 
matter. Indeed, a set of General Assembly resolutions entitled “Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections”, adopted at the end 
of the Cold War, established that electoral method and political system are in the 
                                                 
1665 See Cerna (1992), p. 295. 
1666 See supra ch. 2.3., 2.4. and 2.5. 
1667 See supra ch. 2.2.1. 
1668 See supra ch. 2.2.1., 2.3., 2.4., 2.5. 
1669 ICCPR, Article 25. 
1670 See Roth (1999), p. 332. 
1671 The Nicaragua case, ICJ Rep 1986, paras 261 & 263. 
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essential domestic jurisdiction of states.1672 The resolutions did not mention that 
elections need to be held in a multiparty setting, nor does the HRC General Comment 
on the right to political participation, adopted in the post*Cold War period, stipulate 
for multiparty elections.1673   
 The election*centric definition of democracy has also been disputed in light 
of democratic political theory. Proponents of the election*centric definition argue that 
a more comprehensive definition would lack normative clarity1674 and thus it would 
also be impossible to define democracy with a selection of human rights norms. Yet 
such a view is criticised for being too narrow and based on democratic institutions 
and procedures.1675 In other words, too much substance is sacrificed for a clear 
normative definition of democracy. 
 The following critical argument captures the inadequacy of a definition of 
democracy in terms of certain civil and political rights and the existence of electoral 
procedures: 
[D]emocracy cannot be conceived purely as an ‘institutional arrangement’, organizational form or 
checklist of procedures. Rather, it must be understood as an ongoing process of enhancing the 
possibilities for self*rule and the prospects for political equality, against a background of changing 
historical circumstances … [P]olitical legitimacy cannot be approached as a matter of episodic 
procedure. The fact that parliaments are subject to periodic popular recall is not, of itself, sufficient to 
justify public power. Democracy demands that state authority be required to justify itself to the 
citizenry on a continuing basis.1676  
                                                 
1672 GA Res 43/177, GA Res 44/146, GA Res 46/137, GA Res 47/138, GA Res 48/131. 
1673 HRC, General Comment 25 (1996). 
1674 See Schumpeter (1942), p. 296; Huntington (1990), p. 7. 
1675 See supra ch. 2.2.2. 
1676 Marks (2000), p. 59. 
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This thesis thus took the position that “[t]he core idea of democracy is that of … 
popular control over collective decision*making [and] its starting point is with the 
citizen rather than with the institutions of government.”1677  
 Popular control over collective decision*making demands equality of the 
citizenry, which stretches beyond equal enjoyment of civil and political rights:  
[P]olitical equality must be seen to require more than the constitutional guarantee of civil rights. 
Universal suffrage has not put an end to inequalities in the capacity of citizens to exercise and 
influence state power, because that capacity is affected by disparities in society … Efforts to ensure 
political and civil rights must go hand in hand with moves to secure respect for social, economic, and 
cultural rights.1678 
Democratic procedures and institutions are thus seen a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for democracy.1679 Further, democracy is not only a matter of respect of 
civil and political rights. 
Lastly, this thesis took a stance against the perception of human rights and 
democracy as synonyms.1680 Human rights and democracy reinforce each other but at 
the same time human rights and democratic principles can work in opposite 
directions.1681 Democratic procedures of decision*making may not only fail to 
adequately protect human rights but actually lead to their violation. An example of 
such a situation is the so*called tyranny of the majority. It is human rights standards 
that protect minorities from majority rule and a broader understanding of democracy 
requires that a democratic society implement adequate minority protection standards 
and respect them.1682 
 
                                                 
1677 Beetham (1999), p. 91. 
1678 Marks (2000), p. 59. 
1679 See supra ch. 2.2.2. 
1680 See supra ch. 2.2.2. 
1681 Beetham (1999), p. 114. 
1682 See supra ch. 2.2. 
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The idea of international law as law among liberal*democratic states is based on the 
neo*Kantian postulates of the theory that democracies do not fight wars among 
themselves.1683 A proposal was made to use this theory of democratic peace as an 
underpinning to reconceptualise international law to take into account differences 
between states with different types of government.1684 
This thesis took a sceptical position toward both the postulates of the 
democratic peace theory in general and toward its proposed implications for 
international law. It was argued that one cannot accept that there exist two systems of 
international law, one governing the relations between states deemed democratic and 
the other the relationship of states deemed democratic vis*à*vis those deemed non*
democratic.1685 Notably, while democracy might play some role in the process of 
new state creations, it cannot be argued that ‘democratic government’ is an ongoing 
statehood criterion and that absence of such a government could result in a loss of 
statehood or loss of certain attributes of statehood (e.g. protection by Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter).1686 At the same time an argument was made that the democratic 
peace theory is founded on questionable empirical premises proving the absence of 
war between democracies and on false assumptions that popular control over 
decision*making on the domestic plane fosters peace*prone behaviour 
internationally.1687  
 The idea that type of government could determine the attributes of statehood 
of existing states is thus disputable from the aspect of both the postulates in political 
                                                 
1683 Kant (1795). 
1684 See Teson (1992), Teson (1998), Slaughter (1995), Slaughter (1997). 
1685 See especially Teson (1998), 64–65. 
1686 Compare ibid., p. 90. 
1687 See supra ch. 2.5.2. 
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theory on which they are built and the idea of contemporary international law as a 
universal and inclusive system. The normative democratic entitlement idea and the 
theory of international law as law among liberal*democratic states build their 
prescriptions on the election*centric understanding of democracy, equate democracy 
with a hierarchical selection of civil and political rights and reflect the democratic 
self*image of states of European cultural origin. Their prescriptions may undermine 
the system of the UN Charter and appear to be similar to nineteenth century 
international law as law among “civilised states” (i.e. those of European cultural 
origin).1688 On the other hand, democracy might have become an important 
consideration in the practice of the post*Cold War new state creations.   
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The traditional statehood criteria stem from the Montevideo Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States and are essentially based on effectiveness.1689 Yet in the UN 
Charter era there exists significant practice of states and UN organs suggesting that 
an effective entity will not necessarily become a state. This follows from the 
international responses to the respective declarations of independence of the TRNC, 
Southern Rhodesia and the South African “Homelands”.1690 
 In these situations recognitions were collectively withheld based on illegality 
of state creations. It is undisputed that the creation of a state as a result of an illegal 
use of force, in breach of the right of self*determination and/or in pursuance of racist 
policies makes such a state creation illegal.1691 There are, however, different 
interpretations regarding the consequences of illegality. 
                                                 
1688 See supra n. 222. 
1689 See supra ch. 3.2. 
1690 See supra ch. 3.2.2. and 3.3. 
1691 See supra ch. 3.2.2. 
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 Crawford argues that a result of an illegal state creation is that such an entity, 
albeit effective, is not a state.1692 In this perception the legality considerations in the 
creation of states have a status of additional statehood criteria, while the purpose of 
non*recognition is to confirm the fact that such an entity is not a state.1693 The 
relationship between additional statehood criteria and the duty to withhold 
recognition to an illegally created effective entity is thus similar to the relationship 
between the traditional statehood criteria and the prohibition of premature 
recognition.1694 
Talmon, on the other hand, makes an argument against the additional 
statehood criteria and sees the legality considerations for new state creations as 
recognition requirements.1695 In his view states may be illegally created but are 
nevertheless states, albeit illegal and non*recognised ones.1696 According to Talmon, 
if effective entities are not deemed states, a call for non*recognition only implies that 
recognition may constitute a state.1697 
This thesis took the view that the act of recognition is, generally, based on 
political reasoning.1698 Yet the legality considerations for new state creations have a 
legal, not political, quality. The prohibition of illegal use of force, the right of self*
determination and prohibition of racial discrimination are all norms of international 
law. At the same time, the reaction of the international community in situations of 
illegal state creations suggests that there exist both state practice and opinio juris in 
support of a norm of customary international law requiring that a state may not be 
                                                 
1692 Crawford (2006), pp. 106–07. 
1693 See Raič (2002), p. 105. 
1694 See supra ch. 3.3.2. 
1695 Talmon (2004), p. 126. 
1696 Ibid., p. 125. See also Talmon (2006), p. 238. 
1697 Talmon (2004), p. 138. 
1698 See supra ch. 3.3.1. and 3.3.2. 
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created in violation of these norms.1699 However, if there is a legal norm in question, 
this can only be considered a part of statehood criteria, which have a legal quality, 
and not part of recognition requirements, which are based on political 
considerations.1700 The requirements that a state must not be created as a result of an 
illegal use of force, in violation of the right of self*determination and/or in pursuance 
of racist policies, should be thus perceived as additional statehood criteria, which are 
of a legal nature, and not as recognition requirements, which are of a political nature.  
This thesis has also taken a position that it should be acknowledged that 
universal recognition would sometimes have constitutive effects. It is indeed difficult 
to defend the argument that recognition of an illegally*created effective entity could 
not create a state. This does not mean that one must always perceive recognition as a 
constitutive act. Indeed, recognition can still be seen as an act of acknowledging the 
fact that a new state has emerged. Yet such a fact is not always clear. This is 
especially the case when there exists a claim to territorial integrity of a parent state 
and/or it is not clear whether an entity meets the statehood criteria.1701 In such 
circumstances the international response may either crystallise or produce a fact that 
a new state has emerged. The international response may often be channelled through 
(collective) recognition, which can have effects of collective state creation.1702 
 The question of legality and illegality of state creations can be determined by 
some democratic principles which operate within certain norms of international law. 
This is, notably, the case with the right of self*determination. Indeed, in response to 
Southern Rhodesia’s declaration of independence, the General Assembly called for 
elections based on the one*man*one*vote principle and, inter alia, invoked the 
                                                 
1699 See supra ch. 3.3.3.5. 
1700 Compare supra n. 302. 
1701 See supra n. 346. Compare also the Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1702 See supra ch. 3.3.2. 
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prohibition of political parties of native Africans as a source of illegality of the state 
creation.1703 Yet it was established in this thesis that these arguments were made in 
the context of the exercise of the right of self*determination and not as a call for a 
specific political system.1704 However, international involvement into post*Cold War 
state creations is significantly more concerned with democracy as a political system 
and not only limited to the exercise of the right of self*determination.  
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In 1991, the emergence of new states in the territories of the Soviet Union and the 
SFRY was closely associated with an international commitment to implement 
democratic institutions, human rights protection standards and to commit the new 
states to international peace. The most express association of these three goals with 
the new state creations stems from the EC Guidelines on Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.1705  
 The EC Guidelines express a willingness to recognise states constituted on a 
democratic basis.1706 They implicitly make reference to the statehood criteria1707 and 
to the Charter of Paris, which unequivocally demands elections in a multiparty 
setting.1708 Through the Charter of Paris, the EC Guidelines thus adopted the liberal*
democratic image of democracy. The EC Guidelines, however, did not address 
questions of substantial democracy but largely remained confined to electoral 
                                                 
1703 GA Res 2022, para 8 
1704 See supra ch. 3.3.3.3. 
1705 The EC Guidelines (1991).  
1706 Ibid., para 2. 
1707 Ibid. 
1708 See Charter of Paris (1990), especially Annex 1, Article 7. 
 320 
procedures.1709 Further, the EC Guidelines also refer to the Final Act of Helsinki, 
which expresses a commitment to peaceful behaviour in the international 
community.1710 
 Notably, the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris were adopted as 
documents applicable to the existing states and without prejudice to the attributes of 
their statehood.1711 Their application to entities which are not (yet) states therefore 
brings a new dimension into the process of state creation, as the requirements of 
these two documents have a much wider scope than the additional statehood criteria. 
Indeed, the Final Act of Helsinki expresses an absolute commitment to peaceful 
behaviour in the international community,1712 while the statehood criterion stemming 
from the prohibition of the use of force more narrowly demands that a state itself 
may not be created as a result of an illegal use of force.1713 The Charter of Paris 
demands a liberal*democratic political system, while democratic principles operating 
within the statehood criteria are confined to the exercise of the right of self*
determination.1714 
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The creation of new states in the territory of the Soviet Union significantly differed 
from that in the SFRY. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a process for which 
consent had been expressed at least among all of its republics, although not among 
all organs of the federation.1715 The creation of new states was thus a fact, which was 
merely acknowledged by the international community and recognition was granted 
                                                 
1709 See supra ch. 4.2.2.1. 
1710 Final Act of Helsinki (1975), Chapter II, para 1.  
1711 See supra ch. 4.2.3. 
1712 See supra notes 549–552. 
1713 See supra ch. 3.2.2., 3.3.2. and 3.3.3. 
1714 See supra ch. 3.3.3.3. 
1715 See the Minsk Agreement (1991) & the Alma Ata Protocol (1991). See also Kotkin (2001), pp. 
96–108.  
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without examining the (non*)democratic practices of the governments of the 
emerging new states.1716 
 In the situation of the SFRY, the EC’s involvement became crucial for the 
determination that the federation was in the process of dissolution and thus also for 
the determination of the mode of new state creations.1717 Indeed, it was the authority 
of the Badinter Commission which rejected the view that attempts at unilateral 
secession were at issue.1718 Further, the Badinter Commission also discussed 
recognition of the former Yugoslav republics and application of the EC Guidelines. 
 Significantly, the implementation of liberal*democratic institutions was 
thoroughly discussed only in the Badinter Commission’s opinion on Slovenia,1719 
while this issue was virtually ignored in the opinions on other republics. Importantly, 
Slovenia at that time met the statehood criteria and, since the Badinter Commission 
(by establishing that the SFRY no longer existed) removed the legal significance of 
Yugoslavia’s claim to territorial integrity, there was no legal ground to maintain that 
Slovenia was not a state.1720  
The situations in Croatia and in Bosnia*Herzegovina were different as these 
two entities clearly did not meet the traditional statehood criteria.1721 Yet the question 
of effective control over the territory was not discussed by the Badinter 
Commission.1722 In the opinion on Croatia, the Badinter Commission thoroughly 
discussed rights of the Serb minority and established that they were not sufficiently 
guaranteed. Despite this reservation, recognition was universally granted.1723  
                                                 
1716 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1717 See supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3. 
1718 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 1 (29 November 1991), para 3. 
1719 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 7 (11 January 1992). 
1720 See supra ch. 4.3.1. and 4.3.2. 
1721 See supra ch. 4.3.3. and 4.3.4. 
1722 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 5 (11 January 1992), especially para 3.  
1723 See supra ch. 4.3.3. 
 322 
In its opinion on Bosnia*Herzegovina, the Badinter Commission held that a 
new state cannot be established without the express consent of its peoples.1724 
Consequently, a referendum on independence was held, but was boycotted by ethnic 
Serbs.1725 The Badinter Commission did not specify whether one of the three 
constitutive peoples of Bosnia*Herzegovina could be outvoted by the other two 
peoples; however, the international community was obviously ready to accept this 
view and extended recognition.1726 Both the Badinter Commission and the ICJ held 
that Bosnia*Herzegovina became a state on the day of proclamation of the 
referendum results.1727 
The EC Guidelines were not entirely followed in the dissolution of the SFRY. 
This observation refers to both the requirements expressed in the EC Guidelines that 
refer to the statehood criteria (traditional and additional) and to the requirements that 
stretch beyond the scope of these criteria.1728 Sometimes the EC Guidelines were 
ignored by the Badinter Commission1729 and sometimes by the recognising states 
(even when the Badinter Commission pointed out some deficiencies).1730 
The doubtful quality of democratic practices, human rights abuses and 
involvement in armed conflicts did not prevent some of the newly*emerged states in 
the territories of the SFRY and of the Soviet Union from acquiring an international 
personality. Further, it was shown in this thesis that Macedonia and the FRY were 
considered states although they, for a period of time, largely remained unrecognised 
                                                 
1724 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 4 (11 January 1992), para 4.  
1725 See supra ch. 4.3.4. and 5.4.3.3. 
1726 See supra ch. 4.3.4. 
1727 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 6 & The Bosnia Genocide case, ICJ 
Rep 1996, para 23. 
1728 See supra ch. 4.2. 
1729 The EC Guidelines made a reference to the traditional statehood criteria, which were, however, 
not discussed by the Badinter Commission. See supra ch. 4.3. 
1730 See supra ch. 4.3.3. 
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and were not members of the UN.1731 Significantly, nothing implies that the 
undemocratic nature of the Milošević regime, gross human rights violations and 
involvement in armed conflicts in Croatia and in Bosnia*Herzegovina resulted in the 
FRY’s lack of statehood.1732  
The EC Guidelines therefore clearly did not have the status or effect of 
statehood criteria.1733 Their scope reaching beyond the traditional and additional 
statehood criteria could be understood as part of the recognition policy of EC 
member (and also some non*member) states.1734 At the same time, broader EC 
involvement into the non*consensual dissolution of the SFRY showed a pattern of 
producing a legal fact of an emergence of new states. Recognition that later followed 
was expressly declaratory, while international involvement as a whole had 
constitutive effects.1735 International involvement in the creation of new states also 
reflected an attempt to create liberal*democratic institutions in these states; the 
democracy requirements for recognition were, however, not applied strictly. 
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Even in subsequent post*1991 state creations, modes of state creation were not 
unitary and where initial consent of the parent state was not achieved, international 
involvement focused on securing such consent. While the consensual dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia1736 and the consensual secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia (in specific 
political circumstances after a lengthy armed conflict)1737 were mere facts that had to 
                                                 
1731 See supra ch. 4.3.5. and 4.3.6. 
1732 See supra ch. 4.3.6. 
1733 See supra ch. 4.3. See also the Badinter Commission, Opinion 11 (16 July 1993), para 7, holding 
that the FRY became a state on 27 April 1992, i.e. the day it adopted its constitution.  
1734 See supra ch. 4.2.2. and 4.3. 
1735 Compare Caplan (2005), pp. 61–62. 
1736 See Stein (1997); Crawford (2006), p. 402. 
1737 See Haile (1994); Crawford (2006), p. 402. 
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be acknowledged by the international community, the state creations of East Timor, 
Montenegro and Kosovo attracted significant international involvement. 
International involvement in the territorial statuses of East Timor and Kosovo 
was channelled through the UN Security Council. In both situations human rights 
abuses led to the establishment of international territorial administration and loss of 
effective control of the respective parent states over the territories of East Timor and 
Kosovo.1738 Such arrangements were put in place by the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1739 
 In both East Timor and Kosovo, the international territorial administration, 
whose actions are attributable to the UN,1740 implemented liberal*democratic 
institutions and sponsored multiparty elections.1741 The UN, as a universal 
organisation, thus formally enacted a political system which is not universally 
perceived as the only legitimate political system.1742  
After the declaration of independence, Kosovo adopted a constitution in 
which it unilaterally bound itself to the provisions of the ECHR as interpreted by the 
ECtHR.1743 Given the Court’s interpretation of the so*called democratic rights,1744 
Kosovo legally bound itself to organise its political system along liberal*democratic 
lines. On the other hand, in the example of East Timor, the European image of 
(procedural) democracy was applied (by the UN) outside of Europe and to a society 
which does not perceive itself as a part of the European public order.1745  
 The legal arrangements for international territorial administration established 
in East Timor and in Kosovo influenced the question of sovereignty over these two 
                                                 
1738 See supra ch. 4.5.1. and 7.3. 
1739 See SC Res 1244 (Kosovo); SC Res 1272 (East Timor).  
1740 See Bothe and Marauhn (2002), p. 228. 
1741See supra ch. 4.5.1. and 7.3. 
1742 Compare supra ch. 2.3. 
1743 See The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 22.  
1744 See supra ch. 2.3.3. 
1745 See Foley (2008), p. 141. 
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territories.1746 In East Timor, international involvement led to Indonesia’s consent to 
holding a referendum on independence, which was conducted under UN auspices.1747 
East Timor’s path to independence was ultimately affirmed by a subsequent Security 
Council resolution which was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1748  
 In Kosovo, international involvement did not lead to Serbia’s consent to 
independence and no Security Council resolution was passed which would affirm 
Kosovo’s path to independence (against the wishes of its parent state). However, it is 
significant that independence was proposed by the Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary*General, Martti Ahtisaari.1749 The Ahtisaari Plan, inter alia, suggested that 
lack of statehood hindered Kosovo’s democratic development. Since democratic 
institutions had already been established by international territorial administration, 
Special Envoy Ahtisaari thus implied that Kosovo’s democracy could not be 
consolidated in the absence of statehood.1750  
 This, however, does not mean that democratisation can play a role in the legal 
argument regarding creation of a new state. In the example of Kosovo, such a view 
was not affirmed by the Security Council. Kosovo’s democratic development was 
nevertheless considered by some states which have extended recognition,1751 yet this 
was part of political (not legal) deliberations of some states when considering the 
legitimacy of this particular attempt at unilateral secession.1752  
In the absence of Serbia’s consent, from the legal point of view, Kosovo’s 
secession was unilateral.1753 As identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Québec case, success of a unilateral secession ultimately depends on recognitions, 
                                                 
1746 See Wilde (2001), p. 605.   
1747 See supra ch. 5.4.3.8. 
1748 See SC Res 1338 (31 January 2001). 
1749 See supra n. 1526. 
1750 The Ahtisaari Plan, para 7. 
1751 See supra ch. 7.6.3. 
1752 Compare the Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1753 See supra ch. 7.6.2. 
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while the recognising states take legality and legitimacy criteria into consideration 
when they decide whether to grant recognition.1754 Thus, when unilateral secession is 
in question, recognition by definition has constitutive effects. The democratic 
legitimacy of secession in such circumstances might be accommodated within the 
category of ‘legitimacy considerations’ before recognition is granted. However, it 
would be an exaggeration to conclude that democratic legitimacy of a new state 
creation has become a statehood criterion.  
 The creation of the state of Montenegro saw significant involvement of the 
EU. The EU sponsored the transformation of the FRY to a transitional state 
formation, the SUSM, the constitution of which explicitly allowed for secession, 
foresaw holding of a referendum and even solved the problem of state succession and 
continuity of international personality in advance.1755 Yet the referendum rules at that 
time remained undefined by the constitution. 
Prior to the referendum, the EU also imposed the referendum rules,1756 which 
were designed to provide for the democratic legitimacy of the decision*making. The 
fifty*five percent threshold obviously sought to avoid decision*making with a very 
narrow majority and gave reasonable hope to both sides for winning the 
referendum.1757 A liberal*democratic political system was not imposed, as 
institutions of procedural democracy had already been implemented in 
Montenegro.1758  
A pattern that can be identified within some of the post*1991 state creations is 
significant international involvement that begins prior to the declaration of 
independence. In this process consent of a parent state is sought and the development 
                                                 
1754 The Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1755 The Constitution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003), Article 60. 
1756 See International Crisis Group Briefing No 42 (30 May 2006), p. 6.  
1757 See supra ch. 5.4.3.6. 
1758 See supra n. 868. 
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of democratic institutions initiated. Even in the case of Kosovo, where no consent of 
the parent state was achieved, there exists significant evidence that Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence was approved by part of the international community 
and that recognition was promised in advance.1759 Thus, in the case of Kosovo 
recognition had constitutive effects and it is one example where it is difficult to 
differentiate collective recognition from collective state creation.1760  
The practice of post*1991 state creations has thus witnessed some examples 
where new states were effectively created by international involvement. The 
international community notably tried to prevent attempts at unilateral secession and 
rather sought to produce a fact that a new state (or more new states) had emerged. 
This was done either by negotiating approval of the parent state or by providing an 
authority for the interpretation that the parent state no longer existed. In both 
circumstances, the parent states’ claim to territorial integrity is removed and 
emergence of a new state becomes merely a matter of fact.1761 In the example of 
Kosovo, however, it is possible to argue that statehood was constituted by collective 
recognition by a number of states. 
In these processes of post*1991 state creations, where the mode of state 
creation attracted international involvement beyond merely a granting of recognition, 
an attempt was made to impose democratic standards. These standards stretched 
beyond the operation of democratic principles within the right of self*determination, 
such as monitoring referenda on independence and confirming their results. Indeed, 
                                                 
1759 See supra n. 1534. 
1760 Compare supra ch. 3.3.2. 
1761 See supra ch. 2.2. and 2.3. (the dissolution of the SFRY), ch. 2.5.1. (East Timor) and ch. 2.5.2. 
(Montenegro).  
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in East Timor and Kosovo, the international territorial administration established 
democratic institutions and thus carried out the process of democratic transition.1762  

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The principle of self*determination and modern democratic political theory have 
common origins in the ideals of the American and French revolutions.1763 The 
underlying principle of both is that a government must be representative of its 
people.1764 However, it is questionable whether the qualification of a representative 
government for the purpose of self*determination as a human right can be perceived 
as identical to the qualification of a representative government within democratic 
political theory.  
 In the UN Charter era, self*determination is codified as a human right.1765 
The drafting history of this specific right and of the ICCPR and of the ICESCR in 
general show that self*determination as a human right is not to be understood through 
the prism of the liberal*democratic political system. Indeed, “it was the former 
Eastern Bloc nations that played the most significant role in developing and 
promoting self*determination following World War II, usually in the face of great 
reluctance from Western democracies.”1766 Further, it can be assumed that Socialist 
states would not have ratified the Covenants if they meant to bind the state parties to 
a liberal*democratic political system.1767 
                                                 
1762 See supra ch. 4.5.1. and 7.3. 
1763 Cassese (1995), p. 11. 
1764 Ibid. 
1765 ICCPR & ICESCR, Article 1. 
1766 R Miller (2003), p. 612.  
1767 See Roth (1999), p. 332.  
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 The right of self*determination, importantly, only applies to peoples.1768 The 
qualification of a representative government can therefore only be defined in regard 
to identities which define a separate people. This does not include identities based on 
political opinion and/or identities stemming from party politics.1769 Thus, it cannot be 
said that a government which is not a result of multiparty elections prima facie 
violates the right of self*determination. The exclusion of Kosovo Albanians from 
political life in the FRY under the Milošević regime resulted in a breach of the right 
of self*determination of Kosovo Albanians.1770 Yet the non*democratic nature of the 
Milošević regime did not breach the right of self*determination of Serbs and 
Montenegrins within the FRY.1771 The qualification of a representative government 
for the purpose of the right of self*determination is therefore significantly narrower 
than its qualification for the purpose of democratic political theory.   
 Further constraints on self*determination in the UN Charter era stem from its 
codification as a human right and not as an absolute principle: 
[T]he right of self*determination is not an absolute right without any limitations. Its purpose is not 
directly to protect the personal or physical integrity of individuals or groups as is the purpose of the 
absolute rights and, unlike the absolute rights, the exercise of this right can involve major structural 
and institutional changes to a State and must affect, often significantly, most groups and individuals in 
that State and beyond that State. Therefore, the nature of the right does require some limitations to be 
implied on its exercise.1772 
The right of self*determination thus needs to be weighed against other human rights 
and against the principle of territorial integrity of states.1773 


                                                 
1768 ICCPR & ICESCR, Article 1, paras 1 & 2.  
1769 See supra ch. 5.3.3.1. 
1770 See supra ch. 7.2. 
1771 See supra n. 1771. 
1772 McCorquodale (1994), p. 876.  
1773 See the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970), annex, principle 5, para 7. 
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As a consequence of limitations on the right of self*determination, secession is not an 
entitlement under international law and in the UN Charter era, the right of self*
determination will normally be consummated in its internal mode.1774 The success of 
a unilateral secession will depend on international recognition and, when states 
consider granting recognition, even democratic legitimacy of secession may play 
some role.1775  
The only post*1991 example of unilateral secession that has attracted a 
significant number of international recognitions is Kosovo.1776 Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence in 1991 was ignored by the international community.1777 Further, in 
1999, independence was not proclaimed but rather an arrangement for international 
territorial administration was established.1778 In other words, Serbia’s and the FRY’s 
abuses of sovereign powers did not directly lead to the creation of a new state. For 
this reason Kosovo’s secession in 2008 cannot be deemed to support the ‘remedial 
secession doctrine’, which stems from an inverted reading of the elaboration of the 
principle of territorial integrity in the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law1779 but acutely lacks state practice.  
Other post*1991 state creations, either resulting from dissolution or secession, 
had a significant consensual element. Sometimes consent was the outcome of a rather 
complicated political situation in a parent state (e.g. the dissolution of the Soviet 
                                                 
1774 See the Québec case (1998), para 126. 
1775 Ibid., para 155. 
1776 See supra n. 1549. 
1777 See Vickers (1998), p. 251. See also Crawford (2006), p. 408. 
1778 See SC Res 1244.  
1779 See the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970), annex, principle 5, para 7. 
Arguments have been made that the elaboration of the principle of territorial integrity allows for an 
interpretation that a state, which has a government non*representative of all of its peoples, might not 
be entitled to limit the exercise of the right of self*determination of its oppressed peoples to the 
internal mode of this right. For more see supra ch. 5.3.3.1.2. and 5.4.    
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Union and the secession of Eritrea). In some other examples consent was achieved 
by international involvement.  
 There is a caveat that a consensual state creation does not override the norms 
of international law. As the examples of the South African “Homelands” have 
shown, even in the absence of a claim to territorial integrity, a state cannot be created 
in violation of the right of self*determination and/or in pursuance of racist 
policies.1780 The example of the South African “Homelands” proves that even when a 
state creation is consensual, it must not be illegal. Yet although human rights law has 
an effect on the law of statehood, this cannot be extended to mean that there is a 
prescribed threshold of human rights protection or even a prescribed political system 
which influences the question of whether an effective entity would become a state. It 
might be possible to argue that the only human rights standards that determine the 
illegality of a state creation are those of jus cogens character.1781 
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Before the legal status of a territory is altered, the operation of the right of self*
determination requires a consultation of the people inhabiting it. Such a requirement 
was expressed by the ICJ in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion1782 and later 
affirmed by the Badinter Commission in its opinion on Bosnia*Herzegovina.1783 It 
remains questionable how the consent of the people is to be expressed and what the 
limits are of its application.  
In the circumstances of an attempt to change the legal status of a territory, a 
referendum is the most common expression of the will of the people. While a 
referendum does not seem to be the only acceptable means of such an expression, it 
                                                 
1780 See supra ch. 3.3.3.4. 
1781 See supra ch. 3.3.3.4. 
1782 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, para 55. 
1783 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 4 (11 January 1992), para 4. 
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is not entirely clear under what circumstances a referendum may be considered 
unnecessary. In this regard two observations can be made. First, a referendum may 
not be required when the will of the people is obvious. This was implied even by the 
ICJ in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion.1784 Further, in the absence of a 
referendum in Kosovo, there have been no doubts expressed regarding the will of 
Kosovo Albanians.1785 Second, it cannot be argued that general electoral results 
imply a decision regarding the legal status of a territory or that the right of self*
determination can be exercised through general elections alone. In other words, an 
overwhelming vote for a political party advocating secession does not necessarily 
imply a support for secession. Indeed, the voting behaviour of people depends on a 
variety of issues, not only those concerning the exercise of the right of self*
determination.1786  
 When referenda on the change of the legal status of a territory are held, the 
democratically*expressed will of a people in favour of the founding of a new state 
will not necessarily create a new state. Indeed, observance of the principle of 
territorial integrity will normally prevail over the will of a people.1787 Nevertheless, 
the democratically*expressed will of a people in favour of secession cannot be 
ignored.1788 This means that such a will of the people would put an obligation on 
both the independence*seeking entity and on the parent state to negotiate a future 
constitutional arrangement of the entity in question. Significantly, such negotiations 
do not begin on the premise that the entity in question would necessarily become an 
independent state.1789 
                                                 
1784 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, para 59. 
1785 See supra n. 1525. 
1786 See McCroquodale (1996), pp. 309–10. 
1787 See the Québec case (1998), paras 112 & 126. 
1788 The Québec case (1998), para 87. 
1789 Ibid., para 91. See also Dumberry (2006), p. 429. 
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 The example of Québec set the standard that both the referendum question 
and the deciding majority need to be clear.1790 It is difficult to prescribe a universally 
applicable standard of clarity. Some referenda questions in situations of post*1991 
state creations might have seemed unclear;1791 however, more direct wordings were 
probably prevented by complicated political situations (in some cases even by an 
emerging armed conflict). Further, even in such circumstances there existed no doubt 
among the people that they were consulted on independence.  
In regard to the clear majority, it can be argued that in each situation, 
differently qualified majorities may be considered legitimate. In most post*1991 state 
creations, a majority of all valid votes cast was prescribed, while the majority of all 
eligible to vote was commonly achieved.1792 At the same time, the case of 
Montenegro shows that in a complicated internal socio*political situation, a situation*
specific majority may be prescribed in order to achieve legitimacy of the decision*
making.1793 
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In the process of international involvement in the dissolution of the SFRY, the 
Badinter Commission interpreted the decision of the Chamber of the ICJ in the 
Burkina Faso/Mali case as an authority supporting the applicability of the uti 
possidetis principle outside of colonial situations.1794 Such an interpretation was 
criticised on two grounds. First, it was argued that the uti possidetis principle is 
inherently associated with the process of decolonisation and therefore not applicable 
                                                 
1790 The Québec case (1998), para 87. See also The Clarity Act (2000), Articles 1 and 2. 
1791 See supra ch. 5.4.3.2., 5.4.3.3. and 5.4.3.4. 
1792 The majority of all eligible to vote was unequivocally demanded only in Slovenia (see supra ch. 
4.3.1.) At the same time, of all successful post*1991 state*creations where independence referenda 
were held, a majority of all eligible to vote was not achieved only in Montenegro (see supra ch. 
4.3.8.). 
1793 See supra ch. 5.4.3.6. 
1794 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 January 1992).  
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in non*colonial situations.1795 Second, the “upgrading” of the former Yugoslav 
internal boundaries to international borders, arguably, disregarded people’s ethnic 
identities, limited the will of the people and has been deemed to be a wrong approach 
in a situation of dissolution.1796 
 In the Badinter Commission’s view, the Chamber of the ICJ in the Burkina 
Faso/Mali case established that uti possidetis is a generally applicable principle of 
international law, i.e. a principle not confined to decolonisation.1797 Yet a full reading 
of the relevant paragraph of the Burkina Faso/Mali case shows that the Chamber of 
the ICJ held that uti possidetis was a general principle of international law where 
decolonisation is concerned.1798 In the particular case this meant a principle not 
limited to decolonisation in Latin America but also applicable to decolonisation in 
Africa.1799 Thus, it may well be that the Badinter Commission selectively quoted the 
Burkina Faso/Mali case in order to prove the applicability of the uti possidetis 
principle in non*colonial situations.  
In relation to the criticism that the uti possidetis principle implies drawing 
international borders along lines which, at the same time, disregard people’s existing 
identities and create new ones,1800 it is questionable whether those new state 
creations, which are not a consequence of decolonisation, imply such a border*
drawing, especially when new international borders in Europe, i.e. borders of strong 
historical pedigree, are in question. In the practice of all post*1991 state creations so 
far, international borders were confined along former internal boundaries.1801 The 
international borders of Eritrea and East Timor otherwise have colonial origins but 
                                                 
1795 See Radan (2000), pp. 60–62. 
1796 See Radan (2002), pp. 234–43 
1797 The Badinter Commission, Opinion 3 (11 January 1992). 
1798 Burkina Faso/ Mali, ICJ Rep 1986, para 20. 
1799 Ibid. 
1800 See supra notes 1260 and 1427. 
1801 See supra ch. 6.4. 
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these state creations were not consequences of decolonisation. Therefore uti 
possidetis was not applied in these two situations.1802 In other new post*1991 state 
creations, former internal boundaries which became international borders commonly 
had a historical pedigree of more than arbitrarily*drawn internal administrative 
boundaries. Indeed, the internal boundaries frequently adopted the lines of former 
international borders or internal borders within empires which delimited territories 
settled by distinct peoples.1803 In other words, a common pattern of post*1991 new 
state creations is that international borders were confined along not just any former 
internal boundary but along those boundaries which delimited historically*
established self*determination units. The SFRY was not an exception to this pattern 
but the situation was more complex due to its non*consensual dissolution and 
ethnically*mixed populations in Croatia and in Bosnia*Herzegovina.1804 
 International law does not support an automatic “upgrade” of an internal 
boundary to an international border outside of the process of decolonisation. Indeed, 
the exact definition of borders may become part of the negotiation process for the 
determination of the future legal status of a territory and an entity’s possible path to 
independence.1805 Where internal boundaries have a strong historical pedigree of 
delimiting self*determination units, practice has shown that these boundaries would 
form a strong base for the determination of the new international borders. On the 
other hand, where internal boundaries were subject to relatively recent arbitrary 
changes, an argument in favour of “upgrading” of an internal boundary to an 
international border will be weaker, though not irrelevant.1806  
                                                 
1802 See supra ch. 6.4.2. and 6.4.6. 
1803 See supra ch. 6.5. 
1804 See supra ch. 6.4.8. 
1805 See supra ch. 6.4.1. 
1806 See supra ch. 6.4.1. and 6.4.4. 
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 The different pedigree of internal boundaries and the fact that there is no 
presumption that international borders are not automatically confined along the lines 
of internal boundaries in non*colonial situations thus show that it is probably 
incorrect to equate this process with the uti possidetis principle. However, the non*
colonial determination of the new international border, just like uti possidetis, also 
limits the will of the people and cannot accommodate the wishes of all peoples and 
minority groups inhabiting the territory in question. 
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When new states are created, rights of minorities and numerically inferior or 
otherwise non*dominant peoples within an entity wishing to become a state are an 
important consideration. This was expressly affirmed in the Québec case.1807 Further, 
protection of minorities and numerically inferior or otherwise non*dominant peoples 
were dealt with in situations of both consensual and non*consensual post*1991 state 
creations.1808 
At the same time, the newly*created minorities and numerically inferior 
peoples do not have a right to veto the secession or claim their own ‘right to 
secession’.1809 Nevertheless, the numerically inferior or otherwise non*dominant 
peoples are not precluded from secession from the newly*created state. Even in such 
circumstances, international law remains neutral on the question of secession and, 
ultimately, secession may or may not follow. The status of peoples within newly*
created states does not differ from the status of peoples in any other state.1810 
                                                 
1807 The Québec case (1998), especially paras 74 & 76. 
1808 See supra ch. 4.2.3. 4.4 and 4.5 
1809 See supra ch. 6.4.1. 
1810 See supra ch. 6.5. 
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 When new states are established non*consensually, the situation is more 
difficult. The question is not only who then decides on a new state creation but also 
who decides on the new international delimitation. When a unilateral secession is in 
question, the reasoning in the Québec case implies that when states decide on 
granting recognition, the recognition of a new international border along the lines of 
the internal boundary is part of the legality and legitimacy considerations taken into 
account prior to the granting of recognition.1811 The recognising states recognised the 
internal boundary between Kosovo and Serbia, which otherwise has a strong 
historical pedigree, as the new international border.1812 When a non*consensual 
dissolution was in question in the SFRY, the determination of international borders 
was also left to international involvement, and internal boundaries (which had a 
strong historical pedigree of delimiting self*determination units)1813 were upgraded to 
international borders (though the Badinter Commission probably incorrectly invoked 
the uti possidetis principle).1814 
 Further, when internal boundaries are “upgraded” to international borders, the 
constitutional order of the disintegrating states would seem to be determinative for 
both the state creation and the determination of its borders. In the case of the SFRY, 
the EC only invited republics to choose independence, although it could be argued 
that the right of self*determination was also applicable in some other subunits which 
were also delimited by internal boundaries of historical pedigree.1815 Very notably, 
Kosovo is a self*determination unit, although it only had a constitutional status of an 
                                                 
1811 The Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1812 See supra ch. 7.2. For more on the historic origins of the borders of Kosovo see maps in Malcolm 
(1998), pp. xvii–xxv. 
1813 See supra ch. 6.4.8. 
1814 See supra ch. 4.3.1. 
1815 See supra ch. 4.2.1. and 4.3.1. 
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autonomous province and not of a republic within the SFRY.1816 In the example of 
the consensual dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was also only republics that 
became states.1817 Thus, in post*1991 dissolutions, the possibility of a new state 
creation has been overtly dependent on the constitutional order of the parent state. 
This puts peoples within federal states in a better position and discourages parent 
states from establishing clearly*delimited (federal) self*determination units as this 
could be (mis)used as a step toward independence.1818  

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It cannot be concluded that in the post*Cold War era international law demands 
democracy as a continuous requirement for statehood or that adoption of liberal*
democratic institutions has become a statehood criterion. At the same time it is not 
enough to say that the post*1991 practice of new state creations only shows that 
some states require democratic legitimacy of governments before recognition to new 
states is granted.   
Democratic principles most notably operate in international law through the 
right of self*determination. International law requires that prior to a change of the 
legal status of a territory, such a decision must be supported by the will of the people, 
expressed freely and on equal footing.1819 However, the will of the people in such 
circumstances will only exceptionally result in the creation of a new state. Further, 
when new states are created, the new border arrangement will often be unable to 
accommodate the will of all peoples populating the newly*created state. The 
                                                 
1816 In this context it is argued that if Kosovo had acquired the status of a republic in the SFRY, it 
would have become an independent state in 1992. Caplan (2005), p. 70.   
1817 See supra ch. 4.4.1. 
1818 The Québec Report, Chapter 2.49. 
1819 See supra ch. 5.4. 
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numerically inferior or otherwise non*dominant peoples will then need to seek 
realisation of the right of self*determination in its internal mode. 
 Apart from the operation of democratic principles in international law 
governing the creation and recognition of states, there is some evidence that even 
democracy as a political system has been a consideration in the post*1991 practice of 
state creations. However, when the emergence of a new state is only a matter of fact 
(i.e. a result of a negotiated secession or a negotiated dissolution) and thus there is 
little place left for international involvement, even in the post*1991 practice, new 
states emerged and their statehood was not disputed even where practices of their 
governments did not adhere to liberal*democratic procedural standards. The fact that 
entities in the territories of the SFRY and the Soviet Union, which did not meet the 
democratic government requirement expressed in the EC Guidelines, were 
considered states (albeit in some circumstances non*recognised ones) proves that 
such a requirement did not have effects on statehood criteria.1820   
 Where new state creations are subject to greater international involvement, 
there is a clear tendency that one aspect of the international involvement will also be 
an attempt to create liberal*democratic institutions and thus impose a particular 
political system. In the examples of East Timor and Kosovo, this was done by 
international territorial administration, whose actions are attributable to the UN.1821 
Further, in the example of Kosovo, democratic development (i.e. democratic 
consolidation) was advanced to legitimise the creation of a new state. Such an 
interpretation was not universally accepted (e.g. it was not endorsed by a Security 
Council resolution) but has been accepted as plausible by the recognising states.  
                                                 
1820 See supra ch. 4.3. and 4.4.1. 
1821 See supra n. 1629. 
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 There is room for bringing democratic legitimacy to the process of state 
creation in situations of unilateral secessions. In such circumstances the success of a 
state creation would depend on international recognition.1822 There is some evidence 
that part of the international community might find the democratic legitimacy of an 
attempted new state creation a relevant criterion when granting recognition and thus, 
in the circumstances of unilateral secession, effectively constituting a state. However, 
democratic legitimacy will still be weighed against the principles of international law 
(including the principle of territorial integrity of states) and the success of a unilateral 
secession, even if coupled with an attempt at democratisation, remains very 
unlikely.1823  
In new state creations democracy considerations apply on two grounds: First, 
through the operation of democratic principles within the right of self*determination. 
This operation should not be understood too broadly. The applicability of the right of 
self*determination does not require the political system of liberal*democracy. 
Further, the will of the people within the right of self*determination is subject to 
considerable limitations. Second, in the practice of (informal) collective state 
creations in the post*1991 period, democratic institutions have been created along 
with the creation of new states. Not even this practice of states and UN organs should 
be understood too broadly. When the emergence of a new state is merely a fact that 
only needs to be acknowledged by international recognition, even in the post*1991 
practice, there will be no enquiry into the democratic quality of the government of a 
new state. Indeed, the existence of liberal*democratic institutions is not a statehood 
criterion. However, in the post*1991 practice, when new states are (informally) 
collectively created, attempts have been made to create states with liberal*democratic 
                                                 
1822 See the Québec case (1998), para 155. 
1823 See supra ch. 5.4. 
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institutions of government. This practice has significant universal support and is 
perhaps a limited reflection of the view that in the post*Cold War era liberal*
democracy is considered the preferred method of government. 
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